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Foreword I: Perspective from Saint Lucia
In his valedictory address, my son recently quoted a passage from a Dr. Seuss book
that I often read to him and his brother at bedtime: “You have brains in your head.
You have feet in your shoes. You can steer yourself any direction you choose”.
Words cannot describe how proud I am of both of my courageous young boys and
their well-earned accomplishments and expectations of the bright future ahead. And
yet, I am concerned that this future may not unfold on the small Caribbean island
that my family calls home. I fear that the feet in those shoes will soon be submerged
by rising seas and the direction in which they will be able to steer themselves will
grow more and more limited, as our small island economy continues to be battered
by the effects of climate change. For those of us from small island developing states
climate change threatens our very survival, as sea levels rise, storm surges become
ever more devastating, hurricanes become increasingly severe, the ocean acidiﬁes,
and rising temperatures lead to aridity and dwindling freshwater resources.
This is why representatives from Small Island Developing States (SIDS) fought
so hard for the 1.5 °C global temperature limit in the Paris Agreement. For us, it is a
matter of survival. While I remain optimistic that concerted global action will
achieve the ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to limit tem-
perature rise to 1.5 °C, in the interim, the particularly vulnerable, including our
small island populations, will experience impacts from climate change to which it
will be impossible to adapt. The recognition that climate change will cause loss and
damage that is “beyond adaptation” has been acknowledged by the IPCC as “limits
to adaptation” and has further led to the establishment of a dedicated mechanism
under the UNFCCC—the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM)—to address
loss and damage associated with climate change impacts. It has further resulted in
the treatment of loss and damage in a stand-alone article in the Paris Agreement
(Article 8). But recognition must be followed by action. SIDS and other vulnerable
countries must be supported, as they bear the brunt of coping with unavoidable loss
and damage associated with changes to the climate that are attributable to others.
This is no easy task and the world needs to maintain the Paris momentum of 2015
for this global ﬁght.
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The scientiﬁc community is called upon to support policy-makers to ensure that
we handle the challenge in the most effective and well-informed manner. This book
provides a valuable contribution to this effort. For the ﬁrst time, the current sci-
entiﬁc research and resulting knowledge on loss and damage has been collected in
one comprehensive volume, allowing us to take stock of what we know and don’t
know, especially in areas of critical importance to SIDS, including implementing
comprehensive climate risk management approaches; addressing slow onset events;
ﬁnancing efforts to address loss and damage; and understanding what institutional
and legal arrangements are required to ensure the most effective responses. Of
particular importance to the sustainable future of small islands are the impacts from
slow onset events—including sea level rise, permanent rises in temperature and
ocean acidiﬁcation. Understanding the nature of these events and their impacts will
require dedicated attention, because they are already beginning to affect countries
and are certain to continue. Slow impact events severely limit the applicability of
traditional risk management approaches and require novel solutions. It is my hope
that this book will lay a foundation for further research in this area and foster
enhanced understanding and closer cooperation between the scientiﬁc community
and policy-makers on this and other critical matters. This is essential as we move
forward in our work with the aim of addressing loss and damage. There is much to
be gained in terms of facilitating effective decision-making that is grounded in
science and far too much to be lost if we continue to tarry or get it wrong on this
exigent issue of loss and damage.
Dawn Pierre-Nathoniel
Deputy Chief, Sustainable
Development and Environment Ofﬁcer
Department of Sustainable Development
Saint Lucia
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Foreword II: Perspective of Germany
Climate change can manifest itself in many ways, often with the most dramatic
consequences for the poor and vulnerable. While our generation still has the means
to avert catastrophic outcomes by drastically cutting carbon emissions, some con-
sequences are already felt today, with a profound effect to already pressing social,
environmental and economic issues. “Every year a thousand people die here from
cholera that is spread by flooding, and during the rainy season, many people are
forced from their homes”, Daviz Simango, Mayor of Beira, Mozambique, explains.
The global community increasingly acknowledges climate risks and puts ever more
effort into ﬁnding innovative ways to cope with them on the ground. Equally,
development efforts need to build resilience against climate-related shocks and
stressors. The Paris Agreement provides a solid basis and reminds rich countries
of their responsibility. This is why Germany via the German Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) promotes comprehensive climate
risk management, including mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, risk
reduction measures as well as risk ﬁnance instruments.
For example, the BMZ supported the expansion of a renewables ﬁrm to East
Africa, starting to install solar-based off-grid systems in Uganda. In the meantime,
the company also offers trainings for young people to become electrical engineers.
In addition, we invest in storage facilities to help coffee planters in Rwanda who are
struggling with harvests due to increasing weather extremes. Along with the quality
of harvests, the efforts safeguard their livelihoods and progress to sustainable
development. We offer vocational training to households in Bangladesh whose
entire arable land was destroyed due to riverbank erosion, forcing them to seek
shelter in the bigger city nearby. Along with enhancing water, sanitation and energy
infrastructure in cooperation with local residents, the programme helps migrants,
small businesses and the urban commerce alike. Finally, we fund the InsuResilience
Investment Fund (IIF), which invests in partner countries’ insurance providers, such
as the microﬁnance institution Caja Sullana in Peru. Supported by the IIF, Caja
Sullana offers insurance against flood and drought to small farmers and businesses,
triggering payouts of over USD 630,000 to almost 500 farmers and businesses to
rebuild their destroyed assets.
vii
These are examples for the many ways to counter the damage inflicted by
climate change. However, not all adverse effects of climate change can be dealt with
by reducing vulnerability, increasing resilience or providing pre-agreed ﬁnance.
Other impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, can also lead to
non-economic losses when e.g. cultural sites get inundated. In situations where
community members face slow-onset events, they often have to consider making
decisive changes regarding e.g. their residency and livelihoods. We want to
improve the understanding around the role of climate risks on human mobility
patterns: how can partner countries be best assisted in facilitating seasonal or
temporary migration and, as a last resort, planned relocation processes; how to
ensure implementation in a participative manner and in close coordination with the
hosting communities? Because of the multi-faceted impacts of climate change on
humankind, we acknowledge the importance of dealing with climate change and its
impact on human lives and livelihoods and support our partner countries bilaterally
and through our collaboration with international organizations. We have a
long-standing engagement with the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) since
its inception at the COP 19 in Warsaw and support its catalytic role to reach a
common understanding of the most pressing issues and existing and emerging
approaches to deal with them. The WIM is a good example of how solutions can be
achieved together, through the cooperation of states, academia, civil society and the
private sector.
We have already translated our willingness to act into many projects and pro-
grammes and continue to do so, also by supporting partner countries in tackling
climate risks with tailor-made solutions (see box on a Climate Risk Management
Framework in the chapter by Schinko et al. 2018, page 98). But it is of paramount
importance to continuously study climate change, its known impacts and potential
threats and interlinkages to improve the answers to these challenges. Current and
future research can help us to understand the planetary boundaries and relevant
tipping points. Such insights can facilitate an informed public debate driven by
academia, civil society, private sector as well as governments. The BMZ is and will
remain a strong partner in supporting all those actors on different levels. Only by
fostering partnerships will we be able to address the challenges that lie ahead. This
book is a valuable contribution to the dialogue and fosters a common understanding
of key issues regarding Loss and Damage, thus further strengthening much-needed
exchange.
Ingrid-Gabriela Hoven
Director-General Global Issues
Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation
and Development (BMZ)
Germany
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Preface
Climate change is rapidly proceeding, and climate-related risks are being exacer-
bated. The year 2018 brought about new temperature records in regions of Africa
and Asia (with temperatures exceeding unprecedented 50 °C), the hottest European
summer in recent history with heatwaves from Algeria to the Arctic, also bringing
along forest ﬁres and drought, severe flooding in southern India and Bangladesh, as
well as massive cyclone damage in Fiji. While, largely involuntarily, people and
their assets are increasingly located in harm’s way, the IPCC has shown that the
frequency and severity of climate-related hazards is being adversely shaped by
anthropogenic climate change. Evidence is increasing that those risks have the
potential to signiﬁcantly affect lives and livelihoods across the globe, as well as
push vulnerable people, communities and countries to their physical and
socio-economic adaptation limits.
The Loss and Damage (L&D) discourse, initiated almost three decades ago by
Small Island States worried about sea level rise, has given voice to concerns for
climate change-related impacts that may be irreversible and beyond physical and
social adaptation limits. The discourse has become institutionalised in international
climate policy through the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damages adopted in
2013 and was given ﬁrm consideration in the Paris Agreement in 2015. While
expectations by policy advisors and civil society for the L&D discourse are looming
large, the science has been trailing behind. This is impeding a step-change from
debate to concrete policy deliberation and on-the-ground implementation.
This book provides science-based insight and inroads into the L&D discourse.
The volume, made up of 22 chapters by experts and two forewords by L&D
policymakers and negotiators, articulates the multiple concepts, principles and
methods as well as place-based insight relevant for L&D. It additionally identiﬁes a
number of propositions that may serve as a foundation for improved policy for-
mulation. The volume is the ﬁrst comprehensive outcome of the “Loss and Damage
Network”, a partnership effort by scientists and practitioners bringing together
members from more than twenty-ﬁve institutions around the globe.
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In addition to providing information on critical climate risks and requisite
responses to the public throughout, we are hopeful that the book may inform the
L&D discourse at a critical time with the review of the Warsaw Mechanism
underway and evidence of limits ‘beyond adaptation’ increasing. The network
stands ready to further conduct relevant research, provide capacity building as well
as support policy deliberation.
We dearly thank all authors for their valuable contributions. In particular, we
thank Florentina Simlinger for editorial support and interaction with the L&D
Network colleagues. Special thanks go to Fritz Schmuhl of Springer International
for all the support and advice during this project.
Laxenburg, Austria Reinhard Mechler
Hamburg, Germany Laurens M. Bouwer
London, UK Thomas Schinko
August 2018 Swenja Surminski
JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer
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“Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage” was established in 2013
and further supported through the Paris Agreement in 2015. Despite advances, the
debate currently is broad, diffuse and somewhat confusing, while concepts, meth-
ods and tools, as well as directions for policy remain vague and often contested.
This book, a joint effort of the Loss and Damage Network—a partnership effort by
scientists and practitioners from around the globe—provides evidence-based insight
into the L&D discourse by highlighting state-of-the-art research conducted across
multiple disciplines, by showcasing applications in practice and by providing insight
into policy contexts and salient policy options. This introductory chapter summarises
key findings of the twenty-two book chapters in terms of five propositions. These
propositions, each building on relevant findings linked to forward-looking sugges-
tions for research, policy and practice, reflect the architecture of the book, whose
sections proceed from setting the stage to critical issues, followed by a section on
methods and tools, to chapters that provide geographic perspectives, and finally to a
section that identifies potential policy options. The propositions comprise (1) Risk
management can be an effective entry point for aligning perspectives and debates,
if framed comprehensively, coupled with climate justice considerations and linked
to established risk management and adaptation practice; (2) Attribution science is
advancing rapidly and fundamental to informing actions to minimise, avert, and
address losses and damages; (3) Climate change research, in addition to identifying
physical/hard limits to adaptation, needs to more systematically examine soft limits
to adaptation, for which we find some evidence across several geographies globally;
(4) Climate risk insurance mechanisms can serve the prevention and cure aspects
emphasised in the L&D debate but solidarity and accountability aspects need further
attention, for which we find tentative indication in applications around the world; (5)
Policy deliberations may need to overcome the perception that L&D constitutes a
win-lose negotiation “game” by developing amore inclusive narrative that highlights
collective ambition for tackling risks, mutual benefits and the role of transformation.
Keywords Science · Policy · Practice · Climate justice · Limits to adaptation
Climate risk management · Transformation
1.1 Understanding and Reviewing the Evidence
for Advancing Science and Policy
The debate on Loss and Damage (L&D)1 has gained traction over the last few years.
Although the discourse started already during the establishment of theUnitedNations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the early 1990s with
a proposal by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) on compensation and
1In this chapter and in the book throughout, wewill use the plural form and lowercase letters (‘losses
and damages’) to refer broadly to (observed) impacts and (projected) risks, and the capitalized
singular form (‘Loss & Damage’) where reference is made to the policy debate.
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insurance for losses due to sea-level rise (INC1991), it took about 20 years, alongside
increasing evidence and public awareness of climate change impacts and risks as
collated prominently in reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), for it to be recognised at the institutional level. In 2007 UNFCCC’s 13th
Conference of the Parties (COP 13) in Bali first broadly considered means to address
Loss and Damage, yet only in 2012 at COP 18 in Doha did Parties for the first time
decide to consider institutional arrangements to address L&D, which in 2013 led
negotiators at COP 19 to establish the “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss
and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts” (WIM) (UNFCCC 2013). In
2015 atCOP21, the ParisAgreement established a separate article onL&Dendorsing
the Mechanism (UN 2015) (see Fig. 1.1). Since its establishment, the WIM, whose
Executive Committee has devised work programmes to inform the deliberations, has
been subject to intense debate. While some consider it a distinct building block of
negotiations under the UNFCCC alongside mitigation and adaptation, others suggest
that it is supposed to be an integral part of the negotiations under climate change
adaptation. The implications and final directions for this Mechanism, which will
undergo review in 2019, are, however, largely unclear.
The debate currently is broad, diffuse and somewhat confusing, while concepts,
methods and tools, as well as directions for policy remain vague and contested. Over
the last few years, research has been requested to provide actionable input and has
increasingly become active. Scholarship has started to provide evidence on losses
and damages in vulnerable countries (Warner and van der Geest 2013), coined and
critically examined definitions, the rationale and plural perspectives on the discourse
(Verheyen and Roderick 2008; James et al. 2015; Van der Geest and Warner 2015;
Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016; Boyd et al. 2017), employed applicable methods and
models (Gall 2015; Birkmann andWelle 2015; Schinko andMechler 2017), reviewed
roles for justice and equity considerations (Huggel et al. 2016a; Roser et al. 2015;
Wallimann-Helmer 2015), spent due attention on non-economic losses (Serdeczny
et al. 2017; Tschakert et al. 2017; Wewerinke-Singh 2018a), supported crafting of
policy and governance options (Pinninti 2013; Page andHeyward 2017;Mechler and
Schinko 2016; Crosland et al. 2016; Biermann and Boas 2017) and examined the role
of legal responses toL&D(Mace andVerheyen 2016;Mayer 2016;Wewerinke-Singh
2018b).
Many gaps remain, not the least in terms of communication across the science-
policy interface. Analysts and observers, including the authors of this book, have
argued that these gaps have hampered understanding and progress towards effective
policy formulation, as well as practical implementation. As we demonstrate in this
book, a more strongly evidence-based dialogue is desirable and feasible, and we
see a number of promising options for instilling more coherence into the debate and
foster alignmentwith other policy agendas, particularlywith regard to climate change
adaptation (CCA), current international efforts on disaster risk reduction (DRR), as
well as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
This book thus aims at providing insights into the L&D discourse by highlighting
state-of-the-art research frommultiple disciplines aswell as policy contexts related to
L&D. It articulates the multiple concepts, principles and methods relevant for L&D,
6 R. Mechler et al.
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1 Science for Loss and Damage. Findings and Propositions 7
including those that have only recently become available. As such, this volume is
the first comprehensive outcome of the Loss and Damage Network, a partnership
effort by scientists and practitioners, which includes members from more than 40
institutions around the globe. Aimed at informing research, policy, practice and the
interested public, this book:
• discusses the political, legal, economic and institutional dimensions of L&D,
• introduces normative and ethical questions central to the discourse,
• highlights the role of climate risks and climate risk management,
• presents salient case studies from around the world,
• identifies practical and evidence-based policy and implementation options, and
thus
• supports the science-policy dialogue and possible future directions of the L&D
discourse, both under and outside the Paris Agreement.
The volume overall is organised into five sections: Sect. 1 sets the stage with
key concepts and insights regarding trends in impacts and risks, while Sect. 2
presents critical issues that increasingly are shaping the policy discourse. In
Sect. 3, methods and tools for research and practice are reviewed in terms of
their applicability, Sect. 4 presents place-based evidence and insights on losses
and damages as well as any soft and hard limits across geographies, and finally in
Sect. 5,policy options and other actions for the L&D discourse are discussed. This
introductory chapter further elaborates on the evolution of the discourse, presents key
concepts of relevance and salience that arise from the book, shortly summarises the
individual chapters, and concludes by outlining a number of propositions that link
relevant findings to forward-looking suggestions for research, practice and policy.
1.2 Evolution of the Policy Discourse
Formal and informal deliberations regarding “dangerous” climate-related risks and
sharing the burdens (including justice considerations) associated with responses to
climate change have been fundamental for shaping the climate debate since the
beginning (see also chapter by Calliari et al. 2018; see Fig. 1.1). Science, in particu-
lar as reported by the IPCCassessments, has had amajor impact on policy formulation
and decisions as part of the UNFCCC (see Fig. 1.2). Given the ultimate objective
as stipulated by the UNFCCC in 1992 “to prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system” (UN 1992, Art. 2), the focus of the UNFCCC was
originally–and continues to predominantly be–on climate mitigation responses. The
first discussions about L&D were initiated by the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) in the early 1990s with due linkages to mitigation. During the negotiations
that led to adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, AOSIS proposed the establishment
of, what they called, an international insurance scheme–also referred to by some
as a compensation fund–to be supported by mandatory contributions from industri-
alised parties on the basis of their gross national product and relative greenhouse gas
emissions (INC 1991).
8 R. Mechler et al.
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1 Science for Loss and Damage. Findings and Propositions 9
The scheme was intended to compensate small island- and low-lying developing
nations for climate-related impacts from sea-level rise (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2003;
AOSIS 2008; see the chapters by Schäfer et al. 2018 and Linnerooth-Bayer et al.
2018). While the proposal was eventually dropped, discussions on compensation
and insurance as a means to address the adverse effects of climate change prevailed
with expert workshops convened in 2003 and 2007 on the basis of COP decisions
5/CP 7 and 1/CP 10 and COP13 started to consider means to address Loss and
Damage (Mace and Verheyen 2016).
In 2008, AOSIS submitted an expanded version of the 1991 proposal to the Ad
HocWorking Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-
LCA). This Multi Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate
Change Impacts in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and other developing
countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change comprised three
interdependent components: (1) insurance; (2) rehabilitation/compensation; and (3)
riskmanagement (AOSIS 2008). The idea of an “internationalmechanism addressing
risk management and risk reduction strategies and insurance related risk sharing and
risk transfer mechanisms” was reiterated a year later in the AOSIS proposal for a
Copenhagen Protocol (UNFCCC 2009).
After losses and damageswerementioned in the 2007Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC
2007), the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework (UNFCCC 2010) initiated formal
UNFCCC activities on the issuewith the establishment of an ad hocwork programme
(UNFCCC 2011). The latter was meant to advance technical work on L&D in three
thematic areas over the course of 2011 and 2012: (1) assessing the risk of L&D and
the current knowledge on the same; (2) proposing a range of approaches to address
L&D from both extreme and slow onset events, taking into consideration experience
at all levels; and (3) determining the role of the Convention in enhancing the imple-
mentation of approaches to address L&D (UNFCCC 2012). Since its inception, the
work programme has conducted several calls for submissions asking parties (national
government representatives) and observers (other organisations attending UNFCCC
meetings) for input on specific questions. These calls gave parties, observers and
non-admitted organisations the opportunity to lay out their views on thematic issues,
institutional questions, governance arrangements and suggestions on how to take the
L&D work programme forward.
As part of the Doha Climate Gateway in 2012, the Parties decided to establish
institutional arrangements to address L&D at COP 19. This laid the groundwork for
the creation of the WIM, that is charged to “address loss and damage associated
with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change” (UNFCCC 2013, para 1). COP19 also established an Executive Committee
(ExCom) to guide the implementation of functions of the WIM through an initial
2-year work plan. A distinct L&D article in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015,
Article 8) at COP 21 meant further recognition for L&D and theWIM, and arguably,
institutional anchoring within the UNFCCC architecture.
The action areas for work under the WIM have been broad and diverse, ranging
in scope and focus. Action areas include considering particularly vulnerable coun-
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tries, populations and ecosystems, dealing with both slow- and sudden-onset events,
and paying particular attention to non-economic losses. Policy areas include con-
sideration for resilience, recovery and rehabilitation efforts, migration, displacement
and mobility, as well as financial instruments including insurance. The work plan is
intended to integrate also with other on-going work under the UNFCCC, such as on
finance and technology.
Fundamental to this book, and the climate policy debate in general, has been the
concept of comprehensive risk management including transformational approaches.
The mandate of the WIM includes enhancing understanding of and promoting both
short- and medium-term risk management, including risk analysis, risk reduction,
risk transfer and risk retention. Furthermore, theWIM is to consider transformational
approaches that help to build and strengthen the long-term resilience of countries and
communities (UNFCCC 2016, Decision 3/CP.22). Since the establishment of the
WIM, the ExCom has met several times and has transitioned from its initial 2-year
work plan to a 5-year rolling work plan. Achievements and the WIM will officially
be reviewed at COP 25 in 2019.
Recent non-climate policy developments, such as the compact on Sendai
(UNISDR 2015), the SDGs (UN 2015), as well as the Nansen Initiative on Displace-
ment (nanseninitiative.org) and its follow-up, the Platform on Disaster Displacement
(Displacement Solutions 2015) provide potential opportunities to increase under-
standing of and respond to growing climate-related risks, including L&D. However,
these approaches and preliminary actions are scattered across several sectors and
actors, and their relevance to L&D has not yet been systematically evaluated with lit-
tle exchange between research and policy. In addition, attention to L&D in research
and policy has tended to focus heavily on only a few aspects, such as insurance.
Broader reflection, particularly on the different dimensions of L&D decision-making
has been largely lacking.
While it is difficult to summarise the different strands of the discourse(s), it may
be argued that essentially three issues have been highlighted with varying levels of
emphasis over time:
1. Burden sharing for the costs of managing climate impacts and risks (losses and
damages) including compensation arrangements.
2. Awareness regarding the sensitivity and limitations of human and natural systems
to climate change, and the need to respond with stringent climate mitigation
policies for limiting warming to 1.5 °C or 2 °C.
3. Support for further risk reduction and risk management interventions for enhanc-
ing climate change adaptation and building climate resilience.
Some observers have suggested that there has been a shift in the debate away from
“harmful wrongdoing” (1.) to mostly considering support for risk and climate insur-
ance mechanisms (3.) (see Serdeczny and Zamarioli 2018). While indeed, insurance
mechanisms have been given substantial attention, it seems that the debate overall
has becomemore comprehensive and the three discursive lines rather exist in parallel
offering potential to be further aligned as delineated in this book (see also Mechler
2017).
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1.3 The Research Perspective: Definitions and Concepts
1.3.1 Defining Losses and Damages
Many of the issues associated with the L&D discourse are controversial, and given
the various perspectives on what exactly L&D might refer to, it is unsurprising
that there is no official UNFCCC definition for “Loss and Damage.” There are,
however, some aspects of L&D that have been relatively widely accepted. UNFCCC
documentation consistently states that L&D refers to climate-related impacts and
risks from both sudden-onset extreme events, such as flooding and cyclones, and
slow-onset events, including sea level rise, glacial retreat, desertification, and others
(UNFCCC 2013, 2015). Some analysts have also made a distinction between losses
associated with irreversibility, for example, fatalities from heat-related disasters or
the permanent destruction of coral reefs, while damages are referred to as impacts
that can be alleviated or repaired, such as damages to buildings (Boyd et al. 2017).
Another useful distinction, which has been adopted by many authors (including in
this book), was made by Verheyen and Roderick (2008) between avoided, unavoided
and unavoidable losses and damages (see Table 1.1).
Avoided losses and damages are those that have been and will be avoided by
DRR and CCA. Unavoided impacts and risks are and will not be reduced due to
socio-economic constraints and trade-offs (finance, governance, political economy).
These unavoided losses and damages are also called residual impacts and risks in the
literature (Warner and van der Geest 2013) and are characterised by limits imped-
ing avoidance and reduction. Losses and damages can be material (i.e., physical) or
immaterial, as well as economic (measurable in financial or economic terms) and
non-economic, with some overlap between these categories (Schäfer and Balogun
2015; Serdeczny 2018). Many consider the L&D discourse to deal particularly with
losses and damages “beyond adaptation” and limits to adaptation, that is, unavoided
or unavoidable impacts that go beyond adaptation potentials (Verheyen and Roderick
2008; van der Geest and Warner 2015). While adaptation opportunities and barriers
Table 1.1 Classifying losses and damages
Avoided Unavoided Unavoidable
Avoidable losses and damages
that can and will be avoided
by climate change mitigation
and/or adaptation measures
Avoidable losses and damages
that are and will not be
addressed by further
mitigation and/or adaptation
measures, even though
avoidance would be possible.
Financial, technical and
political constraints, as well as
case-specific risk preferences
narrow down the adaptation
space
Losses and damages that
cannot be avoided and adapted
to through further mitigation
and/or adaptation measures,
for instance impacts from slow
onset processes that have
kicked-off already, such as sea
level rise and melting glaciers
Classification further developed based on Verheyen and Roderick (2008)
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are enablers/disablers for adaptation planning and implementation, adaptation limits
have been defined by Klein et al. (2014) as loci at which adaptation actions can no
longer guarantee key actor objectives or system’s needs can no longer be achieved in
the presence of intolerable risks (Dow et al. 2013). These limits can be hard (meaning
adaptive technologies and actions are not physically feasible), or soft (technology
and/or important socio-economic trade-offs affect priorities today, yet there is poten-
tial for overcoming limits in the future) (see also chapter by van den Homberg and
McQuistan 2018).
1.3.2 Loss and Damage in the Context of Climate
and Disaster Risk Management
InL&Ddiscussions, riskmanagement approaches have received increasing attention.
Climate risk management has become the widely accepted methodological frame-
work for assessing potential impacts and devising strategies for adaptation. The IPCC
(2014a, p 5.) defines risk as:
The potential for consequences where something of value is at stake and where the outcome
is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values. Risk is often represented as probability of
occurrence of hazardous events or trends multiplied by the impacts if these events or trends
occur. Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability, exposure, and hazard.
IPCC’s Special Report on ExtremeEvents (SREX2012) and the IPCC5thAssess-
ment Report (IPCC 2014b) define climate risk management (CRM) as an integrative
Fig. 1.3 Risk as a function of hazard, exposure and vulnerability. Sources IPCC (2012, 2014a)
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Fig. 1.4 The risk concept as applied to sudden-onset and slow-onset processes. Source Huggel
et al. (2016a)
framework for understanding and addressing climate-related risks (see Fig. 1.3).
CRM broadly may be defined as comprehensively reducing, preparing for, and
financing climate-related risk, while tackling the underlying risk drivers, includ-
ing climate-related and socio-economic factors (Schinko et al. 2016). Climate risk
management can build on expertise developed in DRR and CCA research and prac-
tice. Firstly, it considers climate risk as a function of hazard (and any climate-related
changes), exposure and vulnerability; secondly, it gives proper attention to variability
and probability (low frequency vs. high frequency events), calling for probabilistic
risk analytical approaches; and thirdly, it accounts for differences in risk perception
and the various types of outcomes.
In principle, this climate risk concept can be applied to sudden-onset events and
slow-onset climate-related processes unfolding over timescales from hours to days
(landslides, storms, floods) toweeks andmonths (droughts, heatwaves), to years (sea-
level rise and impacts), and decades (glacial shrinkage) (see Fig. 1.4). In practice, risk
analysis has so far usually been applied to phenomena lasting from hours to months.
While risk analysis is a keypolicy tool for climate riskmanagement, includingdealing
with unavoided losses and damages, it cannot effectively address those impacts that
are irreversible and permanent.
1.4 A Broadening Research Landscape–Chapter
Summaries
Over the last few years research on L&D has grown in number and focus. In this
section, we summarise some of the most relevant findings from the various book
chapters providing a review of key topics addressed in the book. Building on fore-
words by policy makers and negotiators from developing (Dawn Pierre-Nathoniel
of the Small Island State of Saint Lucia) and developed countries (Ingrid-Gabriela
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Hoven of Germany), the book is divided into five sections, for which we shortly
summarise the respective chapters.
1.4.1 Setting the Stage: Key Concepts, Challenges
and Insights
The chapter on the Ethical Challenges in the Context of Climate Loss and Dam-
age by Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, Lukas Meyer, Kian Mintz-Woo, Thomas Schinko
and Olivia Serdeczny sets out the main types of justice and ethical challenges rel-
evant to the L&D debate. The authors argue that a clear differentiation between
mitigation, adaptation policy domains and L&D policy is important to understand
the normative implications of L&D. They show why distributive and compensatory
justice perspectives are of key relevance to capture all ethical entitlements stemming
from adaptation needs and the materialisation of L&D. Of particular importance, the
chapter presents a distributive justice perspective for understanding ethical implica-
tions of L&D in the short- to medium-term, arguing that L&D can be understood as
undeserved harm demanding redistribution to even out this unfairness.
Laurens M. Bouwer in his contribution on Observed and Projected Impacts
from Extreme Weather Events: Implications for Loss and Damage presents
the current knowledge on observed and projected impacts, and risks from extreme
weather events in light of anthropogenic climate change. Research on the subject
has focused on three key drivers: changes in extreme weather hazards due to natu-
ral climate variability and anthropogenic climate change, changes in exposure and
vulnerability, and any implemented risk reduction efforts. Studies currently iden-
tify increasing exposure as the dominant driver, through growing populations and
increases in assets at risk. The chapter further elaborates on how residual weather-
related losses (i.e., impacts after implemented risk reduction and adaptation) have not
yet been attributed to anthropogenic climate change. The author holds that globally
increasing asset exposure will lead to increases in risk, yet presents evidence that vul-
nerability has declined; thus, it appears there is potential for reducing risks through
DRR and adaptation. At country scale, and particularly for developing countries, the
evidence points towards increasing risk, indicating the need to significantly upgrade
climate riskmanagement efforts and international support. This stage-setting chapter
thus shows the challenges in understanding global trends in losses and damages,
impacts, and risks from disasters in light of climate change.
Thomas Schinko, Reinhard Mechler and Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler build on the
discussions on ethics and trends in impacts and risks. In their chapter on the Risk
and Policy Space for Loss and Damage: Integrating Notions of Distributive and
Compensatory Justice with Comprehensive Climate Risk Management they
ask whether a policy framework can be developed around a broad notion of risk
to identify a distinct L&D policy space. The authors see ample potential in align-
ing comprehensive climate risk analytics with distributive and compensatory justice
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considerations alongside principles of need and responsibility linked to risk-based
actions. Building on the findings of the trends and ethics chapters, the authors develop
a policy proposal arguing for international support for needs-based comprehensive
climate risk management. At the same time, they also propose to include action on
liabilities attributable to anthropogenic climate change and associated impacts. They
identify a policy space composed of, what they call curative and transformative
measures. Transformative measures are measures that go beyond the standard tool-
box of risk management, also involving actions that change fundamental systems’
attributes. Curative action would be triggered through the identification of unavoided
and unavoidable losses and damages attributed with relatively high confidence to cli-
mate change (examples are impacts linked to sea-level rise and glacial retreat; see
IPCC 2014a). Presenting and going beyond a public finance application, the authors
maintain that the broad risk and justice approach developed may be applied to other
highly contested L&D issues such as migration and the preservation of cultural her-
itage, as discussed elsewhere in the book.
1.4.2 Critical Issues Shaping the Discourse
A number of issues have been critical for shaping the discourse. Importantly, the
role of attribution has been in the limelight. The chapter on Attribution: How is it
Relevant for Loss and Damage Policy and Practice? by Rachel A. James, Richard
G. Jones, Emily Boyd, Hannah R. Young, Friederike E. L. Otto, Christian Huggel
and Jan S. Fuglestvedt provides an overview of the state of scientific evidence linking
losses and damages to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, and takes a criti-
cal look at the relevance of this science for L&D policy and practice. The authors’
point of departure is a consideration of the existing understanding and perceptions
of attribution among policy-makers and observers to L&D discussions. Following
several years of research into stakeholder perspectives on attribution and L&D, they
find that attribution is often associated with responsibility and blame, and therefore,
some might prefer to avoid discussions of attribution. Yet, as the authors argue, attri-
bution science itself is not about responsibility, but rather is a scientific investigation
of causal links between elements of the earth system and society. The chapter there-
fore outlines available research into the causal connections between anthropogenic
climate change and L&D from a climate science view focused on changes in hazard,
but also from a risk research view that examines the drivers of exposure and vulnera-
bility. The chapter closes with an examination of potential applications of attribution
research, highlighting its importance to inform practical actions to avert, minimise
and address L&D.
As mentioned, the L&D debate has been strongly shaped by political rationale.
Elisa Calliari, Swenja Surminski and Jaroslav Mysiak’s chapter on the Politics of
(and behind) the UNFCCC’s Loss and Damage Mechanism reviews political
science research and takes an international relations view on the L&D discourse
to enhance understanding of current negotiation processes. It also points out ways
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forward for research and policy. Adopting a multi-faceted notion of power drawing
on neorealist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought, the authors examine the
structuralist paradox in L&D negotiations in light of the fact that smaller parties to
the convention have been able to successfully negotiate key milestones with stronger
parties. The authors emphasise the relevance of discursive power for L&D decisions.
Framing L&D in ethical and legal terms has been important to developing standards
shared and agreed upon beyond the UNFCCC context, including basic moral norms
linked to island states’ narratives of survival and the reference to international cus-
tomary law (see also the ethics chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018). Looking
forward, they however argue that a change in narrative may be conducive to truly
achieve collective action on L&D as an issue of common concern countering the risk
of the policy debate becoming a win-lose negotiation “game.”
Legal actions on climate change have been proliferating in recent years. Flo-
rentina Simlinger and Benoit Mayer explore the current status of debate around
Legal Responses to Climate Change Induced Loss and Damage. The discussion
reviews the legal literature, scoping out the spectrum of potential legal actions on
L&D including key challenges and possible directions for further research. The dis-
cussion broadly examines private and public climate change litigation with examples
from around the world. It also lays out how human rights issues have been applied
in international law with a view towards L&D. As one focus, the authors examine
the applicability of the no-harm principle in climate change. This principle, which
has long been applied in international law, requires states to refrain from activities
that have potential to cause significant transboundary harm, and to prevent actors
within its jurisdiction from carrying out such activities. The chapter, furthermore,
presents legal actions with relevance for L&D negotiations. A synopsis of the various
legal responses to L&Dhighlighting their premises, specific challenges and proposed
remedies, provides a succinct summary of the discussion.
Non-economic Loss and Damage (NELD) is a distinct theme in the work plan of
the Loss and Damage Executive Committee (WIM Excom). The chapter on Non-
economic Loss and Damage and the Warsaw International Mechanism byOlivia
Serdeczny starts by providing a definition of NELD as climate-related material- and
non-material impacts, risks to well-being, and assets and goods not commonly traded
in the market. Examples comprise loss of cultural identity, sacred places, as well as
humanhealth and lives. Initial analysis shows that the twomain characteristics of non-
economic values are their context-dependence and incommensurability. The author
suggests that these attributes need to be preserved and respected when considering
measures to avoid the risk of NELDs as part of comprehensive risk management
approaches. AddressingNELDs in a central mechanism under theUNFCCC requires
substantial understanding of the permanently lost values and their functions for those
negatively affected.
Studies of L&D from climate change have focused strongly on human systems
and tended to overlook the mediating role of ecosystems and the services ecosys-
tems provide to society. This is a significant knowledge gap as losses and damages
to human systems often result from permanent or temporary disturbances to ecosys-
tems services caused by climatic stressors. The chapter on the Impacts of Climate
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Change on Ecosystem Services and Resulting Losses and Damages to People
and Society written by Kees van der Geest, Alex de Sherbinin, Stefan Kienberger,
Zinta Zommers, Asha Sitati, Erin Roberts and Rachel James advances understand-
ing of the impacts of climatic stressors on ecosystems in light of the implications
for losses and damages to people and society. The chapter develops a conceptual
framework for studying the complex relations, which is applied to a case study of
multi-annual drought in the drylands of the West-African Sahel. This case study
exhibits the complexity of causal links between climate change, climate variability
and specific weather and climate events leading to losses and damages, including
warming, multi-decadal drought, and flooding. The authors conclude the chapter by
advising against the oversimplification of causality and suggest that governance and
natural resource management should be given attention in future research and policy
discussions.
How do we understand displacement and resettlement in the context of climate
change? Alison Heslin, Natalie Delia Deckard, Robert Oakes and Arianna Montero-
Colbert’s contribution on Displacement and Resettlement: Understanding the
Role of Climate Change in Contemporary Migration presents challenges and
debates in the literature on climate change impacts and the growing global flow of
people. The authors position their discussion within the literature on environmental
migration, presenting associated definitions, forms of environmental migration and
ways to measure the movement of people. The literature on the reception of migrants
and migrant resettlement is also presented. The discussion is contextualised through
a selection of cases where the environment plays a role in displacing populations,
including sea level rise in Pacific Island States, cyclonic storms in Bangladesh, deser-
tification in West Africa, and deforestation in South America’s Southern Cone. The
examples highlight the complex set of losses and damages incurred by population
displacement in each case.
1.4.3 Research and Practice: Reviewing Methods and Tools
The chapter on the Role of the Physical Sciences in Loss and Damage Decision-
Making by Ana Lopez, Swenja Surminski and Olivia Serdeczny elaborates on con-
tributions that physical climate science canmake to improve decision-makers’ under-
standing of climate-related losses and damages. For climate science both the present
and future are of relevance when estimating actual and potential losses and damages
associated with climate change. For both timescales climate science seeks to under-
stand those aspects that determine the climate-hazard, including the links between
human induced changes in climate and climate variability, the probability of occur-
rence of extreme meteorological events (e.g., rainfall), and the resulting hazards
leading to losses and damages (e.g., flood). The chapter reviews the approaches used
to assess this component of risk. Particular attention is paid to the identification of
sources of uncertainty and the potential for providing robust information to support
decision-making. As the authors demonstrate, uncertainty does not imply policy
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inaction. To this end, they present tools and approaches developed in the context of
CCA and DRR, which, as the authors show, are also of relevance for L&D.
Understanding all components of impacts and risks is crucial for considering fur-
ther policy actions. Wouter Botzen, Laurens Bouwer, Paolo Scussolini, Onno Kuik,
Marjolijn Haasnoot, Judy Lawrence and Jeroen Aerts present approaches for Inte-
grated Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation aimed at informing L&D pol-
icymakers. Insights provided refer to how risk management and adaptation options
interact with options discussed in the L&D debate (such as insurance), as well as
how L&D-related activities may support risk reduction and adaptation in vulner-
able communities and countries. The authors particularly focus on outlining how
risk management can help people and societies to adapt to the increasing impacts of
weather-related disasters in relation to anthropogenic climate change. The perspec-
tive established is one of holistic risk management comprising state-of-the-art risk
assessmentmethods, socio-economic evaluations of riskmanagement and adaptation
options—including household-scale risk reduction strategies and insurance schemes
for residual risk. The method of adaptation pathways is presented as an innova-
tive contribution for coping with uncertainty in the timing and intensity of climate
change impacts. Case studies on Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, Mexico, Bangladesh,
Netherlands, New Zealand and Germany illustrate each of these topics with concrete
insight.
Laura Schäfer, Koko Warner and Sönke Kreft’s contribution on Exploring and
Managing Adaptation Frontiers with Climate Risk Insurance follows a similar
vein as the adaptation pathways proposition discussed above. The authors suggest that
climate insurance, a key focus of policy discussion and implementation, may serve as
an entry point and tool for exploring adaptation frontiers, which are closely linked to
the concept of limits and defined in the literature as a “transitional space between safe
and unsafe domains” (Preston et al. 2014). Introducing climate risk insurance (also
covered in the chapter by Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018), the authors propose three
routes through which an insurance focus may contribute to this exploration. The first
route provides an action-focussed framework for signalling the magnitude, location,
and exposure to climate-related risks, as well as on any actual and potential adapta-
tion limits. The second route supports actors in moving away from adaptation limits
by improving ex-ante decision making, incentivising risk reduction and reducing
uncertainty around climate-resilient development, while the third route helps actors
to stay within the tolerable risk space by facilitating financial buffering as part of risk
financing approaches. The authors also highlight that insurance-based approaches
are not a silver bullet, and suggest that these are effectively embedded in a com-
prehensive climate risk management framework integrating other risk-reduction and
management strategies (for a similar point, see the chapter by Wallimann-Helmer
et al. 2018).
Unsurprisingly, climate finance has been a hot topic for the L&D debate and has
been receiving a lot of emphasis in current policy dialogue (in 2018 it is the focus
of the so-called Suva Dialogue under the UNFCCC informing potential actions on
finance leading up to the WIM review in 2019). The evidence base is, however,
almost non-existent and there are very few empirical and model-based estimates
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of L&D finance needs. Anil Markandya and Mikel González-Eguino present what
we can learn about possible L&D finance needed from an economic angle in the
chapter on Integrated Assessment for Identifying Climate Finance Needs for
Loss and Damage: A Critical Review. This economic perspective presents and
critically reviews a methodological approach that builds on economic rationality for
modelling market-based and monetised risks, and actual and perceived trade-offs
between investment into income-generating actions, climate mitigation and adapta-
tion. Specifically, the authors present estimates using Economic Integrated Assess-
ment Modelling (EIAM), which calculates economically optimal responses to cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation in terms of maximising welfare (GDP) a
few decades into the future. Interpreting modelled residual damages as unavoided
losses and damages, a number of implications emerge from the analysis. The authors
emphasise that uncertainties are very large and any meaningful projections of resid-
ual damages in the medium to long term are currently not feasible. Furthermore,
residual damages are found to strongly vary by region as well as by climate scenario.
Overall, the chapter finds residual damages to appear significant under a variety of
models, and for a range of climate scenarios for both developing and developed
countries.
1.4.4 Geographic Perspectives and Cases
Many chapters in this volume contextualise their discussions and findingswith exam-
ples of place-based insight. The section on geographic perspectives and cases focuses
strongly on local experience in relation to L&D. Small Island Developing States
(SIDS), being highly vulnerable to climate change due to, among others impacts, sea-
level rise and associated consequences, started the discussion on L&D and are very
vocal in the debate. John Handmer and Johanna Nalau localise the global debate by
focusing on Pacific SIDS in their contribution on Understanding Loss and Damage
in Pacific Small Island Developing States. Specifically, the authors provide com-
mentary regarding the risk and options space (as discussed in Schinko et al. 2018
and Mechler and Schinko 2016) in the Western Pacific SIDS context, particularly in
Vanuatu, where many of the livelihood activities are subsistence-based, reliant on the
current climate and its variability, and already seriously disrupted by extremeweather
events. As the authors show, for some low-lying island states climate change poses
an existential threat, and the region is increasingly recognised as one that is most
immediately vulnerable to potential mass migration and relocation due to climate
change. The authors thus find the options-policy space for SIDS very constrained as
demonstrated through evidence on soft (intolerable risk) and hard limits (irreversible
high-level risk). The authors conclude with a proposal to mainstream L&D aspects
into sectoral policies and strategies in Pacific SIDS in order to better manage the soft
limits and understand any hard limits that could affect vulnerable communities.
Migration and displacement driven by climate-related impacts and risks is a reality
in the Pacific and other regions. The chapter on Climate Migration and Cultural
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Preservation: The Case of the Marshallese Diaspora by Alison Heslin expands
that conversation by addressing the consequences of the relocation of Marshallese
Islanders on their cultural heritage, an important component of NELD. The low-lying
islands of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, with little capacity to withstand
even minor increases in sea level and tides, are an important case in point, as its
population is faced with relocation in the immediate future. Interestingly, nearly a
third of the population already lives outside of the Marshall Islands, benefitting from
visa free entry into the United States. This provides an evidence base for helping to
anticipate future challenges faced by those who will be displaced by rising sea levels.
The study draws on data from interviews with migrants from the Marshall Islands
regarding accounts of life in theUnited States and identifies challenges (differences in
livelihoods, family structures, foodhabits, etc.), aswell as opportunities (better access
to various forms of employment, improved healthcare and cultural preservation in the
midst of theMarshallese diaspora). The study closes by laying out howunderstanding
the means through which Marshallese migrants maintain cultural traditions and the
challenges they face can help to address potentially irreversible, but in this case,
avoidable losses of cultural traditions in the event of mass displacement from these
small islands.
Suggestions have increasingly been brought forward regarding the potential for
partnerships between public and private sectors and civil society for devising and
implementing options that manage critical climate-related risks at scale. But how are
suchmodels and partnerships organised?What can be learned from existing activities
and how can learning be upscaled? The chapter Supporting Climate Risk Manage-
ment at Scale: Insights from the Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance Partnership
Model Applied in Peru and Nepal by Reinhard Mechler, Colin McQuistan, Ian
McCallum, Wei Liu, Adriana Keating, Piotr Magnuszewski, Thomas Schinko and
Finn Laurien reports on the learnings from one such partnership, the Zurich Flood
Resilience Alliance–a multi-actor partnership launched in 2013 to enhance commu-
nities’ resilience to floods at local to global scales. The chapter presents learnings
from two caseswhere flood risk, amplified by climate change, has been eroding liveli-
hoods leading to some soft limits. In the Karnali and Koshi river basins in Nepal,
communities are facing rapid on-set flash floods during the monsoon season that, in
the absence of appropriate early warning technology, have led to severe loss of life
and assets. In the Rimac and Piura river basins in Peru, the wellbeing of communities
in the absence of effective preparedness has been severely affected by lowprobability,
but high impact El Niño episodes. Options to overcome these impacts have included
identifying novel evacuation routes and emergency plans, the development of flood
brigades, and supporting communities to interact with local governments on DRR
planning. This critical examination of the experience across geographies and scales
leads the authors towards suggestions for identifying novel organisational, funding
and support models involving NGOs, researchers and the private sector, side by side
with public sector institutions.
The Arctic is a “laboratory” of physical transformation, where climate change
is happening about two times faster than the global average; there is high evidence
that meltwater from Arctic sources accounts for 35 percent of the current global
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sea level rise. Local impacts are of relevance as well, particularly those on social
systems and responses.Arctic communities have had to seekways to dealwith rapidly
changing environmental conditions that are leading to social impacts such as through
outmigration, similar to the experience in the global South. Yet, the international
debate on L&Dhas not sufficiently addressed the Arctic region so far. In their chapter
on Loss and Damage in the Rapidly Changing Arctic Mia Landauer and Sirkku
Juhola provide the first such research contribution reviewing the literature to show
what impacts of climate change are already visible in the Arctic. The authors present
a literature review with local cases to provide empirical evidence of climate losses
and damages in the region. Particularly, they show that there is solid evidence and
examples of outmigration and relocation. In addition to the implications of Arctic
losses and damages for the international debate, the authors suggest a need for new
governance mechanisms and institutional frameworks to tackle losses and damages
in this quickly changing region.
1.4.5 Policy Options and Other Response Mechanisms
for the L&D Discourse
Thefinal section of the bookdealswith policy options andother responsemechanisms
relevant to L&D. The chapter byMasroora Haque,Mousumi Pervin, Saibeen Sultana
and Saleemul Huq on Towards Establishing a National Mechanism to Address
Loss and Damage: A Case Study from Bangladesh reports on innovative efforts
that are underway to establish a national mechanism that addresses losses and dam-
ages in Bangladesh–a highly climate-vulnerable country which, at the same time, is
one of the forerunners in comprehensive risk management. Bangladesh has a history
of well-established DRR policies involving institutions at national and sub-national
levels, as well as political and regulatory institutions. Furthermore, the country has
been one of the first to establish aNationalAdaptation ProgrammeofAction (NAPA),
which has led to the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Loss and
Damage is currently not explicitly addressed, yet particularly the work area on com-
prehensive Disaster Management provides an entry point with activities underway
or planned on insurance, as well as on tackling climate migration and displacement.
Taking explicit account of L&D is the main gap in Bangladesh’s adaptation and DRR
policy framework, and thus the motivation behind the plans is to set up a legislative,
institutional and policy-related mechanism to address climate-induced losses and
damages.
As presented by Florentina Simlinger and Benoit Mayer, legal actions on climate
change are proliferating. The contribution by William Frank, Christoph Bals and
Julia Grimm on the Case of Huaraz: First Climate Lawsuit on Loss and Damage
against an Energy Company before German Courts reports on the first climate
litigation lawsuit in Germany and the first specifically on L&D. The case has been
brought forward by the plaintiff, Saul Luciano Lliuya of the city of Huaraz in the
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Andes nestled just below the Palcacocha glacial lake. Global warming has led to dan-
gerous increases in the lake’s volume, increasing the risk of a glacial ice avalanche.
Such an avalanche would cause an outburst flood from the lake potentially leading to
massive destruction and loss of life. As a precedent, in 1941 an outburst flood killed
more than 5,000 people in Huaraz. Saúl Luciano Lliuya’s climate lawsuit, brought
forward with support from the German NGO Germanwatch in 2016 against the Ger-
man energy company RWE, seeks support from the company to make a contribution
to risk measures that avoid such a glacial lake flood, proportional to the company’s
share in historical CO2 emissions (about 0.5% overall). The case, dismissed in the
first instance, has since been accepted by a higher regional court in Germany after
an appeal, and is now (mid 2018) in the midst of the evidentiary stage.
Much of the L&D debate has focused on climate risk insurance as a possible
response mechanism. This policy response is explored by JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer,
Swenja Surminski, Laurens M. Bouwer, Ilan Noy and Reinhard Mechler in Insur-
ance as a Response to Loss and Damage? The chapter reflects on recent evidence
and questions whether insurance instruments can serve the prevention and cure inten-
tions of the WIM and the Paris Agreement, in terms of reducing climate-related risk
and providing an equitable response to L&D from weather extremes in developing
countries. The chapter lays out the forms and functions of insurance for climate-
related extremes and emphasises the substantial benefits as well as the substantial
costs of both micro-insurance programs and regional insurance pools for provid-
ing post-disaster relief and reconstruction. Notwithstanding the actual and potential
benefits, the authors find that absent significant intervention in their design and imple-
mentation, insurance mechanisms as currently implemented, will likely fall short of
fully serving the preventive and curative aspirations of developing country parties
to the WIM. The authors emphasise the importance of burden-sharing, as insurance
is generally loaded with an expense and risk margin in addition to the profit margin
for commercial insurance. The chapter, while advising caution about relying largely
on market solutions to provide insurance for fulfilling the prevention and cure aspi-
rations, thus emphasises the criticality of international and public intervention in
climate risk insurance provision.
Technology plays a critical role in coping with climate impacts and risks so that
adaptation limits are not further breached. Yet, vulnerable communities dispropor-
tionally impacted by climate change, often cannot benefit from existing technology.
Those engaging in the L&D debate have only very recently sought dialogue with
discussions on technology, such as under the UNFCCC. The chapter Technology for
Climate Justice: A Reporting Framework for Loss and Damage as part of Key
Global Agreements byMarc van den Homberg and ColinMcQuistan examines how
technology can shape limits to adaptation and how international reporting on tech-
nology (in)justice as part of key global agreements may help. The authors develop
a technology-reporting framework with components of access, use and innovation,
which is consequently applied via the example of transboundary early warning sys-
tems deployed in South Asia. They find that for vulnerable countries only a limited
set of state-of-the-art technologies is available, and the reality of capacity and funding
gaps means only the bare minimum, largely copycat types of technology, is utilised.
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Similar to the ethics chapter, the authors thus argue that more attention to distributive,
compensatory and procedural climate justice principles in terms of distributing tech-
nology, building capacity and providing finance is sorely needed to widen the access,
use and innovation of the technology spectrum available to developing countries. The
authors finally suggest to include technology for climate justice in the Adaptation
Communications, and making reporting mandatory on actual and expected impacts
of L&D measures.
1.5 From Findings to Propositions for the Loss
and Damage Debate
The book chapters cover specific issues showing the wide variety of research on
L&D, as well as the many interconnections, shared concepts, tools and methods. In
this section, we align some of the key findings and suggestions for moving forward.
We identify five key propositions that, as we assert, hold potential for providing a
roadmap for further ‘grounding’ the so far highly political debate. The propositions
are essentially cross-cutting and reflect the architecture of the book in terms of con-
sidering insights from the various sections (setting the stage, critical issues, methods
and tools, cases, policy options). The propositions each build on relevant findings that
then inform suggestions for an actionable element to be taken forward by research,
policy and practice.
Proposition 1 Risk management is an effective entry point for aligning perspectives
and debates. Framed comprehensively, coupled with climate justice considerations
and linked to established risk management practice, it may help to identify a distinct
policy space for Loss and Damage.
The L&D debate has been polarised between those advocating for compensation
for actual losses and damages, and others suggesting support for tackling future risks
by (further) employing disaster risk management and climate insurance solutions.
While L&D remains a political concept developed during theUNFCCCnegotiations,
it has (some of) its technical roots in risk management, which can be built upon to
identify a joint and distinct policy space (see chapters by Schinko et al. 2018; Botzen
et al. 2018; van den Homberg and McQuistan 2018).
Risk management brings along established practices for dealing with extreme
events and any trends therein, and thus may provide an operational framework with
a tested set of methods and tools (see Bouwer 2018; Botzen et al. 2018). Yet, a
broader perspective on climate risk research and policy appears sorely needed. In
its 5th Assessment Report (IPCC 2014b), the IPCC laid the foundations for such a
perspective by broadly defining climate-related risks and the potential (as well as
limits) for adaptation to key risks faced by geographic regions both today and in the
future, characterised by scenarios of aggressive or business-as-usual mitigation and
adaptation. This perspective requires to take into account non-economic losses and
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damages (NELD) such as to humanhealth and lives, but also losses of cultural identity
and sacred places. The issue of NELD,which has garnered substantial attention in the
discourse, but is generally not accounted for in standard DRR approaches, implies
a need for well considering its two main characteristics, context-dependence and
incommensurability (Serdeczny 2018).
Understanding and acting on climate risks is intricately linked to justice and eth-
ical considerations. Justice and fairness issues have played a key role in the climate
change policy and academic discourse since the beginning of the UNFCCC pro-
cess–most prominently through the distributive justice principle of “common but
differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC 1992). These considerations also come
into play when contemplating issues of compensatory justice due to the unequal dis-
tribution of historical and current greenhouse gas emissions, the adverse distribution
of impacts between the global North and South, and the understanding that climate
change is projected to lead to unavoidable and potentially irrecoverable losses and
damages (chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018). Building on risk and justice
principles, Schinko et al. 2018 propose a distinct L&D policy action space that can
be identified by aligning a needs-based, distributive justice perspective, proposing
support for transformative climate risk management beyond adaptation possibilities,
with a compensatory justice perspective which upholds considerations for curative
options for liabilities attributable to anthropogenic climate change (see also Mechler
and Schinko 2016).
Interestingly, both types of principles and policy actions are already seeing some,
if incipient, attention today. Transformative risk management is increasingly debated
in the L&D discourse, and involves issues such as offering alternative livelihoods to
those that are being affected (e.g., switching from smallholder farming to service sec-
tor employment) and assistingwith voluntarymigrationwhere needed.Options under
this rubric exhibit substantial overlap with interventions of disaster risk reduction
and adaptation, yet may be focussed further on avoiding and managing intolerable
risks that touch on hard and soft limits. Insurance applications, a mainstay of policy
attention, e.g., through the G20/V20 InsuResilience initiative (InsuResilience 2017),
can in principle be a useful entry point for tackling transformation; yet, caution must
be exercised about commercial insurance products that place the full burden on the
most vulnerable. Premium support in the form of subsidies and technical assistance
can potentially transform insurance into a mechanism that meets the aspirations of
the L&D discussions. Insurance options furthermore hold additional potential by
serving as a concept and tool for exploring the magnitude and locations of adapta-
tion frontiers, “socio-ecological system’s transitional … operating spaces between
safe and unsafe domains” (Preston et al. 2014) (see chapters by Schäfer et al. 2018
and Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018).
Complementing transformative risk management, largely appropriate for sudden-
onset impacts and risks, with efforts for dealing with slow-onset events, the space for
curative measures overlaps to some extent with demands for compensation, which
have been ruled out by the Paris Agreement, but not from the debate in general
(see chapters by Simlinger and Mayer 2018; Schinko et al. 2018). In addition to
policy proposals in the domain of insurance, essentially a pre-arranged compensation
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mechanism for any losses and damages funded by premiumpayments of those at-risk,
via a climate attribution-triggered capitalisation mechanism (see proposition 4), the
most advanced ideas in the context of curative measures have been articulated with
regard to support for involuntary climate-induced displacement and forcedmigration.
A climate displacement facility is being discussed under the WIM and proposals for
approaches to address climate-induced displacement have been made (e.g., through
the Nansen Principles on Climate Change and Displacement (NRC & IDMC 2011)
and the Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States (Displacement
Solutions 2015).
Identifying the financial costs associated with such a distinct risk and policy L&D
space is currently extremely difficult–particularly as the remit of action has not been
concretised. There are some limited studies extrapolating from estimates of climate
impact and adaptation costs. If L&D is framed as dealing with residual impacts
after adaptation, models using economic optimality reasoning calculate impact and
option costs in the billions of US dollars; yet, as Markandya and González-Eguino
(2018) find, there is currently low confidence regarding damage costs, cost of adap-
tation and residual impacts. Beyond finance considerations, the risk management
approach to L&D—if framed comprehensively (with associated principles, methods
and tools)—may indeed embrace some of the other salient perspectives of the dis-
course, such as those emphasising burden sharing and the limits to adaptation, and
thus help to constitute a systematic platform for future work of the WIM and beyond
(see chapter by Lopez et al. 2018).
Proposition 2 Attribution science is advancing rapidly, leading to increased under-
standing of the causal connections between emissions, climate, human systems, and
Loss and Damage. While the science has often been associated with responsibility
and blame, its aim is to analyse drivers of change fundamental to informing actions
to minimise, avert, and address loss and damage.
Climate change attribution research originally focused on examining drivers of
observed changes in global temperature. Attributing losses and damages is much
more complex and requires investigating how anthropogenic greenhouse gases
(GHGs) influence many other climatic variables apart from global temperature, as
well as their influence on the oceans, cryosphere, biosphere, and human systems on
a range of timescales. It also requires a comparison of the influence of anthropogenic
emissions on hazards, with other potential drivers (for example land use change, and
aerosols), as well as drivers of exposure and vulnerability. Therefore, this is not only
a question for climate scientists, but requires integration of research from a number of
scientific fields. Researchers are stepping up to this grand challenge and have made
rapid advances, particularly in a new field of climate change attribution research
focusing on single extreme weather events. This now allows statements to be made
about how anthropogenic emissions have influenced the likelihood or magnitude of
specific heatwaves, heavy rainfall events, wind storms, and droughts. Several recent
event attribution studies have also demonstrated the influence of GHG emissions
on the probability of monetary losses from flooding and loss of life from cold- and
heat-related events (see chapter by James et al. 2018).
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The evidence base on climate impacts is growing. As summarised in IPCC’s AR5,
impacts of climate change have been observed on all continents and across all oceans.
There is high confidence that worldwide glacial retreat, permafrost thawing, andmass
bleaching of coral reefs can be mainly attributed to climate change (IPCC 2014a).
Yet, impacts to human systems and specific events are much harder to assess due to
multifactorial causation, and in particular, since vulnerability reducing actions have
been employed inmany locations and formanyweather-related hazards (see chapters
by Bouwer 2018; Lopez et al. 2018). Therefore, despite the advances, it may never
be possible to generate a complete inventory of L&D attributable to anthropogenic
emissions. In addition to the uncertainties inherent in the attribution problem, a lack
of robust time series data in many hot spot locations hinders progress in research
and risk management (Huggel et al. 2016b). Thus, policy-advisors and negotiators
should not expect the emergence of fully conclusive evidence regarding the influence
of climate variability and change on specific incidences of losses and damages and,
in particular, should not expect the strength of evidence to be equivalent between
events and between countries.
Some of themost frequently discussed applications of attribution science for L&D
have been made in relation to liability and legal responses. Attribution research is
relevant to private and public administration litigation as well as to breaches of
customary international law—the no-harm principle (see chapter by Simlinger and
Mayer 2018). In the case of litigation before a national or international court or tri-
bunal, legal cases are faced with a myriad of technical difficulties, particularly what
concerns the issue of causality. Litigation requires diligence to prevent or minimise
harm, as well as considering the indirect consequences of harmful wrongdoing in
addition to direct impacts, which are normally considered in litigation. Thus, the case
of Lliuya versus RWE, which is currently (mid 2018) in the evidentiary stages after
having been admitted to a higher regional court in Germany, is exemplary in two
regards. It is considered the first case on L&D in Germany and elsewhere, as several
tort-based cases have been rejected by, for example, courts in the USA. It also inno-
vatively seeks remuneration for risk management efforts to be undertaken to avoid
future, irreversible risk (loss of life) associated with glacial lake outburst flooding
affected by glacial retreat attributed with high confidence to anthropogenic climate
change (see chapter by Frank et al. 2018). Given the many technical difficulties to
be addressed, for legal actions overall, it may be interesting to consider working
with a so-called modified general causation test—as has been done successfully for
other risk classes, such as tobacco, nuclear risk etc. (see chapter by Simlinger and
Mayer 2018). This would mean focusing on proving that GHG emissions are gener-
ally capable of causing damages and that a causal link between action and damage
is probable. Such a rationale would render the requirement to attribute a specific
climatic event to the emissions of a specific person or entity unnecessary. Therefore,
a lack of attribution evidence may not necessarily be a limiting factor in some legal
responses. Overall, attribution research has the potential for much broader applica-
bility. It has an important role to play in helping to understand losses and damages,
including through the quantification of risks; investigating the relative importance of
different drivers of change; and identifying timescales on which significant impacts
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of climate change emerge in different regions of the world. All of these applica-
tions are fundamental to informing actions to address, avert and minimise losses and
damages.
Proposition 3 Climate change researchhas focusedonunderstandingphysical/hard
limits to adaptation, but less so on the soft limits, which are strongly shaped by social
processes. Applying a multiple lines of evidence framework, we find that soft limits to
intolerable risk are already being breached in several geographies globally. Climate
change is a key factor, yet exposure growth and vulnerability dynamics particularly
need attention for a comprehensive understanding.
While research on adaptation limits is still in its infancy, the L&D debate has
had some focus on adaptation limits, which have been defined as points beyond
which actors’ objectives are compromised by intolerable risks. Adaptation research
has focused on how climate-related hazards lead to hard adaptation limits, that is,
where no adaptive technologies and actions are feasible anymore (see also chapter
by van den Homberg and McQuistan 2018). Soft adaptation limits, characterised
by a lack of options and concurrent socio-economic trade-offs, have received less
attention. In addition, empirical research on losses and damages has only recently
started to consider the mediating role of ecosystems and their services provided
to society (van der Geest et al. 2018). Notably, a very recent volume co-edited by
Johanna Nalau, an author in this book, provides a first comprehensive overview
of research and experience on adaptation limits (see Filho and Nalau 2018). As
one methodological contribution along a multiple lines of evidence approach, risk
analysis shows away forward for identifying hard andparticularly soft limits. Starting
with risk identification for assessing risks in monetary and/or non-monetary terms,
the process of risk evaluation examines the ability of agents (households, private and
public sectors) to respond to risk leading to qualifications and quantifications of risk
(in)tolerance.
The cases presented in this volume provide a multiple lines of evidence approach
for considering any actual or potential adaptation limits. The research documented
in the book has generated evidence that poor and vulnerable people and communities
already persist at the edges of these boundaries and limits. Overall, the case studies
in this book report multiple instances where soft and hard adaptation limits are (at
risk of) being breached. Climate change is generally a key factor, yet other drivers
and constraints also need to be understood and addressed. In addition, observed vul-
nerability dynamics imply that adaptation and building resilience lead to reductions
in vulnerability.
Pacific Island states are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise, high tides, and
salinisation, but also to droughts. Some communities experience seasonal food short-
ages, and malnutrition is common, indicating that part of the Pacific (as discussed
for the state of Vanuatu) is already at or near the tolerable/intolerable interface. As a
result, relocations and some resettlement are already occurring or planned (Handmer
and Nalau 2018). As people move, understanding the means through which SIDS
migrants maintain cultural traditions and the challenges current migrants face can
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help address potentially irreversible, but avoidable, losses of cultural traditions in the
event of mass displacement as analysed for the Marshall Islands (Heslin 2018).
Faced with the increasing impacts of climate change and recognising that gains
in development and poverty alleviation are severely hampered by climate change,
the government of Bangladesh is planning to set up a national L&D mechanism
to support those that have already incurred significant losses and damages beyond
adaptation (Haque et al. 2018). Flood climate risk management case studies on
Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Peru show limits to adaptation due to inadequate
transboundary governance, insufficient devolution of mandates and funding to lower
administrative levels, as well as inadequate access to and use of technology (chapters
by Mechler et al. 2018b; van den Homberg and McQuistan 2018).
A case study on the Sahel and the semi-arid drylands of East Africa discusses
how climate variability and change have affected primary productivity and food
production as supporting and provisioning ecosystem services. Losses and damages
reported in this context are livestock losses, food insecurity, displacement, cultural
losses (including traditional livelihood systems), and finally, conflict related to these.
The case also shows that oversimplification must be avoided in a context of multiple
risk factors, including the governance ormanagement of natural resources. Examples
for risk factors presented are a lack of investment in water-related infrastructure, gaps
in access to agricultural technology, barriers to pastoralists’ freedom of movement,
or lack of health care services, which have also contributed to increasing losses and
damages (van der Geest et al. 2018).
Migration, particularly if forced, is an example of “beyond the limits of adapta-
tion.” Contextualising migration as multifactorial, a selection of cases including sea
level rise in Pacific Island States, cyclonic storms in Bangladesh, and desertifica-
tion in West Africa, as well as deforestation in South America’s Southern Cone,
presents instances of migration driven by climate change and variability, as well as
other factors (Heslin et al. 2018). The Arctic case on relocation and outmigration
provides examples of instances “beyond adaptation” due to institutional, political,
organisational and jurisdictional factors hindering implementation of adaptation to
climate impacts, thus leading to losses and damages (Landauer and Juhola 2018).
Proposition 4 Insurancemechanisms can only serve the prevention and cure aspects
emphasised in the L&D debate if they are made affordable with support from outside
the insurance pool, and if they are purposefully designed to encourage or prescribe
risk reduction. While their applications are limited to sudden onset events, insurance
instruments can help to explore adaptation frontiers, inwhichmany factors, including
technology, play a role.
Climate insurance has been one of the foci of debate on L&D and the WIM
work plan. Recent experience, however, shows that insurance instruments can only
serve as a risk-reducing and equitable response to losses and damages from weather
extremes in developing countries if they are designed to explicitly reward risk-
reducing behaviour and if they are supported by those outside the insurance pool.
Commercial insurance is based on the principle of mutuality, according to which the
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insured participate in a disaster pool according to their risk class and pay a risk-based
premium. Thus, the commercial insurance approach, unless subsidised or otherwise
supported, does not share risk beyond the at-risk insured community.
This stands in contrast to most micro-insurance and regional insurance pools,
which for themost part receive substantial support from the international community.
Support appears to be increasingly based on the concept of solidarity, consistent with
the humanitarianprinciples underlyingdevelopment assistance, andnot on attribution
or responsibility for climate change impacts experienced by vulnerable countries. A
common challenge with the solidarity principle, which features subsidies and other
support to reduce premiums, is its failure to incentivise policyholders to reduce
their risk. In meeting this challenge, international financial institutions, development
agencies and other donorswill need to reconcile the contending equity and preventive
objectives in their support of climate insurance programs.
Two examples of insurance instruments serving the poor, the African R4 micro-
insurance program and the African Risk Capacity (ARC) regional insurance pool,
combine these goals. Neither is a commercial insurance enterprise; neither is fully
characterised by risk-based premiums underlying the principle ofmutuality; and both
are highly subsidised. The R4 program’s success has largely been attributed to its
close connection with public safety net programs in the participating countries, while
ARC requires member governments to develop disbursement plans to ensure that the
most vulnerable parts of the population benefit from the macro scheme. Moreover,
ARC’s innovative Extreme Climate Facility (XCF) program may additionally bring
in the concept of accountability, motivated by a perceived ethical or legal obligation
for compensating those experiencing climate-attributed losses and damages, linked
to changes in observed extreme weather in the region (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018).
In general terms, insurance is a pre-arranged compensation mechanism for losses
incurred and can be offered by both private and public actors. Public relief or catastro-
phe funds serve a similar function, while neither collecting premiums nor (typically)
estimating risks. Many countries in the world have contingency funds to support
victims of disasters. In Bangladesh, there is debate on whether to set up a national
mechanism that would reimburse climate-related losses incurred by farmers and
households that go beyond their adaptation possibilities (for example, if flooding
pushes people to leave their homesteads or drought renders farming not profitable)
(Haque et al. 2018).
In such a context, insurance in a wider sense (including national compensation
pools) may innovatively be used as a navigational tool for exploring the adaptation
frontiers (broad loci around adaptation limits). Such exploration may involve: (i) sig-
nalling themagnitude, location, and exposure to climate-related risks and caseswhere
adaptation limits are approached or breached; (ii) supporting actors to move away
from adaptation limits through improved ex-ante decision making and incentivising
risk reduction and adaptation by creating a more certain environment for decisions
on climate resilient development; and (iii) enabling actors with access to appropriate
risk financing measures to remain in the tolerable risk space. One proposition is thus
to embed climate insurance and other related instruments in a comprehensive climate
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risk management approach accompanied by other risk reduction and management
strategies in international cooperation programs and projects (Schäfer et al. 2018).
Proposition 5 Policy deliberations have exhibited characteristics of a win-lose
negotiation “game.” A more inclusive narrative highlighting collective ambition,
mutual benefits and the role of transformation can point a way forward.
The L&D discourse has exhibited strong ethical and legal undertones appealing
to standards shared or agreed beyond the UNFCCC context, such as demanding
redistribution for harm via international customary law. While it is useful to prove
the need for action on L&D by appealing to moral standards recognised by both
contending parties in international arenas, a change of narrative may be conducive to
achieving collective action and to avoid turning the issue into a win-lose negotiation
“game” (chapter by Calliari et al. 2018).
With evidence that climate impacts and risks are also strongly affecting industri-
alised countries directly (e.g., Arctic) and indirectly (e.g., through migration), it may
be fruitful to frame the debate in terms of the benefits that acting on adaptation and
its possible limits and failures could bring for developed countries. Considerations
could range from working towards more resilient global supply chains to gaining
support for climate displacement and refugees. Exploring mutual gains would con-
tribute to bolstering collective action on an issue of common concern, as well as to
elevate and better integrate L&D into other climate negotiation agenda items, such
as capacity building, technology and the global stocktake.
A general and joint entry point is the SDG agenda, essentially supporting UN
member states’ transformation around a set of global developmental goals. The
SDGs, passed in 2015, constitute a universal set of 17 goals and 169 targets defining
development aspiration and ideally, collective transformation for all signatory coun-
tries (UN 2015). The SDG debate casts an integrated and unifying perspective on
development. Integrated—as it requires a synergistic look across these broad devel-
opment goals, and unifying—as it involves all signatories (Dodds and Donoghue
2016). Risk is fundamental in many regards. There are down-side risks (disasters
and climate-related impacts as at the heat of the L&D discourse), which are explic-
itly and implicitly mentioned in many of the SDGs. The need for and benefits of
up-side risk taking through increased investment into the socio-economic develop-
ment objectives is another one of the cross-cutting issues.
Transformative risk management, which, as we argue, should be one of the pillars
of the L&D policy space, thus may be one of those issues of common concern
(Schinko et al. 2018). Innovative polycentric science-society partnership models
are springing up to support the implementation of transformative risk management
options that manage critical disaster risks “on the ground”. Evidence from hotspots,
not only has potential to inform better development policies, but may also support
actions in industrialised countries facing similar issues (Mechler et al. 2018b). The
role of technology is crucial in this context, as it shapes risks and limits to adaptation
and risk management. Yet, access in developing countries is constrained. National
hydrological and meteorological services in developing countries, for example, are
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limited in their possibilities to improve the spatial and temporal resolution of flood
forecasts. This is because these countries lack the funding and capacity necessary to
use state-of-the-art technology (i.e., computing power, advanced hydrological and
meteorological models) and acquire or collect more granular data, such as digital-
elevation-model data. In addition, the poor and the vulnerable can often not benefit
from early warning/early action information due to the digital divide.
As an area of future work, progressive levels of innovation and technology are
required to lead from incremental to transformative change, where the UNFCCC’s
Technology Mechanism can play a more prominent role (van den Homberg and
McQuistan 2018). The WIM Executive Committee may innovatively consider an
assessment of technologies from a climate justice perspective, which means rethink-
ing access, use, innovation, finance, and (bottom-up) governance mechanisms from
the perspective of the poor and vulnerable.
Enabling joint learning regarding technologies (and other means of implemen-
tation) for buffering against high-level risks is necessary for understanding how to
overcome soft and avoid hard limits. This may be appealing for developed and devel-
oping countries sharing similar exposure and risk, where limits to adaptation need
attention (e.g., in the Arctic, mountain areas with glacial retreat, etc.). A joint narra-
tive will be needed to support and incentivise the requisite transformation of energy
generation, consumption, but also adaptation efforts across the globe. An improved
understanding of actual and potential “dangerous interference with the climate sys-
tem” at risk management scales and across geographies may indeed be a decisive
enabler.
1.6 Conclusions
The book has been a joint effort of the Loss andDamageNetwork that brings together
scientists and practitioners frommore than 40 institutions around the globe to inform
the L&D debate. Offering a detailed overview of the multiple facets of knowledge
emerging on the topic of L&D, the volume is a first comprehensive review of the
state of play regarding the science, political debate, practice as well as any policy
proposals seeing or looking for implementation. TheWIM is nowwell into its 5-year
work plan, and after COP23 in Bonn, the first climate summit chaired by a small
island state (Fiji), theWIM stands to deliver on its various workstreams. In 2018, one
focus is on the role of finance in supporting actions to address L&D, for which the
so-called Suva expert dialogue was carried out in mid-2018 to project a way forward.
This and other activities will inform the review of the WIM by the UNFCCC Parties
during sessions of the subsidiary bodies in 2019, leading to proper review at COP25
in Rio. As we demonstrated, the science has matured, and interest in the issues is
increasing. The IPCC has started to pick up on the discussion and considers L&D
in its 1.5 °C report published in October 2018, in special reports on oceans and the
cryosphere, and land, as well as in its 6th Assessment Report due in 2022.
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Further work is to be done, ideally in close collaboration with policy advisors,
negotiators, civil society, private- and public-sector representatives and, particularly,
those vulnerable people and communities around the world that are actually and
potentially affected by climate-related impacts and risks. The partners in the Loss
and Damage Network stand ready to further contribute to the debate and help to
identify actions to avert, address and minimise Loss&Damage.
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Abstract This chapter lays out what we take to be the main types of justice and
ethical challenges concerning those adverse effects of climate change leading to
climate-related Loss and Damage (L&D). We argue that it is essential to clearly
differentiate between the challenges concerning mitigation and adaptation and those
ethical issues exclusively relevant for L&D in order to address the ethical aspects
pertaining to L&D in international climate policy. First, we show that depending
on how mitigation and adaptation are distinguished from L&D, the primary focus
of policy measures and their ethical implications will vary. Second, we distinguish
between a distributive justice framework and a compensatory justice scheme for
delivering L&D measures. Third, in order to understand the differentiated remedial
responsibilities concerning L&D, we categorise the measures and policy approaches
available. Fourth, depending on the kind of L&D and which remedies are possible,
we explain the difference between remedial and outcome responsibilities of different
actors.
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2.1 Introduction
Debate in ethics concerning climate change has mainly investigated questions of
how to deal with mitigation and adaptation. Much of the debate has been on climate
justice asking how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mitigation and adapta-
tion fairly; dealing with the rights of those facing the impacts of climate change; or
discussing the individual moral duty to change lifestyles in order to contribute to cli-
mate protection. An important detail of this debate is that mitigation and adaptation
are often discussed under one and the same heading. Potential differences between
duties related to climate change mitigation and those of adaptation are rarely anal-
ysed. Research dealing with this distinction, however, shows that there are crucial
differences between the ethical challenges of mitigation and those of adaptation
(Jagers and Duus-Otterström 2008; Wallimann-Helmer 2015, 2016). We build on
this distinction to discuss a further distinctive area of climate change research and
policy: the adverse effects of climate change leading to climate related Loss and
Damage (for short: L&D). As we argue and demonstrate throughout, in order to
address the ethical aspects pertaining to L&D in international climate policy it is
essential to clearly differentiate between the challenges concerning mitigation and
adaptation and those ethical issues exclusively relevant for L&D.
This chapter lays out what we take to be the main ethical challenges concerning
climate L&D. Building on this diagnosis, we develop criteria to categorise measures
as being appropriate for dealing with L&D and analyse how the responsibilities com-
ing with these measures must be distributed to be just. First, we show that depending
on how mitigation and adaptation are distinguished from L&D, the primary focus
of policy measures and their ethical implications will vary (2.2). Second, we distin-
guish between a distributive justice framework and a compensatory justice scheme
for delivering L&Dmeasures.We discuss some theoretical advantages of distributive
justice frameworks, but do not decide the issue. One key advantage for a distributive
justice approach is that it covers all L&D rather than only the fraction that is anthro-
pogenically induced (2.3). Third, in order to understand the types of measures that
these justice approaches could apply to, we analyse the appropriateness of different
measures and policy approaches available (2.4). Fourth, depending on the kind of
L&D and which remedies are possible, responsibilities of different actors are found
to vary (2.5). In particular, we discuss the distinction between remedial responsibil-
ity and outcome responsibility. Overall, while our primary aim here is to map out
the most important arguments and principles in climate ethics dealing with L&D,
we also argue that the capacity to most efficiently and effectively contribute to even
out undeserved harm from L&D is crucial. One of our suggestions is that it is the
differentiated capacities of those able to support the ones in need of assistance that
should matter the most when differentiating remedial responsibilities to tackle L&D.
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2.2 Two Approaches to Distinguish Between Adaptation
and L&D
Some argue that the three pillars of climate policy at the UNFCCC level are miti-
gation, adaptation, and L&D (see introduction by Mechler et al. 2018; chapter by
Calliari et al. 2018). While mitigation can be distinguished from adaptation quite
easily (mitigation involves reducing GHG emissions and enhancing sinks and reser-
voirswhereas adaptation involves the processes, practices, and structures tomoderate
potential negative impacts), L&D is more challenging to differentiate from adapta-
tion. Nevertheless, we can adopt a standard definition which helps to separate the
two: in a climate change context, L&D may refer to actions dealing with the resid-
ual, adverse impacts of climate change which remain after mitigation and adaptation
measures have been adopted (Mace and Verheyen 2016). We call this the “beyond
adaptation” approach. This is similar to what the parties to the UNFCCC acknowl-
edge in Decision 2/CP.19 when they state that L&D “involves more than, that which
can be reduced by adaptation” (UNFCCC 2014).
In the literature, an alternative approach to the distinction is that adaptation
involves responses to keep risks within the range of tolerable risk whereas L&D
involves responses to risks that cannot be kept within the range of tolerable risks
and so become intolerable. This means that despite adaptation measures these risks
exceed socially negotiated norms or values defining tolerability (Dow et al. 2013a, b;
Wallimann-Helmer 2015; see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018). We call this the “risk
tolerance” approach. Depending on which of these approaches is chosen, different
kinds of responsibilities and measures will become the primary focus of policy. In
the following, we first show why this is the case and then argue why in setting these
priorities both approaches complement each other.
The question of which responsibilities and measures the “beyond adaptation”
approach encompasses can be elaborated by considering whether the climate-related
impacts cannot be avoided or will not be avoided in the future by mitigation or
adaptation (Mace and Verheyen 2016). In the literature, this same distinction has
also been discussed in terms of unavoidable and unavoided impacts (Roderick and
Verheyen 2008). According to this approach, a key reason why some adaptation
measures that could have been taken will not be taken is that actors may be subject to
socio-economic constraints. Typically, L&D measures are not taken due to a lack of
international financing, implementation restrictions, or political constraints leading
to soft and hard limits (Chambwera and Mohammed 2014). The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sees soft limits if adaptation constraints can in
principle be overcome in contrast to hard adaptation limits, where constraints lead
to limits that cannot be overcome (Klein et al. 2014).
To illustrate this, imagine a scenario in which members of the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS), without international financing, may be unable to afford
large-scale beach renourishment needed to guard against the impacts of high sea
level rise. In turn, such adaptation would be taken were there sufficient financial (or
other) resources available. The impacts associated with the inability to conduct such
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large-scale beach renourishment can be considered losses and damages that will not
be avoided. But it does not fall within the category of hard adaptation limits: impacts
that cannot be avoided. Impacts that cannot be avoided are losses and damages that
will materialize whatever measures are taken to adapt. For instance, AOSIS groups
relocating due to sea-level rise that leads to loss of their homelands and damages to
many of their valued assets (see chapters by Handmer and Nalau 2018; Heslin 2018).
These losses and damages, which comprise market and non-market values, cannot
be avoided by adapting to the new conditions regardless of the level of financial and
other assistance.
This first “beyond adaptation” approach distinguishes L&D from adaptation
by focusing on whether the different impacts can be avoided or will be avoided
by appropriate measures without any assessment by those facing potential L&D.
This is different from the “risk tolerance” approach. This second approach to
distinguishing between adaptation and L&D focuses on how those facing the
risks of L&D evaluate these risks. Risks of climate impacts that are judged to be
intolerable are considered L&D and are contrasted with tolerable risks that are
understood to be avoidable through adaptation (Dow et al. 2013a, b; Mechler and
Schinko 2016; Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Such an evaluation of risks as intolerable,
and thus relevant for L&D, presupposes value judgments that can only be taken
by those facing those risks. Thus, according to the “risk tolerance” approach, it is
crucial that those potentially facing climate impacts can assess the risks they are
facing. Since different communities might assess similar risks differently, they will
demand different measures that might fall within either the category of adaptation
or L&D (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018).
The “risk tolerance” approach primarily relies on the value judgments of those
facingpotential climate impacts. This not only showswhy, according to this approach,
the distinction between adaptation andL&Dtends to be blurred. It also showswhy it is
most probably associated with a primary concern to foster appropriate structures and
institutions for collective decision-making and capacity building within and among
potentially impacted communities. The decisions regarding what measures should
be taken, by whom and how they should be implemented are relegated to secondary
importance. Thus, priorities regarding climate L&D tend to differ depending on
the way of distinguishing adaptation from L&D (see Table 2.1). For the “beyond
adaptation” approach, priority lies with fostering implementation of efficient and
effective L&D measures, i.e. measures not being prone to soft and hard adaptation
limits. For the “risk tolerance” approach, in contrast, priority lies with supporting
capacity building in order for communities facing climate impacts to be better able
to collectively assess the risks they face.
Thus, while the first approach to distinguishing adaptation and L&D mainly
focuses on the impacts and the measures they demand to differentiate responsibili-
ties, the second approach primarily derives the responsibilities to be differentiated
from whether and to what extent capacity building is necessary. On the “risk toler-
ance” approach, although support for implementing L&D measures is of secondary
concern, it may in fact be more effective for support to be provided if needed. As
suggested by adaptation research, implementation of L&D measures is likely to be
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Table 2.1 Difference in policy priority depending on how adaptation and L&D are distinguished
Beyond adaptation Risk tolerance
1st policy
priority
Implementing the most efficient and
effective measures to deal with
unavoided and unavoidable L&D
Fostering collective decision-making
and capacity building to assess
climate risks as acceptable, tolerable
or intolerable
2nd policy
priority
Involving local communities to secure
efficient and effective implementation
of measures to be taken
Implementing those measures
understood to be most efficient and
effective to deal with the threats as
evaluated
more effective and efficient if accompanied by capacity building and involvement of
local communities in decisions andmanagement (cf. Kaswan 2016). Responsibilities
for capacity building and fostering involvement thus also follow as important con-
cerns when distributing responsibilities from the “beyond adaptation” perspective
to distinguish adaptation and L&D. Even though the two approaches to distinguish
adaptation and L&D tend to set different priorities, the foci they suggest regarding
the measures to be taken complement each other.
This is so, because, regardless of the approach used to distinguish L&D from
adaptation, in the end L&D concerns impacts that are in fact expected to materialise.
Thus, L&D measures are expected to respond to or minimise the socio-economic or
human effects of these impacts, but these measures are not expected to prevent these
impacts altogether. In practical terms, they are expected to e.g. enhance transforma-
tive capacities to comprehensively deal with climate-related risks beyond traditional
adaptation or to enhance trust and respect between countries facing L&D and those
contributing to it.1 Consequently, preventing climate impacts from materialising is
a goal only to be ascribed to mitigation and adaptation—but not to L&D measures.
There are a variety of measures which can be used to address L&D demanding dif-
ferent kinds of responsibilities, which we classify below (Sects. 2.3 and 2.4). Before
it is possible to come to this classification, however, wemust first be clearer about the
nature of measures that can fall within the category of L&D. In this regard and as dis-
cussed below, paragraph 52 of decision 1/CP.21 accompanying the Paris agreement
becomes highly relevant.
2.3 Neither Compensation Nor Liability Under
the UNFCCC
When a damage or a loss occurs, it seems natural to ask who is liable for that
harm and to demand repair or compensation of the damage or loss (Shue 1999,
2017). This is why the most natural way to investigate the ethical implications of
1For discussion of this latter point see Cohen (2016), O’Neill (2017), Thompson and Otto (2015).
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L&D would be by considering compensatory or rectificatory justice. These kinds
of justice considerations define the appropriate remedy for a damage or a loss. A
classical compensatory principle, for example, demands that the victim is made
whole again. The victims should find themselves in the same condition as they had
been before infliction; to wit, as they would have been had the harm never occurred
(Wallimann-Helmer 2015; Page and Heyward 2016). According to considerations of
compensatory justice it is key to identify the inflictors contributing to the occurrence
of harm, because, according to the most common understanding of compensation,
those causing harm are seen as liable to make those they inflicted whole again.
In terms of climate L&D, such a principle requires that those facing L&D should
be made whole again by those liable for these harms. This is first and foremost the
major greenhouse gas emitters who contribute or have contributed themost to climate
change and in so doing to climate-related L&D.
Although such considerations of compensatory justice are plausible and impor-
tant, in the following we argue that a different justice framing of how to consider
the ethical implications of climate L&D must be considered alternatively or in con-
junction with the intuitive compensatory view. This alternative framing is based on
considerations of distributive justice. There are at least two reasons for considering
this alternative framework. First, on pragmatic grounds in light of paragraph 52 of
decision 1/CP.21 such an alternative framing may make acceptance of L&D mea-
sures among potential donor countries more feasible, at least under current political
conditions. This is so, because decision 1/CP.21 makes explicit that “Article 8 of the
[Paris] Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensa-
tion” (UNFCCC 2015).2 Second, this alternative framing allows to fully capture the
exigence of those actually facing L&D since it allows not only assignment of reme-
dial responsibilities for anthropogenic climate L&D as is the case with compensatory
claims but also responsibilities for L&D caused by natural climate variability (reme-
dial responsibilities are discussed at greater length in 2.5). Compensatory justice is
only owed for anthropogenic L&D because, conceptually speaking, those inflicting
harm on others are only under a duty to compensate for the harms they cause while
natural climate variation is not addressed. For the remainder of this section we elab-
orate on the differences between compensatory and distributive justice framings (see
Table 2.2).
Compensatory Justice
To better understand the differences in framing ethical implications of L&D in terms
of distributive justice, it is helpful to clarify some issues in analysing these impli-
cations from the perspective of compensatory justice. We can distinguish several
prominent and intuitively plausible principles to justify duties of compensation (cf.
Gardiner et al. 2010). As already mentioned, in the case of L&D the most plausi-
ble responsibility bearer for compensatory duties is the emitter. The corresponding
principle of justice is usually called the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). A second
prominent principle of justice to warrant compensatory duties identifies the benefi-
2For other readings on the legal perspective see for example Lees (2016), Mayer (2017) and the
chapter by Simlinger and Mayer (2018).
2 The Ethical Challenges in the Context of Climate Loss and Damage 45
Table 2.2 Overview of differences between analysing L&D within a framing of compensatory
justice and distributive justice
Compensatory justice Distributive justice
Scope Differentiating responsibilities
in light of compensatory reasons
and liability
L&D understood as undeserved
harm demanding redistribution
to even out this unfairness
Redistribution based on Wrongful emitting Undeserved harms
Temporal context Backward-looking Forward-looking
Implementation horizon Long-term, once attribution
challenges can be tackled
Short- to medium-term, while
attribution challenges still exist
and are a main barrier
ciary of emissions as responsible for providing compensation. This is the Beneficiary
Pays Principle (BPP). In the literature, both principlesmost often identify individuals
as responsibility bearers. But they can also refer to corporations or countries. This is
why sometimes a third principle in some sense combining the first two is invoked.
The Community Pays Principle (CoPP) ascribes the responsibility for compensation
to the polluting and benefitting community. All three principles assign liability for
compensation either to the polluters (PPP), the beneficiaries (BPP) or communities
(CoPP).3 They hold that by emitting, these differing agents acquire responsibility
to make whole again those harmed by the consequences of their emissions. Thus,
decision 1/CP.21 seems to suggest, these agents become liable to compensate for the
L&D they are contributing to causing.
It is important to note that on ethical grounds compensatory duties for climate
L&D are more difficult to justify than it at first appears. There are at least three basic
problems for justifying compensation for L&D (Meyer andRoser 2010;Meyer 2013;
Kolstad et al. 2015): a. Potential duty bearers might not have wrongfully emitted by
exceeding their fair shares of emissions and thus have not acquired any legitimate
compensatory duties; b. Potential duty bearers might have been (blamelessly) igno-
rant about the harmfulness of their emissions and can therefore not be said to be
(fully) responsible to compensate; and c. Potential recipients might be said not to
be wrongfully harmed since they are only wrongfully harmed if they are worse off
due to (wrongful) emissions than they would otherwise be or if they fall below a
specified threshold of harm due to (wrongful) emissions (or both).4
3Although we discuss these three principles as principles identifying the bearers of compensatory
duties, these principles, and especially the beneficiary pays principle have also be shown to be
important in identifying the bearers of duties of distributive justice (see Meyer and Sanklecha
2017).
4By such a threshold of harm, we mean that there is some sufficient (not necessarily minimal)
level of well-being and any individual who falls below that is thereby harmed, regardless of the
counterfactual arrangements (cf. Meyer 2003). In other words, individuals could be harmed by
being below the threshold even if they had never had their interests thwarted by any other particular
individual.
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The challenges associated with identifying the legitimate agents to pay compen-
sation and the legitimate claimants of compensation narrow down the number of
potential recipients of compensatory payments. This number decreases even more
when considering the conceptual challenge that strictly speaking compensation can
only be demanded for anthropogenically induced L&D but not for natural climate
variability (Huggel et al. 2016; Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Natural disasters without
any human cause are tragic and individuals being threatened need to be assisted.How-
ever, this requirement of assistance can only be justified on humanitarian grounds and
for reasons of distributive justice. They cannot be addressed by appeal to compen-
satory justice. This is why, in practice, compensatory claims for some specific (risk
of) L&D demand the detection of anthropogenic cascades demonstrating why this
L&D can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change (Huggel et al. 2013). Hence,
the worry for the advocate of compensatory justice is that some victims of climate
L&D might not be harmed in a normatively relevant sense, whereby considerations
of compensation become unsuitable. Elaborating on these difficulties by considering
individuals as duty bearers and claimants, it becomes possible that many emitters
and legitimate claimants are not identified either as duty bearers or victims. Emitters
only emitting within the limits of their fair shares cannot be identified as liable for
compensation. Similarly, those individuals not wrongfully harmed, are not entitled
to any compensatory payments. These reasons can be taken to be decisive against
addressing L&D in terms of compensatory justice. However, considering the CoPP
both these challenges must be qualified.
According to the assessments of the IPCC and the agreements under theUNFCCC
countries, to wit communities, can definitively be identified as wrongful emitters not
being legitimately excused by ignorance (Meyer and Sanklecha 2017). At least some
agents of industrialised country parties (its citizens, companies or the countries as a
whole) definitively exceed their fair shares of emissions (Shue 2017). Furthermore,
with the publication of the first IPCC report it becomes difficult to argue for excusable
ignorance from 1990 onwards. This suggests ways of how some of the challenges
above can be met. However, even though industrialised countries and at least some
of their companies can potentially be identified as duty bearers, the CoPP still only
succeeds in justifying some compensation for L&D. As shown above, it can only
justify them for some L&D from climate change but not for all since it only warrants
payments for anthropogenic climate L&Dbut not for L&D caused by natural climate
variability. To be clear, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Many developing countries
facing climate L&D would already be much helped if they received some in contrast
to no assistance. In addition, a compensatory approach can be said to be simple
and more strongly in line with international law whereas distributive approaches
are relatively untested in international fora. For instance, considering environmental
issues in terms of reparations for injury has been dominant in legal history (the
influential Trail Smelter case is based on “no harm” considerations, see Simlinger
and Mayer 2018 for complexities in applying international environmental law to this
issue).
Despite these pragmatic advantages, however, from an ethical point of view it
seems highly problematic to only support those facing L&D in coping with part
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of the harm they face. This is so for three reasons. First, the fact that the main
L&D occurs in regions which historically have contributed far less to anthropogenic
climate change seems to unfairly burden those least responsible for these adverse
effects. Second, those regions and countries most burdened with L&D are often
(economically) less well equipped to manage climate impacts once they materialise.
Third and most importantly, since many adverse effects of climate change are not
immediate but linked to slow onset events, it seems appropriate to say that in many
regions of the world we find a situation of more or less acute emergency due to
climate change already.5 In our view, it seems clear that in a case of emergency,
someone is under duty to assist irrespective of whether that agent has caused the
threat (“remedial responsibility”). Such assistance usually is due up to the point
where those under threat are safe again. Thus, it seems inappropriate to only help
countries in need of assistance with L&D up to the point it can be attributed to
anthropogenic climate change and then leave them on their own. That would be
like helping someone drowning to as far to the shore as one has thrown him in, but
then swim away. Rescuing someone drowning means to try one’s best to bring him
safely to the shore irrespective of how much one contributed to the threat. Because
of this, we believe that even in cases in which no one can be ascribed compensatory
responsibility, all of those afflicted by climate L&D are entitled to assistance if they
do not have the capacity to make themselves whole again. This especially applies to
those who, due to climate L&D, fall below a specified threshold of harm.
Distributive Justice
Especially to meet this last challenge, we suggest to also considering an alternative
framingof the ethical implications ofL&D, namely the framingof distributive justice.
According to this alternative framing, rather than regarding L&D as reasons for
compensation only, L&D also provides reasons for redistribution due to undeserved
harms. That is, wrongful emitting would be relinquished as a relevant criterion to
identify the duty bearers for payments in case of L&D. Instead, the focus would be
on the wrongfulness of harms as defined from the perspective of distributive justice.
In other words, the alternative framing to be considered demands redistribution in
case of unfair disadvantage but not compensation due to wrongful emitting.
One way to distinguish between redistribution and compensation starts with the
premise that there is some baseline distribution of goods or bads that is just. This
baseline distribution is on the one hand determined by certain criteria or principles
of justice (such as the priority view, the strict egalitarian view or any other) and on
the other hand by legitimate changes to the distribution (as determined by criteria
or principles of justice) which someone experiences as a result of her own respon-
sible (and non-wrongful) choices. Deviations from this baseline then call for two
different kinds of reactions. In case the reaction the deviation calls for is based on
the wrongfulness of what occurred, we are operating in the realm of compensatory
justice. In case the reaction the deviation calls for is based on the idea of evening out
undeserved benefits or harms (which are due to bad luck, for example, or harmful
5Notably we here understand climate change to encompass both anthropogenic climate change and
natural climate variability.
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but non-wrongful actions), we are operating in the realm of distributive justice since
these undeserved benefits or harms demand redistribution (Meyer 2004; Meyer and
Roser 2010). On the distributional justice approach in the case of L&D, the situation
of communities, who just happen to have “bad luck” to be living in regions more
heavily exposed to climate change, calls for an evening out of these undeserved
harms.
Hence, if necessary to avoid political deadlock in light of decision 1/CP.21 and
to secure assistance not only for the part of L&D that is anthropogenic, but for all
L&D threatening countries and communities, one may speak in terms of undeserved
harms rather than focusing on impacts brought about by wrongful emitters demand-
ing compensation from those liable.Any responsibilities concerningL&Dwould then
be understood as responsibilities that fall into the category of redistribution. In this
manner, L&D-related responsibilities would be regarded as grounded in the objective
of levelling undeserved harms. So, on the one hand, what could be looked for are
ways of differentiating responsibilities without relying on the wrongfulness of emis-
sions, liability and compensation. However, on the other hand, as attribution research
matures and international climate policy develops, it may become more feasible to
rely on causal explanations to help determine the differentiation of responsibilities
in line with a compensatory approach (Boran and Heath 2016; Thompson and Otto
2015; see chapter by James et al. 2018), although doing so may be ambitious at this
point (Huggel et al. 2013; James et al. 2014; Huggel et al. 2016).6
2.4 Categorising L&D Measures to Differentiate
Responsibilities
The previous section leads to an important ethical consideration. Irrespective of the
justice framework applied, the fact that developing countries carry such a large share
of L&D cries out for some kind of response. Such a response makes it necessary
to clarify two issues. On the one hand, it is necessary to be clear about what kinds
of L&D can become relevant since these determine what approaches and policy
measures are most appropriate for either compensation or redistribution. On the
other hand, it is necessary to discuss how responsibilities to provide assistance should
be differentiated. Before analysing the differentiation of responsibilities in the next
section, here we discuss the first of these two issues. We argue that it makes a
significant difference which kinds of climate L&D are at stake since different kinds
of L&D demand different measures requiring varying forms of competence and
6To be sure, one implication of the distributive justice framing is that it brings legitimate claims
for assistance in case of climate L&D on a par with any other claims for assistance in case of
undeserved harm or even more generally any undeserved socio-economic disadvantage. This can
be considered a strength of this alternative framing, because it shows that climate L&D cannot
be appropriately dealt with in isolation (Caney 2012; Wallimann-Helmer 2015). However, it also
points to the weakness of this framing, namely that it expands concerns about L&D beyond what
is currently dealt with under the umbrella of the UNFCCC.
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Table 2.3 Indicative list of measures for different categories of losses and damages. Note that
listed measures are not exhaustive and that these measures could apply under both compensatory
or distributive justice framings
Replaceable L&D (economic
and some non-economic
L&D)
Non-replaceable L&D
(non-economic L&D)
Sudden-onset extremes
(insurable L&D)
Measures (A)
• Risk transfer
- Insurance (e.g. with
subsidised premiums)
- Micro insurance
- Insurance/Risk pools
- Catastrophe bonds
• National and international
disaster funds
• Risk reduction
- Early warning systems
- Preventive building
measures
- Planned relocation
• Technology transfer
Measures (B)
• Recognition of loss
(accompanied by financial
payments or not)
• Active remembrance (e.g.
through museum
exhibitions, school
curricula)
• Counselling
• Official apologies
Slow-onset processes
(non-insurable L&D)
Measures (C)
• Risk reduction
- Preventive building
measures
- Physical risk reduction
measures (sea walls)
- Planned relocation
• Technology transfer
• Risk transfer via catastrophe
bonds
• Redress
• Rehabilitation
Measures (D)
• Alternative livelihoods
provision
• Recognition of loss
(accompanied by financial
payments or not)
• Active remembrance (e.g.
through museum
exhibitions, school
curricula)
• Counselling
• Official apologies
involvement of those responsible to contribute to the measures to be taken (for an
overview of categories and measures see Table 2.3).7
L&D needs to be rectified in order to ensure justice. Within the distributive jus-
tice framework, this means redistribution aiming at a baseline distribution where no
undeserved harm had ever occurred. In case of climate impacts, this means aiming
at overcoming undeserved burdens on some regions, communities, and individu-
als due to climate variability and extremes. In contrast to compensatory claims for
redistribution to even out undeserved harms it is only necessary that the harm in
fact can be neutralised by human action. This makes the distributive framing more
comprehensive. It not only captures L&D caused by anthropogenic climate change
7By thus arguing we implicitly assume the ability-to-pay principle as the appropriate principle for
differentiating responsibilities. In the next section we explain more thoroughly how we think this
principle must be understood in case of L&D.
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but also climate impacts brought about by natural climate variability and extremes.
However, a large amount of the responsibilities involved by these considerations
does not concern natural climate variability but anthropogenic climate change. Most
responsibilities captured in a distributive framework would also directly apply in a
compensatory framework as well.
The categorisation of appropriate measures to respond to different kinds of L&D
significantly depends on whether the distinction between adaptation and L&D is
drawn using a “beyond adaptation” or a “risk tolerance” approach. While according
to the “risk tolerance” approach, the appropriateness of measures does depend on
how those potentially affected assess different kinds of risk for L&D, the “beyond
adaptation” approach can do so without involving them. Focusing on the “beyond
adaptation” approach for now, the relevant climate impacts concern L&D that cannot
and also in some cases will not be avoided. L&D that cannot be avoided must be
considered undeserved harm to the extent that those facing climate impacts did not
contribute to their occurrence. L&D thatwill not be avoided is undeserved harm to the
degree that it can be traced back to adaptation constraints that are not self-inflicted.
In both cases, redistributive responses will have to differ depending on whether they
are designed to deal with replaceable or non-replaceable values, values which can
be non-economic/non-market-based or economic/market-based L&D.
In the case of economic/market-based L&D, measures will have to either man-
age/transfer financial risks or to provide adequate monetary/financial redress for
L&D. However, in the non-economic case, novel approaches for ends-displacing
have to be identified (Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Many such assets (encompassing
material goods and non-material services) fall into the category of non-economic
values, which have entered the L&D discourse as the concept of non-economic
loss and damage or, after COP21 in Paris, non-economic losses (NELD; see also
chapter by Serdeczny 2018). Commonly cited examples of NELD include loss of
life, human health, cultural heritage, ecosystem services and indigenous knowledge
(e.g. Fankhauser et al. 2014; Morrissey and Oliver-Smith 2013). NELD can occur as
direct and indirect consequences of climate change, including negative side effects
of adaptation (Serdeczny et al. 2016). They share the criterion that they are not
commonly traded in the market.8
Non-economic L&D can be replaceable or non-replaceable. Non-replaceable,
non-economic L&D or simply “losses” might be perceived as losses of irreplaceable
ends by those affected. In other words, the assets lost in case of this kind of L&D
might be perceived as ends in themselves. Following Goodin (1983), characteristics
for regarding assets as irreplaceable are typically tied to (1) personal integrity, both
bodily and mentally; (2) history; and (3) variety. Many assets typically listed as
NELD correspond to these characteristics. Loss of cultural identity, sense of place or
indigenous knowledge, for example, are inextricably tied to a community´s integrity
(Bell 2004; Heyward 2014; Zellentin 2010, 2015). A fishing community having lost
its traditional fishing grounds will never be the same again because it lacks a central
8For this reason, “non-market losses” might be a more adequate description of such losses, but the
term was not adopted in the policy process.
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part of its own integrity. Loss of cultural heritage relates to historical characteristics,
where no replica of the lost object will be regarded as equivalent to the original.
Finally, biodiversity, another often quoted NELD distinct from ecosystem services,
is valued as an asset of variety.
Offsetting losses of irreplaceable ends necessarily relies on providing alternative
ends that are perceived by those affected as being able to provide a similar level of
wellbeing compared to before the loss. The fishermen’s community might receive
funding enabling them to become farmers with comparable income levels, food
security and social status as before. However, according to Goodin (1989), a shift
in preferences will have been forced upon them, infringing upon their integrity and
personal autonomy and ultimately leaving them in a state of undeserved harm. What
follows is that actions that inflict the loss of irreplaceable assets on others can never
be fully addressed by any amount of remedy. This is especially important considering
financial payments. Whatever amount of money is paid to a harmed community, if
the ends are irreplaceable, by definition such payments cannot make the community
whole again. But financial payments and other actions recognising the fact of unde-
served L&D are certainly important steps for regaining a just baseline distribution
(cf. Thompson and Otto 2015; Huggel et al. 2016).
Non-economic but replaceable values can either fulfil different ends or consti-
tute ends in themselves, with the distinction being culturally- or even individually-
contingent. Ecosystem services, for example, are often valued as a means because
they provide important resources for human health and nourishment. The value of
cultural heritage in turn might be understood by some as a means to the end of com-
munity identity or social stability or by others as an end in itself. In case the losses
are means towards some end, an appropriate response would ideally replace those
lost means, i.e. to provide those affected with new means to achieve the same ends
(cf. Goodin 1989). Following such an understanding, loss of ecosystem services (e.g.
health and nourishment) could sensibly be responded to by providing medication to
maintain human health and supporting agricultural production to maintain previous
(if adequate) levels of nourishment. In other words, in order to even out undeserved
harms due to climate change, non-economic values which fulfil ends require mea-
sures for their replacement by other non-economic values or byfinancial payments. In
contrast to irreplaceable assets, if non-economic values are perceived as replaceable,
the undeserved harm can be fully addressed and the just baseline can be maintained
despite infliction of harm. This is more clearly the case when economic assets are at
issue. In many cases, economic goods can be replaced by simply reimbursing their
economic costs or by providing a substitute of the same (market) value.
It is far from clear, however, what mechanisms will lead to progress in making the
most vulnerable more resilient to climate change. In line with policy proposals and
current literature on mechanisms to tackle L&D (e.g. AOSIS 2008; Burkett 2014;
Mace and Verheyen 2016; Mechler and Schinko 2016), we identify L&D measures
comprising the following three components (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018):
(1) Comprehensive risk management to support and promote risk management tools
to reduce the risk of future losses and damages in addition to mitigation and adap-
tation, (2) risk financing comprising risk-transfer, sharing and pooling to support
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particularly vulnerable countries to manage their increasing financial risks due to
increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events, and (3) curative measures
such as redress and rehabilitation mechanisms to tackle irreversible impacts due to
progressive slow-onset processes (e.g. sea level rise, ocean acidification, increasing
land and sea surface temperatures) and sudden-onset extreme events that cannot or
will not be avoided.
Factoring in the distinction between economic and non-economic L&D, it seems
clear that risk management and risk-financing mechanisms—the intuitively most
plausible tools to deal with L&D—will not be sufficient in all cases (Surminski
et al. 2016). This is why, in addition to comprehensive risk management, including
risk-financing tools such as insurance, we may require curative action for redress
and rehabilitation (Mechler and Schinko 2016). Such action may address a fur-
ther important pillar of L&D measures, namely climate-related impacts that are
deemed uninsurable. This is either because insurance is not the right instrument for
tackling certain climate-related impacts, particularly those linked to slow-onset pro-
cesses, such as loss of territory with attendant human displacement (Burkett 2014),
or because commercial insurance is just not economically feasible.
Furthermore, it not only makes a difference whether risks of climate impacts are
insurable or not. It also makes a difference whether L&D measures are designed to
tackle sudden-onset extreme events or slow-onset processes. While risk financing
instruments such as insurance are a theoretically feasible strategy to tackle extreme
event risks, insurance is not applicable to deal with potential L&D caused by slow-
onset processes. Indeed, insurance mechanisms also have been found to encounter
limitations even in the case of sudden-onset risks (Mechler et al. 2014; chapters
on insurance in this book by Schäfer et al. 2018 and Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018).
Insurance may only be available for certain risks within a certain probability range or
forwhatwould be considered “acceptable” by those underwriting to the “risks based”
distinction between adaptation and L&D and, hence, may not apply to L&D. Risk
transfer and sharing schemes do not directly reduce the probability of occurrence or
the severity of negative impacts from climate risks, although they can provide incen-
tives to that end (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 2009). Moreover, inappropriately
constructed insurance schemes can have unwanted consequences and may neither
benefit the poor nor foster climate resilience (Vivid Economics 2015).
What seems to be needed to appropriately address L&D is something like the
“Multi-Window Mechanism to address loss and damage” suggested by AOSIS
(AOSIS 2008) or what Roderick and Verheyen (2008) as well as Burkett (2014)
call a “Compensation Protocol” and a “Small Island Compensation and Rehabilita-
tion Commission to deal with impacts of slow-onset processes” (also cf. Boran and
Heath 2016).9 However, in our suggested framing the focus of such institutionswould
not only be on compensation and identifying the wrong-doers but rather on distribu-
tive justice. This would amount to redistributive mechanisms aiming at evening out
9The mechanism suggested by AOSIS consists of three inter-dependent components: (1) an insur-
ance component, (2) a rehabilitation/compensatory component, and (3) a risk management compo-
nent, which taken together aim at enhancing overall adaptive capacities in SIDS.
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undeserved L&D due to climate variability and extremes. What would be needed
is a coordinated redistributive scheme, which could be operationalised under the
UNFCCC as the body with the largest expertise and a clear focus on climate change
and relevant approaches to cope with it.
Notably, such a scheme neutralising undeserved L&D incorporating and combin-
ing all of the components of L&D measures mentioned in this section will require
substantial amounts of funding. Even though L&D is addressed in its own dedicated
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, no new funding stream for addressing L&D has
been created. Nevertheless, as Mace and Verheyen (2016) point out, Article 8.3’s
reference to ‘action and support’, which should come through the WIM and the par-
ties’ action, demands financial mechanisms. With the exception of early voluntary
commitments by developed countries to support the insurance component of L&D
measures, it remains an open question what kind of existing funding schemes could
be accessed or which additional funding windows should be established to address
further components of L&D measures. Based on the two framings of compensatory
and distributive justice, in the next section we set out to answer the question of who
bears what responsibility for providing adequate levels of assistance in financial and
non-financial terms to establish a comprehensive portfolio of L&D measures.
2.5 Differentiating Responsibilities for L&D Measures
Responsibilities will vary depending on whether we are adopting a compensatory or
a distributive approach. Regarding the former approach, it is necessary to determine
who or which groups have contributed to the harm. This is challenging from the point
of view of attribution science as well as the applicability of national and international
law (cf. chapter on attribution by James et al. 2018 and chapter on legal issues by
Simlinger and Mayer 2018). Regarding the latter approach, redistribution to secure
differentiated support for those facing L&D for undeserved harms is required. This
is challenging from the point of view of being considerably more ambitious and
counter to the agreements contained under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. However,
since we are addressing the demands of justice here, it may be that justice requires
radical restructuring. In this section we argue that in order to be effective and efficient
a scheme to tackle L&D must take into account differences in capacity to provide
specific support but also communal ties. Under a distributive framing, this leads to
an extended ability to pay principle, incorporating considerations concerning how to
most efficiently and effectively remedy undeserved harm due to L&D. According to
this scheme, depending on the kinds of L&D at issue, different countries and regions
have different duties in light of their abilities to pay. If adopting a compensatory
approach, ability to pay might be a mitigating factor, but the compensation would
primarily stem from the responsibility a group had for the occurrence of the harms
in question.
To clarify the distinction between responsibility for the occurrence of undeserved
harm and responsibility for remedy of harm we suggest to consider the distinction
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between outcome responsibility and remedial responsibility: outcome responsibil-
ity denotes responsibility for bringing about a certain state of affairs and remedial
responsibility denotes responsibility to even out harm (Hart and Honoré 2002; Hon-
oré 2010; Miller 2007). Whilst the first kind of responsibility is backward-looking
the second looks forward. In principle, both these conceptions of responsibility are
independent. Irrespective of whether or not someone brought about a certain harm,
she can be responsible to (help) remedy that harm. We believe that seeing somebody
drowning puts us under duty to help, irrespective of whether we are responsible for
that person drowning. By contrast, being outcome responsible for a certain harm
does not always imply responsibility to (help) remedy this harm. Somebody who
trips and falls thereby pushing another person in front of him might be responsible
in terms of outcome but not necessarily in terms of remedy. If the one pushing could
not avoid tripping and tripping is not due to a fault of her own then this is bad luck
for both persons involved but no one is usually seen under duty for remedy.
In order to legitimately claim a connection between outcome responsibility and
remedial responsibility, some kind of normatively relevant tie between the two must
be established. Miller (2007) suggests moral failure, responsibility for the outcome
and mere causal contribution as legitimate reasons for assigning remedial respon-
sibilities based on outcome responsibility. If this kind of connection is or can be
established, then we are in the realm of compensatory justice, because in this case it
is the assignment of responsibility for a certain state of affairs that justifies remedial
responsibility. Generally speaking, themost obvious way to differentiate responsibil-
ities in case of harm like climate L&Dwould be to assign responsibilities for remedy
in proportion to the contribution to the harm, like levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
In case of L&D, the reasons linking outcome responsibility to remedial responsibil-
ity would amount to wrongful emitting, non-wrongful but significant contribution
to the harm, or causal contribution. Whichever of these three reasons is operative in
justifying a connection between outcome responsibility and remedial responsibility,
it operates within the framing of compensatory justice. Those bringing about a harm
are assigned responsibilities to make whole again those whom were impacted by
their behaviour.
The potential reasons for linking outcome responsibility with remedial respon-
sibility mentioned above are backward-looking, as is compensatory justice. When
a harm has materialised, considerations of compensatory justice aim at identifying
those responsible for the harm in order to assign remedial responsibilities. However,
in light of our discussion such a (purely) backward-looking assignment of remedial
responsibilities may not be fully appropriate for two reasons. First, in light of para-
graph 52 of decision 1/CP.21 it may become politically unfeasible since it would
amount to compensation and liability. This means that a “responsibility vacuum”
might emerge when, for political reasons, duty-bearers do not step up to their reme-
dial responsibilities. Furthermore, only a portion of experienced L&D would be
covered were remedial responsibility to be based on outcome responsibility only. As
shown before, natural climate variability as well as socio-economic factors on the
ground contribute to much of the L&D as well.
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Relying on Miller (2007) once again, there are at least three additional reasons
allowing the differentiated assignment of remedial responsibilitieswithout relying on
backward looking considerations of outcome responsibility. That is, reasons appli-
cable within a distributive justice framing. First, and in modification of the already
mentioned BPP, those currently benefitting the most from emissions contributing to
climate change are most often those also financially and technologically best able
to foster L&D measures. Second, those with the best know-how to support one or
several of the three components (comprehensive riskmanagement, risk financing and
curative measures) of a comprehensive scheme of L&D measures mentioned before
can most efficiently and effectively provide assistance. Third, indigenous and other
cultural knowledge shared by communities affected not only leads to special duties
among them but also might help to provide more appropriate and effective support in
practice. In the case of many communities and countries, the assignment of remedial
responsibilities according to the first two reasons will most probably overlap because
both determine the developed country parties to the UNFCCC to be under remedial
duty. The third reason, by contrast, probably identifies developing country parties;
e.g. members of AOSIS, to be under specified remedial duties.
Following on from Sect. 2.3 and independent of the reasons employed to assign
remedial responsibilities, support must be differentiated at least along the following
two lines: (a) whether L&D is replaceable or not, and (b) whether L&D measures
shall tackle slow-onset processes or sudden-onset extreme events (see Table 2.3). The
discussion in the previous section reveals that the first type of differentiation roughly
corresponds but is not identical with the distinction between economic and non-
economic L&D. The second type of differentiation largely correlates with whether
L&D is insurable or not. These differentiations/categories need to be taken into
account because a comprehensive scheme to appropriately tackle climate L&Dmust
ultimately differentiate responsibilities in an efficient and effective way in order to
be considered just. Notably, in terms of support for L&D, pledging finance is likely
not enough and probably not the most efficient and effective form of support for
communities and countries in need of assistance.What is further needed is assistance
in capacity building and technology transfer in order for these communities to be
able to take action allowing them efficiently and effectively to mediate the social and
economic costs of climate L&D.
Transfer of technology without know-how available tends to be less effective. In
order to be effective, we claim that a fair differentiation of responsibilities must not
only befall those able to foster L&D measures but also those potentially harmed. As
already mentioned, the effectiveness of measures is substantially increased if those
profiting from them are also involved in their implementation andmaintenance. Sim-
ilarly, shared indigenous or cultural knowledge especially in countries and regions
facing similar risks of L&D can become relevant as well. We believe that such ties as
well as geographic proximity can significantly increase the efficiency and effective-
ness of implementation and maintenance of measures (Wallimann-Helmer 2016).
Furthermore, without transfer of know-how, pledging finance might contribute to
unfairness when it comes to applying for financial support to implement L&D mea-
sures. For instance, there is far less detected and attributed climate events in countries
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probably facing the most severe climate impacts (Huggel et al. 2016). This is not
only the case because in these regions of the world measurement stations are lacking
but also because there is missing capacity to establish and analyse the necessary data
for effective risk management.
According to these considerations for assigning remedial responsibilities in rela-
tion to the four categories of L&D measures, we believe that replaceable L&D can
most probably be moderated by appropriate schemes of risk management and detec-
tion in combination with mechanisms of risk financing like insurance (see Table 2.4).
This is especially the case if that L&D is of an economic nature and occurs due to
expected sudden-onset extreme events. Countries under the greatest duties in this
case are those able to financially contribute to these schemes and/or possessing the
know-how to assist in implementing them. However, responsibilities might befall
other countries when slow-onset processes are at issue since these processes might
contribute to non-replaceable and non-insurable L&D. Although in such cases finan-
cial payments might have great importance in the sense of providing recognition for
undeserved harms, transfer of know-how between communities with similar cultural
experiences and under similar threats of L&D seems to be central to efficiently and
effectively helping even out the undeserved harms due to climate change. In case of
non-replaceable L&D, ends-displacing becomes necessary, a competencemost prob-
ably possessed by those communities already having gone through similar processes
of transformation.
Deciding whether or not non-economic L&D can be deemed replaceable is an
issue that is not easily determined without involving those facing these impacts
(Wallimann-Helmer 2015). This is so, because by definition non-economic L&D is
not traded in the market and cannot be weight up with any established market price.
This also makes it difficult to decide whether or not non-economic but replaceable
L&Dcan be insured since for insurance assessment of the financial value in economic
terms becomes key. And even if non-economic L&D can be deemed insurable, its
value to be insured cannot objectively be decided without involving those whose
assets are potentially damaged or lost due to sudden-onset extreme events or slow-
onset processes. For these reasons, for differentiating remedial responsibilities we
believe it to be crucial to also consider the differentiated competences to foster
appropriate decision-structures and capacity building within potentially threatened
communities. Indeed, this may apply either relying on outcome responsibilities or
reasons independent of responsibilities for the occurrence of L&D.
Once appropriate decision-making structures and capacity are established within
communities and countries potentially threatened by climate L&D and in need of
assistance, they acquire remedial responsibilities to other threatened countries aswell
(Wallimann-Helmer 2016). Appropriate finance and technology provided, develop-
ing countries not only acquire responsibilities for implementing and maintaining
L&Dmeasures in their own regions. Since they also gain specific know-how on how
to most efficiently and effectively respond to the specific L&D they face, they also
become more responsible to assist those facing the same or similar L&D. Conse-
quently, the more developed the decision-structures and capacities in communities
initially in need of assistance become, the more they acquire responsibilities to assist
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Table 2.4 Categorisation of the differentiated remedial responsibilities of countries to foster L&D
measures without exclusively relying on outcome responsibility
Replaceable L&D (economic and
some non-economic L&D)
Non-replaceable L&D
(non-economic L&D)
Sudden-onset extremes
(insurable L&D)
For measures (A) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support risk transfer
(e.g. insurance or catastrophe
bonds) schemes
• financially support risk
reduction (e.g. preventive
building measures) and
relocation schemes
and/or
• provide technology and
know-how in setting up and
maintaining such schemes
For measures (B) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support securing
recognition, remembrance of
loss and counselling
and/or
• provide experience and
know-how how to overcome
loss
Slow-onset processes
(non-insurable L&D)
For measures (C) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support risk
reduction and relocation
schemes
• financially support catastrophe
bonds schemes for countries at
risk
and/or
• provide technology and
know-how in setting up and
maintaining such schemes
For measures (D) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support securing
recognition, remembrance of
loss and counselling
and/or
• provide experience and
know-how how to achieve
alternative livelihoods
other communities and countries still in need of assistance. To increase efficiency
and effectiveness, it seems plausible that those countries are also under a duty to
assist those in need of assistance who are facing similar (risks of) L&D as they were
or are threatened with themselves.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we aimed at mapping out the most important ethical considerations
relevant in case of climate L&D. Especially in light of the Paris Agreement and
the multi-causality of factors beyond anthropogenic climate change contributing to
L&D, we elaborated on the ethical implications of L&D—in the short to medium ter-
m—within a distributive framework. In addition to differentiating responsibilities in
light of compensatory considerations and liability, we argued that L&D could also be
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understood as undeserved harms demanding redistribution to even out unfairness. As
we have shown, evening out such unfairness demands being able to specify the mea-
sures exclusively relevant for L&D either defined as being beyond adaptation and/or
as intolerable levels of risks, where coping capacities of communities are breached.
However, regardless of the appropriate framing, it becomes essential to foster appro-
priate decision-making structures and capacity building for those facing the risks of
L&D. These capacities significantly contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of
L&D measures, measures which comprise a complex net of approaches including
comprehensive risk management, risk finance schemes and curative mechanisms.
The advantage of the alternative framing of distributive justice is to help overcome
political deadlock and potential conceptual confusion. Notably, we do not claim com-
pensatory justice to be irrelevant for differentiating responsibilities for L&D. Much
of our deliberationsweremotivated by paragraph 52 of decision 1/CP.21which posits
that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement does not provide any basis for compensation or
liability. From this we read that implementing support for L&D based on compen-
satory justice may be currently politically unfeasible. However, political infeasibility
is not to be mistaken with moral appropriateness. We have argued that the conditions
for compensatory justice to apply, i.e. no excusable ignorance and exceeding fair
shares of emissions, potentially limit the application of compensatory claims at the
individual level. Here, the difficulty in attributing L&D to anthropogenic climate
change poses a further practical challenge.
However, we also argued that these considerations must be qualified at the com-
munity level of whole countries: No country can be excused anymore for ignorance
after publication of the IPCC reports, and the emissions of a large number of countries
have been deemed to exceed fair shares on multiple accounts. According to these
considerations, compensatory justice thus clearly becomes relevant and should drive
action of countries under the UNFCCC from amoral point of view. Notably, it should
drive increasedmitigation ambition as it is clear that some of the losses due to climate
change are irreplaceable and those affected cannot be made whole again. But as long
as compensation for L&D creates political deadlock and in order to secure that those
under threat get full and not only partial assistance, a framework based on distributive
justice to even out undeserved harm should be considered relevant in implementing
practical approaches to L&D and identifying responsibilities for doing so as well.
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Chapter 3
Observed and Projected Impacts
from Extreme Weather Events:
Implications for Loss and Damage
Laurens M. Bouwer
Abstract This chapter presents current knowledge of observed and projected
impacts from extreme weather events, based on recorded events and their losses,
as well as studies that project future impacts from anthropogenic climate change.
The attribution of past changes in such impacts focuses on the three key drivers:
changes in extreme weather hazards that can be due to natural climate variabil-
ity and anthropogenic climate change, changes in exposure and vulnerability, and
risk reduction efforts. The chapter builds on previous assessments of attribution of
extreme weather events, to drivers of changes in weather hazard, exposure and vul-
nerability. Most records of losses from extreme weather consist of information on
monetary losses, while several other types of impacts are underrepresented, com-
plicating the assessment of losses and damages. Studies into drivers of losses from
extreme weather show that increasing exposure is the most important driver through
increasing population and capital assets. Residual losses (after risk reduction and
adaptation) from extreme weather have not yet been attributed to anthropogenic cli-
mate change. For the Loss and Damage debate, this implies that overall it will remain
difficult to attribute this type of losses to greenhouse gas emissions. For the future,
anthropogenic climate change is projected to become more important for driving
future weather losses upward. However, drivers of exposure and especially changes
in vulnerability will interplay. Exposure will continue to lead to risk increases. Vul-
nerability on the other hand may be further reduced through disaster risk reduction
and adaptation. This would reduce additional losses and damages from extreme
weather. Yet, at the country scale and particularly in developing countries, there is
ample evidence of increasing risk, which calls for significant improvement in climate
risk management efforts.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Impacts from Extreme Weather
Impacts from anthropogenic climate change are often equated with impacts from
weather-related natural hazards, such as floods, droughts and windstorms. Extreme
weather events can lead to substantial impacts, including loss of life, damages to
buildings, agricultural production andnatural capital, aswell as longer termeconomic
effects. The discussion on Loss and Damage from climate change therefore warrants
a discussion on the extent to which increases in impacts from extreme weather have
already occurred,what impacts can be expected in the future, andwhich losses cannot
be prevented or reduced through risk reduction and adaptation.
In this chapter “climate change” is defined according to the definition by the
Intergovernmental Panel (IPCC2012),which includes both natural variability, aswell
as human induced climate change fromanthropogenic forcing such as greenhouse gas
emissions. Losses and damages have varying definitions, and we discuss these in the
light of current understanding of impacts fromweather extremes. As explained in the
introductory chapter (Mechler et al. 2018), “losses” refer to monetary losses, while
“damages” are meant to cover non-monetary impacts as well as irreversible effects.
Losses from extreme weather can include both types; monetary losses (damages to
buildings and other property that can be repaired or replaced), as well non-monetary
impacts such as loss of life, health impacts, and irreversible damages such as coastal
erosion, ecosystem impacts and societal impacts (for instance retreat after severe
flooding).
Current understanding shows that the changes in impacts from extreme weather
hazards are largely moderated by the extent to which humans and assets are exposed
to these hazards, and to what extent they are vulnerable or sensitive to these haz-
ards. This implies that apart from the actual occurrence of the hazards, the level of
impacts—relevant to the Loss and Damage debate—is influenced by non-climatic
factors. Quantitative risk assessment methods and approaches practiced since many
decades in natural hazard research can help to assess risk from weather and geo-
physical extremes using the combination of these processes. The framework that
combines these elements of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability as developed by the
IPCC (2012) has now become widely accepted by the climate change research com-
munity to understand and study the occurrence as well as temporal changes in the
impacts from extremes (e.g. Huggel et al. 2013; see framework depicted in Fig. 3.1).
The hazard driver is influenced by changes in climate; both from anthropogenic
climate change, resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, as well as natural climate
variability. Exposure is influenced by changes in development, including population
growth and economic development that lead to increased accumulation of people
and capital assets in locations that are at risk from natural hazards. Vulnerability and
exposure may change because of adaptation and risk reduction actions that increase
the protection from weather hazards and reduce sensitivity to these extremes that
would otherwise results in negative impacts. Governance can influence land-use
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Fig. 3.1 Risk framework for the analysis of extreme event impacts. Source IPCC (2012)
planning that helps to reduce exposure, as well as the absorption of losses through
risk transfer such as insurance, thereby changing vulnerability.
3.1.2 Extreme Weather Impacts and Loss and Damage
Impacts from anthropogenic climate change are manifold, and there are mostly nega-
tive consequences, especially with higher rates of warming, as well as a few positive
effects. Here we focus on the impacts from extreme weather events. This provides
only a partial picture of Loss and Damage, as there may be negative consequences
from climate change that are not related to extreme weather events. Such impacts
occur because of more gradual shifts, often called slow-onset processes, in climate
variables such as average (seasonal) land-surface temperatures, average rainfall, as
well as other variables, such as sea-level rise, loss of ice and snow-cover, and increas-
ing temperatures of water bodies such as rivers, lakes and oceans. These impacts
include shifts or loss of ecosystems and biodiversity, coastal erosion and loss of
land, submergence of low-lying islands and atolls, changes in agricultural yield, and
loss of indigenous and cultural practices and traditions. Many of such impacts are
treated in this book in the chapters by Serdeczny (2018) and van der Geest et al.
(2018).
Still, a considerable share of impacts on natural and human systems is associated
with changes in weather extremes as a result of natural climate variability, and possi-
bly also anthropogenic climate change.Anadvantage for research is that impacts from
extreme weather events are relatively well-documented across the globe, compared
66 L. M. Bouwer
to impacts such from slow-onset events. Information on extreme weather impacts is
available in observation databases on past disasters collected by humanitarian and
development organisations and research institutes. Also, records of monetary losses
from extreme weather are collected by the insurance and reinsurance industry. In the
disasters and climate research community, the patterns and trends in these databases
have been studied extensively, and therefore several analyses are available in the
academic literature on observed impacts for many locations around the world, and
these analyses are discussed in this chapter.
With regard to climate losses and damages, the question is whether the records
of observed disaster losses are fit for the purpose of comprehensive monitoring and
analysing losses and damages from climate change. Gall (2015) provides a critical
review in this respect, and concluded that the scope of these databases needs to
be broadened, in particular with respect to slow-onset events, and include other
impacts besides direct economic losses, such as indirect impacts and losses. While
not exhaustive, the disaster loss records provide at this moment the best opportunity
to assess andmonitor changes in socioeconomic impacts, at least for extremeweather
and climate change.
In addition, many studies have projected future changes in risk from extreme
weather events, for the purpose of disaster risk reduction planning and climate adap-
tation. These studies also take into account future changes in hazard, exposure and
vulnerability, on the basis of physical modelling and scenarios (Bouwer 2013), and
therefore serve to indicate what impacts are expected for the near and more distant
future, that could inform Loss and Damage discussions.
As shown in other chapters such as the contribution by James et al. (2018), wider
definitions andviewpoints onLoss andDamage can include the impacts frompresent-
day climate, sowithoutmuch influence of climate change. This implies that losses and
damages could also include impacts from extreme weather that are not attributable
to anthropogenic climate change, but simply to (baseline) risk that occurs because of
occurrence of extreme weather. This risk has occurred always, regardless of climate
change, or occurs because of natural variability or increased exposure of people and
capital. In this context, understanding present-day risks from extreme weather, and
understanding the role of drivers of changes in that risk, is important for discussions
on Loss and Damage. These drivers and the way they are understood to determine
risk, ultimately also determine the scope of losses and damages from these extreme
events.
There seems tobe someagreement that theLoss andDamagedebate refers to resid-
ual impacts, i.e. after adaptation (“losses beyond adaptation”) (see James et al. 2018).
Also, losses and damages can refer to actual impacts that have already occurred, as
well as potential future risks of further impacts and damages (see introduction by
Mechler et al. 2018).
In this context, all drivers of weather related risks should be considered. This is
because non-climatic drivers of risk (influencing exposure, and vulnerability) may
consciously (through adaptation) or unconsciously be influenced, as for instancewith
increasing development and wealthy societies become better protected from extreme
weather hazards.
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This chapter builds on previous major reviews of changes in past extreme weather
events and their impacts, including the relevant summaries contained in IPCC reports,
such as the Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters
to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (IPCC SREX; IPCC 2012), as well as the
FifthAssessment Report (IPCC 2013, 2014), and extends thesewith recent published
studies. In addition, it provides a discussion of expectations of future losses under
projected climate change. The discussion is complementary to other chapters that
focus on the attribution of anthropogenic climate change (chapter by James et al.
2018), and decision making in the context of Loss and Damage (chapter by Lopez
et al. 2018) as well as on risk management in the chapter by Botzen et al. (2018).
The following topics are covered
• Observed changes in weather extremes and their relation with anthropogenic cli-
mate change;
• Observed changes in impacts from extreme weather, and their relation to changing
weather extremes;
• Observed changes in exposure and vulnerability, leading to altered impacts from
extreme weather;
• Possible changes in the future in terms of extreme weather impacts and losses and
damages, based on projections from quantitative impact studies.
3.2 Observed Changes in Weather Extremes
The occurrence of weather extremes has been studied extensively, both in natural
hazard research for the purpose of hazard probability estimation and design of pro-
tection, as well as in climate change research. At the same time, uncertainties in the
attribution of extremes (such as windstorms) to anthropogenic climate change are
larger than for slow-onset processes (such as annual average temperature change and
sea-level rise) (IPCC 2013). This is partly because of the rare nature of extremes,
which are often analysed at return periods of 100 years or more, and also because
they often occur at spatial scales that are smaller than slow-onset events. For instance,
tropical cyclones occur over smaller areas than major heat-wave or drought events.
However, over recent years the attention to extremeweather events has increased, and
possibilities to analyse and model the occurrence and intensity of these events have
improved. For a number of extreme weather events, there is considerable evidence
that these have increased in frequency and for some that anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases are a major cause of this increase.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of past changes in weather extremes and the
role of anthropogenic forcing, as assessed by the IPCC in the SREX (IPCC 2012)
and the Working Group I volume of the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2013).
From this table it can be concluded that the detection of changes and attribution to
anthropogenic emissions has been established for extremes related to temperature
and sea-level rise.
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Table 3.1 Observed changes in weather extremes and attribution to human greenhouse gas emis-
sions
Weather extreme Observed past changes Human contribution
Warmer (and/or fewer cold)
days and nightsa
• Very likely increase
(decrease) in frequency over
most land areas
• Very likely
Heat wavesa • Medium confidence in
increase on global scale
• Likely increase in large
parts of Europe, Asia and
Australia
• Likely
Heavy precipitationa • Likely increases over more
land areas than decreases
• Medium confidence
River floodsb • Limited to medium
evidence for changes in
frequency of river floods at
the regional level
• Low confidence for sign of
change of river floods at the
global level
—
Droughta • Low confidence in change
on a global level
• Likely changes in some
regions (increase in
Mediterranean and West
Africa; decreases in central
North America and
north-west Australia)
• Low confidence
Tropical cyclonesa • Low confidence in increase
in activity (intensity and
frequency) on timescales of
100 years
• Virtually certain in North
Atlantic since 1970
• Low confidence
Extra-tropical cyclonesb • Likely pole-ward shift of
storm tracks on the northern
and southern hemispheres
—
Extreme sea-levelsa • Likely increase since 1970 • Likely
Note Based on SREX and Fifth Assessment Report WGI reports from the IPCC (2012, 2013). For
definition of confidence levels see IPCC (2013)
aIPCC (2013) (Summary for Policymakers). bIPCC (2012) (Summary for Policymakers)
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For rainfall related extremes, including droughts and river flooding, findings
regarding the detection of changes is more mixed, as is the attribution of these
changes to human greenhouse gas emissions. For windstorms, in the tropical and
extra-tropical regions, both the changes and the precise human contribution to these
changes are even more uncertain. In addition, there is an extensive literature that
has looked at how the likelihood of individual extreme weather events has possi-
bly changed due to anthropogenic forcing (see James et al. 2018). In addition to
monotonic changes from anthropogenic forcing, the role of natural variability in
shaping the impacts from natural disasters can be very large. This is an important
reason why even when trends in extremes are found, related to large decadal vari-
ability in the occurrence of extremes related to natural variability, the attribution of
smaller changes over time to anthropogenic emissions. This is for instance the case
for tropical cyclones, where large natural variability complicates the detection of any
remaining trend (Knutson et al. 2010).
3.3 Observed Impacts Based on Disaster Loss Records
3.3.1 Loss Data and Normalisation
Several records are available of disaster losses. The most notable global databases
consist of those managed by CRED (EM-DAT database,1 Munich Reinsurance
Company (NatCatSERVICE database),2 and Swiss Reinsurance Company (SIGMA
database).3 Besides these global databases, several combined are available under
Desinventar.4 While these databases provide a good overall understanding of loss
frequency and trends, several other records of natural hazard impacts exist that are
more detailed, including national accounts of disaster losses and national and local
insurance records. Some of these are also assessed in the studies reported here.
Several researchers have analysed disaster loss records, to assess the frequency
and size of impacts from these hazards. In addition, many have analysed which
drivers (hazard, exposure, or vulnerability) may have led to changes in these impacts
over time. An often-used approach is so-called normalisation, which tries to account
for changes in exposure over time, by applying correction factors to the observed
loss record. These factors are based on the total size of the exposed assets and
their value (see Pielke and Landsea 1998). This is also common practise in the
insurance industry in order to arrive at a common reference baseline of historical loss
events that can be compared to catastrophe models that simulate risks for today’s
exposure and vulnerabilities or for a specific baseline year (Pielke et al. 1999). Many
1http://www.emdat.be.
2https://www.munichre.com/en/reinsurance/business/non-life/natcatservice/index.html.
3http://institute.swissre.com/research/overview/sigma_data/.
4https://www.desinventar.org/ and http://www.desinventar.net/.
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of the studies that applied loss normalisation also refer to “attribution of changes
in impacts.” This is however different from the formal detection and attribution as
approached by the climate research community, which usually refers to the detection5
of statistically significant changes in climate variables, and attribution6 of these
changes to natural forcing and anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. In the case of
studies on disaster losses, attribution takes two steps: first attribution of the observed
change in disaster losses to socioeconomic drivers (exposure, vulnerability), and next
establish whether there is a remaining trend, that could be attributed to changing
weather hazard conditions, usually regardless of human causes (e.g. Huggel et al.
2013). Other lines of research, include so-called event attribution studies put a direct
link between the occurrence of individual extreme events and increased likelihood
of these events that is due to anthropogenic forcing. In a few cases, also the impacts
or losses from these events are included in the models (e.g. Pall et al. 2011), but not
changes in other variables beside climate, such as changes in catchment hydrology
or flood defences that would also influence flood risk (Schaller et al. 2016). These
event attribution studies are further discussed in the chapter by James et al. (2018).
3.3.2 Analysis of Loss Trends
A number of assessments is available of the current understanding of disaster loss
records on the basis of individual studies, most notably the IPCC SREX report (IPCC
2012), including the chapter on human and ecosystem impacts by Handmer et al.
(2012), and in the contribution from Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment
report, including the chapters on attribution by Cramer et al. (2014), and on the
insurance sector in the chapter by Arent et al. (2014). Throughout these chapters, it
is acknowledged that losses from natural hazards have increased, regardless of cau-
sation of the increase. In addition, it is noted that losses fromweather-related hazards
have increased more rapidly than from geophysical events such as earthquakes (e.g.
Handmer et al. 2012). The assessments of IPCC have concluded the following on
the causes of the upward trends in losses from extreme weather events:
Long-term trends in economic disaster losses adjusted for wealth and population increases
have not been attributed to climate change, but a role for climate change has not been excluded
(SREX SPM, IPCC 2012).
Economic losses due to extreme weather events have increased globally, mostly due to
increase in wealth and exposure, with a possible influence of climate change (Cramer et al.
2014).
5Detection: “Detection of change is defined as the process of demonstrating that climate or a system
affected by climate has changed in some defined statistical sense, without providing a reason for
that change” (IPCC 2013: Annex III Glossary).
6Attribution: “Attribution is defined as the process of evaluating the relative contributions ofmultiple
causal factors to a change or event with an assignment of statistical confidence” (IPCC 2013: Annex
III Glossary).
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In sum, while increasing trends are found for losses from past extreme weather
events, increasing exposure has been the main driver, and climate change (both
anthropogenic climate change as well as natural climate variability) could have an
additional role, but this role was not substantiated. The confidence of the role of
anthropogenic climate change as driver in the upward trend in disaster loses is how-
ever low. Results from these previous reviews, as well as more recent studies on
disaster loss databases, are displayed in Table 3.2. In total 34 studies are included.
Most of these studies have analysed monetised losses from extreme weather events,
although in some cases the losses concern quantified impacts, such as volume of
damaged timber wood. And most studies account for increasing exposure, using
either data on exposed capital assets, population, wealth indicators, and an inflation
correction.
While this overview is perhaps neither exhaustive nor complete, it provides a
comprehensive overview of scientific studies on impacts frommajor extremeweather
types, such as tropical and extra-tropical cyclones, rainfall flooding, hailstorms, wild-
fires and convectiveweather types.While coastal flooding is often included in tropical
cyclone losses, drought events are underrepresented in these studies. A few studies
detect trends at the regional or national level, the overall conclusion is that very few
upward trends are found, after normalising for changes in exposure.
There are several issues related to the normalisation approach, as well as the inter-
pretation of normalised losses. First of all, the general assumption is that the change
in the major driver of losses, that is increasing exposure of assets, has a propor-
tional (linear) relation with the losses (e.g. Pielke and Landsea 1998; Bouwer 2011a;
Handmer et al. 2012). But alternative approaches such as from Estrada et al. (2015)
show that alternative formulations of statistical models with explanatory variables
may lead to different trends in losses, such as for US hurricanes. Such approaches
are however not yet conclusive, and need further confirmation in consecutive studies
(Hallegatte 2015).
In addition, the interpretation of the normalised record is also not straightforward.
As Visser et al. (2014) and Visser and Petersen (2012) show, different statistical
methods for trend detectionmay lead to different interpretation of upward, downward
or no trends found in the normalised loss records of extreme weather events. And
how fluctuations in the normalised loss-record are interpreted, possibly related to
natural climate variability, is another matter of discussion.
What is clear from the normalisation studies listed here (Table 3.2) is that most
do not find an increasing trend in losses, after the records have been normalised for
increasing exposure. This implies that the main driver of the observed losses likely
has been an increasing number of population and assets, and not a change in the
hazard frequency or severity. A few studies however do find increases in losses, also
after normalisation. These includemost notably convectiveweather events, including
thunderstorms and hailstorms, where three studies find increasing trends for over
several decades. With increasing temperatures, there is a possibility that extremes
related to convective weather could become more frequent. However, IPCC (2012)
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Table 3.2 Normalisation studies of weather-related disaster loss records
Hazard Location Period Normalised loss References
Tropical cyclones (9 studies)
Tropical storm Latin America 1944–1999 No trend Pielke et al. (2003)
Tropical storm India 1977–1998 No trend Raghavan and
Rajesh (2003)
Tropical storm USA 1900–2005 No trend Pielke et al. (2008)
Tropical storm USA 1950–2005 Increase since
1970; no trend
since 1950
Schmidt et al.
(2009)
Tropical storm China 1983–2006 No trend Zhang et al. (2009)
Tropical storm USA 1900–2008 Increase since 1900 Nordhaus (2010)
Tropical storm USA 1900–2005 No trend Bouwer and Botzen
(2010)
Tropical storm USA 1900–2005 Increase since 1900 Estrada et al. (2015)
Tropical storm China 1984–2013 No trend Fischer et al. (2015)
Extra-tropical cyclones (3 studies)
Windstorm USA 1952–2006 Increase since 1952 Changnon (2009b)
Windstorm Europe 1970–2008 No trend Barredo (2010)
Windstorm Switzerland 1859–2011 No trend Stucki et al. (2014)
Snow storms (1 study)
Ice, blizzard and
snow storms
USA 1949–2003 Increase since 1949 Changnon (2007)
Convective weather (7 studies)
Thunderstorm USA 1949–1998 Increase since 1974 Changnon (2001)
Tornado USA 1890–1999 No trend Brooks and
Doswell (2001)
Tornado USA 1900–2000 No trend Boruff et al. (2003)
Hailstorm USA 1951–2006 Increase since 1992 Changnon (2009a)
Hailstorm Southwest
Germany
1974–2003 Increase over last
20 years
Kunz et al. (2009)
Tornado USA 1950–2011 No trend Simmons et al.
(2013)
Thunderstorm USA 1970–2009 Increasing trend
since 1990
Sander et al. (2013)
Flooding (7 studies)
River flood USA 1926–2000 No trend Downton and
Pielke (2005)
River flood China 1950–2001 Increase since 1987 Fengqing et al.
(2005)
(continued)
3 Observed and Projected Impacts from Extreme Weather Events … 73
Table 3.2 (continued)
Hazard Location Period Normalised loss References
River flood Europe 1970–2006 No trend Barredo (2009)
River flood Korea 1971–2005 Increase since 1971 Chang et al. (2009)
River flood and
landslides
Switzerland 1972–2007 No trend Hilker et al. (2009)
River flood Spain 1971–2008 No trend Barredo et al.
(2012)
River flooding Spain 1975–2013 No trend Pérez-Morales et al.
(2018)
Wildfire (1 study)
Bushfire Australia 1925–2009 No trend Crompton et al.
(2010)
Various weather (9 studies)
Weather
(hurricanes, floods)
USA 1951–1997 No trend Choi and Fisher
(2003)
Weather (flood,
thunderstorm, hail,
bushfires)
Australia 1967–2006 No trend Crompton and
McAneney (2008)
Weather (hail,
storm, flood,
wildfire)
World 1950–2005 Increase since
1970; no increase
since 1950
Miller et al. (2008)
Weather (floods,
convective events,
winter storms,
tropical cyclones,
heatwaves)
World 1980–2008 No trend Neumayer and
Barthel (2011)
Weather (winter
storms, heatwaves)
Germany 1980–2008 Increase since 1980 Neumayer and
Barthel (2011)
Weather (floods,
convective events
Germany 1980–2008 No trend Neumayer and
Barthel (2011)
Weather (floods,
convective events,
winter storms,
tropical cyclones,
heatwaves)
USA 1980–2008 Increase since 1980 Neumayer and
Barthel (2011)
Natural disasters
(including extreme
temperatures,
floods, mass
movement, storms,
wildfire)
China 1990–2011 No trend Zhou et al. (2013)
Weather (tropical
cyclones, flooding,
drought)
India (Odisha) 1972–2009 No trend Bahinipati and
Venkatachalam
(2016)
Updated from Bouwer (2011a), including Handmer et al. (2012), Cramer et al. (2014), Arent et al. (2014) and
other recent publications
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noted that there is insufficient evidence7 to conclude that severe convective weather
has already become more frequent.
Other weather hazards for which positive loss trends are found include studies
on tropical storms. While Nordhaus (2010) found a positive trend for US hurricane
losses after normalisation, Bouwer and Botzen (2011) found no trend using other
loss records and alternative normalisation of the same events. The study by Estrada
et al. (2015) used an alternative formulation, assuming a non-linear relation between
changes in exposure and losses,whichhas not yet been confirmedbyother studies, nor
has there been a sufficient explanation for the cause of the remaining increase in losses
(Hallegatte 2015). Schmidt et al. (2009) found an increasing trend in US hurricane
losses after normalisation since 1970, but this is likely due to natural variability
(Bouwer 2011a); in this case the low frequency of landfalling hurricanes in the
North Atlantic and Caribbean in the 1970s, and the subsequent increase in the 1990s
and early 2000s. For river flooding some studies find increases after normalisation
(Fengqing et al. 2005; Chang et al. 2009), but these are relatively short-lived, and it
is unclear whether these increases are related to changes in flood hazard driven by
natural variability or anthropogenic climate change.
Finally, there are some studies that indicate increasing losses after normalisation at
the global level, for several types of weather extremes (Miller et al. 2008; Neumayer
and Barthel 2011), but these trends are also over recent times (over 30 years or less),
and here it is also unclear whether any related changes in hazard are driven by natural
variability or anthropogenic climate change.
3.3.3 Interpretation of Drivers of Losses
As shown above, few studies find signals in losses beyond the driver of increasing
exposure. Less is known about the role of vulnerability changes that potentially may
play an important role. As societies becomewealthier, they are likely to start to invest
more in risk reduction and adaptation, thereby reducing impacts fromweather related
hazards. This may result in reduced losses over time. For normalisation studies, this
may imply that accounting for increases in exposure only, would downplay the role
of any other contributing factors, including anthropogenic climate change (Nicholls
2011). Indeed, there are studies that show that especially loss of life and also mone-
tary losses have decreased, despite increasing exposure (Mechler and Bouwer 2015;
Bahinipati and Patnaik 2015; Kreibich et al. 2017; Bouwer and Jonkman 2018).
Jongman et al. (2015) for instance stress that despite the fact that total losses from
river flooding have increased, fatalities and monetised losses as a share of population
and GDP, have fallen over past decades. However, the question is how significant
these changes in vulnerability are, compared to the very rapid increase in expo-
sure (Bouwer 2011b). While loss of life clearly has benefitted from improved early
7“There is low confidence in observed trends in small spatial-scale phenomena such as tornadoes
and hail because of data inhomogeneities and inadequacies in monitoring systems” (IPCC 2012:8).
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warning and evacuation, and vulnerability has substantially declined (Mechler and
Bouwer 2015;Bouwer and Jonkman 2018),monetary losses can only be substantially
prevented from improved protection, such as through flood prevention, improved
building construction, and alternative agricultural practices. There are however very
few longitudinal studies that have assessed these effects over sufficiently long peri-
ods over time, to establish the long-terms effects, compared to increasing exposure.
The studies indicating substantial reductions in monetary losses have considered the
most recent decades (Jongman et al. 2015; Kreibich et al. 2017), and while efforts
may have been successful at improving the current situation, they can hardly make
up for substantial development in vulnerable areas that has been taken place over the
last 100 years.
Finally, for attributing changes in extreme weather impacts, in the context of
Loss and Damage, any remaining trend after normalisation and after accounting for
vulnerability reductionwould need to be demonstrated to have a relationwith changes
in extremeweather hazards.And this change in extremeweather hazard in turn should
be attributed to anthropogenic climate change. Table 3.3 summarises the results from
the review of loss normalisation studies (Table 3.2), as well as the observed changes
in weather extremes (Table 3.1). While for several weather extremes, increasing
occurrence has been observed, and often also attributed to anthropogenic greenhouse
gas forcing (Table 3.1), these changes are not reflected in loss records, or at least
cannot be recognised. No substantial evidence is present for long-term increases in
normalised losses from these types of extreme weather, based on quantified loss
records. And while a few studies show that losses from convective weather may
have increased, in particular losses from hail and thunderstorm events (Changnon
2001; Changnon 2009a; Kunz et al. 2009; Sander et al. 2013), these are yet to be
linked to structural changes in the occurrence of convective weather events, related
to greenhouse gas forcing (IPCC 2012, 2013).
Table 3.3 Comparison of changes in extreme weather hazards (regardless of human contribution)
and observed change in losses
Type Increase in extreme weather
hazard?
Increase in observed losses?
Heat wave Very likely Unknown
Heavy precipitation Likely Unknown
River floods Limited/medium evidence No increase
Drought Low confidence Unknown
Tropical cyclones Low confidence No increase
Extra-tropical cyclones Likely poleward shift No increase
Extreme sea-levels Likely Unknown
Wildfires Unknown No increase
Convective weather Unknown Possible increase?
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3.4 Projections of Future Extreme Weather Losses
As a stylised case, Fig. 3.2 provides an illustration of how past risk from extreme
weather has increased, and how this risk can be reduced or avoided through disaster
risk reduction (protection and prevention). There will always remain a residual risk
(see also chapter by Schinko et al. 2018), which cannot be reduced in a cost-efficient
way, i.e. the costs of eliminating the risk are considered higher than incurring the
costs. However, current risk has increased by increasing exposure, and possibly by
anthropogenic climate change. Part or all of this risk is related to the Loss and
Damage debate, depending on whether or not residual impacts are considered to
be included. Future risk will increase further due to anthropogenic climate change,
leading to an increasing amount of losses and damages, not addressed by disaster risk
reduction and adaptation. However, as vulnerability is likely to be further reduced
(see also evidence discussed in Sect. 3.3), the share avoided by disaster risk reduction
and adaptation will also increase. The losses and damages after adaptation include
unavoidable losses and damages, potentially including the residual risks that will
remain.
Various studies also project quantified future losses from extremeweather, mostly
for risk assessment purposes in the context of vulnerability and adaptation studies
at national or international level, and also for planning and design purposes at local
level. These studies are assessed by several authors, including IPCC (e.g. Handmer
et al. 2012; Arent et al. 2014). Overall, these studies recognise that changing weather
hazards have a role, driven by anthropogenic climate change as major driver of
Fig. 3.2 Past, current and future risk from extreme weather events, and the relation to Loss and
Damage
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risk. The hazards that are studied include tropical and extra-tropical cyclones, river
flooding, coastal flooding, as well as small scale phenomena such as hailstorms.
Exposure and vulnerability are also considered as important drivers of future risks.
Many but not all of these studies also integrate projections of increasing population
and wealth or capital at risk in the quantitative estimates of future risk. A comparison
of these estimates shows that for tropical cyclones and extra-tropical cyclones, the
effects of future increases in exposure are much larger than from increasing hazard
frequency as a consequence of anthropogenic climate change (Bouwer 2013). Some
recent studies have analysed these signals together in a single analysis, such as
Crompton et al. (2011). They show that for tropical cyclones in the USA, it will
take at least until the end of this century before the effects from anthropogenic
climate change can be disentangled from the loss record. Muis et al. (2016) show
for Indonesia that coastal and river flood risk in the future will be largely driven by
increasing exposure. Preston (2013) shows for various weather hazards in the USA
that exposure potentially will have a major impact on losses until the year 2050.
Strader et al. (2017) show for tornado risk, that increasing expansion of urban areas
in the US outweighs the effects of increasing severe weather occurrence.
Only very few studies have analysed the effects of a further decline in vulnera-
bility, as a result of increasing risk reduction and adaption efforts, in comparison to
projected future climate change. Jongman et al. (2015) shows that when considering
vulnerability reduction (e.g., through adaptation and disaster risk reduction), future
absolute losses from river flooding in terms of loss of life andmonetary impacts could
be substantially reduced, at the global scale than without adaptation, and under an
optimistic scenario even declining, compared to today’s risks. Also, Mechler and
Bouwer (2015) show for Bangladesh that increases in risks are potentially lower
when dynamic vulnerability is considered.
These projection studies imply that for Loss and Damage, it will remain difficult
which elements of the actual losses fromextremeweather are attributed to greenhouse
gas emissions; first of all, increasing exposure could still play a dominant role. But
in addition, successful vulnerability reduction could increasingly lead to a lowered
pace of risk increases, compared to the past. Changes are observed in the frequency
of several weather extremes, and anthropogenic climate change is an important driver
for several of these. Also, losses, including monetary losses, from extreme weather
events have increased, as can be seen from several observational records. The records
of losses discussed above are focused on monetary losses, while several other types
of impacts, including non-monetised damages and irreversible impacts from extreme
weather, are underrepresented, complicating the assessment of losses and damages.
Studies into drivers of losses from extreme weather show that increasing exposure
has been the most important driver, through increasing population and capital assets.
Anthropogenic climate change is currently not an important driver for changes in
losses from events related to extreme wind, rainfall, and flooding, except perhaps for
convective weather events (thunderstorms and hail). Other extreme weather types
(such as extreme heat) have not been addressed in this chapter, and monetary losses
are rarely assessed for extreme temperatures. It is known that anthropogenic climate
change is increasing heatwave frequency, andmortality andmorbidity have been high
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in recent events. Residual losses (after risk reduction and adaptation) from extreme
weather have not yet been attributed to anthropogenic climate change. For the Loss
and Damage debate, this implies that overall it is currently difficult to attribute losses
to greenhouse gas emissions.
Anthropogenic climate change is projected to become more important for driving
future weather losses upward. However, drivers of exposure and especially vulner-
ability reduction will interplay. Exposure will continue to lead to risk increases.
Vulnerability on the other hand may to be further reduced if disaster risk reductio-
nand adaptation is taken forward.Asmodelling studies show thiswould reduce losses
and damages from extreme weather at the global scale. In the most optimistic sce-
nario with high adaptation assumed, it could even reduce the burden from extreme
weather. Yet, at national scales and particularly for developing countries there is
ample evidence of increasing risk, which calls for a significant upgrade of climate
risk management efforts.
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Chapter 4
The Risk and Policy Space for Loss
and Damage: Integrating Notions
of Distributive and Compensatory Justice
with Comprehensive Climate Risk
Management
Thomas Schinko, Reinhard Mechler and Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler
Abstract The Warsaw Loss and Damage Mechanism holds high appeal for com-
plementing actions on climate change adaptation and mitigation, and for deliver-
ing needed support for tackling intolerable climate related-risks that will neither be
addressed by mitigation nor by adaptation. Yet, negotiations under the UNFCCC
are caught between demands for climate justice, understood as compensation, for
increases in extreme and slow-onset event risk, and the reluctance of other parties to
consider Loss and Damage outside of an adaptation framework. Working towards a
jointly acceptable positionwe suggest an actionableway forward for the deliberations
may be based on aligning comprehensive climate risk analytics with distributive and
compensatory justice considerations. Our proposed framework involves in a short-
medium term, needs-based perspective support for climate risk management beyond
countries ability to absorb risk. In a medium-longer term, liability-based perspective
we particularly suggest to consider liabilities attributable to anthropogenic climate
change and associated impacts. We develop the framework based on principles of
need and liability, and identify the policy space for Loss and Damage as composed
of curative and transformative measures. Transformative measures, such as managed
retreat, have already received attention in discussions on comprehensive climate risk
management. Curative action is less clearly defined, and more contested. Among
others, support for a climate displacement facility could qualify here. For both sets
of measures, risk financing (such as ‘climate insurance’) emerges as an entry point
for further policy action, as it holds potential for both risk management as well as
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compensation functions. To quantify the Loss and Damage space for specific coun-
tries, we suggest as one option to build on a risk layering approach that segments
risk and risk interventions according to risk tolerance. An application to fiscal risks
in Bangladesh and at the global scale provides an estimate of countries’ financial
support needs for dealing with intolerable layers of flood risk. With many aspects of
Loss and Damage being of immaterial nature, we finally suggest that our broad risk
and justice approach in principle can also see application to issues such as migration
and preservation of cultural heritage.
Keywords Climate justice · Loss and Damage space · Transformative measures
Curative measures · Climate risk management
4.1 Tackling Climate-Related Risk in a Contested Policy
Context
The 19th conference of the Parties (COP 19) in Warsaw in 2013 saw the establish-
ment of the “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage” (UNFCCC
2014). With Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a) Loss and Damage
(L&D) can now be regarded as a sort of “3rd pillar of the work under the UNFCCC
in addition to mitigation and adaptation” (Verheyen 2012). The terrain is extremely
contested with highly-at risk countries of the global South (such as those of the
Alliance of Small Island States, AOSIS) demanding compensation payments for
actual past, present and future incurred losses and damages due to climate change,
while Annex I countries are unwilling to consider such framing and any related
actions (see introduction by Mechler et al. 2018; chapters by Calliari et al. 2018;
chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018). Yet, these parties have shown willing-
ness to support climate change adaptation (CCA) and have supported ‘good’ risk
management over the years to tackle potential loss and damage, as evidenced by
intense debates on moral responsibility that preceded the approval of the Sendai
Framework of Action (SFA) in March 2015. Interestingly, this discussion also saw
heated debate as developing countries started to frame their interventions around the
common, but differentiated responsibility logic, which has been fundamental for the
UNFCCC discussion (Mysiak et al. 2015).
Liability and compensation on the one hand, and support for disaster risk man-
agement plus insurance on the other hand remain key negotiation positions for the
parties. The divergence in perspectives (see also chapter by James et al. 2018) has led
to difficult negotiations for the Executive Committee, which was established in 2015
to support the implementation of an informational work programme. Currently, the
work programme somewhat balances the two perspectives without explicitly refer-
ring to justice and equity principles (more on the politics behind L&D can be found
in the chapter by Calliari et al. 2018).
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The science behind climate-related risks relevant for the L&D debate is equally
complex. It has made great leaps forward with IPCC’s SREX and IPCC’s Working
Group II reports as well as the UNGAR publications, which discuss climate and non-
climate drivers of climate-related risk, the role of uncertainty, the role of attribution
and the relevance of climate risk management (CRM) (IPCC 2012, 2013, 2014;
UNISDR2015). Overall, the science shows that, while anthropogenic climate change
indeed amplifies intensity, frequency andduration ofmanyhazards, a clear causal link
from anthropogenic CO2 emissions as a driver of risk to quantified socioeconomic
risks cannot be established, and that therefore a principle of strict liability cannot
(yet) be applied to climate risk (for more details on the frontiers in science regarding
L&D see the chapters Bouwer 2018; James et al. 2018 and Lopez et al. 2018). In this
context, Mechler and Schinko (2016) proposed a policy framework that builds on
recent IPCC framing and evidence on climate-related risk, and Schinko andMechler
(2017) suggested to apply recent insights from CRM, an approach that strives for
linking disaster risk reduction (DRR) and CCA agendas under one umbrella (see
Schinko et al. 2016) to L&D. The authors argued that a better understanding of
climate-related disaster risk and risk management can inform effective action on
CCA and point a way forward for L&D policy as well as practice.
This chapter takes this proposition forward to the L&D debate and suggests to
find a balance between notions of compensatory and distributive justice. While the
compensatory justice notion’s scope is distributing responsibilities in light of com-
pensatory reasons and liability, the notion of distributive justice understands L&D
as undeserved harm demanding redistribution to even out this unfairness (see also
chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018; Dellink et al. 2009 on the fair distribution
of CCA costs). As a principle of strict liability cannot yet be applied to climate-
related risk, we suggest an actionable way forward for the deliberations under the
WIM based on the concept of CRM, which allows for an alignment of distribu-
tive and compensatory justice over time. The approach involves in a short-medium,
needs-based perspective, international support for risk management beyond individ-
ual countries’ ability to cope with climate-related risk; in a medium-longer term,
rights-based perspective, we particularly argue for a strong consideration for liabili-
ties attributable to human induced climate change. The discussion can be integrated
towards a principled framework for identifying the space for Loss and Damage com-
posed of curative and transformative measures.
As another key element to operationalise CRM in the context of L&D in practice,
we put forward ‘risk layering’ as an actionable concept of risk and risk management
(Mechler et al. 2014). This concept involves identifying efficient and acceptable
interventions based on recurrence as well as severity of climate-related risks. For
example, for flood risk, this would mean identifying physical flood protection to
deal with more frequent events, considering risk financing for infrequent disasters as
well as relying on public and international compensation for extreme catastrophes.
Risk layering overall points towards considering risk comprehensively as determined
by climatic and non-climatic factors as well as considering portfolios of options that
manage risks today and in the future.
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The further discussion in this chapter is organised as follows: Sect. 4.2 provides a
short definition of L&Dand aims at identifyingmajor building blocks of a framework
for L&D. Section 4.3 takes this discussion forward, and based on our three building
blocks identifies the risk and policy space for Loss and Damage. The concept of risk
layering based on risk-basedmodelling is put forward as amethod for quantifying the
Loss and Damage space in Sect. 4.4, which is followed by some short conclusions.
4.2 Building Blocks of a Principled Framework for Loss
and Damage
Many analysts and parties have argued that the WIM is to deal with climate-related
risks ‘beyond adaptation’ when coping capacities of communities and countries are
exceededv (see e.g. Verheyen 2012). This is also reflected in what the parties to the
UNFCC acknowledge in decision 2/CP.19 when they state that L&D “includes, and
in some cases involvesmore than, that which can be reduced by adaptation” (UNFCC
2014). Beyond this consensus, little common ground exists and particularly ethical
aspects have been the elephant in the room ever since the early stages of the debate on
L&D. The following discussion aims at overcoming the ethical challenges involved
in the discourse by referring to the debate via notions of climate justice and a CRM
perspective (see also the chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018 for more detailed
exploration of the ethical challenges in the debate).
Defining Losses and Damages
Climate-related risks considered in the Loss and Damage discussion are associated
with sudden-onset extreme events, such as flooding and cyclones, and slow-onset
impacts including sea level rise and melting glaciers (see Fig. 4.1).
Timescale: hours days weeks months years decades
Examples: landslides, storms, floods... droughts sea level rise, glacier shrinkage
Sudden-onset events
shocks
Slow-onset processes
gradual changes increasing stress
Fig. 4.1 Characterisation of climate-related risks relevant for Loss&Damage. Based on Huggel
et al. (2016). Pictures Source Wikimedia Commons
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Table 4.1 Classifying loss and damage
Avoided Unavoided Unavoidable
Avoidable loss and damage
that can and will be avoided by
climate change mitigation
and/or adaptation measures
Avoidable loss and damage
that will not be addressed by
further mitigation and/or
adaption measures, even
though the avoidance would be
possible. Financial, technical
and political constraints as
well as case-specific risk
preferences narrow down the
adaptation space
Loss and damage that cannot
be avoided through further
mitigation and/or adaptation
measures, e.g. loss and
damage due to slow onset
processes that have kicked-off
already, such as sea level rise,
and extreme event risk where
no adaptation efforts would
help preventing the physical
impacts
Source Table based on Verheyen and Roderick (2008)
While there is no official definition, losses in this context have been associated
with irreversibility, e.g. fatalities from disasters or households stuck in poverty traps
post-event, while damages have been referred to as impacts that can be rectified in
principle. A useful distinction made that we build on has been between avoided,
unavoided and unavoidable loss and damage (Verheyen and Roderick 2008) (see
Table 4.1). In the literature, this same distinction has also been discussed with regard
to whether climate-related impacts cannot or will not be addressed by mitigation or
adaptation (cf. Mace and Verheyen 2016).
An example for unavoidable impacts or loss and damage that cannot be addressed
either by mitigation or adaptation are extreme event risks where no adaptation efforts
would help preventing the physical damage (Verheyen and Roderick 2008). A rea-
son that some adaptation measures will not be taken or losses and damages remain
unavoided is that actors may be subject to socio-economic constraints, especially
international financing, and/or implementation constraints, although at least in the-
ory these measures could have been taken (Chambwera and Mohammed 2014).
Further constraints to adaptation planning and implementation comprise a lack of
technological or knowledge resources and institutional characteristics that impede
action.
4.2.1 Risk Identification: Analytics for Defining Avoidable
and Unavoidable Losses and Damages
Over the last few years, with consequences of climate change becoming visible on
all continents and in all oceans (IPCC 2014), assessments of climate change impacts
have changed in focus from an initial analysis of the problem to the assessment
of actual observed and potential future impacts, and finally, to the consideration
of specific risk analytical methods to assess and manage future increases in risks.
Originally focussed on incremental risk induced by anthropogenic climate change
to identify dangerous levels of global risk (IPCC’s five reasons for concerns), a risk
perspective has prominently gained traction in recent IPCC reportswhere climate risk
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at different scales has been considered to be both shaped by natural climate variability
and climate change, as well as by socioeconomic exposure and vulnerability. This
evolved framing has opened doors for considering DRR as an important part of
climate adaptation and lead to novel considerations organised aroundCRM, involving
themanagement of total climate-related risk including any current adaptation deficits
(Jones et al. 2014).
To inform thinking and action on CRM, a sort of ‘climate risk language’ has been
developed by IPCC’s working group II in its 5th assessment report (IPCC 2014). In
doing so, working group II has built on IPCC’s multiple lines of evidence philoso-
phy, including collating empirical evidence on impacts and risks with information
on adaptation options, and the modelling of future risks, as well as using expert
judgment. The IPCC report succinctly summarises climate risks and the potential
(as well as the limits) for adaptation for key risks and three time steps (present, near-
and long-term 2 and 4 °C).
While adaptation constraints or barriers are defined as “factors that make it harder
to plan and implement adaptation actions,” an adaptation limit is “the point at which
an actor’s objectives or system’s needs cannot be secured from intolerable risks
through adaptive actions.” (Klein et al. 2014) Furthermore, soft and hard limits
to adaptation can be distinguished. The latter concept describes limits where no
adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks, while in the former concept
adaptive actionmight be possible in the future but nomeasures are currently available
(IPCC 2014). The distinction between barriers and limits to adaptation as well as
between soft and hard limits is coherent in theory, yet many difficulties might arise
in operationalising it in practice. What determines when a limit is breached and
who decides what the limits are? For example, Fig. 4.2 visualizes risks from sea
level rise and high-water events as well as the corresponding adaptation potential in
Small Island States. Building on the identification of key hazard drivers, sea level rise
and cyclones interacting with high tide events, it finds the level of risk, essentially
for coastal flooding, to currently be at medium levels and increasing with future
warming to very high levels, particularly for the 4 °C warming scenario. While the
risk bar, which is the product of the IPCCC’s meta-analysis of available literature on
climate-related risks in SIDS, shows overall risk (given adaptation actions taken),
this visualization also teases out the potential for additional adaptation efforts in
terms of further reducing risk.
IPCC’s analysis applied to key world regions shows that the potential for adapta-
tion is large for many regions and suggests that many risks are avoidable (although
actions are not yet fully implemented thus defining a soft adaptation limit). Yet, for
some regions and risks (particularly in natural systems) and at higher levels of warm-
ing, limits to adaptation are found to be reached, and these climate-related risks may
become unavoidable (see chapters by Handmer and Nalau 2018; Haque et al. 2018;
van der Geest et al. 2018; Landauer and Juhola 2018). An example is the bleaching
of tropical coral reefs beyond 1.5/2 and 4 °C, where no options for adaptation exist
(hence defining a hard limit to adaptation) (Magrin et al. 2014).
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4.2.2 Climate Attribution of Unavoidable Losses
and Damages: Establishing a Role for Climate Justice
Ethical considerations in the form of questions regarding justice and fairness have
played a key role in the policy and academic discourse on climate change (see e.g.
Brown et al. 2006; Gardiner 2004a, b, 2006; Jamieson 1992, 2001, 2005; Ott 2004;
Posner and Weisbach 2010; Shue 1992, 1993, 1999; Singer 2002, 2006; Vander-
heiden 2008; chapter by Wallimann-Helmer 2018) ever since the beginning of the
UNFCCC process, prominently exemplified by the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities in the Rio Declaration (United Nations 1992, Article 3.1).
For climate change mitigation and adaptation the discourse has largely circled
around distributive justice (Grasso 2007; Posner and Weisbach 2010). In the mitiga-
tion domain different principles of distributive justice, applicable to the sharing of
mitigation burdens have been discussed (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009; Vanderhei-
den 2008). Due to inertia in the climatic system, no matter how effective global GHG
mitigation efforts turn out to be, humanity will be faced with risks due to climate
change that have direct and indirect (e.g. through ecosystem services) impacts on
human welfare and which will require substantial adaptation efforts (IPCC 2012,
2014). The justice debate in the adaptation domain has thus centred on the question
of how the costs (and benefits) of adaption should be distributed across countries
(Adger et al. 2006; Dellink et al. 2009; Paavola and Adger 2006).
With the L&D debate, another notion of climate justice has now formally entered
the international climate policy scene: compensatory justice. Basically two kinds of
justice are especially applicable in the context of L&D (see chapter by Wallimann-
Helmer et al. 2018). Forward-looking contexts are concerned with distributive jus-
tice, especially when distributing the risks of damages that cannot be adapted to.
Backward-looking contexts are concerned with compensatory justice, especially in
legal or procedural attributions of responsibility and liability. Compensatory justice
suggests that it is those agents who primarily caused climate change who should
compensate the agents which are experiencing losses and damages due to climate
change without having substantially contributed to the problem themselves. This in
turn implies that the agents who are not responsible for climate change are given a
right for compensation by the agents who are found responsible and hence liable for
particular risks that climate change increases the likelihood for (i.e. the outcome).
Distributive justice (based on the ability to pay principle) suggests that it is those
agents who are able or have the capacity to pay for managing residual risks should
bear the lion’s share of the costs, and those agents in greatest need for financial
assistance should be allocated the bulk of the benefits, i.e. the resources globally
available.
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The IPCC has attributed trends in slow onset climate change processes and many
climate extremes to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2012). More-
over, climate model results evaluated in the latest IPCC report show peak windstorm
velocity of tropical storms is set to increase, rainfall to become more volatile and sea
levels to rise as ice caps melt, altogether leading to even more severe adverse impacts
of climate change in the future (IPCC 2013). These findings imply an explicit and
moral obligation for enhanced action on managing climate-related risks. Different
principles of distributive justice, such as capacity to pay or greatest needs, may be
applied to share the associated costs among agents, a principle which indeed the
international community has built on as it supports the most vulnerable countries1
(Posner and Weisbach 2010). In addition, climate change also brings along a need
for considering issues of compensatory justice due to the unequal distribution of
historical and current emissions as the root cause of global warming, the adverse
distribution of impacts of climate change between the global North and the global
South, and the fact that climate change is projected to lead to unavoidable and poten-
tially irrecoverable losses and damages, such as of low-lying islands in the wake of
strong sea-level rise (Roser et al. 2015).
Climate science has been making great progress in climate attribution research
evenwith regard to specific events (see chapter by James et al. 2018). Recent research
has shown a significant human element in mega events (Trenberth et al. 2015) such
as superstorms Sandy in 2013 in the US, the Australian heatwave in 2013 (Herring
et al. 2014), the 2016 drought in Kenia (WWA 2017). Mann et al. (2017) found
that amplified arctic warming, influenced by climate change, makes temperature
patterns (so called “planetary waves”) that cause heatwaves, droughts and floods
across Europe, North America and Asia more likely. Yet, causally linking anthro-
pogenic emissions to extreme weather events and eventually to risks on people and
property has not conclusively been achieved and will remain complex, as risks from
climate-related events are shaped by many factors, including climate variability, ris-
ing exposure of people and assets as well as socio-economic vulnerability dynamics
(Stone et al. 2013). While basic evidence to link anthropogenic GHG emissions to
climate impacts is there (Schaller et al. 2016), making the concrete, enforceable case
will remain much harder (Huggel et al. 2015; chapter by Bouwer 2018). Hence, and
as argued above, the causal attribution and strict liability principle cannot be invoked
currently (e.g. for legal action). Nevertheless, we suggest it is kept in the background,
when decisions are made in the meanwhile based on principles of distributive justice.
In the medium to longer-term, as evidence from climate change attribution studies
potentially increases, we argue for a gradual integration of the compensatory justice
dimension.
1Current international support for the most vulnerable countries is primarily based on implied
responsibility and moral duty, as well as humanitarian reasons. Donor countries are currently not
acting on explicit responsibilities.
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To this effect, again, IPCC is the scientific authority with its methodological
framework for detection and attribution. This systematic approach first focusses on
detecting any trend in changes of key variables, then seeks to attribute those to climate
change (e.g. change in local temperature and other system variables) (Cramer et al.
2014). As one example, Fig. 4.3 shows a summary application of the framework in
terms of specifying the degree of confidence in the detection of observed impacts
of climate change versus the degree of confidence in attribution to climate change
drivers for tropical small islands. While, for example, it finds for “greater rates
of sea level rise relative to global means” (a coastal system impact) both very high
confidence levels of detection and attribution, it detects trends at very high confidence
levels for tightly associated impacts in human systems (environmental degradation
and casualties), albeit only at low levels of confidence, as risks in human systems
are importantly shaped by socio-economic vulnerability and exposure.
4.2.3 Risk Evaluation: Considering Risk Preference and Risk
Tolerance for Identifying Soft and Hard Adaptation
Limits
Establishing risk as the overarching concept and metric naturally leads to addressing
the question of risk coping or risk preference. While risk identification assesses risks
in monetary and/or non-monetary terms, risk evaluation, involving socioeconomic
analysis, leads to the notion of risk preference and risk tolerance. The process of
risk evaluation examines agents’ (households, private and public sectors) ability to
respond to risk, also termed risk tolerance. Economics has distinguished risk prefer-
ence around risk aversion, neutrality and risk loving (Eeckhoudt et al. 2005). Risk
analysis, e.g. Dow et al. (2013), building on Klinke and Renn (2002), conceptu-
ally break risk tolerance down into acceptable—no formal risk reduction interven-
tions necessary; tolerable—risk reduction measures are necessary and implemented
depending on resources available; and intolerable risks-risk cannot be taken on, i.e.
action is required irrespective of costs but often no further action is possible, thus
essentially defining risks that exceed the limits of adaptation (see Fig. 4.4).
Following such framing, one could argue that, backed up by considerable evidence
(UNFCCC 2015b) as well as heuristics, the intolerable risk space (globally) with
regard to ‘dangerous interference with the climate system,’ as put down in Article
2 of the UNFCCC, has been determined by the Paris agreement as starting beyond
1.5 °C of average global warming. The 1.5 °C line is a political compromise based on
intense negotiations and normative discourse, which was informed by science. It is
not a ‘hard’ system boundary and already today, with good levels of confidence, the
IPCChas identifiedmany communities and countries as facing substantial stress from
climate change-exacerbated impacts on agriculture in Africa (high confidence), sea
surge in small islands states (high confidence) and riverine flooding in Bangladesh
(medium confidence) (IPCC 2014).
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Fig. 4.4 Framing risk acceptance and (in)tolerance. Source Klinke and Renn (2002)
Eventually, what constitutes acceptable, tolerable, and intolerable risk can be
defined in a subjective/normative or technical/science-based way. Risk tolerance is
strongly determined by social, cultural, and economic factors and often requires sub-
jective judgment (Dowet al. 2013). The IPCCWorkingGroup II in 2014, for example,
used expert judgement for determining levels of low, medium and high risk in its
regional risk assessments. On the other hand, risk analysis has developed analytical
procedures for segregating risk according to differential ability to bear risk to which
risk policy instruments can be tailored to - termed risk layering (Mechler et al. 2014).
4.3 An Actionable Framework for Outlining the Risk
and Policy Options Space for Loss and Damage
Overall, we argue for a practical and dynamic policy approach to the L&D debate
based on the concept of comprehensive CRM and balancing the ethical principles of
compensatory justice and distributive justice (see also Dellink et al. 2009, discussing
a similar approach for the case of CCA). Figure 4.5 conceptualizes a dynamic needs
and liability-basedCRMapproach to theL&Ddebate. It summarizes the twodifferent
notions of justice (compensatory and distributive) as linked to the different political
principles (capacity andneeds, liability and rights) onwhich policies tackling residual
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Political principles
Funders
Capacity
Recipients
Needs
Funders
Liability
Recipients
Rights
Policy & Implementation Needs & liability-basedClimate Risk Management
Implementation horizon Short to medium term Medium to long term
Notion of justice Distributive justice Compensatory justice
Analytical perspective Forward looking Backward looking
Fig. 4.5 Elements of the dynamic principled approach to Loss and Damage. Source Own Figure
risks in the domain of L&D are based. Given the present difficulties of attributing
climate related losses and damages to (1) anthropogenic climate change and further
(2) to certain agents, we propose taking on a distributive justice perspective for the
short to medium-term. We argue for supporting comprehensive CRM based on the
capacity to pay principle in those countries with the greatest need, identified, e.g. by
a country level risk assessment based on risk layering (such as presented in Sect. 4.4),
and focusing on both national and local levels.
Particularly in the medium to longer-term, as evidence from climate change attri-
bution studies is bound to increase, we see a strong consideration of a compensatory
justice dimension into the practical policy approach, by taking on (in addition) a
liability-based perspective. This is important given the evidence on climate impacts
and the fact that compensation will remain a central normative aspect in the climate
negotiations and has to be dealt with in order to establish healthy long-term inter-
national relations, which themselves are a precondition for implementing just and
effective responses to global climate change (Thompson and Otto 2015).
Naturally, the question emerges whether and how the three building blocks—risk
identification, risk evaluation, and climate attribution and justice–which have been
discussed in the previous section, can now be brought together and how to fill the
principled approach outlined here with life to identify and visualise the Loss and
Damage space? Our discussion builds on the policy proposal made by Mechler and
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Schinko (2016) that considers key contributions from these fields of research and
synthesizes respective insights into a visual representation of, what we consider,
constitutes the risk and policy space for Loss and Damage.
4.3.1 The Loss and Damage Risk and Options Space
Synthesising existing literature, in particular building on IPCC assessments and the
UNFCCC stocktake that led to defining the Paris ambition of 1.5 °C respectively
2 °C of change as the upper global warming limit (UNFCCC 2015b), the summary
chart (Fig. 4.6) shows stylised past, present, and future climate-related risk levels and
corresponding CRM portfolios for a given community or country (here again shown
via the example of the Small Island States, whose risk profile has been presented
in Fig. 4.2) facing severe climate risk today and expecting further increases in risk
due to climate change (the socio-economic component is kept constant for ease
of presentation, which does not affect our argumentation). In line with the three
cornerstones presented above, the key foci are to (i) consider total climate-related
risk incl. the adaptation deficit, (ii) include risk preference in terms of acceptable,
tolerable and intolerable risk, (iii) consider risk of irreversible loss.
The options portfolio comprises actual and potential cumulative action in terms
of CRM, implemented as part of separate or synergistic efforts related to DRR and
climate adaptation. It is important to note here that while IPCC (2012) highlights the
need to look at all drivers of risk and to synergisticallymanage those, in the context of
climate anthropogenic climate change is at the centre of interest. The IPCC (2012)
has suggested that “Effective climate risk management portfolios integrate sound
risk analysis, risk reduction, risk financing, response and opportunities for learning.”
(see also chapter by Lopez et al. 2018; chapter by Botzen et al. 2018). How can those
concepts be further operationalised at scale? As one example, Box 4.1 presents a
comprehensive CRM framework developed for the case of informing Indian state
and national-level policymakers, which may act as a blueprint for taking action on
climate-related losses and damages.
Comprehensive risk management and policy can be broken down to comprise
incremental (e.g., raising dikes), fundamental (e.g., floodplains instead of dikes)
and transformative (e.g., voluntary migration from floodplains) interventions (see
also Mechler and Schinko 2016). Accepting this stylised visualisation (Fig. 4.6), the
options space for Loss and Damage may be determined as follows: (i) with climate
change amplifying risk, there is a legitimate case for international action in the Loss
andDamage transformative risk space to push risk down from intolerable to tolerable
levels complementing the DRR and adaptation policy domains; (ii) the Loss and
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Fig. 4.6 Identifying the risk and policy options space for Loss and Damage. Source Own Figure
based on Mechler and Schinko (2016)
Damage curative space opens upwhen technical and feasible risk reduction becomes
limited over time with risk increasing, e.g. sea level rise leading to irreversible and
unavoidable loss of land and induced migration, limiting the societally negotiated
pathway, and foreclosing development opportunities (people being pushed tomigrate
from their homelands).
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Box 4.1 A Climate Risk Management (CRM) framework for India
On behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
the German development assistance agency GIZ with partners developed a CRM framework that
can be utilised to assess climate-related risks and identify management measures at various scales.
In close cooperation with IIASA, KPMG and IIT Delhi, a six step process operationalising the
CRM process at scale was developed (Fig. 4.7). The CRM process is embedded in a learning
framework, which allows for updating decisions over time with mounting evidence and insights.
Traditional DRR and CCA policy typically operates via incremental adjustments to existing man-
agement approaches. While such incremental learning is important in the short term, climate-
related (residual) risks require a particular focus on locally-applicable bottom-up techniques for
understanding risks and risk management interventions. Such techniques are, for example, Vulner-
ability Capacity Assessments (VCAs) and community-led focus groups. In the face of financial,
technical and institutional constraints, fundamental and transformative learning is needed. These
advanced learning loops aim at achieving the required adjustments of management processes at
national and subnational levels in order to be able to deal with increasing risk over time.
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Step 5:
Step 6:
Triple-loop
learning:
(1) Incremental
(2) Fundamental
(3) Transformational
Evaluate risk tolerance and
limits — Conduct risk 
segregation into acceptable, 
tolerable and intolerable
Identify risk— Conduct a 
qualitative and quantitative 
risk assessment
Develop context specific 
methodology to assess 
risk of the system of 
interest
Identify system of 
interest (sector, region) —
Conduct hotspot and
capacity analysis
Identify and assess feasible
options to avert, minimize 
and address climate-related
residual risk
Status quo — Assess the
information needs and
objectives of the overall
CRM framework
Tolerance
Transformative
Fundamental
Incremental
Fig. 4.7 Climate riskmanagement (CRM) six step approach. SourceGIZ et al. (2018 unpublished)
An exemplary application of the comprehensive framework to Tamil Nadu in India (cyclone
and flood risk) served to test the methodological approach and glean its usefulness at state and
local levels. The application showed that risks are on the rise due to climate and socio-economic
drivers, and that risks are significantly affecting key objectives of households and the public
sector. Furthermore, risk responses by farmers and households are largely of incremental, yet
increasingly also of fundamental and importantly transformative nature. Governmental DRR and
CCA institutions work well within their remit to provide incremental assistance, yet are usually
not charged to deal with fundamental and transformative interventions. The assessment revealed
that the risk management policy options space needs more attention and further deliberation with
those at risk and in charge to deploy interventions with public support from state, national to
international levels.
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Transformative Measures
With sea level rise alone threatening to displace 72–187 million people by 2100
(Nicholls et al. 2011), transformative measures are increasingly needed, such as
offering alternative livelihoods (e.g., switching from smallholder farming in coastal
areas to services in cities) and assisting with voluntary migration, as compared with
curative support for forced migration, which we discuss below (se also Mechler and
Schinko 2016). Hino et al. (2017) find thatmanaged retreat—“the strategic relocation
of structures or abandonment of land”—is a potentially important transformational
option when limits to structural protection or other adaptation measures to manage
climate-related risks are reached. It is important to note that even though consid-
ered transformational, managed retreat is confronted by its own set of case-specific
complexities and challenges, whether political, social, or legal (Hino et al. 2017).
Curative Measures
The space for curative measures is much less clear, and has not seen a lot of attention
owing to the fact that it overlaps largely with demands for compensation, which
have been ruled out from the Paris agreement, and because of existing limitations in
the causal attribution of losses and damages from slow-onset processes and sudden-
onset extreme events to anthropogenic climate change. The most advanced ideas in
the context of curative measures have been articulated with regard to support for
involuntary climate-induced displacement and forced migration. A climate displace-
ment facility is being discussed under the WIM and proposals for approaches to deal
with climate-induced displacement have been made, such as the Nansen Principles
on Climate Change and Displacement (Nansen Conference 2011), and the Peninsula
Principles on Climate Displacement Within States (Displacement Solutions 2015).
Yet, concrete ideas for operationalisation are largely lacking.
For the contested discourse around international compensation for climate-related
impacts exacerbated by climate change, only few concrete options have been put on
the table so far. Sprinz and Bünau (2013), for example, find that no convincing mech-
anism has yet been found to compensate for climate-related impacts. The authors
present a conceptual outline for a voluntary, internationally organized compensa-
tion fund and highlight the need for specialized, independent climate courts. At the
national level, however, the establishment of national mechanisms to address climate
induced losses and damages is being discussed, e.g. for Bangladesh. The chapter by
Haque et al. (2018) suggests to make use of a reserve fund of approximately USD
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140 million accumulated by unspent finance from the Bangladesh Climate Change
Trust Fund in order to deal with those climate-related impacts not tackled by con-
ventional DRR or CCAmeasures. This would also include ex-post compensation for
losses and damages triggered by climate change induced slow onset events, salinity
intrusion and increased intensity of cyclones.
4.4 Identifying the Space for Loss and Damage:
An Application
Science can provide insights into defining the Loss and Damage risk space and
associated policy response options. As indicated by the list of building blocks for
a framework outlined above and also demonstrated by other chapters in this vol-
ume (see particularly chapters by Lopez et al. 2018; Botzen et al. 2018; Serdeczny
2018), science for L&D has to essentially be transdisciplinary and multifaceted. This
requires input by, among others, climatology, meteorology, ethics and philosophy,
geography, risk science and social sciences including economics. We proceed with
an application building on transdisciplinary analysis and focused on one aspect,
identifying fiscal risk tolerance with respect to managing climate-related extreme
events.
4.4.1 From Risk Identification to Risk Evaluation: Risk
Layering and Risk Tolerance
Climate risk assessments generally go through a structured process, starting with
the identification of risks based on qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Risk
identification is then followed by risk evaluation for determining risk tolerance, as the
next step in the structured process, which, again, can build on various methods, such
as eliciting stated risk preferences via focus groups, studying behaviour in markets
to reveal preference, or use risk and economic modelling. Box 4.2 reports on the
political decision-making process for defining acceptable and unacceptable risks for
accident risks in Switzerland. Risk analytics has provided the scientific basis for the
political decision in that case, but has tended to only matter up to a certain point.
After all, the delimiters of acceptable to not acceptable risk areas have mostly been
determined by the political process.
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Box 4.2 Defining acceptable and unacceptable risks for accident risks in Switzer-
land
This example distinguishes different levels of accident risk acceptance as specified in
the Swiss Industrial Accident Regulation, building on various inputs and procedures.
The acceptable risk area demarcated in green and aggregating small risks (low extent
of damage) is defined and regulated by specifications made in the Swiss Labour Act.
Beyond the transition zone (marked in yellow), risks are considered not acceptable
(catastrophic, large-scale accidents) and identified in red. Here it is the (national-level)
political decision-making process, building on analytics, but also other inputs, that
determine risk areas as (non) acceptable, thus putting emphasis on rolling out a proper
democratically-legitimated process for managing risks and appropriate risk manage-
ment actions.
Fig. 4.8 Defining acceptable and unacceptable risks for accident risks in Switzerland.
Source WBGU (1998)
As one promising analytical component of aCRMapproach, the concept and prac-
tice of risk layering has seen increasing attention (Mechler et al. 2014; Mechler and
Schinko 2016; Schinko and Mechler 2016). Risk layering involves segmenting risk
into acceptable, tolerable and intolerable layers and allocating roles and responsibil-
ities to reduce, finance or accept risks. We suggest to build on risk analytics in terms
of a risk portfolio approach that breaks down total risk (as determined by probability
and impacts/losses) into 4 distinct layers: (i) a layer for frequent risks for action on
risk reduction, (ii) a medium layer of risks, where risk reduction will be combined
with insurance and other risk-financing instruments that transfer residual risk; (iii)
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Fig. 4.9 Conceptualising risk layering. Source Based on Mechler et al. (2014)
a layer for infrequent catastrophic events, where public and international assistance
is decisive, and (iv) a very rare, high risk layer, which will require assistance from
international climate funding sources (see Fig. 4.9).
We argue that risk layering can be a valuable tool to define the Loss and Damage
risk and options space for economic or market-based losses and damages, which can
be quantified and costed. Employing a climate risk lens, a focus on loss distributions
is appropriate as it provides information on the whole risk spectrum and not only on
expected or average losses. Average annual (or expected) losses may differ greatly
compared to potential losses of low probability events, e.g. for Bangladesh average
losses associated with cyclone hazard are estimated to be around 0.5 billion USD,
while a 500 year event is gauged to cause losses 40 times higher (UNISDR 2015).
In addition, the risk layering approach can help determine the increase or decrease
of climate-related risks, and disentangle the increase according to the underlying
drivers of risk—hazard, exposure and vulnerability. This has important implications
for the prioritisation of instruments within the options space.
As one example, Fig. 4.10 provides results from an application of the risk layering
approach to the fiscal implications of flood risk in Bangladesh, the dominant climate-
related risk in the country (based on Mechler et al. 2014; Mechler and Bouwer
2015; Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 2016) (for a more detailed discussion of the case of
Bangladesh see the chapter by Haque et al. 2018). The quantitative risk assessment
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Fig. 4.10 Understanding
risk and risk layering for the
case of flood risk in
Bangladesh. Note The
different colours represent
acceptable, tolerable and
intolerable risk layers
ranging from high
probability, low impact
events (1 year) to low
probability, high impact
events (100 years). Source
Adapted from Mechler et al.
(2014)
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carried outwith the IIASACATSIMmodel (seeHochrainer-Stigler et al. 2014) builds
onhydrological and socio-economicmodelling and estimates increasingflood risk for
1 to 100 year events for present, 2020 to 2050 periods. A 100 year event today would
cost about USD 4.7 billion, and increase in 2050 to more than USD 20 billion absent
additional risk management measures. Much of the burden (infrastructure losses and
support for households and business) generally may end up with the public sector
and we find fiscal risk tolerance, determined by the country’s capacity to absorb risk
by national means and international assistance, is already today exceeded at events
with a return period of less than 25 years (the area shaded in red). This fiscal risk
threshold is expected to move down to even lower return periods over time and the
costs are estimated to strongly increase, forwhichnational (the planned compensation
fund) and international funding will be required to pick up the burden. Risk layering
thus not only helps to identify appropriate measures for tackling different layers of
climate-related risk, but also provides an opportunity to investigate how risk layers
will change in the future andwhat portions of riskmay eventually become intolerable.
The logic of risk layering can be expanded to global analysis, which may be used
to identify countries that are in need of international support for transformative and
curative CRMmeasures. Figure 4.11 shows results from such an exercise identifying
fiscal risk tolerance as the gap return period in financial resources available. Countries
shaded in red face such instances of fiscal intolerance at particularly low return period
events.
The fiscal risk evaluation methodology, while only covering certain aspects of the
problem, enables analysts to determine global funding arrangements to support coun-
tries that face risks beyond their financial tolerance and may assist the international
community in prioritising investment decisions with regard to transformative and
curative CRM measures. Such a fund may build on available sovereign risk pooling
arrangements in the Caribbean, Pacific, Africa and the Indian oceans (see chapters
by Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018 and Schaefer et al. 2018).
104 T. Schinko et al.
Fig. 4.11 Global map identifying high-level risks. Note The lower the return period the higher are
the chances of a gap event. Source Based on Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2014)
Overall, a risk-layering plus risk tolerance-based approach supports the integrated
assessment of risk portfolios across global to country, down to local levels—a fea-
ture that is beneficial especially in the context of identifying the Loss and Damage
risk space and corresponding implementation measures. As mentioned throughout,
decision makers, communities or societies will differ in their understanding of what
constitutes acceptable, tolerable and intolerable risk. Thus, risk layers will differ
according to decisions at stake, context, and stakeholders involved.
4.5 Implications for Research and Policy
The L&D debate has been contested among those advocating compensation for
actual losses and damages, versus those that have been suggesting support should
be extended for tackling potential losses and damages, most prominently as part
of further employing disaster risk management and climate insurance applications.
Our discussion proposed an actionable way forward for the deliberations based on
a broad interpretation and conceptualisation of comprehensive CRM, importantly
aligning and balancing notions of distributive and compensatory justice. The sug-
gested approach involves in a short-medium term, needs-based perspective, support
for risk management actions, which fall beyond countries’ ability to prevent and
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absorb risk; these actions to be supported internationally would largely comprise
of fundamental and transformative risk management interventions. Particularly in
a medium-longer term liability-based perspective, we emphasise consideration for
liabilities attributable to climate change. As we suggest, these considerations can be
integrated into a policy-oriented framework, which identifies the policy space for
Loss and Damage as composed of curative and transformative measures.
Transformative measures exhibit substantial overlap with DRR and adaptation
agendas, yet focus on high-level risks. This set ofmeasures is seeing attention,mostly
focussed on climate insurance (e.g. the G7 Initiative; GIZ 2015; Schäfer et al. 2018).
Many analysts and advocates, however, see a need for broadening this debate towards
comprehensive CRM, so that risk prevention and preparedness are better integrated
and linked with risk financing. The curative action space is less clearly defined, while
heavily contested. Beyond the calls for compensation for actual losses and damages,
which are currently ruled out in the Paris agreement, the set-up of and support for a
climate displacement facility has been in the spotlight and may qualify as an action
item in this space.
Common to both sets of measures, and discussed as a working element of the
agenda, is a need for committing finance for the genuine implementation of the
WIM. Such commitments to finance may have a prospective and transformative
function in terms of financial support for CRM, encompassing financing for climate
insurance premium subsidies, reserve capital and technical assistance. The curative
function involves finance for dealing ex-post with unavoided and unavoidable loss
and damage, on top of mechanisms that deal with avoidable risk. An important
aspect to emphasise is that our proposed principled approach, ideally to be linked
to international commitments to support, can serve as a sort of “canary in the coal
mine” where risks, costs and implications detected now and modelled for later time
horizons at local to regional risk management scales can help to inform the ultimate
remit of the UNFCCC, which is to harness collective global action for “avoiding
dangerous interference with the climate system” (United Nations 1992).
There is analytical and modelling expertise that can be employed to identify risks
‘beyond adaptation’ and to define the Loss and Damage risk and options space. We
argued that risk layering can be a valuable tool—at least for market-based losses
and damages. Non-economic or non-market based impacts may require alternative
assessment tools. When taking a climate risk lens, probabilistic loss distributions
are useful to provide information about the whole risk spectrum beyond expected
or average losses only. The risk layering approach can also provide support for
determining any increase (or decrease) of climate-related risks, and disentangle the
contributing drivers of risk—hazard, exposure and vulnerability, which has important
consequences for the prioritisation of instruments within the options space. It is
important to note, however, that disentangling anthropogenic and natural drivers of
risk is still not conclusively possible.
Our application of a risk analytical approach, comprising risk layering and risk-
based probabilistic modelling to the case of flood risk in Bangladesh and at the global
level represents amethodological approach for determining countries’ financial needs
for dealing with intolerable risk layers. Notwithstanding the fact that our example
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dealt with monetary losses, we hold that, with many aspects of being of immaterial
nature, our broad risk and justice approach, with a different set of methods and tools,
is also applicable to issues such as migration and preservation of cultural heritage.
Such and other assessments at national as well as at regional and global scales may
provide the basis for tackling the salient follow-up question towards the genuine
implementation of theWIM around justice aspects: whowill provide (receive) which
share of the required levels of financial support, and based on which burden-sharing
principle? After all, if any of the options discussed here and as part of the WIM
process are to see acceptance and implementation, they need strong embedding in a
framework based on principles of justice.
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Part II
Critical Issues Shaping the Discourse
Chapter 5
Attribution: How Is It Relevant for Loss
and Damage Policy and Practice?
Rachel A. James, Richard G. Jones, Emily Boyd, Hannah R. Young,
Friederike E. L. Otto, Christian Huggel and Jan S. Fuglestvedt
Abstract Attribution has become a recurring issue in discussions about Loss and
Damage (L&D). In this highly-politicised context, attribution is often associatedwith
responsibility and blame; and linked to debates about liability and compensation. The
aim of attribution science, however, is not to establish responsibility, but to further
scientific understanding of causal links between elements of the Earth System and
society. This research into causality could inform the management of climate-related
risks through improved understanding of drivers of relevant hazards, or, more widely,
vulnerability and exposure; with potential benefits regardless of political positions
on L&D. Experience shows that it is nevertheless difficult to have open discussions
about the science in the policy sphere. This is not only a missed opportunity, but also
problematic in that it could inhibit understanding of scientific results and uncertain-
ties, potentially leading to policy planning which does not have sufficient scientific
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evidence to support it. In this chapter, we first explore this dilemma for science-
policy dialogue, summarising several years of research into stakeholder perspectives
of attribution in the context ofL&D.We then aim to provide clarity about the scientific
research available, through an overview of research which might contribute evidence
about the causal connections between anthropogenic climate change and losses and
damages, including climate science, but also other fields which examine other drivers
of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. Finally, we explore potential applications of
attribution research, suggesting that an integrated and nuanced approach has poten-
tial to inform planning to avert, minimise and address losses and damages. The key
messages are
• In the political context of climate negotiations, questions about whether losses
and damages can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change are often linked
to issues of responsibility, blame, and liability.
• Attribution science does not aim to establish responsibility or blame, but rather to
investigate drivers of change.
• Attribution science is advancing rapidly, and has potential to increase understand-
ing of how climate variability and change is influencing slow onset and extreme
weather events, and how this interacts with other drivers of risk, including socio-
economic drivers, to influence losses and damages.
• Over time, some uncertainties in the science will be reduced, as the anthropogenic
climate change signal becomes stronger, and understanding of climate variability
and change develops.
• However, some uncertainties will not be eliminated. Uncertainty is common in
science, and does not prevent useful applications in policy, but might determine
which applications are appropriate. It is important to highlight that in attribu-
tion studies, the strength of evidence varies substantially between different kinds
of slow onset and extreme weather events, and between regions. Policy-makers
should not expect the later emergence of conclusive evidence about the influence
of climate variability and change on specific incidences of losses and damages;
and, in particular, should not expect the strength of evidence to be equal between
events, and between countries.
• Rather than waiting for further confidence in attribution studies, there is potential
to start working now to integrate science into policy and practice, to help under-
stand and tackle drivers of losses and damages, informing prevention, recovery,
rehabilitation, and transformation.
Keywords Loss and Damage · Attribution · Climate change · Science-policy
interface
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5.1 Introduction
The science of attributing observed phenomena to human-induced and natural cli-
mate drivers has seen remarkable progress since its emergence in the 1990s. The
first studies demonstrated that the late 20th century increase in global mean surface
temperature would not have occurred without human influence on concentrations of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols (Tett et al. 1999; Stott et al. 2000). In subse-
quent years, many more studies of global temperature supported this finding, leading
to greater and greater confidence in anthropogenic influence on global warming (San-
ter et al. 1995; Mitchell et al. 2001; Hegerl et al. 2007; Bindoff et al. 2013), and, the
most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states
that anthropogenic drivers are “extremely likely [or>95% probability] to have been
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (IPCC
2014). These scientific attribution statements provide a fundamental underpinning
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; UN
1992), demonstrating that recent warming was predominantly caused by human
emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and short-lived climate forcings (SLCFs),
and modifications to GHG concentrations associated with land use change (LUC);
and thus establishing the imperative for mitigation.
As the UNFCCC’s mandate has extended beyond mitigation, to include adapta-
tion, and now Loss and Damage (L&D) from climate change impacts (UNFCCC
2013, 2015; see introductory chapter by Mechler et al. 2018), new challenges and
questions are emerging about the science of attribution, and its role in policy. Whilst
there is strong evidence from attribution studies that human activity is influencing
global and regional temperatures (Bindoff et al. 2013), and also other global and
regional scale changes (including sea level rise, e.g. Church et al. 2013; and atmo-
spheric moisture content, e.g. Santer et al. 2007), understanding how anthropogenic
drivers influence losses and damages in particular ecosystems, economies, and com-
munities is a very different endeavour, which raises questions extending far beyond
physical climate science. When referring to the loss of coastline from a storm surge,
fatalities during a heat wave, or famine during a drought, the issue of causality
becomes more challenging scientifically. As we will explore in this chapter, at this
scale and complexity, multiple factors contribute to a specific loss or damage, and the
signal from climate change ismore difficult to detect relative to themany other poten-
tial influences on hazard occurrence, exposure, and vulnerability (Huggel et al. 2013).
Questions about attribution of specific losses and damages also make the impli-
cations of the scientific research more political than the implications of studies into
global or regional climate. Now questions are being asked about the influence of
human actions (through anthropogenic GHGs) on specific people, and often not
the same people who were responsible for the majority of GHG emissions. It is
therefore not difficult to understand why, in the context of L&D policy discussions,
attribution has often been associated with responsibility, blame, and liability. For sci-
entists, research into causality is a fundamental route towards understanding how the
Earth System works, and attribution research is not necessarily intended to identify
responsible parties. In the context of political negotiations, however, evenmentioning
attribution science can be seen as, and arguably often is, a political move.
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If attribution science is to be helpful in this controversial policy space, scien-
tists must not only push the boundaries of their physical scientific analyses, but also
improve their understanding of policymechanisms, and themotivations, perceptions,
and knowledge of policy-makers and practitioners. Interdisciplinary research in col-
laboration with social scientists, and transdisciplinary studies with stakeholders in
policy and practice, are fundamental to identify whether there are entry points for
physical attribution science. In response to this need, the authors have been investi-
gating the potential relevance of attribution science for L&D by attending UNFCCC
meetings (James et al. 2014a; Parker et al. 2015; Otto et al. 2015a), interviewing
stakeholders about attribution (Parker et al. 2017a), playing participatory games
about attribution science and its role in L&D (Parker et al. 2016), and more broadly
analysing perspectives of what L&D signifies (Boyd et al. 2017). This research has
highlighted the challenge of applying attribution science in a context where it is dif-
ficult to even discuss climate change science (James et al. 2014a). There are many
vested interests in the outcomes of attribution research, and, for negotiators of climate
policy, clarity on exactly what can and cannot be attributed might not be considered
helpful.
Unsurprisingly, then, our research also suggests that stakeholders to the L&D
debate have quite different understandings of what can and cannot be attributed to
anthropogenic climate change (Parker et al. 2017a). Yet, we find that attribution is an
issue which recurs in negotiations: and there is a risk that, without improved under-
standing, policy planning could proceed based on assumptions about the science, and
then later find that the evidence available is either stronger or weaker than expected.
In this chapter, we revisit the question of whether and how attribution science might
be useful for L&D policy and practice, first examining existing understandings of
attribution in L&Dpolicy discussions, then outlining the science itself andwhat it can
offer, and finally turning to potential applications. We hope to open up opportunities
for more informed dialogue between researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners:
helping scientists to understand the L&D policy context, the perceptions and impli-
cations of attribution, helping policy-makers and practitioners to understand what
the science can offer, and identifying areas which might require further integration
for progress (see Box 5.1 for key messages).
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Box 5.1 Key Messages
• In the political context of climate negotiations, questions about whether losses and
damages can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change are often linked to issues
of responsibility, blame, and liability.
• Attribution science does not aim to establish responsibility or blame, but rather to
investigate drivers of change.
• Attribution science is advancing rapidly, and has potential to increase understanding
of how climate variability and change is influencing slow onset and extreme weather
events, and how this interacts with other drivers of risk, including socio-economic
drivers, to influence losses and damages.
• Over time, some uncertainties in the science will be reduced, as the anthropogenic
climate change signal becomes stronger, and understanding of climate variability and
change develops.
• However, some uncertainties will not be eliminated. Uncertainty is common in sci-
ence, and does not prevent useful applications in policy, but might determine which
applications are appropriate. It is important to highlight that in attribution studies, the
strength of evidence varies substantially between different kinds of slow onset and
extreme weather events, and between regions. Policy-makers should not expect the
later emergence of conclusive evidence about the influence of climate variability and
change on specific incidences of losses and damages; and, in particular, should not
expect the strength of evidence to be equal between events, and between countries.
• Rather than waiting for further confidence in attribution studies, there is potential to
start working now to integrate science into policy and practice, to help understand and
tackle drivers of losses and damages, informing prevention, recovery, rehabilitation,
and transformation.
Section 5.2 summarises findings from our transdisciplinary research of perspec-
tives on attribution in L&D policy discussions, drawing directly on qualitative evi-
dence from stakeholder interviews (see Box 5.2). Section 5.3 then provides an
overview of sources of evidence about attribution of L&D to climate variability
and anthropogenic climate change. This is not restricted to physical climate science,
but also includes other fields of enquiry which investigate causative links between
L&D, climate and weather, and human activity. Section 5.4 will discuss if and how
such attribution science might be applied to support L&D policy and practice, taking
into account previous ideas from the L&D literature, and stakeholder interviews (see
5.2), but also drawing on our own conclusions and ideas about potentially fruitful
applications.
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Box 5.2 Evidence from stakeholder interviews
The discussion of perspectives of attribution in the context of L&Dpolicy in this chapter
draws on qualitative evidence from two research projects which included interviews
with stakeholders to L&D discussions. The first project aimed to explore stakehold-
ers’ understandings of probabilistic event attribution in relation to L&D (Parker et al.
2017a), and the second project was designed to more broadly investigate stakeholder
perspectives on L&D (Boyd et al. 2017). In both projects we asked stakeholders what
kind of scientific evidencemight be relevant for L&Dpolicy, and how; and both projects
led to insights into stakeholder perspectives on attribution science, including some con-
sistent findings. The methodologies are described more thoroughly in the key academic
papers, but here we provide a brief overview of the interview design and participants
to provide context for the quotations that are included in this chapter. All interview
data were anonymised and analysed for the respective papers, and here we draw on key
quotations which emerged from these analyses.
The focus of the Parker et al. (2017a) study was on just one area of attribution research:
probabilistic event attribution (PEA), a rapidly emerging field which aims to explore
the extent to which anthropogenic emissions influence the likelihood and magnitude
of specific extreme weather events such as heatwaves, floods and droughts in a spe-
cific location (see Sect. 5.3). Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted
between November 2013 and July 2014 with 31 stakeholders including UNFCCC del-
egates, representatives from non-governmental organisations, climate scientists, and
social scientists. Interview questions focusing on the extent to which the interviewees
understood PEA, and their views about its relevance to L&D policy.
The broader study of stakeholder perspectives on L&D, described in Boyd et al. (2017),
was prompted by the authors’ work on the relevance of attribution science for L&D
policy (including Parker et al. 2017a). One of the emerging insights from the initial
engagement with L&D discussions was the difficulty of initiating detailed discussions
about science and practice to understand and address L&D, given the controversy of
the topic, but also the lack of clarity on the concept of L&D (James et al. 2014a).
This prompted an in-depth investigation of stakeholder perspectives of L&D, in which
interviewees were asked how they would define L&D, the relationship between L&D
and adaptation, and what actions might be needed to address L&D. On the basis of these
interviews a diverse spectrum of ideas about L&D was identified, characterised as a
typology of four perspectives (see Fig. 5.1). The interviews included questions about
the relevance of anthropogenic climate change in the context of L&D and what kind of
science might be needed for L&D policy, and it is these aspects which we discuss in
this chapter. 36 qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted between April
and November 2015 with stakeholders from science, policy, and practice, including
negotiators, adaptation and disaster risk practitioners, and researchers with expertise in
climate science, social science, law, philosophy, and economics.
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5.2 Attribution in the Context of L&D: Why Is Attribution
a Critical Issue?
5.2.1 Recurring Questions: Is This Really About
Anthropogenic Climate Change?
The UNFCCC has a mandate to address anthropogenic climate change (UN 1992).
Its ultimate objective is to “achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system” (UN 1992:4), and therefore the original focus of UNFCCC
discussions was on mitigation, or reducing GHGs. However, there has long been a
recognition that some climate change impacts cannot be avoided (e.g. Meehl 2005;
Wigley 2005); and the UNFCCC now has frameworks and mechanisms to address
climate change impacts in terms of adaptation (UNFCCC 2011) and more recently
L&D (UNFCCC 2013, 2015; see also introductory chapter by Mechler et al. 2018).
In seeking to address the impacts of anthropogenic climate change, the bound-
aries of the UNFCCC’s mandate become less clear. Efforts to help people cope with
climate change include risk reduction, e.g. by reducing vulnerability or more gener-
ally by enhancing adaptive capacity, and improving disaster response and recovery.
These activities are already important ambitions for institutions which focus on
development, disaster risk management, and humanitarian aid. An obvious question
is therefore:what is distinct about adaptation and/or L&D?How should theUNFCCC
interact with UNDP (the UN Development Programme), UNISDR (the UN Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction), and a whole host of other UN agencies and interna-
tional organisations? Which activities are specific to climate change?1 In the case of
L&D, the term—“losses and damages”—has been used in disaster risk reduction for
many years.2 Losses and damages from natural disasters have occurred and would
continue to occur without climate change. So, which losses and damages are relevant
for the UNFCCC?What further effort is needed to address the new and/or additional
losses and damages which will result from climate change?
These questions about institutionalmandates and responsibilities lead to questions
about attribution: about which losses and damages can be attributed to anthropogenic
climate change. It is not easy to find conclusive scientific answers, partly because
these attribution questions are motivated and posed differently to research questions
in scientific studies (Otto et al. 2016), and partly due to the complexity of isolat-
1Similar questions were raised by many of the stakeholders we interviewed (see Box 5.2), for
example one said: “That’s a fundamental question—am I fighting climate change or poverty?”, and
one interviewee described the challenge in UNFCCC L&D discussions to “draw the distinction
about what’s considered adaptation and L&D, and some of the humanitarian and DRR issues”,
explaining “we had a very long discussion in the committee meeting just to discuss whether the
humanitarian assistance can be counted for climate finance”.
2As one interviewee highlighted (see Box 5.2), the “use of this phrase in this very policy context
is very different from use of the phrase in the disaster risk management community, where they’re
looking at L&D from all events”.
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ing the influence of anthropogenic climate change on specific losses and damages.
Scientific attribution studies usually take anthropogenic emissions as their starting
point, and ask what influence those emissions have had on climate and weather. In
policy discussions, attribution questions emerge from questions of how to address
specific cases of losses and damages, and what proportion of the losses or damages
can be related to anthropogenic climate change. As we will outline in Sect. 5.3,
at a local scale it becomes more challenging to understand how the influence of
anthropogenic climate change interacts with natural variability in weather and cli-
mate. Furthermore, the influence of hazards resulting from local climate changes and
extreme weather events on people (through impacts on health, water resources, food
systems, infrastructure and beyond) interacts with a whole range of other drivers.
These include the vulnerability and exposure components of coupled human-natural
systems (see chapters by Bouwer 2018; Lopez et al. 2018 and Botzen et al. 2018).
These complexities and uncertainties perhaps start to explain why questions about
attribution recur in UNFCCC negotiations3: there are obvious and practical reasons
to ask which L&D is related to climate change, but no straightforward answers.
5.2.2 Questions with Political Implications: Controversy
and Ambiguity in the Negotiations
The answers to attribution questions also have important political implications.
Attributing specific losses anddamages toGHGemissionsmight imply responsibility
for emitters (potentially including countries, regions, sectors, companies, and individ-
uals). Some of the stakeholders we interviewed (see Box 5.2) highlighted that men-
tions of attribution in the negotiation context were likely to be politically motivated,
associated with attempts to push for compensation for climate change impacts.4
They also suggested that the political motivations might influence how attribution
sciencewould be represented, i.e. negotiatorsmight “choosewhat they know” (Parker
et al. 2017a).5 When developed countries mention attribution in UNFCCC negotia-
tions they might highlight the uncertainty and imply inability to attribute losses and
3Recurring questions about whether L&D is related to climate change, and specifically about attri-
bution, were witnessed in our own participant observation of UNFCCC discussions (see Boyd et al.
2017), notably including one quote from a member of the Executive Committee to the WIM “it’s a
question of attributionwhichwe always get back to”. Interviewees (see Box 5.2) also commented on
the recurring nature of the topic in UNFCCC discussions, for example “there’s a lot of unproductive
exchanges that say ‘how can we be sure this is related to anthropogenic changes,” explaining “it’s
not an explicit agenda item, but it always pops up.”
4For example, one interviewee said “When you talk about attribution, there’s an important sense of
who’s paying for it and who’s to blame… people look at attribution as a way to get compensation.”
5Another interviewee said, referring to attribution science: “I think there will be different ways in
which people interpret this and use this to get what they want, and to avoid having to do/pay for
things.”
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damages to anthropogenic forcing.6 Conversely, vulnerable countries might want to
highlight the strength of attribution evidence to try to prompt action from emitters7
(see also chapter by Calliari et al. 2018).
Therefore, whilst on an institutional level it seems important to distinguish losses
and damages which are attributable to climate change, and losses and damages which
might not be relevant to the UNFCCC, doing so is not only scientifically challenging,
but also politically contentious. Perhaps in order to make progress in the presence
of this controversy, and to achieve agreement across different Parties, deliberately
ambiguous language has been used in the official L&D text under the UNFCCC,
including in the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) (UNFCCC 2013) and
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015).8 The WIM refers to L&D from
climate change impacts, but it is unclear how those losses and damages might be
distinguished from L&D from natural disasters (James et al. 2014a).
5.2.3 Perspectives from Practitioners: Is It More Pragmatic
to Avoid Isolating Anthropogenic Climate Change
Impacts from Other Losses and Damages?
The ambiguity in international policy leaves room for multiple perspectives on the
relevance of anthropogenic climate change to L&D, and the potential role for attri-
bution science. Boyd et al. (2017) asked stakeholders whether they thought actions
to address losses and damages should refer only to the impacts of anthropogenic
climate change, or to any adverse effects from climate variability and change (see
Fig. 5.1). This revealed a divide in opinion. In 9 of the 36 interviews, stakehold-
ers were clear that, since the WIM was part of the UNFCCC, it should focus on
anthropogenic climate change. Nine others, predominantly practitioners, argued that
it would be more pragmatic to address all weather and climate-related losses and
damages together (in keeping with several working definitions of L&D, Warner and
van der Geest 2013; UNEP 2016).9
Many of the remaining interviewees also expressed caution about limiting L&D
actions too strictly to those impacts that could be attributed to anthropogenic climate
change. This was partly due to awareness of the political connotations of attribution
6For example, Vanhala and Hastbaek (2016) refer to the response of New Zealand to an AOSIS
proposal, in which they rejected the proposal on the basis that it is not possible to attribute any
specific extreme event to climate change.
7One interviewee discussed the challenge of attribution science for vulnerable countries: “the risk
is that L&D may well go unattributed to climate change and once the opportunity to compensate is
lost, in the scheme of things it’s lost…It’s difficult, obviously you want to attribute everything.”
8According to Vanhala and Hastbaek (2016), the ambiguous nature of the WIM was central to its
establishment; or as one interviewee in Boyd et al.’s (2017) study stated “they’ve made it fuzzy to
get people to sign on”.
9In the remaining 18 interviews, a conclusive opinion about this question was not expressed.
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Fig. 5.1 A schematic diagram illustrating a spectrum of views on L&D identified by Boyd et al.
(2017). Each of the four perspectives are arranged along an axis in terms of how far suggested
approaches to address losses and damages are distinct from, or go beyond, existing adaptation
mechanisms. The shading illustrates how the perspectives differ in terms of the relevance of anthro-
pogenic climate change: for two of the perspectives identified, L&D refers to anthropogenic climate
change impacts only, for the other two perspectives, there is an emphasis on addressing all climate-
related risk. Adapted from Boyd et al. (2016, 2017)
in the negotiations,10 and the suggestion that more progress might be possible if the
mandate of L&Dmechanisms remained vague and inclusive.11 It was also partly due
to frustration at the inefficiencies of multiple institutions in disaster risk, humanitar-
ian aid, development, adaptation, and now potentially L&D, working on separate but
related issues without effective coordination12; and an appeal formore integrated risk
10This was expressed several times when this question was linked to issues of compensation and
attribution by the interviewee, e.g. “to get political consensus around attribution, and therefore
compensation, is just never going to happen.”
11For example: “If you push too hard the discussion on defining, other than the quagmire semantics
and politics it takes you into, it actually works against the idea that you have to address the problem
comprehensively.”
12For example: “There are too many forms of funding coming out of development, the problem
with that is that you need a broad resilience approach to short term risk and long term stresses which
can create conflict related to climate change.”
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management.13 The suggestion that L&D should refer to all climate-related events
was also related to an expression of caution about relying too heavily on complex
scientific assessments.14 Interviewees were concerned that uncertainties in the sci-
ence could delay progress,15 or inhibit efforts in regions with limited data availability
and limited ability to provide evidence of the influence of climate change.16 They
suggested that the more important ethical imperative should be to help people who
are suffering.17 This is also in keeping with comments expressed in the literature
(e.g. Hulme et al. 2011). Several stakeholders suggested that focusing on attributing
hazards would be counterproductive in diverting attention away from helping those
in need.18
5.2.4 A Challenge for Science-Policy Dialogue
In policy (Sects. 5.2.1, 5.2.2) and practice (Sect. 5.2.3), questions about attribution
may therefore emerge from questions about which institutions and countries should
take responsibility for dealing with L&D; about who should pay for L&D. Many
see that assigning responsibility is politically challenging, and addressing climate
change impacts in isolation is impractical. Attribution, by association, is sometimes
seen as unhelpful or irrelevant.19
For scientists, questions about attribution have different motivations, objectives,
and implications. Analysis of causality is an important way to further understanding
of the Earth System. There are many important reasons to ask attribution questions
besides establishing responsibility. And, it is worth highlighting that the results of
scientific attribution studies are not sufficient to indicate responsibility. Attribution
studies can estimate the extent to which certain drivers (such as GHGs) contributed
to certain outcomes (such as flooding), but this “contribution” is very different from
13For example: “disaster risk management thinking and also climate change thinking has to be
integrated with this big development perspective.”
14For example: “that places too great a weight upon scientific evidence in ethical and political
negotiations, which cannot be borne by climatic science.”
15For example: “We cannot wait for them [climatologists] to determine to what extent this is about
climate change or not” (Parker et al. 2017a).
16For example: “Science can establish maybe for some impacts earlier than others, there’s some
differences”, and “there’s a big issue with that in that the data for developing countries, we have less
certainty on what is climate enhanced disaster in the south, simply because we don’t have the data
sets. We don’t have the information to say with certainty that that was caused by climate change.”
17For example: “the more urgent issue is… actually… responding to or adapting to extremeweather
events, whether it’s caused by people or not”.
18In the words of one interviewee: “trying to disentangle the climate change portion of that risk
might be useful from a political point but it’s actually counterproductive in terms of having an
impact on reducing risk”. Similar points were expressed by stakeholders interviewed specifically
about attribution science (Parker et al 2017a).
19For example: “I know there’s this question around attribution, if you think it is key, then the
science is very important. In my mind it isn’t and I don’t think that is the way forward.”
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“responsibility”, which is a moral or ethical issue (Gardiner 2004; Muller et al. 2009;
Skeie et al. 2017). Even where a scientific study might demonstrate that a country’s,
or company’s, emissions contributed to a particular loss, that would not necessarily
equate to responsibility to act or compensate, for example, if the emitterwere unaware
of the influence of their emissions. Ethical questions about responsibility extend far
beyond the domain of climate science (ethical issues and perspectives are treated in
the chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018 of this book).
Yet many of the stakeholders interviewed appear to see a direct association
between attribution and blame, liability, or compensation.20 Several also suggested
that the motivation for attribution research is blame or compensation.21 This might
explain why mentioning attribution science can receive a hostile, or wary, reception
in many L&D discussions.22 As one interviewee said: “the minute you talk about
anthropogenic climate change, the purpose in talking about that is to figure out who
is to blame and who to pay for the effects of it.”
The assumption of political motives behind scientific inquiry or discussion poses
a dilemma for science-policy dialogue: it is difficult to talk about attribution and
climate change signals in connection with L&D, but it seems important that policy-
makers are aware of what the science can offer, and what it cannot. And, if policy
is to address losses and damages from climate change, it is important to understand
changing risks. A central aim of attribution research, to investigate how rising GHGs
are influencing climate and the occurrence of extreme weather events, would appear
to be quite fundamental in order to prepare for climate change and address losses
and damages.
Initial evidence suggests that the current understanding of attribution science
amongst stakeholders involved in the L&D discussions is quite limited (Parker et al.
2017a). There are several opinions about the science which were found amongst
the interviewees which might be problematic. First, several implied that scientific
evidence would later become stronger which would provide more evidence for pol-
icy, particularly for compensation.23 Whilst the science is advancing rapidly, some
20In many of the interviews, attribution was mentioned in the same sentence or fragment as blame,
compensation, and liability, for example: “attribution and culpability of climate damage,” “attribu-
tion of blame and taking compensation,” “attribution, and therefore compensation,” “the compen-
sation or liability issues, as well as attribution,” “how do you attribute and get compensation.” This
was often with the implication that the main purpose of attribution is to establish responsibility,
or that the only reason why attribution would be needed is to establish responsibility e.g. “Is this
about making an argument that there is an ethical responsibility on polluters to compensate for
damage caused by pollution. In which case, attribution of weather events to particular cases in the
atmosphere becomes important”.
21For example: “There will at some point be a growing need for a politically motivated answer that
looks at attribution, but the reason for that is not practical it is political”, and: “climate attributions are
trying to understand what’s climate change doing to extremes and slow onset events and suggesting
that this can create a call for compensation”
22Based on research team’s experience of attending>20 meetings with a focus on L&D (Boyd et al.
2017).
23For example: “the science … that’s kind of the one thing that’s lagging” and “that issue of
attribution aroundwhichpolitical consensuswill not occur in the next 5 years or 10.”One interviewee
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uncertainty will always remain, and it is important to help these stakeholders under-
stand what the science might be able to offer, and where it might be insufficient. On
the other hand, many other stakeholders highlighted the challenges and difficulties
of attribution,24 some even saying that it is impossible,25 which perhaps misses an
opportunity, as there may be useful research available which they are unaware of. In
the next section, we review sources of attribution evidence to examine the extent to
which they might provide useful information about the changing risk of losses and
damages.
5.3 The Science of Attribution: What Kind of Evidence Is
Available About the Influence of Anthropogenic
Climate Change on L&D?
Climate change attribution research initially focused on investigating drivers of
observed global warming (e.g. Tett et al. 1999; Stott et al. 2000). However global
mean surface temperature does not have direct influence on people or infrastructure.
Attribution of losses and damages is a much more challenging and more interdisci-
plinary scientific problem.
Attributing losses and damages involves investigating how anthropogenic GHGs
influence many other climatic variables besides global temperature, as well as
their influence on the oceans, cryosphere and biosphere, on a range of timescales.
UNFCCC documents (e.g. UNFCCC 2013, 2015) consistently state that losses and
damages refers to impacts from both extreme events (including heatwaves, flood-
ing, tropical cyclones, and drought), and “slow onset” events or climatic processes
(including glacier retreat, sea level rise, ocean acidification and desertification).26
Understanding this wide range of environmental processes requires input frommany
different scientific disciplines (from physical climate science, to hydrology, to ecol-
ogy, to economics), and collaboration between them. It is worth highlighting that the
described attribution science as the key to unlocking liability, implying that it would later emerge:
“we don’t have to enter the rooms on liability and compensation, those doors are locked behind
a door called attribution. The key to that door lies with the scientific community, it is still being
forged.”
24For example: “Attribution is just really difficult,” “as we know attribution is very difficult,” and
“the whole attribution thing is tricky.”
25On being asked whether L&D should refer to L&D which can be attributed to anthropogenic
climate change, or all climate-related L&D, one interviewee said “there’s no science that can
distinguish between the two,” and another said “I think in many cases, it’s just simply impossible to
differentiate between the two. And I cannot think about one methodology that would allow a small
island state to argue whether a storm surge is part of a natural variability or climate change.”
26In decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC 2011), it was noted that approaches to address losses and dam-
ages should consider climatic impacts “including sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean
acidification, glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of
biodiversity and desertification”
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distinction in policy, between extreme events and slow onset events, is not consistent
with the way the events are studied by scientists; and losses and damages in many
cases result from the interplay between incremental change (including “slow onset
processes”) and rare (extreme) events. For instance, sea level rise is often experienced
through an increase in the height of storm surges. Gradually increasing temperatures
may have their largest impact during a drought.
Attribution to anthropogenic climate change requires a comparison between the
influence of human GHGs and the influence of other potential drivers. The first cli-
mate change attribution studies compared the “forcing” on global temperature from
anthropogenic GHGs and aerosols, with natural drivers including solar variations
and volcanic aerosols (Tett et al. 1999; Stott et al. 2000). Attribution of global tem-
perature also, importantly, considers the role of natural modes of variability, such
as the El Nino Southern Oscillation or Atlantic Multi-Decadal Oscillation (e.g. Fyfe
et al. 2010; Foster and Rahmstorf 2011; Folland et al. 2013), which can modify the
global temperature from year to year or even decade to decade (Parker et al. 2007).
At a regional or local scale, the role of natural variability on weather and climate is
even more pronounced, and it is therefore a very important factor to consider in attri-
bution of losses and damages. In addition, the climatic and environmental hazards
which lead to losses and damages have many other drivers besides anthropogenic
emissions and natural variability, for example changes in land use (such as defor-
estation, urbanisation, agricultural development) which have important influences,
for example via the hydrological cycle, meaning more confounding variables need
to be taken into account in an attribution analysis.
To understand losses and damages, it is essential to not only study drivers of
environmental hazards, but also to investigate other components of risk: influences
on exposure and vulnerability (Huggel et al. 2013; chapters byBouwer 2018; Schinko
et al. 2018; Lopez et al. 2018; Botzen et al. 2018). The extent of losses and damages
during a flood, for example, will be determined by the scale of the meteorological
and hydrological hazard, but also the exposure of populations (are there people
living in the floodplain?), and their vulnerability (are houses flood-resilient? are
there early warning systems and procedures for emergency response? do people
have insurance?). Furthermore, losses and damages might include monetary losses,
loss of life, damage to infrastructure, detrimental effects on ecosystems, and a diverse
array of non-monetary or non-economic losses and damages (NELs/NELD), such
as loss of identity, or psychological distress (Serdeczny et al. 2016; Clayton et al.
2017; chapter by Serdeczny 2018). Attribution of such a range of quantifiable and
non-quantifiable variables poses further uncertainties and challenges.
Attributing losses and damages may start to sound like an impossible challenge.
As we will explore, it is not currently possible, and it may never be possible, to
generate a complete inventory of losses and damages from anthropogenic emissions.
Yet that should not prevent scientists from seeking to develop a fuller understanding
of the drivers of losses and damages, and it does not mean that the science that is
already available is not useful for policy-makers, who are accustomed to dealing
with incomplete information and uncertainties. There are several important fields of
enquiry which can already contribute evidence to help us understand how anthro-
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pogenic climate change is influencing losses and damages, and steps are already
being made to integrate these disciplines. For example, recent work has estimated
the monetary losses attributable to anthropogenic emissions from damage to hous-
ing following the 2013/2014 winter flooding in the UK (Schaller et al. 2016), and
the number of heat-related deaths attributable to anthropogenic emissions during the
2003 European heatwave (Mitchell et al. 2016).
Here we review fields of study that might contribute to more such analyses in
the future, for each giving a brief overview of how the science works, examples
of the kind of attribution findings it can deliver, an evaluation of the strength of
evidence which is currently available, and future directions in the field. Given the
scale of the challenge, we cannot not hope to be comprehensive, but rather to give
an introduction alongside references which could provide more detailed insights.
Figure 5.2 summarises some of the causal connections between anthropogenic activ-
ity and losses and damages, and illustrates contributions from the different scientific
fields described in Sects. 5.3.1–5.3.4. Several authors have described a “causal chain”
between anthropogenic emissions, climate andweather, and local impacts (Stone and
Allen 2005; Hansen et al. 2016). Here we show there are many interacting causal
chains,whichmight be conceived of as awebor network of natural and anthropogenic
interactions.
5.3.1 Attribution of Climate Change and Extreme Weather
Events to Anthropogenic Forcing
The science of attributing observed climate andweather to external drivers, including
attribution of climate change trends, and attribution of extreme weather events, is
the type of research which physical climate scientists are usually referring to when
they use the term “attribution,” and this is also how “attribution” is used in the IPCC
Working Group I (WGI) reports (Bindoff et al. 2013). Here, attribution is defined as
“the process of evaluating the relative contributions of multiple causal factors to a
change or event with an assignment of statistical confidence” (Hegerl et al. 2010: 2;
Bindoff et al. 2013: 872). The aim is to investigate the influence of human-induced
changes inGHGs andother short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) on climate or extreme
weather events, relative to the influence of other drivers, including modes of natural
climate variability, solar variability, and volcanic eruptions. The studies usually focus
on climate and weather, and therefore do not necessarily provide information about
impacts or losses and damages, therefore the results are most relevant for the links
shown in the top left of Fig. 5.2. What follows is a brief overview of the relevance
of attribution research to L&D. For more detailed information, several reviews are
available (Hegerl and Zwiers 2011; Bindoff et al. 2013; Stott et al. 2016; National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016).
Until very recently climate change attribution studies analysed trends, most
notably the increase in global mean surface temperature. In these attribution studies,
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Fig. 5.2 A conceptual causal network illustrating multiple potential “causal chains” between
anthropogenic changes inGHGs and aerosols, climate andweather, andL&D.The figure is designed
to be illustrative rather than comprehensive, showing the influence of human factors (shown in grey
at the bottom of the figure) on L&D, including monetary losses, fatalities, damage to infrastructure
and ecosystems, and non-economic losses (NELs). The arrows are labelled with the section of the
chapter which deals with scientific research relevant to that link in the network: importantly not
all of the links are labelled, highlighting again that this chapter is not comprehensive, and there
may be other fields of research which could be integrated into L&D research and practice to better
understand L&D
observed trends are compared to model simulations with and without certain drivers
(including GHGs, anthropogenic aerosols, solar variability, and volcanic aerosols)
to test the relative importance of each forcing factor (see Fig. 5.3). These studies
have demonstrated that anthropogenic activity has influenced global warming, and
also regional warming on six continents, as well as global changes in related vari-
ables, such as atmospheric water vapour. The global increase in sea level rise has
also been attributed to anthropogenic GHGs (Bindoff et al. 2013). Trend attribution
can therefore provide relevant information about the influence of climate change on
some “slow onset” events including sea level rise, and increasing temperatures. It
is also possible to conduct trend attribution studies on long term trends in extreme
weather events, for example the global increase in heavy precipitation events has
been attributed to anthropogenic emissions (Zhang et al. 2013).
In the last 10 years, a new field of climate change attribution research has rapidly
emerged, which focuses on single extreme weather events (Stott et al. 2016). It is
now possible to make statements about how anthropogenic emissions have influ-
enced specific heatwaves, heavy rainfall events, wind storms, and droughts. Since
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Fig. 5.3 Example of a simplified detection and attribution study for global temperature. Points
show observed global temperature anomalies relative to 1880–1920 (shaded blue to pink to repre-
sent cooler to warmer temperatures). These are compared to model simulated temperatures with
natural forcings only (blue), anthropogenic forcing only (orange), and a combination of natural
and anthropogenic forcings (black). As shown, the observations can only be reproduced with both
natural and anthropogenic forcing. Source Bindoff et al. (2013) IPCC AR5 WGI, Box 10.1 Fig. 1,
p. 876
extreme weather events are rare, and their occurrence is strongly influenced by nat-
ural variability, it is not possible to say that a specific event would not have occurred
without anthropogenic interference. However, it is possible to investigate whether
and how anthropogenic emissions influenced the probability and magnitude. There
are several different methods for examining the influence of anthropogenic climate
change on extreme weather events, including observational and model-based stud-
ies (Stott et al. 2016). All methods use either large ensembles of climate models
or statistical models to estimate the likelihood of an event occurring in the current
climate as well as with the anthropogenic climate drivers removed. The resulting
frequency distributions can be used to estimate the change in the probability due to
anthropogenic interference (as in Fig. 5.4).
Extreme event attribution studies are increasingly being applied to understand
contemporary extreme events, and for the past 6 years the Bulletin of the Ameri-
can Meteorological Society has published a summary of attribution studies refer-
ring to the previous year (Peterson et al. 2012, 2013; Herring et al. 2014, 2015,
2016, 2018). The science is advancing rapidly, evidenced in the large growth in
the number of studies published, and the ability to make attribution statements
more quickly: scientists are investigating the possibility of operational event attri-
bution which could deliver statements in the weeks and months following an event
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Fig. 5.4 A schematic illustration of the probability distribution of a climate variable (such as tem-
perature or precipitation) with (solid red line) and without (green line) human influence on climate.
Extreme event attribution studies use statistics or climate models to estimate these distributions and
then calculate the change in probability associated with anthropogenic forcing (i.e. the difference
between the green hatched area—P0—and the red hatched area—P1). The red dashed line illustrates
how the probability distribution of the variable might change in future. Source Stott et al. (2016)
(see www.climatecentral.org). For example, the flooding in Louisiana in August
2016 was attributed to have been made twice as likely due to anthropogenic cli-
mate change, two weeks after the event occurred (van der Wiel et al. 2017).
A large signal from anthropogenic climate change on the early 2017 drought
in Kenya could be excluded while the event was still unfolding (Uhe et al.
2017).
It is currently not possible to conduct scientifically viable attribution studies for
all types of extreme weather events leading to losses and damages (see Fig. 5.5), and
some specific cases can be particularly difficult to model due to rare and complex
weather patterns, as was found for flooding in Pakistan in 2010 (e.g. Christidis et al.
2013). There are also important variations in the availability and quality of attribu-
tion evidence between regions. Currently, many more studies have been conducted
for developed than developing countries (Otto et al. 2015a). There are efforts to
change this (e.g. wwa.climatecentral.org), but limited availability of data in devel-
oping countries is a barrier (Huggel et al. 2015a). This is highly relevant for L&D,
because it means it is challenging to make attribution statements about losses and
damages from some disasters. It is also important to highlight that in some cases
anthropogenic climate change is found to decrease the probability of extreme events,
such as spring flooding from snowmelt in the UK (Kay et al. 2011) or not to alter the
likelihood of the event occurring, as for the 2014–15 droughts in the Sao Paolo area
(Otto et al. 2015b).
Uncertainties associated with event attribution studies can make the results chal-
lenging to communicate and apply in policy (Otto et al. 2015a), as with projections of
climate change (Weaver et al. 2013). The results of attribution studies also depend on
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Fig. 5.5 Schematic illustration of the assessment by the National Academy of Sciences of the state
of attribution science for different types of extreme weather events, both in terms of the general
understanding of the impact of climate change on this kind of events, and in terms of the attribution
of specific extreme events to anthropogenic forcing. Source National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering and Medicine (2016)
how events are defined, how attribution questions are asked, and the methodologies
used (Dole et al. 2011; Rahmstorf and Coumou 2011; Otto et al. 2012), which has
led to some disagreements between scientists about the strength of evidence which
they provide (Trenberth et al. 2015; Otto et al. 2016). This does not preclude the
use of evidence about changing risks from attribution studies, but highlights a need
for research to explore how the science might contribute to decision analyses (see
chapter by Lopez et al. 2018; chapter by Botzen et al. 2018), potentially building
on existing efforts to combine and translate sources of uncertainty into a common
confidence language (Stone and Hansen 2016).
AsGHGconcentrations increase, and the Earth System adjusts to this perturbation
to the energy balance, the signal from climate change will be strengthened, and
therefore it is likely that the Earth will experience more regional changes, and more
extreme events which show a detectable influence from anthropogenic emissions
(e.g. Lee et al. 2016; Frame et al. 2017). The rapid developments in the science also
suggest that there will be a continued growth in available literature, and now there are
also increasing efforts to extend extreme event attribution studies beyond climatic
variables to also consider ecological and hydrological impacts (e.g. Marthews et al.
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2015; see Sect. 5.3.2), loss of life (Mitchell et al. 2016), andmonetary losses (Schaller
et al. 2016), as well as linkingwith research into the sources of anthropogenic forcing
(see Sect. 5.3.3). However, it is worth highlighting that some uncertainties in the
sciencewill not be eliminated, and the research is unlikely to provide an even evidence
base for all countries and events: some events will always be easier to study due to
differences between events in the strength of the climate signal, availability of data,
and ability of models to simulate them.
5.3.2 Attribution of Climate Change Impacts
There is a growing body of evidence about how recent changes in climate have
influenced natural and human systems. As part of the IPCC AR5 Working Group
II (WGII) report this evidence is drawn together to assess the detection and attribu-
tion of climate change impacts on the cryosphere, water resources, coastal systems,
terrestrial and oceanic ecosystems, and on human systems, including analysis of
food systems and the livelihoods of indigenous people (Cramer et al. 2014). In this
context, attribution “addresses the question of the magnitude of the contribution of
climate change to change in a system” (Cramer et al. 2014, 985), and that contribu-
tion is evaluated as being “major” or “minor”. This is a slightly different approach
to the attribution of climate changes and weather events in WGI (Sect. 5.3.1; see
Fig. 5.6), and in particular, does not necessarily imply that the change in question
Fig. 5.6 Schematic diagram from the IPCCWGIIChap. 18 on detection and attribution of observed
impacts, which illustrates how WGII work on impacts attribution (here Sect. 5.3.2) relates to WGI
work on attribution of climate and weather (here Sect. 5.3.1) and wider research into changes in
climate, natural, and human systems. Source Cramer et al. (2014) IPCC AR5WGII, Fig. 18-1, 985
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can be traced back to anthropogenic emissions. Given the challenges of attribution
to anthropogenic emissions for certain variables, notably precipitation changes, this
flexible approach allows for evidence to be gathered even where the signal-to-noise
ratio from anthropogenic activity is so far small.
The basic premise of impacts attribution research is consistent with the atmo-
spheric research (Sect. 5.3.1). Once a change in a certain variable has been detected,
potential drivers of that change are compared: the influence of regional or local
climate change is compared with other confounding variables such as pollution and
land use change, and sometimes technological innovation, or social and demographic
changes. The precise methodologies vary between disciplines (Stone et al. 2013), but
for a causal relationship to be established it is essential to understand the processes
by which climate change contributed to the observed impact, which is often explored
using ecological, hydrological, agricultural, or epidemiological models.
Over the past couple of decades, evidence about the observed impacts of climate
change has grown substantially (Hansen 2015). In the IPCC report of 2001, strong
evidence was restricted to the cryosphere and terrestrial ecosystems in northern lat-
itudes or mountainous regions (Gitay et al. 2001; Arnell et al. 2001). In the AR5,
impacts of recent climate change were observed on all continents and across all
oceans. There is high confidence that worldwide glacial retreat, permafrost warming
and thawing, and mass bleaching of coral reefs can be mainly attributed to climate
change. There is evidence that the livelihoods of indigenous people in the Arctic
have been altered by climate change, and emerging evidence for indigenous people
in other regions (Cramer et al. 2014).
As might be expected, understanding causal relationships is very challenging for
human systems, and there is often a strong role for social and economic factors,
making it difficult to isolate the role of climate change (Cramer et al. 2014). Hansen
and Cramer (2015) also highlight that the availability of evidence varies markedly
between regions. Often there is less evidence available about impacts in regions
considered to be most vulnerable to climate change: suggesting that the lack of
evidence does not indicate that climate change impacts have not occurred, but rather
than there are fewer studies available. For example, between 2000 and 2010, 10,544
scientific studies were published about climate change impacts in Europe, and just
1987 about South America (ibid).
Increasingly, there are efforts to analyse whether impacts attributed to climate
change can also be attributed to anthropogenic emissions, aswell as to extend extreme
event attribution studies ofweather to also investigate impacts (i.e. linkingSects. 5.3.1
and 5.3.2). Attribution to anthropogenic emissions has been demonstrated for global
scale studies of shrinking glaciers (Marzeion et al. 2014), ecological studies at a
global aggregate level of a meta-analysis (Rosenzweig et al. 2008), changing water
runoff, for example in the western United States (Barnett et al. 2008), and changes in
ecosystem productivity (Sippel et al. 2018). Hansen and Stone (2016) analysed the
role of anthropogenic emissions across all of the impacts assessed in the IPCCWGII
report (Cramer et al. 2014), and found that approximately 65% of the impacts related
to changes in atmospheric or ocean temperature could be confidently attributed to
anthropogenic forcing (Fig. 5.7). The strongest evidence exists for shrinking glaciers,
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Fig. 5.7 An analysis by Hansen and Stone, revisiting impacts in the IPCC WGII report to assess
whether they can be linked to anthropogenic forcing. Note Blue symbols show impacts which
have been attributed to anthropogenic forcing with at least medium confidence, and confidence
bars indicate the confidence level, with the colour of the confidence bars indicating whether the
observed impact is related to changes in air temperature (red), ocean surface temperature (violet)
or precipitation (blue). Impacts that are linked to regional climate trends, but with little evidence
for anthropogenic forcing are shown in grey. Source Hansen and Stone (2016)
permafrost degradation, bleaching and decline of coral reefs, increasing forest fires,
and the increase in shrub cover in Arctic regions. For impacts-related to precipi-
tation, the evidence of anthropogenic forcing is still weak, and for many impacts,
the evaluation of the relative contribution of anthropogenic climate change is still
qualitative. It is currently difficult to make quantitative statements due to the limited
availability of long-term, high quality data on the potential (non-climatic) drivers of
change required to perform a comprehensive analysis.
However, despite the remaining gaps and challenges, there is already substantial
evidence available about the attribution of climate change impacts (see Fig. 5.7),
which can contribute to an understanding of how anthropogenic climate change
is influencing losses and damages. The steps taken to integrate impacts research
(Sect. 5.3.2) with climate research (Sect. 5.3.1), are promising, and several authors
have proposed frameworks, and provided examples to illustrate, “end-to-end” attri-
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bution (Stone and Allen 2005; Stone et al. 2013; Huggel et al. 2015a; Hansen et al.
2016), which might be useful for further research. There is a question about whether
this constitutes true “end-to-end” attribution in the case of L&D. Do all climate
change impacts constitute L&D? It is notoriously unclear exactly howL&Dshould be
defined, but it is perhaps worth considering various other elements which might con-
tribute to an “end-to-end” attributionofL&D, including extending the “causal chains”
from emissions to emitters (Sect. 5.3.3), and towards disaster losses (Sect. 5.3.4).
It is also worth considering which of the impacts attributed (in e.g. Fig. 5.7) might
already be considered L&D. Recent event attribution studies have analysedmonetary
losses fromflooding (Schaller et al. 2016); and loss of life from cold- and heat-related
events (Christidis et al. 2010; Mitchell et al. 2016). Huggel et al. (2016a) also exam-
ine the Hansen and Stone (2016) data (Fig. 5.7) to consider which impacts constitute
irreversible losses, finding evidence for the attribution of irreversible loss of glaciers,
coral reefs, or livelihoods of Arctic communities.
5.3.3 Attributing Anthropogenic Forcing to Regions,
Countries, and Sectors
IPCC (2013) stated “Human influence on the climate system is clear.” This overar-
ching statement can be decomposed on the response side of the cause-effect chain in
terms of various types of impacts and their regional distribution (Sects. 5.3.1, 5.3.2).
But it is also possible to do so on the driver side—along several dimensions. Firstly,
there are different emissions and surface changes that perturb the radiative balance of
the earth-atmosphere system and cause radiative forcing; greenhouse gases such as
CO2, CH4 and N2O, aerosols such as sulphate and black carbon, and albedo changes
from land surface changes. Secondly, these factors also have a regional resolution;
i.e., the emissions and changes in albedo from land use changes can be distributed
to regions and nations, and economic sectors. Thirdly, these changes have occurred
at different points in time; e.g. early deforestation and coal burning versus late emis-
sions from more modern sectors (e.g. aviation) and technologies (e.g. halogenated
gases). Several studies have quantified contributions to climate change by regions
(den Elzen et al. 2005), nations (e.g. Matthews 2016; Skeie et al. 2017), sectors (e.g.
Fuglestvedt et al. 2008) and even companies (Heede 2014).
To investigate the contributions to climate change, simple climate models are
used to test the influence of specified quantities of emissions, or types of radiative
forcing, on climatic changes, primarily global temperature. Contributions to climate
change are often defined in counterfactual terms; i.e., how would the change in the
chosen climate indicator (usually global mean surface temperature) be different if
a particular subset of emissions were removed? A large number of simulations are
used to test many different subsets of emissions. Due to non-linearities the individual
contributions do not necessarily add up to 100% and there are various methods to
adjust for this. Availability of emissions data is also a key issue. Various emission
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Fig. 5.8 Sensitivity of estimated contributions to global mean surface temperature increase to
the choice of forcing components included in attribution analysis. CO2FF: CO2 from fossil-fuel
combustion and cement production. LUC: Land use change. KP: Kyoto Protocol gases (CO2, CH4,
N2O, HFC, SF6, PFC). ALL POS: All warming components. Source Skeie et al. (2017)
databases and inventories are used and often assumptions and inter/extrapolations
are needed (see Skeie et al. 2017).
The results of these studies depend strongly on various choices taken during
the analysis. Among the choices that have to be made are start and end dates for
emissions that are considered, when to measure the effect of the emissions, what
indicator of climate change is chosen (temperature, precipitation, extremes, sea level
rise, etc.), which drivers (GHGs, aerosols, land use changes) are included, how to
frame the emissions by the selected entities (extraction/territorial/consumption based
emissions), and whether the contributions should be normalised by population size.
An alternative could also be to normalise the contributions by the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the countries. Figure 5.8 shows how the choice of emission com-
ponents included can impact the resulting calculations of how much each region or
country has contributed to change in global mean surface temperature up to 2012
(Skeie et al. 2017).
As discussed by Skeie et al. (2017), and Fuglestvedt and Kallbekken (2015) there
is no simple and single answer to the contribution question. Thus, it is not straight-
forward to ask how much a particular country, company, or sector contributed to
observed global warming. The answer varies depending on many choices in the
methodology, and these choices are associated with many open value-related and
ethical questions. Scientists might therefore best support policy-makers by present-
ing a spectrum of results showing how the calculated contributions vary according
to various choices.
A natural research question to ask is whether it will be possible to go further and
attribute other implications of climate change to nations’ emissions. Otto et al. (2017)
for the first time explore the link between emissions from countries to radiative forc-
ing and temperature contributions, and changes in the probability of extreme weather
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events, demonstrating how this area of work might be integrated with attribution of
climate and weather events (Sect. 5.3.1) and impacts (Sect. 5.3.2).
5.3.4 Assessing and Analysing Losses and Damages
from Disasters
To understand L&D from anthropogenic climate change, it is also important to con-
sider disaster assessments and disaster research. Before the establishment of L&D
as an area within the UNFCCC, there was already a great deal of work seeking
to quantify and analyse losses and damages from natural hazards. Not all of this
work examines causality, and therefore might not be considered attribution research,
but integrating knowledge, expertise, and analysis tools from disaster research with
climate change and climate impacts attribution research (Sects. 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3)
could be a fruitful way to obtain a fuller understanding of L&D, and in particular
to compare the influence of anthropogenic climate change with drivers of exposure
and vulnerability.
Loss and damage assessments are routinely conducted after major disasters, and
the results are widely available in disaster databases including at global (EM-DAT:
Guha-Sapir et al. 2009; DesInventar 2015), and national levels. Reinsurance compa-
nies also hold disaster databases,27 but these are generally not publically available.
Disaster databases represent an impressive resource, however the quality, consistency
and completeness varies between regions and between events. The results also vary
between datasets: there is no consensus about how to collect data following disasters
(Huggel et al. 2015b), and different methodologies can have quite different results
(Kron et al. 2012). Collecting data about losses and damages from slow onset events
such as drought is very challenging, due to the timescales of data collection, and the
many other drivers which might play a role over this longer time period. Developing
countries are poorly represented (Gall et al. 2009), and in particular there is a lack of
information at the subnational scale in vulnerable countries (Huggel et al. 2015b).
Disaster risk research uses these databases to examine trends in losses from disas-
ters, including extremeweather events, and including analysis of causal relationships
with climatic variability (Bouwer 2011; chapter by Bouwer 2018). It is generally
accepted that the observed global increase in disaster losses is largely attributable to
increases in exposure to hazard, with more wealth situated in locations that are at
risk (Bouwer 2011; IPCC 2012). Research on the role of changes in vulnerability on
observed losses and damages is still very scarce and needs to be investigated in more
detail, although there is evidence that vulnerability to flood hazard is decreasing in
some places (Mechler and Bouwer 2015; Jongman et al. 2015; Kreibich et al. 2017).
Disaster databases often focus on a few key variables such as monetary losses and
fatalities. The range of losses and damages considered under the UNFCCC extends
far beyond these quantities (Serdeczny et al. 2016) and therefore it is also important
27E.g. www.munichre.com/natcatservice; www.swissre.com/sigma.
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to consider social science research to understand losses from disasters at a local level
(e.g. Warner and van der Geest 2013).
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for integration with attribution research lies with
“disaster forensics” and related fields which seek to examine past disasters, and draw
lessons for future disaster risk management (e.g. Keating et al. 2016). Techniques
include root-cause analysis (Blaikie et al. 2014), meta-analytical reviews (Mitchell
1999), longitudinal analysis ofmultiple disasters in a specific location (Erikson 1976;
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Kreibich et al. 2017), and retrospective scenarios
(Jones et al. 2008).
5.4 Policy Implications: How Might Attribution Science Be
Applied to Support Actions to Address Losses
and Damages?
To date, it has been challenging to initiate detailed conversations in the policy arena
about the potential relevance of attribution science to L&D: in part due to the con-
troversy surrounding L&D, and the association which is often made between attri-
bution and responsibility, blame, and liability (see Sect. 5.2). In this chapter we seek
to highlight that attribution science itself does not aim to establish responsibility;
and to outline some of the motivations, methods, and findings of different forms of
attribution research, also considering how the integration of these fields could lead
to a fuller understanding of the influence of anthropogenic climate change on losses
and damages (Sect. 5.3). Now, having reviewed the available attribution evidence,
we consider whether this science might have any useful applications to support L&D
mechanisms, policies, and practice.
Many attribution scientists have suggested that their research could be useful
for adaptation and/or L&D (e.g. Pall et al. 2011; Mitchell et al. 2016; Parker et al.
2017b). Parker et al. (2017a)’s literature review highlighted that climate scientists
frequently refer to the potential applications of PEA. However, they found that in the
L&D literature itself, including, for example, publications from non-governmental
organisations, there was little mention of attribution science. This suggests that there
is a need for science-policy dialogue to explore potential applications (in agreement
with e.g. Stott and Walton 2013); and to this end, there have already been a number
of studies involving interviews with decision-makers about the potential uses of
attribution science (e.g. Sippel et al. 2015).
One potential barrier in identifying applications for L&D is that it is not yet
clear exactly what actions to address losses and damages would entail, with different
stakeholders holding different perspectives and priorities (Boyd et al. 2017; Fig. 5.1).
Previous literature has already highlighted that the potential role for science in rela-
tion to L&Dmight be different depending on what is meant by L&D, and what L&D
mechanisms aim to do (Surminski and Lopez 2015; Huggel et al. 2015a; chapters by
Lopez et al. 2018 and Schinko et al. 2018). Here we explore potential applications
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for attribution science in a L&D context with a very broad view of what L&D might
signify, including a large range of actions to address losses and damages, as identified
by different stakeholders (Boyd et al. 2017), for example adaptation, risk reduction,
risk transfer, insurance, risk pooling, risk management, recovery, rehabilitation, and
compensation.
5.4.1 Catalysing Action
Many papers, and stakeholder interviews, have highlighted an important role for
attribution in catalysing action (Bouwer 2011; Surminski and Lopez 2015; Parker
et al. 2017a). This refers to action in terms of greater mitigation ambition, as well as
actions to better prepare for disasters. Stott and Walton (2013) highlight that attri-
bution of extreme weather events could help aid agencies to encourage preparation
for disasters, and research projects are now underway to develop attribution studies
with DRR agencies to pilot such an approach (www.climatecentral.org). Promoting
mitigation could also be seen as an important element in relation to L&D. Several
interviewees in the Boyd et al. (2017) study highlighted that one of the important
goals of L&D negotiations is to heighten ambition to mitigate, in order to avoid
impacts and risks. If the interviewees and commentators are correct, that attribu-
tion evidence could motivate mitigation (see Parker et al. 2017a), presumably by
demonstrating quantitative evidence and examples of how GHGs and aerosols are
affecting people; this motivates further attribution research, and also further efforts to
communicate the results in an understandable form for policy-makers and the public
(following existing work e.g. wwa.climatecentral.org).
5.4.2 Providing Evidence for Liability and Compensation
The most frequently discussed applications of attribution science for L&D arguably
relate to liability and compensation (Allen 2003; Allen et al. 2007; Stone et al. 2009;
Thompson and Otto 2015; Parker et al. 2016, 2017a; Thornton and Covington 2016).
L&D has its origins in calls from small islands states for some form of compensation
for climate change impacts, particularly sea level rise (Mace and Verheyen 2016),
and L&D is sometimes still discussed with reference to some notion of a global
compensation mechanism. In this context, attribution is often raised in terms of
whether it could provide sufficient evidence for such a mechanism (e.g. Craeynest
2010). For example, one interviewee from Boyd et al. (2017)’s study explained: “In
order to have a reliable L&D compensation mechanism, you’ll need to have a very
high confidence about the causes of L&D, if the science is not 100% or close, there’ll
always be room to contest” (see similar discussions in Parker et al. 2017a). For one
stakeholder, attribution science was even described as the key to unlocking liability:
“we don’t have to enter the rooms on liability and compensation, those doors are
140 R. A. James et al.
locked behind a door called attribution. The key to that door lies with the scientific
community, it is still being forged.”
These interviews took place before the Paris Climate Conference, when the fol-
lowing text was included in Decision 1/CP. 21, referring to the article of the Paris
Agreement about L&D: “Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide
a basis for any liability or compensation;” (UNFCCC 2015, paragraph 51). Subse-
quent analysis suggests that this does not prevent liability or compensation per se, but
rather only in connection with Article 8 (Mace and Verheyen 2016; Calliari 2016). It
does not, for example, prevent actions outside the framework of the UNFCCC, such
as legal action against individual countries or companies.
The potential for attribution evidence to support ad hoc litigation, outside of the
UNFCCC, has also received considerable attention in the literature, withmixed views
about whether the science would be strong enough to stand up in court (e.g. Farris
2009; Adam 2011;Wrathall et al. 2015; Hannart et al. 2016; Thornton and Covington
2016; see also the chapter by Simlinger and Mayer 2018).
Drawing on the review of available evidence in Sect. 5.3, it would seem that any
form of liability and compensationwhich relies on a complete “causative chain” from
monetary losses—to weather and climate—to anthropogenic climate change—to
emitters, might currently struggle to find many examples with sufficient evidence.
Given the progress of the science, such examples will however emerge, albeit with
uncertainties (Otto et al. 2017). It will then become a legal question of whether
and how these might support individual lawsuits. Existing analysis suggests that the
requirements of quantitative evidence would be rather different, for example if the
case is examined in tort law or in the context of human rights (Marjanac and Patton
2018).
Beyond ad hoc litigation, the idea of a global compensation mechanism based on
fully attributable losses and damages is currently far from reality. This is not to say
that some kind of global insurance and/or compensation mechanism is not possible,
but rather that trying to base payments on quantitative attribution evidence at a local
level is unlikely to lead to fair outcomes, as the strength of available evidence will
vary between places and events. In fact, the evidence at the disposal of poor countries,
typically highly vulnerable to climate change, is very limited as compared to richer
countries with long-term and high-quality data series and information (Huggel et al.
2016b; Fig. 5.9). Several proposals for global insurancemechanisms in the context of
L&Dhave been developed (e.g. Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009; chapter byLinnerooth-
Bayer et al. 2018),28 and these have not necessarily required a full causative chain
of attribution evidence (see also introduction by Mechler et al. 2018).
28The original proposal from the Alliance of Small Islands States for to establish a ‘collective loss-
sharing scheme’ to ‘compensate the most vulnerable small island and low-lying coastal developing
countries for losses and damages’ is described in Mace and Verheyen (2016), and can be found in
an annex at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/a/15_2.pdf.
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5.4.3 Informing the Distribution of Adaptation or L&D
Funding
Another frequent, and related, discussion about the potential use of attribution sci-
ence concerns whether it might be applied to help inform distribution of adaptation
or (potential) L&D funding. Currently projects which seek support from the Green
Climate Fund are judged against a list of criteria, for example expected reduction in
vulnerability and ability to strengthen institutional capacity (the investment frame-
work is documented in e.g. GCF 2015). It is conceivable that some kind of attribution
evidencemight be required as part such a checklist. In the context of L&D, some have
suggested a separate fund could be established for projects which seek to address
losses and damages (e.g. Richards and Boom 2015). Such a fund would presumably
also have a list of necessary criteria which could include attribution evidence. The
concept of a L&D fund is related to the idea of a global compensation mechanism,
but here we discuss it separately, since it could, for example, be based on voluntary
contributions, and it is perhaps useful to think about how evidence might be applied
to distribute available funds rather than to extract new funding from emitters.
Several authors (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2011) and stakeholders interviewed (in
Parker et al. 2017a; Sippel et al. 2015) have suggested that attribution science could
be used to help allocate resources. However, others argue that, given disparities in
the strength of evidence, it would be counterproductive or unfair to give priority only
to projects which address impacts that can be confidently attributed to anthropogenic
Fig. 5.9 Map demonstrating the location of weather stations in the Global Historical Climatology
Network (black points), as well as the number of detected impacts reported in the IPCC AR5
for Annex I countries (in purple), Non-Annex I countries (in green), and regions not party to the
UNFCCC (in grey). Source Huggel et al. (2016b)
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climate change (Hulme et al. 2011). Referring again to Fig. 5.9, it is clear that
some countries and regions have more data available than others, and whilst this
is not the only factor that determines confidence in attribution studies (Otto et al.
2013), the strength of evidence will continue to vary between regions, and between
climate change impacts. The discussion about who is most deserving of funding
raises ethical questions which cannot be answered by scientists, and highlights that
incorporating attribution science into a system for distributing funding would not be
straightforward. In the final section we explore a potentially less controversial, and
perhaps more fundamental way in which the science can be used in helping to decide
which actions might address losses and damages.
5.4.4 Analysing Drivers of L&D to Inform Practical Actions
to Avert, Minimise, and Address Losses and Damages
Rather than being used to help answer political and ethical questions about who
should pay, and who should receive support (see chapter byWallimann-Helmer et al.
2018), attribution science could instead help to answer practical questions about how
to spend the money: How should risks be managed? What can be done to minimise
and address losses and damages?Which actions can be taken to help people to recover
from L&D? In order to prepare for changing risks, it is fundamental to understand
their causes, including drivers of changes in hazard, as well as vulnerability and
exposure. Anthropogenic climate change is just one driver of changing hazard, but a
fundamental driver which must be incorporated into risk analyses in order to identify
risk management options which will be most effective in a changing climate (see
Mechler and Schinko 2016; chapter by Schinko et al. 2018). As demonstrated in
Sect. 5.3, attribution science is focused on establishing causality and, alongside
other climate change research, is an important element in a toolkit for climate risk
management.
From a climate risk management perspective, the key is to be able to quantify
current risks and how these may evolve in the future in a changing climate (and,
more broadly, a changing world). The importance of future climate model projec-
tions is frequently highlightedwith reference to adaptation planning (e.g. Giorgi et al.
2009) and, more recently, with reference to planning to address losses and damages
(Surminski and Lopez 2015). It is also increasingly recognised that, to understand
risk, climate projections should be combined with projections of future changes in
exposure and vulnerability (Mechler and Bouwer 2015). Attribution science can be
a complementary source of evidence, which (a) provides important additional infor-
mation about changing risk in the presence of uncertainty, (b) offers an assessment
of how risks are changing now (whilst future projections might not be relevant for
30 years or more), and (c) helps to diagnose the causes of losses and damages,
which could be useful in prioritising actions to reduce risk. The need to assess sci-
ence investigating the role of climate and non-climate drivers in recent high-impact
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events, and how those drivers are changing across time and spatial scales, in order
to inform adaptation and risk management, has been recognised as a key priority for
the next IPCC report (RC/RCCC 2017). Here we give a few examples to illustrate
the importance of this approach.
In East Africa, many climate models suggest that the region will become wetter
in future (Shongwe et al. 2011; James et al. 2014b), which might imply the need
to adapt to wetter conditions, and potential for losses and damages from extreme
precipitation or flooding (Shongwe et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2013). However, obser-
vations suggest that there has been a recent increase in drought (Rowell et al. 2015),
and analysis of the climate processes associated with precipitation decline suggest it
could be caused by warming of the Indian Ocean, which is expected under anthro-
pogenic climate change (Copsey et al. 2006; Williams and Funk 2011; Williams
et al. 2012). An attribution study of the drivers of the climate hazards that resulted in
the extreme drought in 2010–11 (Lott et al. 2013) showed that it was influenced by
both climate change and natural variability (with an important role for the El Nino
Southern Oscillation). By combining evidence from attribution research with obser-
vational evidence, physical understanding, and future projections, it seems clear that
adaptation and L&Dplanning for East Africa should not assumewetter futures (Funk
2011), and should strengthen measures to respond to drought, which could continue
to occur due to natural variability, and may be amplified by climate change.
Another reason that attribution research can provide important evidence to help
address losses and damages, is that it offers an assessment of how risk is changing
now. For many decision-makers, information about how climate might change in
30 years is not relevant because their planning horizons are much shorter (Jones
et al. 2017). This is true for several of the approaches which have been suggested to
address losses and damages. For example, there has been a great deal of emphasis
on risk pooling schemes and (re)insurance. These systems rely on estimates of the
probability of extreme weather events based on historical data, which may no longer
be relevant in a changing climate. Attribution studies can provide an estimate of
the current probability of extreme weather events. Finally, the above has focused
on the hazard component of climate risk management but attribution science can
also be extended to provide relevant information on the vulnerability and exposure
components. This principle is demonstrated by considering the impact of different
responses to two category 4 tropical cyclones in Mozambique (Benessene 2007;
UNISDR 2010). This showed significantly less loss of life in a more recent event in
2007 compared to 2000, as a result of better early warning systems reducing human
exposure to a hazard of similar magnitude. Another example by Otto et al. (2015b)
showed that climate change had not altered the likelihood of the precipitation deficit
associated with the 2014–15 droughts in the Sao Paolo area. Thus higher losses
in this case compared to earlier events could not be attributed to a change in the
hazard and so were attributable to higher vulnerability and exposure resulting from
socio-economic changes. These examples demonstrate that attribution science can
be useful to guide the design of improved future responses to climate-related risks.
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5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have discussed how attribution science might be useful for L&D
policy and practice. As has been widely recognised, the concept of L&D from cli-
mate change is still vague and contested with a diverse range of perspectives held
amongst stakeholders. Thismakes it challenging to say exactlywhat kind of scientific
input is needed. Here we take a broad approach to consider how attribution science
might be relevant to L&D discussions, and a range of possible options for L&D
policy and practice. The first step was to examine the discourse surrounding L&D
and existing mentions of, and debates about, attribution in the L&D policy space
(Sect. 5.2). If scientists, practitioners, and policy-makers are to jointly integrate sci-
ence into actions to address losses and damages, it is important to understand the
baseline understandings and associations held by different stakeholders. We have
followed policy discussions for a number of years, and directly asked many par-
ticipants in L&D discussions about their views on attribution, including through
stakeholder interviews (Box 5.2). This research has demonstrated that attribution is
a controversial but also recurring issue in L&D discussions. In our interviews with
stakeholders and observations of meetings about L&D, attribution was often men-
tioned. Few stakeholders demonstrated in-depth knowledge of attribution science,
but they often raised questions about whether losses and damages could be attributed
to climate change. These questions relate to practical issues about the mandate of
the UNFCCC, but also have important political implications. Attribution is often
mentioned alongside responsibility, blame and liability.
It therefore appears that attribution is a key issue of relevance to L&D discussions,
but it is so far very difficult to discuss in detail how the science might be used,
because it is considered to be a controversial topic. If scientists are to effectively
engage in dialogue with policy-makers, it would be helpful for them to be aware
of these associations and controversies; and also aware that policy-makers work
in an environment where science is often used for political motives, and clarity is
not always helpful or asked for. In fact, climate negotiators may be mandated to
avoid certain topics or terminology. Communicating scientific results is therefore
not sufficient to support policy: it must be communicated in a language that policy-
makers can work with. At the same time, it would be helpful if policy-makers and
practitioners were made more aware of the findings and methodologies of attribution
studies and the fact that attribution science itself is not primarily designed to establish
responsibility. The political and ethical implications are far beyond the realm of
physical scientists, and many scientists are keen to remain impartial purveyors of
information, without becoming involved in politics: a potentially useful resource for
policy-makers in a landscape where most actors do have political motives.
A more in-depth discussion between scientists, practitioners, and policy-makers
about attribution science would likely reveal much that is relevant to averting and
addressing losses and damages, regardless of political positions. As outlined in
Sect. 5.3, there are a number of fields of inquiry that are advancing rapidly which
could be integrated to better understand the influence of anthropogenic climate
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change on losses and damages, and how this compares with other drivers of risk.
There are uncertainties, and the level of evidence available is not even between
countries, regions, or between different climate change impacts. It may therefore be
challenging to use attribution science for the kind of applications which are most
frequently suggested. Notably it might be challenging to use attribution science for
some kind of global compensation mechanism, or to allocate funding to address cli-
mate change impacts. Such systems might benefit from being informed by global
estimates of attributable changes and evidence for the emergence of climate change
impacts in different regions, rather than being informed by attribution studies for spe-
cific events or specific losses. However, as well as the difficult political and ethical
questions about who should pay for losses and damages, and who deserves sup-
port to address losses and damages, there are also fundamental practical questions
about how to help people prepare for, and recover from, climate change impacts and
losses and damages. To address these questions most effectively, and manage risks
in a changing climate, understanding drivers of risk is fundamental, and attribution
science has a key role to play.
To end, how is attribution science relevant for L&D policy and practice? And
could it be useful? While in a political context attribution is often associated with
compensation for climate change impacts, we show that the science of attribution
has the potential for much broader applications. Attribution has an important role
to play in helping understanding L&D, including through quantification of risks,
investigating of the relative importance of different drivers of change, and identify-
ing timescales on which significant impacts of climate change emerge in different
regions of the world. Regardless of the policy mechanisms for addressing losses and
damages, it is important to foster a better understanding of how climate change is
influencing losses and damages. With further scientific integration, including inte-
grating attribution studies with future projections, and through informed science-
policy-practice dialogue, attribution could contribute towards the development of
useful practical actions to avert and address losses and damages.
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Chapter 6
The Politics of (and Behind)
the UNFCCC’s Loss and Damage
Mechanism
Elisa Calliari, Swenja Surminski and Jaroslav Mysiak
Abstract Despite being one of the most controversial issues to be recently treated
within climate negotiations, Loss and Damage (L&D) has attracted little attention
among scholars of InternationalRelations (IR). In this chapterwe take the “structural-
ist paradox” in L&D negotiations as our starting point, considering how IR theories
can help to explain the somewhat surprising capacity of weak parties to achieve
results while negotiating with stronger parties. We adopt a multi-faceted notion of
power, drawing from the neorealist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought, in
order to explain how L&D milestones were reached. Our analysis shows that the IR
discipline can greatly contribute to the debate, not only by enhancing understanding
of the negotiation process and related outcomes but also by offering insights on how
the issue could be fruitfullymoved forward. In particular, we note the key importance
that discursive power had in the attainment of L&D milestones: Framing L&D in
ethical and legal terms appealed to standards relevant beyond the UNFCCC context,
including basic moral norms linked to island states’ narratives of survival and the
reference to international customary law. These broader standards are in principle
recognised by both contending parties and this broader framing of L&D has helped
to prove the need for action on L&D. However, we find that a change of narrative
may be needed to avoid turning the issue into a win-lose negotiation game. Instead,
a stronger emphasis on mutual gains through adaptation and action on L&D for both
developed and developing countries is needed as well as clarity on the limits of these
strategies. Examples of such mutual gains are more resilient global supply chains,
reduction of climate-induced migration and enhanced security. As a result, acting on
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L&D would not feel as a unilateral concession developed countries make to vulner-
able ones: it would rather be about elaborating patterns of collective action on an
issue of common concern.
Keywords Loss and Damage · AOSIS · UNFCCC · International relations
Neorealism · Liberalism · Constructivism
6.1 Foundations for an International Relations’
Contribution to the Debate
In recent years, the academic community has made important contributions to the
Loss & Damage (L&D) debate, especially by (i) framing it through a disaster and
climate risk management perspective (Mechler et al. 2014; Fekete and Sakdapolrak
2014; Birkmann and Welle 2015; Mechler and Schinko 2016); (ii) looking at the
connection between L&D and the limits to adaptation (Warner and van der Geest
2013, 2015); (iii) outlining how attribution studies could support the assessment of
L&D (Huggel et al. 2013; James et al. 2014); and (iv) discussing L&D’s connection
with the concept of state responsibility in international law (Tol and Verheyen 2004;
Verheyen 2012, 2015; Mayer 2014; Mace and Verheyen 2016). Some authors have
also provided historical overviews on the emergence of L&D in the international
debate, analysed the role of the UNFCCC in addressing it, and discussed the possi-
ble implications of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) (Huq et al. 2013;
McNamara 2014; Mathew and Akter 2015; Roberts and Huq 2015; Stabinsky and
Hoffmaister 2015). Against this background, contributions by political science and
International Relations (IR) scholars have been almost absent (recent exceptions are
Johnson (2017), Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016) and Calliari (2016a)).
This is only partly surprising. Overall, limited attention has been devoted to cli-
mate change within the discipline, especially when considering adaptation-related
issues (Crump and Downie 2015). While contributions on mitigation are somewhat
more common, where the need for international cooperation is more evident, this
is not the case for adaptation and its (possible) failures and limits (i.e., L&D). Yet,
there are a number of reasons why the current discourse on adaptation and its lim-
its/constraints should be of interest to those exploring global policy and international
power relations (Khan 2016): These include the self-interest of states and how in a
globalised and interconnected world they are exposed to the effects of social, eco-
nomic, political, environmental, and technological events, even when those occur in
a different corner of the world. In addition, norms, values and justice imperatives
also feature as a base for collective action on adaptation (Brown and Weiskel 2002)
and play an even more important role when considering L&D.
Moreover L&D provides a very interesting case to be studied by IR scholars given
the relevance of power dynamics in the climate change negotiations setting and its
complex, asymmetrical and multilateral characteristics. Decision-making under the
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UNFCCC relies on consensus: disagreement around the voting majority required for
certain decisions has until now prevented the adoption of the rules of procedure (draft
art. 42). This implies that, differently from other multilateral fora where each Party is
bestowed a single vote and thus given equal weight, final outcomes in the UNFCCC
will likely mirror Parties’ capacity to shape and influence the decision-making pro-
cess. In this context, it is important to point out that, on their initiative, developing
countries managed to establish the WIM in 2013 and obtain a dedicated article on
L&D in the Paris Agreement in 2015. A leading role in the process was assumed
by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), a coalition of small island and low-
lying coastal countries sharing similar development challenges and vulnerabilities to
climate change impacts, and regarded among the most vocal groups in climate talks.
Generally considered as the parties with less negotiation power, at least in terms of
sheer delegation sizes, these achievements appear particularly remarkable.
The case of AOSIS has been characterised as an example of the so-called “struc-
turalist paradox” in negotiations (Betzold 2010), i.e., the case that weaker parties
are often able to effectively negotiate with stronger parties and get something out
of the process (Zartman and Rubin 2002). More specifically, AOSIS’ capacity to
influence the UNFCCC has been explained in terms of moral leadership (de Águeda
Corneloup andMol 2014), capacity to “borrow power” (Betzold 2010), promotion of
collaborative approaches to knowledge building and cooperative institutional mech-
anisms (Larson 2003). While importantly shedding light on a relatively overlooked
topic, these contributions only explore limited timeframes1 and, by design, are not
able to capture evolutions and diversifications in the use of power sources. Moreover,
none of them specifically addresses L&D negotiations, instead applying a broader
adaptation lense.
In this chapter we specifically focus on the L&D process over time in order to
consider its emergence and evolution from the negotiation of the UNFCCC (1991) to
the entry into force of the Paris Agreement (2016). Taking the “structuralist paradox”
in L&D negotiations as our starting point, we look beyond aggregate measures of
power (like GDP, population size or military forces) and consider different sources of
influence thatAOSISmight have activated to shapeL&Doutcomes.We analyseL&D
negotiations through the lenses of the main schools of thought in IR—the neorealist,
liberal and constructivist (Snyder 2004)—to better understand the complexities of
finding international agreement on L&D issues. This approach might look unortho-
dox, given that these schools of thought are based on hardly reconcilable premises.
Nevertheless, conceptual pluralism around the notion of power is much needed to
understand how global outcomes are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005), as dif-
ferent forms of power might capture different and interrelated ways through which
actors are enabled or constrained in pursuing their objectives.
1Betzold (2010) focuses on AOSIS‘s negotiating strategies in the climate change regime from 1990
to 1997; de Águeda Corneloup andMol (2014) consider the period 2007–2009; while Larson (2003)
analysesAOSIS’ 1994 position paper: “Draft Protocol to theUnitedNations FrameworkConvention
on Climate Change on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction”.
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The chapter is organised as follows. We first provide an overview of the L&D
process within the UNFCCC from AOSIS’s first proposals to the PA, looking at
the historic developments and actions by different actors that led to the emergence
of L&D as a pillar of the UNFCCC architecture. We then consider the negotiating
process through the lenses of IR theories to understand how L&D outcomes have
been produced. By analysing the actors involved, their positions, the negotiation
process and related outcomes, we finally identify opportunities, both for research
and policy, to move this contested discourse forward.
6.2 Positioning of L&D in the UNFCCC Negotiations
As discussed in the introductory chapter (Mechler et al. 2018), the debate on L&D
has been spearheaded by AOSIS since the early 1990s, by calling for an insurance
pool to compensate vulnerable small island and low-lying developing countries for
the impacts of sea level rise (INC 1991) (Fig. 6.1).
It took more than 20 years to institutionalise the debate within the UNFCCC
architecture through the creation of the WIM in 2013 and eventually the stipulation
of the stand-alone article 8 in theParisAgreement. Figure 6.2 shows the positioning of
the Executive Committee of theWIM (ExCom), which the COP established to guide
the implementation of functions of the WIM through an initial 2-year work plan, in
the UNFCCC architecture. ExCom is a body constituted under the Convention, and
is guided by and accountable to the COP.
COP 20 finalised the governance of the ExCom by bestowing 10 members each
to Annex I and non-Annex I Parties.2 However, disagreement around regional rep-
resentation within Annex I parties caused substantial delays in nominating ExCom
members, convening of the ExCom first meeting (September 2015), and implement-
ing the activities of the WIM. The balanced representation among Parties is also
reflected in the Chairmanship, with the two Co-chairs being elected from Annex 1
and non-Annex 1 respectively to serve for 1 year.3 The ExCom may establish expert
groups, subcommittees, panels, thematic advisory groups or task-focused ad hoc
working groups to help execute its advisory role.
The initial 2-year work plan of the WIM comprises 9 action areas focusing on:
(1) Particularly vulnerable developing countries, population, ecosystems; (2) Com-
prehensive risk management approaches; (3) Slow onset events; (4) Non-economic
losses; (5) Resilience, recovery and rehabilitation; (6) Migration, displacement and
human mobility; (7) Financial instruments and tools; (8) complementing and draw-
ing upon the work of and involvement other bodies; and (9) development of a 5-
2Members from non-Annex I Parties include 2 members from each of the African, the Asia-Pacific,
and the Latin American and Caribbean States, 1 member from SIDS, 1 member from the LDC
Parties, and 2 additional members from non-Annex I Parties.
3During the first meeting of the ExCom in 2017, co-chairmanship went from Tuvalu and USA to
Jamaica and European Union.
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Fig. 6.2 TheWIM in the UNFCCC architecture. According to Decision 2/CP. 19, theWIM reports
annually to the COP. Source Adapted from own elaboration
year rolling work plan. As for the latter, its strategic workstreams were approved
at COP23 and call for enhanced cooperation on: (1) Slow onset events; (2) Non-
economic losses; (3) Comprehensive risk management approaches; (4) Migration,
displacement and human mobility; and (5) action and support, including finance,
technology and capacity-building.
The “structure, mandate and effectiveness” of the WIM is to be periodically
reviewed, with the first review to be held in 2019 and subsequent ones to take place
no more than 5 years apart (UNFCCC 2017). Reviews should consider progress on
the implementation of the ExCom’s work plan but also adopt a long-term vision to
reflect on how the WIM may be enhanced and strengthened. As an input to the 2019
review, decision 4/CP.22 called for a “technical paper (to) be prepared by the secre-
tariat elaborating the sources of financial support”. At COP 23 it was agreed that the
latter should be informed by an expert dialogue (baptised as “Suva Expert Dialogue”)
that took place in May 2018, in order “to explore a wide range of information, inputs
and views on ways for facilitating the mobilisation and securing of expertise, and
enhancement of support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, for
averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage” (SBI and SBSTA 2017).
Besides the WIM, a major institutional milestone on L&D was reached with the
adoption of the Paris Agreement. A stand-alone article 8 recognises L&D as distinct
from adaptation, elevating it almost as a third pillar of climate action. Through the
article “Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss
and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme
weather events and slowonset events” (UNFCCC2015). The article sanctions the per-
manence of theWIM,whilst leaving the door open for it to be “enhanced and strength-
ened” through futureCOPdecisions. It also calls Parties towork “on a cooperative and
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facilitative basis” to “enhance understanding, action and support” in areas including
early warning systems, comprehensive risk assessment and management, risk insur-
ance facilities, climate risk pooling, and non-economic losses (UNFCCC 2015).
6.3 Actors and Positions in the L&D Debate
The inclusion of L&D as a distinct concept from adaptation in the Paris Agreement
was the result of a series of politically charged negotiations, fuelled by a range of
actors with a variety of viewpoints. The role played by each of these actors, including
their negotiation positions, is briefly discussed in this section.
6.3.1 Developing Countries and Their Representative Groups
As recognised above, developing countries and their representative groups have pro-
vided much of the impetus for the recognition of L&D within the UNFCCC. AOSIS
has been particularly important, having first campaigned for the inclusion of L&D in
climate change negotiations in the early 1990s and continuing to do so in conjunction
with other representative groups. Other key events have included:
• In 2005 at COP11, Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group called for the com-
pensation of climate change damages (Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016);
• In 2013, G77 with support from AOSIS and LDCs pushed for (and achieved) the
adoption of the WIM (Calliari 2016a); and
• Prior to the commencement of COP21, members of the G77, China bloc, the
Climate Vulnerable Forum, LDCs, AOSIS and the Africa Group all emphasised
the importance of L&D to the Paris negotiations (Hoffmeister and Huq 2015).
The negotiating position of developing countries in general has been to (i) con-
sider L&D as distinct from adaptation; (ii) treat climate change negotiations as an
appropriate forum to discuss L&D; (iii) hold developed countries liable for L&D;
and (iv) call for compensation (Huq and De Souza 2016). At the same time, they
have raised concerns that the emphasis of L&D discourse on financial compensation
could have a trivialising effect on addressing the underlying needs of developing
countries (Hoffmaister et al. 2014).
6.3.2 Developed Countries
Developed countries have generally been critical and provided the opposite stance to
developing countries on negotiations around L&D. Particular resistance was made
in recognising L&D as distinct from adaptation. This is reflected, for instance, in
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developed countries’ attempts to have L&D treated outside the Paris Agreement
through a COP decision, or inside the text of the agreement but under the same
article as adaptation. As for compensation, any references to such a concept have
mostly been avoided, with developed countries shifting instead the attention to non-
economic L&D, such as “losses of lives and negative impacts for health”, and “loss of
biodiversity and ecosystemservices necessary to sustain livelihoods” (Norway2013).
The US also raised ethical concerns, by claiming that considering compensation
would have meant “put[ting] a monetary value on the lives, livelihoods and assets of
the most vulnerable countries and populations” (UNFCCC 2012a).
Not surprisingly, in Paris they rejected compensatory language (e.g. “rehabilita-
tion”, “compensation” and “liability”) for fear of creating a legal liability for L&D
suffered by developing countries (Huq and De Souza 2016). Former U.S. Secretary
of State JohnKerry explained the US’ reluctance in relation to this as follows: “We’re
not against [loss and damage]. We’re in favour of framing it in a way that doesn’t
create a legal remedy because Congress will never buy into an agreement that has
something like that…the impact of it would be to kill the deal” (Goodell 2015).
Ultimately, Article 8 can be viewed as a compromise for developed countries;
although they conceded the treatment of L&D as a separate pillar for climate action,
they made it clear that they continue rejecting any liability for L&D, and emphasised
a strong role for climate risk management. This attempt to move the L&D discourse
under the less contested and binding disaster risk reduction framework or under
the wider humanitarian arena is not new and has characterised developed countries’
position since the inception of the L&D work programme. A central argument for
it has been the extreme difficulty in attributing “the incidence of loss and damage
to climate change, as opposed to natural climate variability and/or vulnerabilities
stemming from non-climatic stresses and trends like deforestation and development
patterns”, as put by the US (UNFCCC 2012a).
6.3.3 NGOs
Generally speaking, NGOs have been highly supportive of the efforts of developing
countries to create a liability and compensation mechanism for L&D. Such support
has its roots in climate justice considerations; for example, ECO noted at the time of
COP19 that L&D is a matter of “climate justice…It is time for those who are mainly
responsible for climate change to act here inWarsaw” (Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016).
In particular, NGOs:
• Haveadvocated for the development of anL&Dmechanism. For example,German-
watch, supported by theMunichClimate Insurance Initiative (MCII) (togetherwith
other partner institutions), launched the Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries
Initiative in 2012 (CDKN et al. 2012). Similarly, the ACTAlliance, a network con-
sisting of 140 humanitarian and development organisations, advocated for L&D
during COP19: “Governments should recognise that we cannot choose between
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mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage.…The lower the mitigation ambition,
the higher the adaptation need. The lower the adaptation support available to help
poor communities and countries, the more serious the limits to adaptation become
from climatic changes, the more loss and damage ensues” (Vulturius and Davis
2016)
• Have helped to stimulate interest in L&D in developing countries. For example,
LDCs participating in a MCII workshop developed much greater interest in the
development of an L&Dmechanism than they held prior to participation (Vanhala
and Hestbaek 2016);
• Have acted as enablers for change. For example, the pro bono Legal Response
Initiative (LRI)4 operated by WWF-UK and Oxfam-GB has provided legal sup-
port to LDCs during climate change negotiations. A similar role was played by
the Foundation for International Environmental Law andDevelopment (FIELD), a
non-governmental research institute based at the Law Department at SOAS, Uni-
versity of London (see for instance Hyvarinen (2012)). A recent advisory group
employed by the Republic of Marshall Islands and AOSIS is the New York based
Independent Diplomat (Carter 2015);
• Have sought public support on L&D. For example, through reports produced by
ActionAid, Care, and WWF (ActionAid 2010; ActionAid et al. 2012, 2013);
• Have continued to pursue options for compensation outside of climate change
negotiations. For example, Greenpeace has used the Philippines Human Rights
Commission to accuse a number of major companies of human rights abuses for
carbon emissions. The Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines contacted
those companies in 2016 to give them an opportunity to respond to Greenpeace’s
allegations (Vidal 2016).
6.3.4 The Private Sector and the Insurance Industry
There is limited evidence of private sector actors playing a role in the development of
L&D as a concept and mechanism, with the exception of some insurance companies.
Indeed, from a private sector point of view, the conceptual separation of L&D, adap-
tation, and disaster risk reduction might appear a highly theoretical and academic
exercise, with limited relevance (Surminski and Eldridge 2015). However, back in
2011, when the UNFCCC consulted on an L&D mechanism, a number of responses
to the UNFCCC called for greater engagement with the private sector in climate risk
management. For example:
• Norway noted that ‘broad participation from stakeholders [including the private
sector] would be crucial to a good outcome of the work programme’ (Norway
2011);
• Gambia asked ‘to seek (private sector) contribution for a successful mechanism
to address L&D in LDCs’ (Gambia 2011)—but explicit detail of what this ‘con-
4http://legalresponseinitiative.org/.
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tribution’ means remains lacking. Gambia also referenced the need to provide the
private sector in LDCs with tools and information to help them respond to the risk
of L&D. The submission specifically mentions ‘climate services for users in both
the public and private sector in LDCs and other vulnerable countries, (… including
the) strengthening of meteorological services in developing countries to facilitate
free sharing of data and information’ (Gambia 2011).
TheWorldHealthOrganization, International LabourOrganization, andUNISDR
have all made similar calls. However, while these submissions point to a clear deficit
in integrating the private sector, they do not provide much detail on the expectations
that come with it. The US has been more specific in explaining the aim of this private
sector engagement: ‘increase collaboration with the private sector (…) to achieve
effective and comprehensive risk management. (…) We should also prioritise the
development of strategies that leverage private sector resources and create market-
based mechanisms that are not overly reliant on public sector budgets, and that are
sustainable in the long term’ (USA 2011).
ExCom’s 2016 report makes several references to the private sector. In particular
the ExCom (SBSTA and SBI 2016):
• has recommended to the COP that the private sector be invited to cooperate and
collaborate on issues relating to L&D where relevant.
• has initiated engagement with the private sector to identify how to enhance the
implementation of comprehensive risk management approaches relating to L&D.
• has reached out to private investors to encourage them to incorporate climate risk
and resilience into development projects.
The only sector that has been engaged in the L&Ddiscussions under theUNFCCC
is the insurance industry. In fact, the dominant focus on insurance-related instruments
within the WIM is likely to have been influenced by the presence and engagement
of these insurance companies.
A particularly prominent role has been played by MCII. MCII was initiated as a
charitable organisation by representatives of insurers, research institutes and NGOs
in 2005 in response to the rising interest in insurance-related solutions for climate
adaptation. It brings together a broad range of insurers, policy researchers, NGOs
and other climate change experts in a single forum. TheUNFCCC is recognised as an
‘observer’ and ‘friend’ of MCII. Between 2008 and 2011, MCII’s submissions to the
UNFCCC focused on the role of insurance for weather-related risks in the context
of adaptation (MCII 2012). Notably, some elements of a 2008 MCII proposal for
a climate risk management module, comprising prevention and insurance pillars to
facilitate adaptation (MCII 2008),were eventually included in theCancunAdaptation
Framework and the SBI Work Program on L&D.
Other parts of the insurance industry are also showing an emerging interest in
L&D. This has been highlighted by the Philippines, which hosted a UNFCCC Stand-
ing Committee on Finance forum in early September 2016. The forum was designed
to support the work of the WIM and ExCom. The programme for the forum was
designed by the UNEP FI Principles for Sustainable Insurance (PSI) Initiative, and
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members of the Philippines insurance industry participated in the forum by provid-
ing technical expertise. A separate event was also hosted by the PSI together with
the Philippines Insurers and Reinsurers Association the day following the forum
(UNEPFI 2016). This event involved discussion of the L&D, and involved members
of ExCom. Chapters 13 (Schäfer et al.) and 21 (Linnerooth-Bayer et al.) of this book
look at the role of insurance for L&D in greater detail.
6.4 The L&D Negotiation Process Through the Lenses
of IR Theories
In the previous section attention was drawn to the different actors involved in L&D
negotiations, describing their positions and contributions. In particular, we empha-
sised that developing countries’ negotiators, includingAOSIS, after long negotiations
managed to reach at least a partial victory in terms of the WIM and Art. 8 of the
Paris Agreement.We now investigate this somewhat surprising victory from different
IR perspectives to better understand the complexities of finding international agree-
ment on L&D solutions. More specifically, we look at L&D negotiations through
the lenses of the main school of thoughts in IR, namely neorealism, liberalism and
constructivism (Snyder 2004). We believe that a pluralistic approach is necessary to
understand how global outcomes are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005).
In general terms, a neorealist viewpoint is useful to highlight resource-endowment
asymmetries and highlight strategies to overcome them. Neorealism is a very influ-
ential strand in IR and sees states as pursuing their self-interest (which is ultimately
security orwealth) in an international system defined by anarchy. States possess vary-
ing capabilities, or power, that they use to turn deals in their favour. The power States
possess depends on their resource endowment, including the economy, population,
and military forces. Nevertheless, aggregate measures of power might explain little
about power positions when considering a specific bargaining circumstance (climate
talks, in this case). What becomes relevant, instead, is “issue-specific power”; that
is, the amount of relevant resources a Party can use for a specific conflict or concern
(Habeeb 1988). In a multilateral setting such as the UNFCCC, two main resources
acquire particular relevance and are considered for our analysis: delegation size and
capacity.
Liberalism shares some assumptions with realism (anarchy of the international
system and rationality of actors), but rejects power as the sole explaining factor
and stresses the role of international cooperation and mutual benefits in shaping
international outcomes. In particular, liberalism postulates that (i) it is the interde-
pendence among state preferences to influence world politics [that promotes inter-
national cooperation,] and that (ii) states’ preferences mirror the views of some
subset of (domestic) social groups (Moravcsik 2008). The first assumption derives
from the special emphasis liberals place on globalisation as a characteristic of the
international political-economic system. In an interconnected world, characterised
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by high degrees of complexity and feed-back effects, state interactions are daily
occurrences in a number of realms, including society, economy, politics and technol-
ogy. These interactions are fuelled by specific state preferences (as determined by
domestic actors), without which a state would not have any incentive to engage in the
international context. Liberalist lenses are thus useful to investigate how asymmetry
between states’ preferences affect L&D outcomes.
Finally, constructivism is a relatively recent theoretical paradigm, challenging in
many aspects both realist and liberal theories in explaining international negotiations
and power relations. What fundamentally distinguishes constructivism from the for-
mer schools of thought is its ontological assumption of the world as being socially
constructed. This means, as Hurd (2008) puts it, that “how people and states think
and behave in world politics is premised on their understanding of the world around
them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about
themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they
participate”. One of the most important contributions of constructivism is showing
that norms matter (Price 2008) and thus ethical and legal standards are important in
guiding world politics (Snyder 2004).
We suggest all these viewpoints are necessary to understand L&D negotiations.
In the following sections we apply such competing theories to the L&D case by
assuming the particular perspective of small island states, AOSIS being their most
proactive proponent on the L&D issue.
6.4.1 Neorealism
In terms of aggregate power, AOSIS—a coalition of socially, economically and envi-
ronmentally vulnerable small island nations—would be defined as a low-power actor
in international negotiations. Its members are home to less than 1% of the world pop-
ulation; the sum of their 39 GDPs equals the annual economy of the city of London5;
and almost half of the states have no or limited armed forces (Barbey 2015). Yet, such
traditional indicators of power might explain little in a specific bargaining situation
like climate negotiations. In this setting, two “issue-specific power” resources acquire
particular relevance: delegation size and capacity. Both are reflections of a country’s
GDP. The size of national budgets influences the number of personnel and experts in
the government and the ministries back home that can develop national negotiation
positions, as well as the size of the delegations (Panke 2012). Developing countries
often cannot afford to send big negotiating teams to COPs, and some initiatives have
been put in place in response to that. One of them is the Trust Fund for Participation
in the UNFCCC established under the Convention, which is nevertheless based on
limited and decreasing voluntary contributions and can only support around two addi-
tional delegates per eligible developing Party (UNFCCC 2016). These circumstances
inevitably hamper developing countries’ full participation in the negotiation process.
5Own calculations based on the World Development Indicators by the World Bank (2015).
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Delegations composed of a small number of people only are unlikely to possess the
range of technical expertise needed to follow different negotiation streams and are
physically unable to cover simultaneous or exhaustingly long sessions (Chasek 2005;
Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012). The smaller the delegation, the less it will also
be able to participate in the informal side of UNFCCC negotiations (where the most
contentious issues are likely to be solved) and to exploit the networking opportunities
offered by COPs.
AOSIS’ “issue-specific power” is evident when considering the evolution of the
group’s delegations at COPs. A comparison among the sizes of UNFCCC Party-
groupings between 1995 and 2011 (own elaboration based on Böhmelt (2013)6 con-
firms AOSIS as the smallest one, with its size increasing at a slower pace compared
to other non-Annex 1 Parties (Fig. 6.3).7
Although some authors consider size as an indicator of bargaining skills (Weiler
2012), other non-material resources like knowledge and expertise influence Par-
ties’ capacity at the negotiating table. Developing countries are typically ascribed a
“capacity gap”, only partially alleviated by the support offered by non-state actors
(Schroeder et al. 2012). The case of AOSIS is somewhat different as the personal
leadership of its negotiators and the early engagement of NGOs as knowledge bro-
kers turned the group into one of the most vocal and proactive in climate talks. This
is at least true when considering some key issues like the 1.5 °C target, adaptation
and L&D, on which the group has been more cohesive. On topics of specific con-
cern, members have started to increasingly negotiate out of the group, for instance on
6Latest available data.
7We are aware that a more accurate consideration of AOSIS’ resource-endowment in L&D nego-
tiations would require disaggregated data on the number of delegates effectively working on the
issue, to be compared with their counterparts in other groups. Unfortunately this information does
not yet exist.
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the issue of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)
(Betzold et al. 2012).
Yet, it is not just about resources. “Issue-specific power” can be increased using
“behavioural power”, i.e. tactics to alter perceived or real power structures (Habeeb
1988). Teaming up with NGOs was one of the strategies employed by AOSIS to rec-
tify power asymmetries on L&D. The other was to pull resources and gain influence
through coalition-building with other non-Annex I groupings. The alignment with
LDCs, the African Group and the G77+China was arguably a result of a conceptual
“reshaping” of the L&D concept in the 2000s. While originally AOSIS’ claims only
focused on losses resulting from sea level rise (as in its 1991 proposal), consideration
for the residual impacts from slow onset events as a whole and the financial risk asso-
ciated with extremes (e.g. AOSIS 2008) made a stronger case for other developing
countries to support the cause. This is not to say that all these groupings had the
same position on L&D and, even less, the same idea about what L&D is. If AOSIS
stressed the life-threatening dimension of L&D, the LDCs focused more on the con-
nection with development and how L&D could affect the quality of life, livelihoods,
food security, and social fabric at the community/household level. At the same time,
Bolivia defined L&D as lost development opportunities and pointed at the deferral
of payments to international institutions, debt relief and similar measures as a way to
address them (UNFCCC 2012a). However, common denominators laid in the request
for L&D to be a stand-alone pillar in UNFCCC architecture and in the need for sup-
porting developing countries’ limited capacity to address climate change impacts.
The G77+China is worthy of separate consideration. While its position was decisive
for the establishment of theWIM and the creation of a separate article on L&D in the
Paris Agreement (see, for instance, the work done within the AdHocWorking Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action—ADP), future alignment with AOSIS’
positions cannot be taken for granted. This is mainly because of the heterogeneity of
the groupwhichmakes synthesis among its members’ positions challenging to reach.
Recent examples of difficulties in finding common ground include the review of the
WIM at COP22 (Calliari 2016b) and the quarrels between China and AOSIS on the
need (supported by the former) to erase the reference to “particularly” vulnerable
developing countries in defining beneficiaries of L&D support.8
While AOSIS has surely benefitted from liaising with other developing countries
in bringing L&Dhigh on theUNFCCCAgenda, this cannot deterministically explain
why outcomes on L&Dwere obtained. Coalition-building in itself is not a suremeans
for any grouping to impact substantively on negotiations (Cooper and Shaw 2009)
and even less in a consensus-based setting such as the UNFCCC (Deitelhoff and
Wallbott 2012). As the institutional context does not level power asymmetries—-
for instance through a one state-one vote system—weaker Parties will be unable to
succeed by relying on their resource-endowment only. Thus, trying to explain L&D
negotiations through “realist eyes” does not allow for going beyond the “structural-
ist paradox”. It is therefore worth investigating other sources of power beyond the
neorealist perspective to get more insight on how AOSIS’ outcomes on L&D were
obtained.
8Personal observations at COP 22.
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6.4.2 Liberalism
By stressing the role played by preferences, liberals point to their interdependence
as a determinant of bargaining outcomes. Some liberals ascribe particular impor-
tance to economic preferences in determining state behaviour. In the L&D case,
developed countries would be incentivised to support their vulnerable developing
counterparts so as to guarantee their viability as commercial partners or to safe-
guard their delocalised supply-chains. Global trade systems can indeed transmit a
variety of negative impacts, as exemplified by the billion dollar losses incurred by
the American corporation Intel that resulted from the collapse of the Thai electronic
industry following flooding in 2011 (Struck 2011). Actually, this liberal argument
was also employed by AOSIS when it called on the international community to con-
sider the “increased interdependence of global economy and society” and to address
“the cascading effects that climate change impacts in poor and vulnerable regions
can globally have” as it would be “cost-effective” (AOSIS 2008). It is worth noting,
however, that this argument was incidentally used by developing countries and that
they largely approached the debate in ethical and legal terms.
While making the case for increased international cooperation on L&D, liberal
theory also allows for highlighting some of the “hampering factors” that have affected
developing countries in L&D negotiations. These are related to the liberal concep-
tualisation of power, which differs significantly from realist theory. According to
Kehoane andNye (1977), one formof international influence derives from the “asym-
metric interdependence” of preferences among states. The more interdependent a
state is and the more intense its preference for a given outcome, the more power
others potentially have over it (Moravcsik 2008). In other words, the salience an
actor attaches to an issue is inversely linked to its success at the negotiating table
as the actor will be more willing to make concessions to get the result (Schneider
2005). Moreover, salience is linked to the existence of an outside option: if a state
has alternatives to the negotiated agreement it will exploit the circumstance to ask
for a higher “price” to take part in it. Translating this reasoning to L&D negotiations,
it easy to see how AOSIS has negotiated since the beginning from a disadvantageous
position. By virtue of their extreme vulnerability and the existential threat posed
by climate change, small islands states can only rely on ambitious mitigation efforts
and support for adaptation and rehabilitation by developed countries to address L&D.
This has two intertwined implications: (i) as they do not have control over the issue at
stake (mostly in terms of mitigation), small island states can do nothing but wait for
developed countries to act; and (ii) not having bargaining power, small island states
are forced to accept a sub-optimal solution compared to what they would prefer.
Beyond salience, liberals stress the importance that domestic actors have in shap-
ing negotiating outcomes. Governments facing a strong opposition back home—and
thus looking less powerful—can convince counterparts that only a minimum com-
mitment is possible (Schneider 2005). While not really applying to AOSIS’ member
states (as domestic actors should agree with the survival of their country), this can
be observed in a relevant counterpart of the L&D debate: the US. One of the leit-
170 E. Calliari et al.
motifs of the US delegation at COP21 was that any reference to legal remedies in
the Paris Agreement would have encountered the opposition of the Congress and
had the effect “to kill the deal”. The US ratification constraint (Putnam 1988) forced
AOSIS to put aside their responsibility claims and go for a compromise solution.
Talks between the US and small island states, labelled a “meeting of the minds” by
Secretary Kerry (Friedman 2015), were held at the onset of the second negotiation
week, with Saint Lucia minister Fletcher describing their objective as “ensur[ing]
that everybody was comfortable with the agreement” (CarbonBrief 2015). Yet, the
compromise solution (paragraph 52 of the accompanying decision to the Agreement
excluding basis for any liability or compensation claims) did not make everybody
comfortable. The Philippines expressed deep concern and Bolivia stated that “no
clause can deny people and countries’ rights to ask for compensation” and that “all
the necessary institutional means will be used so that [climate] justice can be made”
(Bolivia 2015).
As made evident by this discussion, a liberalist view of L&D negotiations does
not really help to explain the structuralist-paradox. In fact, it reinforces it. This is the
result of considering, as in realism, negotiation outcomes a function of the (static)
characteristics—being Parties’ features or capabilities—of a particular negotiation.
In other words, for liberals and neorealists it is material power (military hardware,
strategic resources, and money) that ultimately matters (Hurd 2008). On the con-
trary, constructivists argue that both material and discursive power are necessary for
understanding world politics (Hopf 1998).We therefore turn our attention to the con-
structivist approach and the role that ethical and legal discourses have had in shaping
L&D negotiations.
6.4.3 Constructivism
Along the constructivism line, L&D negotiations would have been shaped not only
by material power or state interest but also by a competition between states around
different understandings and framings (i.e. discourses) of L&D. Developing coun-
tries have largely framed L&D in ethical and legal terms and made a case for this
conceptualisation since the beginning of climate talks. They have pointed to the
unfairness of climate change (affecting first those least responsible for the problem)
and to the threats for survival it poses for the most exposed societies. By analysing
developing countries’ submissions to the SBI and ADP (2011–2015) and High Level
Segment statements from COP 16 to COP 21 (see Calliari (2016a) for the material
employed), it is possible to find references to the concepts of fairness, international
solidarity; equity and intergenerational equity. The legal counterpart of these ethi-
cal arguments is the concept of state responsibility–compensation (see Chap. 7 on
legal issues: Simlinger and Mayer 2018), which seeks reparation for wrongful acts
attributable to states. In terms of citation frequency, this is the most-cited principle
in the (wide) sample of submissions we analysed, and it is often accompanied by
the Polluter Pays Principle; Common but differentiated responsibility and respective
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capabilities (CBDR-RC) and references to precautionary measures. On the contrary,
as explained above, developed countries have mostly avoided any references to com-
pensation, and have tried instead to shift the attention to non-economic L&D. This
is interesting if we consider that, up to the establishment of the WIM, developing
countries tended to associate L&D to (in principle) the quantifiable and monetisable
effects of climate change, like physical impacts—e.g. loss of land because of sea
level rise—and economic impacts, such as the loss of development opportunities
advanced by Bolivia (UNFCCC 2012a). As a whole, developed countries have tried
to shift L&D to the less contested DRR and humanitarian frameworks; used scientific
knowledge (issues of attribution) to neutralise the developing Parties’ compensation
claims; and employed ethical claims to avoid the ‘monetisation’ of the discourse, by
hinting at the inappropriateness of placing price tags on the lives, livelihoods and
assets of the most vulnerable societies (Calliari 2016a).
If power, in a simplified constructivist view, is about “convince[ing] others to
adopt [ones] ideas” (Snyder 2004), can AOSIS be deemed successful on the L&D
issue? Can the WIM and Article 8 be seen as a result of AOSIS’ discursive power?
Undoubtedly, the developing countries managed to institutionalise the idea of L&D
as something beyond adaptation both in the text of Decision 2/CP.19 establishing
the WIM and with a stand-alone article for L&D in the Paris Agreement. Thus, they
were able to “convince” developed countries on this point. The result was obtained by
framing the L&D debate in such a way that Parties’ resources and interests became
irrelevant as the playground was moved into the legal and moral fields. While nar-
ratives of survival (and thus moral issues) have also been employed by AOSIS in
other UNFCCC negotiation streams (for instance, in asking for ambitious mitigation
actions), the massive recourse to state Responsibility-compensation claims was the
main factor in determining AOSIS’ outcomes. It can be argued that, rather than being
an objective per se, calls for compensation were used strategically to get concessions
from Annex 1 Parties. This idea is somehow reinforced when looking at the timing
of compensation claims (Table 6.1).
Most of them concentrated before 2013, at the time of the discussion for an
institutional mechanism to address L&D (what was going to be the WIM). After
that, reference was made episodically by AOSIS and the G77+China in the proposal
for a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility. Among the performed
functions, the facility was to provide “compensation measures for people displaced
by climate change”—a provision that was dropped without excessive clamour on the
road to Paris. And while at COP 21 requests for compensation were “traded” for a
dedicated L&D article, they reappeared in a number of interpretative declarations to
the instruments of ratification of the Paris Agreement (see Bolivia, the Philippines,
Nauru, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu). This is not
to imply that such calls for retributive justice were not genuine: they are consistent
with the unfairness that developing countries ascribe to the climate change problem.
However, some tactical considerations are discernible behind their use in climate
talks.
In terms of the “status” that L&D has in the UNFCCC architecture, AOSIS and
other developing countries were less successful in “convincing” their counterparts
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Table 6.1 Party/Grouping calling for compensation in the period 1991–2016
Year Party/grouping
1991 AOSIS
2008 AOSIS; Sri Lanka
2009 Brazil; Colombia; India; Nicaragua on behalf of Guatemala, Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Panama and Nicaragua; Turkey; Tuvalu; Cook Island;
Algeria on behalf of the African group; AOSIS; Bolivia;
2010 Bolivia; Ghana; AOSIS; Maldives; The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on
behalf of Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua; Alba;
2011 Mexicoa, Sri Lanka
2012 AOSIS; Gambia for the LDCs; Swaziland for the African Group; Ghana;
Bolivia with Ecuador, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, Philippines,
Nicaragua;
2013 AOSIS
2014 Central American Integration System (SICA, in Spanish)
2015 (pre-PA) AOSIS, G 77
2015–2016
(post-PA)
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cook Islands; Micronesia (Federated States of); Nauru;
Niue; Solomon Islands; Tuvalu
aMexico does not properly call for compensation, but rather highlights it among the mechanisms
that could be “identified, prioritised and developed”
in placing L&D as a truly third pillar of climate action. In particular, L&D does not
seem to be placed on an equal footing with mitigation and adaptation in the climate
regime designed by the Paris Agreement as no reference is made to Article 8 by other
treaty provisions. It is not mentioned in the purpose of the Agreement (Article 2), in
the context of the “ambitious efforts” required to achieve it (Article 3), in the related
transparency framework (Article 13), or in the global stocktake process (Article 14).
This signals not only the “last minute” nature of the agreement reached at COP 21,
but also—and most importantly—the contested status that L&D continues to have
under the UNFCCC. Besides the symbolic meaning of keeping L&D separate from
adaptation, Article 8 contains nothing more than tentative and cautious language.
6.5 From Theory to Practice: Next Steps and Key
Questions for Moving the L&D Discourse Forward
Despite being one of the most controversial issues to be recently treated within cli-
mate negotiations, L&D has attracted little attention among IR scholars. Yet, the
discipline can greatly contribute to the debate, not only by enhancing understand-
ing of the negotiation process and related outcomes but also by offering insights on
how the issue could be fruitfully moved forward. This chapter specifically adopted a
multi-faceted notion of power, drawing from the neorealist, liberal and constructivist
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schools of thought, in order to explain how L&D milestones were reached. This
allowed for overcoming the “structuralist paradox” in negotiations, i.e. the appar-
ently surprising capacity of weak parties to take home results while negotiating with
stronger parties.
Developing countries’ achievements on L&D (WIM and Article 8) are only sur-
prising when considering power in its purely materialistic form. If discursive power
is added to the picture, then achievements can be ascribed to developing countries’
capacity to shape their fate rather than to fortunate circumstances. This is not to
say that material power does not play any role. Developing countries are faced with
resource and capacity constraints which make it harder for their needs to be fully
addressed within the UNFCCC. Consistently, NGO support will continue to play a
crucial role in levelling current asymmetries in terms of capabilities, together with
other initiatives to fund developing countries’ participation in the process.
Yet, other sources of power besides the realist and liberal ones can be decisive
for obtaining desired international outcomes. Our analysis has shown the key impor-
tance that discursive power, by framing L&D in ethical and legal terms, had in the
attainment of L&D milestones. First, it moved the debate to a playground where
resources and interests became irrelevant, therefore putting developed and develop-
ing countries on an equal foot. Second, it appealed to standards somehow shared
or agreed beyond the UNFCCC context, including the basic moral norms linked to
island states’ narratives of survival and the reference to international customary law
(state responsibility-compensation principles). This was useful to prove the need for
action on L&D recurring to standards in principle recognised by both contending
parties in other international arenas. Although this was not enough to impose devel-
oping countries’ view on what L&D is and how it should be addressed, it at least
moved developed countries’ position towards the direction paved by the former.
At the same time, however, this strategy prevented Parties from starting a process
towards the creation of shared meaning and understanding around L&D. Indeed,
definitional issues have been carefully avoided in order not to stumble into the taboo
reference of ‘compensation’. As a result, no official definition of L&D has been
agreed at the UNFCCC level yet and Parties rely on a working one formulated under
the SBI (UNFCCC 2012b). This is not just a matter of form, but a more impor-
tant matter of substance. Without clarity around L&D conceptual boundaries, it will
ultimately be difficult to go beyond the explorative mandate the WIM was given.
In particular, concrete guidance is needed in order to implement the WIM’s third
function on enhancing “action and support to address loss and damage”, which also
includes finance. For example, there is a need for establishing relevant criteria to
identify L&D projects on the ground, as well as defining the level of adaptation
beyond which L&D materialises. Does L&D arise when social, technical and phys-
ical limits are surpassed, or should also economic and institutional constraints be
considered? The answers cannot but be political.
Yet, we are not claiming that agreeing on a definition is the only way to have
meaningful action on L&D. We are aware that the discussion still causes discom-
fort and may lead to political deadlock. We thus believe that a more fruitful way
forward entails adopting a different perspective and agreeing on shared principles
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against which action could be tested (see chapter on justice by Wallimann-Helmer
et al. 2018). Such shared principles would support an L&D working space where
solutions can be developed (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018), including tools
to address irreversible losses, which are mostly associated with slow-onset events.
While there is general accord around the use of comprehensive risk management
approaches (including risk assessment, reduction, transfer, retention), how to deal
with impacts from slowonset events remains an open question. Discourse about those
impacts and efforts to develop creative or transformative instruments in response has
been somewhat limited, often hampered by the taboo of compensation. A change
of narrative is therefore needed. Framing L&D exclusively in terms of justice might
have turned the issue into a win-lose negotiation game. Instead, a bigger emphasis on
mutual gains through adaptation and action on L&D for both developed and devel-
oping countries is needed, as well as more clarity on the limits of those strategies.
Examples of such mutual gains are more resilient global supply chains, reduction of
climate refugees and enhanced security. As a result, acting on L&Dwould not feel as
a unilateral concession developed countries make to vulnerable ones: it would rather
be about elaborating patterns of collective action on an issue of common concern.
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Chapter 7
Legal Responses to Climate Change
Induced Loss and Damage
Florentina Simlinger and Benoit Mayer
Abstract Legal issues are central to ongoing debates on Loss and Damage asso-
ciated with climate change impacts and risks (L&D). These debates shed light, in
particular, on the remedial obligations of actors most responsible for causing climate
change towards those most affected by its adverse impacts. The aim of this chapter is
to take stock of the legal literature on the topic, to identify potential legal approaches
to L&D, identify challenges and to explore possible directions for further research. It
looks at the feasibility of private and administrative climate change litigation while
providing examples from around the world. Subsequently, we explore how human
rights issues have been applied in international law to address L&D. The discus-
sion particularly addresses the question whether the no-harm rule can be applied
to climate change and would in fact trigger legal responsibility for greenhouse gas
emissions. In addition, we examine relevant legal actions with relevance for L&D
taken under the UNFCCC and the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and
Damage. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the various legal responses to
L&D highlighting their premises, specific challenges and proposed remedies.
Keywords Climate change litigation · Climate regime · No-harm rule
Loss and Damage
7.1 Introduction and Preliminary Notes
Legal issues are central to the ongoing debate on Loss and Damage associated with
climate change impacts (L&D). These debates on L&D shed light, in particular, on
the remedial obligations of the actors most responsible for causing climate change
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towards those most affected by its adverse impacts. Ethical perspectives are explored
in the chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. (2018) in this book, and the aim of the
present chapter is to take stock of the legal literature on the topic, to identify poten-
tial legal approaches to L&D, and to explore possible directions for further research.
While the Warsaw International Mechanism is an important institutional develop-
ment, it does not appear as the unique entry point for providing redress for the adverse
impacts of climate change. In outlining how diverse domestic or international legal
frameworks could approach L&D, this chapter engages with the relation between
legal arguments and necessary political or scientific developments at different scales
of the regime complex for climate change.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents different approaches to
climate law litigation before domestic courts and highlights themost prominent cases
relevant to L&D. Section 7.3 briefly discusses whether regional and international
human rights law is of avail to those affected most by the impacts of climate change.
Section 7.4 highlights the potential of international litigation based on principles
of customary international law. Section 7.5 turns to the developments taking place
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, including the Warsaw
International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM). Section 7.6 finally discusses
the different legal responses analysed and concludes with possible ways forward.
7.2 National Laws
Recent years have seen a rapid development of national laws related to climate
change. From only a few climate laws in the pre-Kyoto Protocol era, there are now
more than 1,200 laws and policies world-wide (Nachmany et al. 2017). Beyond
a general focus on climate change mitigation, some of these laws have sought to
address the damages caused by climate change.
Developments have also taken place before national courts, often driven by indi-
viduals or groups interested in bypassing the inertia of political institutions.Generally
speaking, litigation is more likely in “common law” jurisdictions, as largely based
on the doctrine of precedent—the application of the rule identified by a court in a
given case to any similar subsequent cases. Most English-speaking countries apply
a system of “common law,” while other countries apply a form of “civil law,” based
on extensive codes covering fundamental areas of law.
Litigation can be based on private or public law. Through private law litigation, a
person (individual or group) may seek a court’s finding regarding the responsibility
of another person or private entity for harms suffered. Through public law litigation,
a person may seek a court’s finding regarding the obligation of the government or
another public administration to take a particular course of action, for instance to
mitigate climate change, to adapt to the impacts of climate change, or to compensate
for losses and damages. Whether litigation leads to a favourable court decision or
not, it contributes to raising awareness and creating political momentum for further
developments.
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7.2.1 Public Law Litigation
Public law litigation puts the action or inaction of national authorities under scrutiny.
In common law jurisdictions, such “judicial review” often takes place before an
ordinary court, whereas civil law jurisdictions often have specific courts in charge of
administrative and, mostly, constitutional oversight. Normally, public law litigation
is based on the inconsistency of an act or omission of a national authority with a
rule of higher hierarchical standing. For instance, a regulation could be struck by a
court because it is incompatible with a statute, or the application of a statute could
be suspended when it is incompatible with the constitution.
Public law litigation related to climate change has often focused on the obligation
of a state tomitigate climate change rather than directly onways to address losses and
damages. The decision of the US Supreme Court inMassachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, for instance, forced the Environmental Protection Agency to
regulate GHGs as air pollutants. As another example, in 2015, a decision of the
District Court of The Hague in the case of Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the
Netherlands found the government of the Netherlands in breach of its obligation to
mitigate climate change under international law and ordered it to take measures to
reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% until the end of 2020 based
on the 1990 levels. This judgment is currently under appeal and the final decision is
still pending at the time of publication.
The Netherlands is one of very few jurisdictions where international law obliga-
tions are recognised a legal value similar to that of the constitution, thus providing
a strong basis for public law litigation on the implementation of international com-
mitments. Nevertheless, the success of the Urgenda case in a first instance judgment
inspired many similar cases such as Juliana v. United States of America on the
constitutional protection of future generations against climate change and decision
W109 2000179-1/291E [2007] on the adverse ruling to a third runway on the Vienna
Airport due to climate change concerns (which has however been reversed by the
constitutional Court in June 2017).
Likewise, public law litigation can be used to push a government to promote
climate change adaptation or otherwise address L&D. The case of Ashgar Leghari
v. Federation of Pakistan regarded an alleged inconsistency of the limited efforts by
the government of Pakistan to promote climate change adaptation with constitutional
provisions on the protection of fundamental rights. In 2015, the High Court of Lahore
recognised that “the delay and lethargy of the State in implementing the Framework
offend[ed] the fundamental rights of the citizens which need to be safeguarded”
(W.P. No. 25501/2015, at para. 8). Accordingly, the court ordered the government of
Pakistan to take action to promote climate change adaptation under the supervision
of an ad hoc panel of experts reporting to the court. As this case illustrates, redress
can extend far beyond compensation.
The effect of public law litigation is limited by the rules on the basis of which the
action or omission of national authorities can be contested. Domestic constitutional
provisions on the protection of fundamental rights, invoked in the case of Ashgar
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Leghari, are often limited to the territory of the state: they do not usually provide
ground for a Court to recognise the obligation of a state to address L&D beyond
its own jurisdiction. International law, on the other hand, can sometimes be invoked
before domestic courts in support of public litigation, as illustrated in the case of
Urgenda, although national courts are often reluctant to implement international law
obligations.
7.2.2 Private Law Litigation
Private law litigation sheds light on the obligations of any person (individual or group
granted legal personality within a particular legal system) towards another. Courts in
common law jurisdictions apply various concepts of “tort” such as nuisance, trespass,
or a risk-based regime of strict liability. By contrast, courts in civil law jurisdictions
refer to particular provisions of their respective Civil Code on “extra-contractual
responsibility.” Absent more specific statutory developments, Courts in civil law
jurisdictions could theoretically play an extensive role in interpreting such principle
of responsibility to the context of climate change.
Private law litigation on L&D face a myriad of hurdles and, to date, most have
been unsuccessful. A first hurdle is the issue of attribution. It is generally impossible
to attribute a certain climatic event to human induced climate change, and certainly
not to the emissions of a specific person or entity. While it is beyond doubt that
GHG emissions, as a general proposition, cause harm, it is currently impossible to
trace specific damages to certain emitters. Most legal systems require a direct causal
relation for damages to be granted, but climate science only offers probabilistic
attribution (see e.g. Pall et al. 2016). Some authors have suggested that courts should
apply a modified general causation test as have sometimes been developed on “toxic
tort cases” (Grossman 2003: 23). It would accordingly be sufficient to prove that
GHG emissions are generally capable of causing damages and that a causal link
between action and damage is probable thus render the requirement to attribute a
specific climatic event to the emissions of a specific person or entity unnecessary
(Grossman 2003).
A second hurdle is the deference of the courts to other branches of government.
Courts haveusually been reluctant to touchmatterswhich require afine-tunedbalance
between different interests, especially when the executive and the legislature have
already seized themselves of the matter. These concerns may be phrased in the terms
of the “political question doctrine” in the United States or in more or less implicit
considerations of the “justiciability” of disputes brought before domestic courts in
other jurisdictions. This is an even greater obstacle in civil law countries, where
courts are posited to simply apply the law created by the legislative branch.
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut the US Supreme Court regarded
the alleged nuisance constituted by the greenhouse gas emissions of five US power
utilities. It unanimously rejected the claim in 2011 on the ground that the regulation
of greenhouse gas emissions by the Environmental Protection Agency precluded the
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application of tort law of nuisance. In this view, compliance with domestic provisions
on greenhouse gas emissions protects the power utilities from private law litigation.
This doctrine was also one of the obstacles that precluded the inhabitants of the
Alaskan village of Kivalina from obtaining damages from major hydrocarbons and
power companies. In 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Clean
Air Act had displaced tort-based claims for damages and efforts to appeal before the
US SupremeCourt have been unsuccessful (Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012)) (see also chapter by Landauer and Juhola 2018).
A similar case was initiated by a Peruvian farmer against RWE, a German utility
company.AGerman district court dismissed the lawsuit as it held that the plaintiff had
not established that RWE was legally responsible for protecting the city of Huaraz
from flooding and because of lack of direct chain of causation. In January 2017,
the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was rejected on grounds of unclear causality and
inadequacy. The case has since been taken to the higher regional court in Hamm,
where it was finally admitted in November 2017 and has now proceeded to the
evidentiary stage (see also chapter by Frank et al. 2018).
7.3 Regional and International Human Rights Law
Multiple regional and international human rights instruments recognise the obliga-
tion of states to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of individuals within
their jurisdiction. International institutions have been established to promote com-
pliancewith these obligations. These include regional human rights courts such as the
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as regional commissions.
The Human Rights Council and its special procedures as well as international human
rights treaty bodies have also contributed to naming and shaming governments failing
to comply with their obligations.
The impact of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights are well recog-
nised (e.g., Preamble of the Paris Agreement). The UN Human Rights Council, for
instance, emphasised that “the adverse effects of climate change have a range of
implications … for the effective enjoyment of human rights” (2015, recital 8). Var-
ious regional and international human rights that are affected by L&D include the
right to life (e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6; see also
Human Rights Committee 2017, para. 65), the right to property (Protocol 1 ECHR,
art. 1), the right to a clean environment (African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, art. 24) and the right to enjoy one’s own culture (International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 27). Yet, human rights law has gener-
ally been of little help in addressing L&D. While states have an obligation to take
positive steps to protect and fulfill the rights of individuals within their jurisdiction,
this obligation is limited to their available means. More importantly, it is generally
understood that the obligation to protect human rights is limited to individuals within
the states’ own jurisdiction or, at most, to individuals under their effective control
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(see e.g. Al-Skeini v. UK). Thus, from a legal perspective, states have no obligation
to take into account the effects of their policies on the enjoyment of human rights
outside their jurisdiction or effective control.
To complywith their obligation to protect and fulfill human rights, statesmust also
take measures necessary to prevent human rights violations by private actors under
their jurisdiction. However, this is again limited to human rights violations within the
jurisdiction of the state. Efforts to promote responsibility of states for companies that
commit human rights violations extra-territorially have seen increased support. For
instance, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines, which has the power
to investigate alleged barriers to the enjoyment of human rights, investigates whether
carbonmajors in causing climate change andocean acidificationviolate human rights.
The petition filed byGreenpeace Southeast Asia and PhilippineRural Reconstruction
Movement is based partly on the expert drafted, legally non-binding Maastricht
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ETO Consortium 2013). The investigation was still ongoing as
of the time of writing.
However, also cases invoking the failure of a state to address L&D within its
own jurisdiction appear extraordinarily unlikely to succeed before human rights
institutions. The petitionerwould first need to establish that greenhouse gas emissions
of a particular state caused him or her to lose the enjoyment of a right within that
jurisdiction. Then, further evidence would need to be provided that the cause of such
loss in the enjoyment of a rightwas the failure of the state to take appropriatemeasures
to prevent such greenhouse gas emissions. Lastly, the petitioner would have to rebut
likely arguments by the state according towhich the protection of human rights can be
limited in the pursuance of objectives of general interest such as economic growth
or development. Before an international human rights body, the petitioner would
need to make the latter argument in a manner sufficiently compelling to persuade
judges or commissioners that the state’s balance of human rights protectionwith such
objectives of general interest was not within the national “margin of appreciation,”
so-called by the European Court of Human Rights, in the protection of human rights.
For instance, in 2005, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference submitted a petition to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against the United States for their
failure to prevent greenhouse gas emissions resulting in a violation of the human
rights of Inuit communities. Following a public hearing, the Commission dismissed
the petition (Chapman 2010).
However, cases are more likely to succeed when invoking the obligation of a state
to protect the human rights of its population in isolation from its responsibility for
climate change. An example of such successful proceedings before domestic courts
was mentioned in Sect. 7.2 in the case of Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan.
Similar cases could be brought in in every circumstance where a state fails to take
appropriate measures to protect its population against the adverse circumstances
which may relate to impacts of climate change. Yet, this approach does not properly
provide for redress for the impacts of climate change as it relies on the state on
whose territory a person is present for the protection of the human rights of this
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person. Thus, the burden of addressing L&D falls disproportionately on developing
states rather than on those states responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions.
A particular question related to human rights law surrounds the protection of
individuals displaced in circumstances related to climate change impacts. Some
arguments have been made for an international protection of “climate refugees”
either in application of existing international law or through the development of new
international legal frameworks. In existing international law, however, a “refugee” is
narrowly defined as a person fleeing out of awell-founded fear of being persecuted on
the ground of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion (Convention relating to the Status ofRefugees, art. 1(A)(2)). Even
when states have extended this definition to people living in a situation of generalised
violence, environmental factors have not generally been recognised as a ground for
international protection. For instance, claims for asylum based on the environmental
conditions in Tuvalu were rejected by the New Zealand Immigration and Protection
Tribunal in 2009 (In Re: AD (Tuvalu)). Arguably, the lives of people migrating from
a state seriously impacted by climate change are threatened if they are returned to
that state. However, national courts have previously considered that provisions of
international human rights treaties dealing with the right to life, such as art. 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, did not prevent the expulsion
of an individual whose country of origin is seriously affected by impacts of climate
change (see e.g. for instance Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business
Innovation and Employment) or was in violation of the principle of non-refoulement
(see e.g. AC (Tuvalu)).
Further developments could, however, occur. Ongoing developments include for
instance the Platform on Disaster Displacement which continues the work of the
Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement and the work by
the ILC on the protection of persons in the event of disasters (ILC 2016), as further
discussed in the chapter by Heslin et al. (2018).
7.4 Customary International Law
National and international human rights laws are too limited in scope to fully address
L&D. This is because climate change responsibilities and harms are geographically
split. Most greenhouse gas emissions take place in industrialised nations, whereas
most L&D affects individuals in the least developed or developing states. Human
rights protection may reduce the harm caused to particular communities, including
through adaptation measures, but its effectivity largely depends on the resources
available to national authorities. Without enhanced support from the international
community, the most vulnerable states may have little capacity to effectively protect
their populations. This suggests that approaches to address L&D are more likely to
take place at an international level.
There are two main sources of international law: customs and treaties (Statute
of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)). Norms of customary international
186 F. Simlinger and B. Mayer
law are constituted by the general practice of states accepted as law (Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b)). A treaty is instead an agreement through
which two or several states voluntarily commit to comply with certain obligations.
When a state fails to respect its international obligations, including obligations stem-
ming from customary international law and treaty law, this state has a secondary
obligation to cease the wrongful act and perform its international obligation and to
make adequate reparation to any state injured (ILC Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 29–31).
Section 7.4.1 examines whether excessive greenhouse gas emissions could consti-
tute a breach of a norm of customary international law—the no-harm principle—and
consequently entails an obligation to make reparation for the injury caused to the ter-
ritory of other states. Section 7.4.2 turns to the treaty-based international climate law
regime. Thus, we elude, for the sake of brevity, any discussion of other treaty-based
regimes, such as the provisions on pollution of the marine environment contained
in the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas or the work of the International Law
Commission on the protection of the atmosphere.
7.4.1 The Obligation of States Not to Cause Serious
Environmental Harm
The contemporary international legal system is based on the principle that states are
equal sovereigns. States could not be equal sovereigns if it was permitted for one
state to interfere with the internal affairs of another state in any manner that would
seriously affect the latter. Likewise, states would not be genuinely equal sovereigns
if one state was permitted to render the territory of another state uninhabitable or
otherwise to significantly affect the conditions under which that territory can be
used, for instance through causing serious environmental harms across international
borders (see Order of 13 December 2013 in the joined proceedings Construction of
a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica); Certain
Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
Provisional Measures ICJ Rep 2013, 398).
The no-harmprinciple, as a corollary of the principle of equal sovereignty,wasfirst
recognised in the 1941 arbitral award in the Trail Smelter case. This case concerned
a dispute between Canada and the United States over air pollution arising from a
smelter in Canada, which was brought by dominant winds towards the US State of
Washington, causing serious environmental damages. In an oft-cited passage, the
tribunal declared that:
under the principles of international law […] no state has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
or the properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequences and the injury
is established by clear and convincing evidence (Trail Smelter Arbitration: 1905).
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This principle was confirmed in further decisions of international courts and tri-
bunals (e.g.Corfu Channel, 22;Case concerning theGabcikovo-Nagymaros Project,
para. 53; Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, paras. 101, 193 [here-
inafter: Pulp Mills]). It was also recognised in international declarations (e.g. United
Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, principle 2; Declara-
tion of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, principle 21;
UNGA Res. 2996 (XXVII)) and, although less systematically, in treaties, including
a mention in the preamble to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In
the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the
International Court of Justice recognised
the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of
the corpus of international law relating to the environment (para 29).
The no-harm principle requires states to refrain from engaging in activities which
would cause significant transboundary harm and to prevent persons or entities within
its jurisdiction to carry out such activities. Beyond this general understanding, the
modalities of the no-harm principle are debated. As with any customary norm, it is
difficult to establish the exact scope of this duty to prevent significant transbound-
ary harm. In its previous cases, the ICJ has clarified little the content of the duty to
prevent significant transboundary harm. Generally, it has been understood as one of
due diligence (Pulp Mills, para 101; ILC 2001:154, para. 7). This means that a state
is required to act in a way that can be expected from a “good government” (ILC
2001: 155, para. 17) and to exert its best efforts to minimise the risk of significant
transboundary harm (ILC 2001: 154, para. 7). As such, the no-harm principle is an
obligation of conduct, not of result. Thus, a state is not responsible for harm that
occurs despite its reasonable efforts to prevent it or—in case that it is not possi-
ble—to minimise the risk. The International Law Commission has acknowledged in
its work on the Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities that a different degree of care is expected from states with fewer capacities
and economic difficulties (ILC 2001:155, para. 17). When applying this criterion to
climate change, it must also be kept in mind that treaties may contribute in differ-
ent ways to the development of customary international law. Despite the continuing
work of the ILC on the role of treaties in identifying customary international law (see
e.g. Wood 2015: 14 ff), there remain fundamental uncertainties on how the multilat-
eral environmental agreements shape, crystallise and form the content of customary
international law.
State practice and cases where the no-harm rule was invoked generally dealt with
activities at or around a shared border. These activities included for instance emitting
toxic fumes that caused damages in the woods of the neighbouring state, dredging in
a shared river and altering its waters (e.g. Lac Lanoux Arbitration) or else polluting
it through mills (e.g. Pulp Mills) or construction activities close to it. This raises the
question whether the no-harm principle is applicable to climate change.
Climate change differs from most aforementioned cases in at least three pivotal
points. Firstly, damages from climate change result not from a single activity of a state
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but of its reliance on fossil fuels as an economic motor, i.e. from many activities.
Secondly, damages from climate change results not from the conduct of a single
state but from the concomitant conduct of multiple states, with the resulting harm
not confined to a single state but affecting virtually all states. Thirdly and relatedly, the
harm results not from any particular activity, but from an accumulation of activities
over decades.
For these reasons, in the 1990s, the International Law Commission excluded phe-
nomena such as creeping pollution and pollution deriving from ordinary economic
activities from its work on the Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities (Rao 2000:9). The International Law Commission con-
sidered these situations too complex, and possibly too politically sensitive, to make
statements about their legal nature. Although the Articles are not binding as such and
do not reflect existing customary international law in their entirety, this is indicative
of the difficulty of applying the no-harm principle to new situations.
The multiplicity of states contributing to climate change and impacted by its
consequences at least complicates the application of the no-harm rule. Scholars have
questioned the applicability of the no-harm principle to circumstances where harm
is caused not directly by a single source, but by multiple diffuse sources over a
long period of time, which accumulate and result in harm (Zahar 2014; Okawa
2010:307; Scovazzi 2001:61).Most cases before the international courts and tribunals
are decided over situations where a single activity caused harm to another state.
Environmental harm accruing because of the conduct ofmultiple stateswas discussed
in the pleadings before the ICJ in one case. In their submissions on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, some states raised concerns with the possibility
that the repeated use of nuclear weapons over a relatively short span of time would
create a “nuclear winter”—a cataclysmic upheaval of the climate systemwhich could
wipe out most of life on our planet (Mexico 1995, para 65; Egypt 1995, para 32;
Ecuador, para D). When mentioning that the damages caused by nuclear weapons
could not “be contained in either space or time” and had “the potential to destroy all
civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet,” (Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, para. 35) the International Court of Justice made no distinction
betweenmediated damages and damages caused by cumulative causation but implied
that the no-harm principle applied equally to both (see also Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Weeramantry: 456–458; Mayer 2015:8).
If there is indeed an obligation for states not to cause transboundary environmen-
tal harms through greenhouse gas emissions, its modalities remain ill-defined (see
also Mayer 2016b, 2018a). In particular, the scope of the no-harm principle is ill-
determined. In general, the duty to prevent significant harm exists whenever a state
has or should have been able to foresee the risk of harm. Unfortunately, there is no
interpretation of these modalities of the no-harm principle by the International Court
of Justice or sufficient clarification through the work of the International Law Com-
mission. However, it appears possible to assume that a state must have had at least
some scientific hints of the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, the historical
failure of a state to prevent activities generating excessive greenhouse gas emissions
does not constitute a breach of the no-harm rule until at least some scientific evi-
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dence suggested that they may have a serious impact on the climate system. It is also
unclear to what extent a state must have been able to foresee the specific damage that
might occur. Very few cases involving indeterminate damage have been decided by
international courts and tribunals. In the Naulilaa case, an Arbitral Panel held that
Germany should have anticipated that its attack on some Portuguese colonies would
likely expose Portugal to further turmoil in an unstable colonial context, although
Germany could not have foreseen the nature and extent of the turmoil that unfolded.
On this basis, the Panel condemned Germany to the payment of an “equitable addi-
tional compensation” established ex aequo et bono (Responsabilité de l’ Allemagne
à raison des dommages causés dans les colonies portugaises du sud de l’Afrique:
1032-3).
Another area of uncertainty exists with regards to the stringency of the due dili-
gence obligation of states under the no-harm principle. The International Court of
Justice held that in order to fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing
significant transboundary environmental harm, a state must carry out an environmen-
tal impact assessment when there is a risk of such harm and, if the risk of signifi-
cant transboundary harm is confirmed, notify and consult with any states potentially
affected (see e.g. Certain Activities and Construction of a Road, paras. 104, 168).
Where a state has acted in due diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm,
it cannot be made responsible for harm that occurs nonetheless, in which case a state
has to prevent further damages. This, however, does not result in a right for a state
to veto an activity conducted in another state. Notably, in relation to environmental
matters, the ICJ has often put emphasis on procedure, including the obligation to
conduct an environmental impact assessment, rather than substantive obligations to
refrain from a certain conduct. However, it is reasonable to assume that a state must
ultimately refrain from certain activities if that is the only way to prevent significant
harm. Nevertheless, the question of the actual content of the no-harm rule, especially
in the context of climate change where procedural processes such as consulting with
all potentially affected states is often unhelpful, will remain difficult to be answered.
States certainly are not under an obligation to stop all greenhouse gas emissions at
once (see e.g. Voigt 2015:162). The scope of their due diligence obligation depends
on their capacity. The obligation of all states under the no-harm principle is one of
employing all their best efforts to limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
activities within their jurisdiction in order to prevent and minimise injurious effects
on other states. In any event, the question whether a state has fulfilled its obligations
of due diligence must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances and the
norms of customary international law emerging from the general practice of states
accepted as law (see e.g. Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border
Area, Separate Opinion of JudgeDonoghue, para. 10). Especially, the extent to which
efforts of economic growth shape the understanding of due diligence remains unclear
and should be further researched within the concept of sustainable development.
Thus, there remain many difficulties in defining the modalities of application of
the no-harm principle in relation to climate change. Some authors such as Verheyen
(2005: 146) conclude that the vagueness of the customary no-harm rule provides for
space for interpretation. Certainly, only an authoritative interpretation by an interna-
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tional court or tribunal, or possibly by the International Law Commission, could help
disentangling the debates. In 2013, the International Law Commission has initiated
a project on the protection of the atmosphere, which could possibly address the issue
of climate change.
7.4.2 State Responsibility Following a Breach
of the No-Harm Principle
The breach of an obligation is to be sanctioned for a legal system to be meaningful.
Accordingly, it is a well-established principle of customary international law that a
state whose conduct breaches its international obligation commits an internationally
wrongful act entailing its international responsibility (ILC Articles on the Responsi-
bility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 1 and 2). Whereas the above
section discusses whether and under which assumptions greenhouse gas emissions
could amount to a breach of the no-harm rule, this section will look at the legal conse-
quences resulting from these emissions, based on the hypothetical premise that they
constitute an internationally wrongful act. It is important to bear in mind that certain
questions, such as foreseeability and multiplicity of actors, are problematic not only
concerning the characterisation of a state conduct as an internationally wrongful act,
but also to assess whether any particular state is responsible for it.
State responsibility involves two main legal consequences: the continued duty
of performance—which involves the obligation to cease a continuing internationally
wrongful act—and the obligation to make reparation for any injury (ibid, art. 28–39).
The obligations following a breach of the no-harm rule depends on the content of
this obligation in the context of climate change, which is difficult to determine. As a
consequence of the continued duty of performance, states would have to cease these
emissions that are considered an internationally wrongful act. Of greater importance
to the present discussion is the other consequence involved by the international
responsibility of a state, namely, the obligation to make good for any injury caused
by the internationallywrongful act. This obligation is generally analysed by reference
to the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the
Factory at Chorzów, according towhich “reparationmust, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situationwhichwould, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” (at 47). Accordingly, the
International LawCommission concluded that “[f]ull reparation for the injury caused
by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation
and satisfaction, either singly or in combination” (ILC Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 34). “Full reparation” is understood
as reparation for the full value of the injury. Restitution consists often in returning
something wrongfully taken, whereas compensation—in practice the most common
form of reparation—is the payment of the financial value of something that cannot
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be returned or other damage done. Satisfaction relates to measures such as apologies,
usually limited to reparation for symbolic harms.
For a claim for reparation to be successful, it is, presumably, necessary to establish
that an activity has caused harm in a way that the harmwould not have occurred with-
out the activity. The causal link between greenhouse gas emissions and its adverse
impacts is a long and complex one, which will make this argument difficult to estab-
lish. Yet, the law of state responsibility appears slightly more flexible in this regard
than many national legal systems. Rather than a strict limitation to the “direct” con-
sequence, injury in international law is extended to any consequence unless it is “too
indirect, remote, and uncertain to be appraised” (Trail Smelter Arbitration: 1931; ILC
2001: 92, para. 10). Assessing the value of the injury on the basis of which compensa-
tion should be paid would however face many difficulties. Particular damages would
have to be attributed to climate change in abstraction from the multitude of natural
or social processes in which they unfold. Things that have no inherent economic
value (e.g. human lives, health, culture, ecosystems) would have to be given one (see
chapter by Serdeczny 2018). The value of future harms would need to be discounted
at an arbitrary rate. Responsibility would then need to be allocated among states on
the basis of their respective share of the wrongdoing, despite the indeterminacy of the
threshold beyond which greenhouse gas emissions become excessive and wrongful
and the contribution of the injured state to its damages (see e.g. Reis 2011:183). This
would lead to never-ending controversies, nullifying the role of international law in
settling international disputes through pacific means.
However, such a perilous analysis may not be necessary. When concluding that
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act involves an obligation to make
“full reparation,” the International Law Commission referred to the usual practice of
international courts and tribunals dealing with relatively small quantum of damages
(ILC 2000: 2). Like in the Naulilaa case (Responsabilité de l’ Allemagne à raison
des dommages causés dans les colonies portugaises du sud de l’Afrique), larger
injuries—such as reparations for wars and other mass atrocities, for unlawful trade
measures, for nation-wide expropriation programs or for hazardous activities—have
never led to full reparation, but rather to an agreement on lump-sum compensation.
Relevant judicial decisions or international negotiations considered the capacity of
the responsible state to pay, the need of the injured parties for reparation, the possible
disproportion of the injury to the “culpability” of the responsible state, and the lim-
its of the fundaments for a collective responsibility (Mayer 2017; Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission:522, para. 22; Mayer 2016a). The International Law Commis-
sion has promoted in its work on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary
harm arising out of hazardous activities an approach to balance the interests of the
responsible and the injured party (ILC 2006: 58ff).
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7.4.3 Relationship Between the Climate Regime
and the No-Harm Principle
A possible objection to the reasoning presented in this section relates to the existence
of a treaty-based international climate law regime. Some scholars argued that the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and following treaties as well as
decisions adopted by theConference of the Parties precluded the application of norms
of international law such as the no-harm principle and the law of state responsibility
for L&D (see Zahar 2015).
Such an argument would have to be based on the doctrine of lex specialis (“special
law”). This notion prescribes that a more specific rule prevails over a general one.
However, this is only the case when there is an actual norm conflict between the
two rules. In this context, the International Law Commission stated that for the lex
specialis doctrine to apply, “it is not enough that the same subject matter is dealt with
by two provisions; there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or else
a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other” (ILC 2001:140;
see alsoMavrommatis Palestine Concessions: 31). Absent such actual inconsistency
or discernible intention to exclude the more general rule, both rules should be “be
interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations” (ILC2006:178).
There is certainly no ground to believe that states, as a whole, intended to exclude
the application of the no-harm rule when establishing the international climate law
regime. Similarly, inconsistencies between the climate regime and the customary
no-harm rule do not necessarily arise (Mayer 2014; Verheyen 2005). The ultimate
objective of the UNFCCC, to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system” (UNFCCC, art. 2), is certainly not inconsistent with the no-harm
principle, and the specific commitmentsmadeby states under successive international
climate agreements do not exclude the existence of more demanding obligations
under customary international law. The obligation to prevent significant transbound-
ary harm, insofar as it may apply to emissions of greenhouse gases, should thus be
interpreted consistently with the climate regime “so as to give rise to a single set of
compatible obligations” (ILC 2006a, para. 4). Hence, the commitments entered into
through the climate regime do not replace the no-harm rule—and vice versa –but
both simultaneously work towards bringing states closer to compliance with their
obligations arising under international law (see Mayer 2018b). In this regard a num-
ber of vulnerable states have made several statements emphasising that successive
international climate change agreements do not in principle derogate the application
of principles of general international law (see e.g. Declarations of Kiribati, Fiji, and
Nauru upon signature of the UNFCCC and other declarations upon signature of the
Paris Agreement. Arguably, the customary rule, should it apply and be triggered in
the context of climate change, requires efforts that go beyond that of the climate
regime in so far as those are not sufficient to actually prevent harm.
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7.5 The International Climate Law Regime
After this overview of customary international law, the present section turns to inter-
national obligations based on climate treaties. Several treaties have been negotiated
to address climate change, in particular the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC 1992), the Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the Paris Agreement
(2015). These treaties establish an institutional framework composed in particular by
a Secretariat and a Conference of the Parties. The Conference of the Parties adopts
decisions at its annual meetings. The treaties and decisions adopted under them form
what is often referred to as the international climate law regime.
In contrast with customary international law, the international climate law regime
is negotiated by states. More powerful states have naturally a greater say in the nego-
tiations. Diplomatic and financial pressure is often exercised on weaker states. This
political determination of the international climate law regime has significantly hin-
dered efforts of vulnerable nations to bring up the question of L&Dbecause, often, the
most powerful states, responsible for the largest share of greenhouse gas emissions,
are also the most influential in international negotiations on climate change.
In the following, a first subsection recounts the progressive mezzo voce recogni-
tion of something possibly akin to “responsibility” in the international climate law
regime. A second subsection then discusses the initiation of a workstream dedicated
to negotiations on L&D over the last decade (see also introduction by Mechler et al.
2018 and chapter by Calliari et al. 2018).
7.5.1 An Ambivalent Recognition of Responsibilities
In a declaration adopted in the Caracas Summit of the G77 in 1989, most develop-
ing states took a common position on climate change. They declared that, “[s]ince
developed countries account for the bulk of the production and consumption of envi-
ronmentally damaging substances, they should bear the main responsibility in the
search for long-term remedies for global environmental protection” (Caracas Dec-
laration, paras. II-34). Two years later, Small Island Developing States submitted
a proposal for an instrument to address “loss and damage” associated with climate
change by “compensat[ing] the most vulnerable small island and low-lying coastal
developing countries for loss and damage resulting from sea level rise” (Vanuatu
1991:2).
Yet, no provision recognising the “main responsibility” of developed states or
their obligation to “compensate” the most vulnerable nations was inserted in the
final draft of the UNFCCC, adopted at the Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro, in
June 1992. Rather, this treaty focused on forward-looking efforts to mitigate climate
change in order to “achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system” (UNFCCC, art. 2). Nevertheless, since negotiations had been
pursued on the basis of consensus, the position of developing states had been taken
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into consideration, if only marginally. Developed states agreed to the insertion of
elements of language containing constructive ambiguities which, without entirely
rejecting the demands of developing states, did not fulfil them either.
One such provision is the principle of “common but differentiated responsibili-
ties,” which was inserted in the UNFCCC and in the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development adopted at the same time (UNFCCC, art. 3; Rio Declaration, prin-
ciple 7). Including the word “responsibility” gave some satisfaction to developing
states, but theword could be understood alternatively as a ground for reparation based
on culpability or simply an obligation to cooperate based on each state’s capacities.
Thus, the position of the United States, reflected on their written statement on the
Rio Declaration, was that this concept highlighted “the special leadership role of the
developed countries, based on [their] industrial development, [their] experience with
environmental protection policies and actions, and [their] wealth, technical expertise
and capabilities.” To avoid any doubt, the United States stated on record that they
did not accept any interpretation of this concept “that would imply a recognition or
acceptance … of any international obligations or liabilities, or any diminution in the
responsibilities of developing countries” (United States 1992, para. 16).
Likewise, small island developing states secured the insertion in the UNFCCC of
a provision recognising the duty of developed states to “assist the developing coun-
try Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change
in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects” (UNFCCC, art. 4(4)). This,
again, was of a limited avail. “Meeting costs of adaptation” does not mean “meeting
[all] the costs of adaptation” (Bodansky 1993). The obligation accepted by devel-
oped states was simply one of contributing something to the costs of adaptation in
developing states.
A stream of negotiations on climate change adaptation appeared, for long, as a
potential entry point for claims for compensation for losses and damages. Since the
adoption of the UNFCCC and despite the creation of an adaptation fund under the
Kyoto Protocol, international financial assistance to adaptation in developing states
has remained limited, especially when compared to financial assistant to climate
change mitigation (Buchner et al. 2015). A growing frustration of some advocates
led them to push for a distinct conceptual frameworkwithin international negotiations
on climate change, where claims for compensation could emerge. Yet, any mention
of compensation or reparation was a non-starter.
7.5.2 The Workstream and Mechanism on Loss and Damage
A workstream on L&D was initiated in 2007 through the Bali Action Plan adopted
by a decision of the 13th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
(COP13). The Kyoto Protocol had just entered into force and, although measures
to mitigate climate change were being designed or implemented, there was a clear
sense that much more had to be done through future agreements. Accordingly, the
Bali Action Plan aimed “to launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, effec-
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tive and sustained implementation of the Convention” (UNFCCC 2007, Decision
1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, para. 1). Much attention was starting to be put on emerg-
ing economies and other developing states, whose greenhouse gas emissions were
increasing much faster than the greenhouse gas emissions of developed states could
possibly be reduced. In this context, “enhanced action on adaptation” was one of the
concessions that developed states agreed in exchange of an increase commitment of
developing states to “enhanced … action on mitigation” (UNFCCC 2007, Decision
1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, 1(b) and 1(c)).
One of the items listed under “enhanced action on adaption” in the Bali Action
Plan was “disaster reduction strategies and means to address losses and damages
associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particu-
larly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC 2007, Deci-
sion 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, para. 1(c)(iii)). The length of the concept reflected
the difficulty of its insertion in a COP decision. There was no clear understanding
on whether the two branches of this provision—“disaster reduction” and “loss and
damage”—were necessarily related, that is, whether losses and damages would nec-
essarily stem from (sudden-onset) disasters. Nor were there any clear understanding
of the differences between “loss,” “damage,” “impacts,” and the “adverse effects of
climate change.” Yet, a great achievement of the Bali Action Plan was the insertion
of a provision hinting to the obligation of developed states to pay reparation for the
injury caused by excessive greenhouse gas emissions.
The Bali Action Plan initiated a new stream of negotiations. However, this was
largely side-lined, in the following years, by intense negotiations on climate change
mitigation and the reluctance of developed states to virtually anything (Warner and
Zakieldeen 2012:4). Not much had been achieved when, 3 years later, the Cancún
Agreements recognised “the need to strengthen international cooperation and exper-
tise in order to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse
effects of climate change, including impacts related to extreme weather events and
slow onset events” (UNFCCC 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, para. 25).
The Cancún Agreements created a “work programme” were negotiations could
be pursued. Thematic areas were defined in 2011 and further explored in 2012
(UNFCCC 2011, Decision 7/CP.17, paras. 6–15; UNFCCC 2012, Decision 3/CP.18).
More specifically, COP18 expressed a common desire “to enhance action on address-
ing loss and damage” (UNFCCC 2012, Decision 3/CP.18, para. 6). The following
year, COP19 established the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Dam-
age (WIM), a subsidiary body of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2013, Decision 2/CP.19).
The objective of the WIM was to “fulfil the role under the Convention of promoting
the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage … in a comprehen-
sive, integrated and coherent manner,” including through “enhancing knowledge
and understanding,” “strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and syner-
gies among relevant stakeholders,” and “enhancing action and support, including
finance, technology and capacity-building, to address loss and damage” (UNFCCC
2013, Decision 2/CP.19, para. 5). More specific arrangements were made at COP20,
including the composition of the Executive Committee of the WIM, basic rules on
procedure, and a 2-year workplan (UNFCCC 2014, Decision 2/CP.20, para. 5). This
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2-year workplan was followed by a “five-year rolling workplan” adopted at COP22
(UNFCCC 2016, Decision 3/CP.22).
The inclusion of an article on L&D in the Paris Agreementwas another ambiguous
concession to developing states. Through Article 8, the Parties of the Paris Agree-
ment “recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and
damage … and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and
damage” (Paris Agreement, art. 8(1)). It places the WIM under the “authority and
guidance” of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to the Paris Agreement (Paris Agreement, art. 8(2)). It also highlights some areas
of cooperation and facilitation such as on “early warning systems,” “emergency
preparedness,” “slow onset events” and “events that may involve irreversible and
permanent loss and damage” (Paris Agreement, art. 8(4)). Yet, Article 8 does not
imply any substantive international legal obligation beyond a vague statement that
the Parties “should enhance understanding, action and support … as appropriate, on
a cooperative and facilitate basis with respect to loss and damage associated with
the adverse effects of climate change” (Paris Agreement, art. 8(3)). In that sense,
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement does not really go further than Article 4(4) of the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Even such provision, however, was only inserted in the treaty after hard-fought
negotiations andwas accompanied by a caveat. COP21, in its decision on the adoption
of the Paris Agreement, asserted that “Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve
or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” (UNFCCC 2015, Decision
1/CP.21, para. 51). The legal nature of COP decisions has been discussed extensively
by scholars (see e.g. Mace and Verheyen 2016; Verheyen 2005:67ff; Brunnée 2002;
Gehring 2007; Churchill andUlfstein 2000:639). However, it only states the obvious:
nothing in Article 8 could be taken to imply any liability or compensation, as the
language is weak and the concepts are undefined. Moreover, it goes without saying
that this does not exclude the possible applicability of customary international law
and possible arguments for state liability that stem from an alleged breach of the
no-harm principle.
Ten years after the initiation of a workstream on L&D, few concrete steps have
been taken. Instead, a work programme led to a 2-year workplan which led to a 5-
year rolling workplan. The concept of L&D became more prominent in international
negotiations on climate change but no agreement was reached on how to implement
it. COP21 decision on the adoption of the Paris Agreement requested that the WIM
establish a “clearing house for risk transfer” and a “task force … to develop recom-
mendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement
related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC 2015, decision 1/CP.21,
paras. 48 and 49). These developments suggest a growing role of theWIM in sharing
good practices and issuing recommendations, rather than providing compensation. It
may thus replicate the evolution of the concept of adaptation in international negotia-
tions on climate change, from claims for remedies for thewrongs caused by excessive
greenhouse gas emissions in industrialised states, to a regime of international over-
sight on national measures supported only very partially by insufficient international
financial support.
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7.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter has given an overview over the potential remedies in law to L&D.
National laws have started to address this issue, including public law litigation forc-
ing governments to address L&D in mitigation and adaptation efforts and private
law litigation trying to hold private actors responsible for excessive greenhouse
gas emissions. While most legal systems could theoretically be applied to exces-
sive greenhouse gas emissions, their potential has not yet been fully recognised by
national courts. The main caveat is the reluctance of courts to decide on something
they perceive as a political decision: whether these emissions are falling within the
competence of the court to decide. Human rights on the other hand do recognise
their importance to the discourse relating to L&D. However, conceptual weaknesses
regarding their application and enforcement make them an unlikely forum to address
L&D. The enforcement of even these vague obligations is often reliant on their
implementation in national laws and, on the international level, of the political will
to exercise pressure on high emitting states.
We have also reviewed the applicability of the customary obligation not to cause
serious environmental harm to other states and the viability of the climate change
treaties to address L&D. While the no-harm rule is generally accepted as binding
in international law, it remains unclear whether and, even more, how it applies to
climate change. In the case of litigation before an international court or tribunal, it
would be faced with a myriad of technical difficulties, not least the issue of causality
and the required diligence to prevent or minimise harm. Certainly, the obligations
under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement do not replace the
obligations under customary international law, but they may shape the understand-
ing of what is to be considered as “best possible efforts” required under customary
international law. Even where an international wrongful act is considered, difficulties
remain to determine the quantum of remedies. The breach of an obligation entails
the obligation to cease the wrongful act, if it is continuing, and to make good for
damages it caused. However, how to disentangle the injury caused through climate
change and the harm caused due to other socio-economic factors in the state con-
cerned will remain difficult. In any event, it is unlikely that such a case would go
before an international court or tribunal, as states would be reluctant to agree to their
jurisdiction. Treaties, on the other hand, mostly provide for the jurisdiction of an
international court or tribunal. However, it has become clear in their negotiation his-
tory that states are reluctant to accept legal responsibility. They thus fail to establish
clear rules can be breached by parties.
Table 7.1 summarises the common legal approaches to climate change induced
losses and damages and shortly highlights the main challenges to their efficacy and
potential remedies to those challenges. The table is only supposed to serve as a
potential starting point for further research and in no way intends to be complete or
perfect in any way.
While the previous analysis of the available means to address L&D through the
legal framework does not seempromising for real change, it is important to notice that
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Table 7.1 Legal responses, their challenges and potential next steps
National laws
Public law litigation Private law litigation
Rationale States have obligations to protect their citizens from the
adverse effects of climate change
Companies are responsible
for damages from climate
change and the costs of
remedial action
Challenges Dismissal based on lack of
legal causality
Dismissal based on political
nature of claim, international
treaties not directly
applicable to national courts
Dismissal based on lack of
legal causality, complexity
and multiplicity of causation
Potential remedy Broader interpretation of
causality; progress in
attribution science
New or amendment of
existing laws
Broader interpretation of
causality; progress in
attribution science. New or
amendment of existing laws
Regional and international human rights law
Various human rights to life and safety Refugee law
Rationale States have an obligation to ensure health and safety of
people within their jurisdiction
States have an obligation to
grant asylum to climate
refugees
Challenges Cases are likely to be
dismissed based on lack of
legal causality
States have a “margin of
appreciation” of human rights
No sufficient legal basis
Potential remedy Courts apply a broader
interpretation of causality
requirements
Amending regional and
international human rights
treaties
Enhanced negotiation and
work on international levels
such as via the Platform on
Disaster Displacement
Customary international law
Rationale States have a customary obligation not to harm other states and therefore must refrain from
emitting greenhouse gases that cause harm to other states
Challenges States are unlikely to agree to the jurisdiction of the ICJ or an
international tribunal
Content of the no-harm rule
relating to climate change is
unclear and not specific
enough
Potential remedy Addressing fears of escalating responsibility; limiting
jurisdiction to specific problems
ICJ or international tribunal
issues judgment or advisory
opinion on that matter; further
research on the relationship
between climate regime and
the customary no-harm rule;
further research on required
due diligence, especially
relating to sustainable
development
Climate change regime
Rationale States that excessively emit greenhouse gases are in breach of international treaties relating
to the UN climate convention
Challenges Obligations are not clear and specific enough
Potential remedy Addressing fears of escalating responsibility; amending
convention treaty text
Enhanced negotiations and
work on the international
level, such as through the
WIM
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the behaviour of states is not only motivated by binding, enforceable law. So-called
soft law, i.e. law that is not legally binding, has often proved to be more effective
than binding, enforceable international law. Although the pace of the progress of the
WIM workstream can be frustrating, it shows that the issue of L&D is being picked
up by the political bodies.
Previous treaties and institutions have developed from political bodies and stren-
uous negotiations—this evolution might also come true for the issue of L&D. More-
over, it seems that efforts at the national levels are increasing. While the overwhelm-
ing amount of the cases have been dismissed, it shows that public awareness is
increasing. Mostly, it is not the science that is failing, it is the political will of the
states. Understandably, what they fear is escalating responsibility for historic and
present emissions. However, Gsottbauer et al. (2017) argue that a liability regime can
under certain circumstances indeed promote precaution to prevent L&D. Moreover,
law is flexible and can be adapted to the specific concerns of the states—provided
there is political will to negotiation (see also Lees 2016). Thus, while legal responses
to climate change induced L&D might not be as clear now, they probably will be at
a later point in time.
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Chapter 8
Non-economic Loss and Damage
and the Warsaw International
Mechanism
Olivia Serdeczny
Abstract Non-economic Loss and Damage (NELD) forms a distinct theme in the
documents outlining both the initial 2-year workplan that concluded in 2017 and the
future work areas as outlined in the next 5-year rolling workplan of the Executive
Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM
Excom). NELD refers to the climate-related losses of items both material and non-
material that are not commonly traded in the market, but whose loss is still experi-
enced as such by those affected. Examples of NELD include loss of cultural identity,
sacred places, human health and lives. Within the context of the WIM the goal is
to raise awareness of the kinds of NELD that occur and, for an expert group, to
“develop inputs and recommendations to enhance data on and knowledge of reduc-
ing the risk of and addressing non-economic losses” (UNFCCC Secretariat 2014).
Initial analysis shows that the two main characteristics of non-economic values are
their context-dependence and their incommensurability. These attributes need to be
preserved and respected when integrating measures to (i) avoid the risk and (ii)
address NELD by a central mechanism under the UNFCCC. While (i) will rely on
integrating NELD into existing comprehensive risk management approaches, (ii)
requires thorough understanding of lost values and the functions they fulfilled for
those affected.
Keywords Loss and Damage · Values · Assessment · Justice
8.1 Introduction
Climate change affects people and their environments in multiple adverse ways.
Extreme heat waves like the Central Asian one in 2010 damage agricultural crops and
undermine food security (Barriopedro et al. 2011); sea-level rise endangers coastal
infrastructure and related economic activities such as tourism and transport (Wong
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et al. 2014); diseases like malaria spread into previously unaffected regions posing
novel health risks (Siraj et al. 2014).Many of these impacts of climate change can and
have been quantified andmonetised. A common example ofmonetised and aggregate
impact assessments is the social cost of carbon. It measures the economic effects of
climate change as an aggregate of changes in net agricultural productivity, human
health, property damages and wider economic effects from, e.g., increased flood
risk, and changes in energy system costs per unit of emitted carbon (United States
Environmental Protection Agency 2015). The social cost of carbon thus derived is
used to calculate the benefits of mitigation and adaptation policies and to weigh those
against the costs of climate policies to arrive at an optimal level of mitigation and
adaptation.
However—as has long been recognised (e.g. IPCC 1996:9; Tol 2005)—not all the
negative consequences of climate change have been captured in the assessments of
the social cost of carbon, as well as other assessments that rely either on qualitative
or quantified data. For example, mental distress has been observed at the individual
level following forced relocation due to deteriorating rural livelihoods. The distress
has been linked to such losses as loss of social networks or physical surroundings
that provided for a feeling of familiarity and belonging (Tschakert et al. 2013). At the
collective level, the disruption of informal networks as a consequence of migration
can cause losses in the form of a population´s diminished capacity to cope with
continued climate impacts, further increasing the toll of climate change (Olsson et al.
2014). The effects of such often intangible losses on human wellbeing are often hard
to measure and are rarely included in estimates of observed and projected climate
impacts, particularly where aggregates are sought. This can be considered a serious
limitation. The fact that values other than economic are of substantive importance for
people is evidenced in livelihood decisions that involve trade-offs to the benefit of
retaining social or cultural capital at the cost of potential economic gains. An example
of such decisions are cases where migration is desisted despite its expected positive
effects on income (Bebbington 1999). There is thus good reason to pay attention to
non-economic values and to integrate them into policies that may lead to or prevent
their losses if the overall goal is to safeguard and protect human well-being. Notably,
adjustments have been made to earlier economic assessments of climate impacts in
order to account for non-market losses. Nordhaus (2014), for example, reports an
adjustment of 25% of the monetised damages to reflect non-monetised impacts.1
The concept of NELD takes into focus the dimensions of climate change impacts
that are hard to quantify and whose value cannot easily be determined through the
market. The term non-economic losses, which is often used interchangeably with
non-economic losses and damages, originates from medical malpractice law. Meth-
ods for the assessment and expression of non-economic values inmonetary units have
been developed but remain controversial (see Box 8.1). Non-market losses might be
a more adequate description, which, however, has not been adopted in the policy-
1It should be noted, however, that his list of non-monetised impacts includes extreme events, catas-
trophic events that are inherently difficult to model, and some other which are not considered NELD
under the UNFCCC, as explained below.
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process. In the following, the term of non-economic losses is used synonymously
with non-market losses. Non-economic values are understood to be the object of
non-economic losses.
In recognition of the importance that non-economic values hold particularly for
vulnerable developing countries, NELD has been included in the workplan of the
Warsaw International Mechanism as a specific work area (UNFCCC Secretariat
2014). While not spelled out as such, the two central tasks that work under the
WIM will be faced with concerning NELD are the development of instruments
(i) to avoid the risk of non-economic losses occurring ex ante and (ii) to respond
to unavoided losses ex post. A rich body of knowledge can be drawn upon when
developing approaches to both these tasks. Avoiding or reducing the risk of non-
economic losses will most likely rely on the integration of the value of potential
non-economic losses into comprehensive risk management. Literature on adequate
assessment methods and participatory approaches to adaptation planning is available
in this regard, including on the integration ofNELD intowider economic assessments
and the drawbacks of such integration. Addressing unavoided losses, in turn, raises
questions of justice and questions of fair remedy (Wallimann-Helmer 2015) that
require further critical academic debate but whose solutions ultimately need to be
politically negotiated.
8.2 NELD—Causal Pathways and Examples
Impacts related to NELD as reported in the literature are direct or indirect effects of
climate-related changes that were experienced as adverse by those affected. While
they are triggered by climate-related environmental changes, they are always medi-
ated by social factors that drive the vulnerability of a human system to environmental
stressors, and by cultural factors that provide the context in which losses are expe-
rienced as such. The social and cultural factors notwithstanding, direct and indirect
causal pathways can be identified which show how NELD impacts are caused by
climate change.
NELD can be a direct consequence of climate change, for example, when losses
are incurred due to physical damage of natural environments or cultural sites. High
coral reef mortality due to rising sea-surface temperatures, as observed at a large
scale during the 2015/2016 El Nino event (Eakin et al. 2016) is one such example
of how climate change may directly cause non-economic loss of biodiversity in the
future, adding to the sizeable toll of economic losses associated with the loss of
biodiversity and other ecological functions (e.g. TEEB 2010). Loss of territory due
to sea-level rise presents another way in which climate change may lead to NELD
(Albert et al. 2016). Indeed, projections over two millennia show that under 3 °C
global mean warming 3–12 countries will have lost more than half of their territory
due to sea-level rise (Marzeion and Levermann 2014). Non-economic losses and
damages directly related to climate change are often compounded by human activity
such as marine pollution and unsustainable groundwater extraction.
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Examples of indirectly induced NELD change include adverse impacts on human
health following the contamination of freshwater due to sea level rise or heavy flood-
ing (Nunn 2009). Loss of sense of place, traditional knowledge or cultural iden-
tity are often indirect consequences of climate change if migration is necessary for
populations or individuals to safeguard their survival (see chapter by Heslin et al.
2018). Migration is frequently framed as a form of adaptation deliberately chosen by
migrants (Tacoli 2009). However, indirect non-economic losses are often incurred
involuntarily as negative side-effects of adaptation. For example, following heavy
flooding and submersion of informal housing in Douala, Cameroon a government
official was quoted saying: “We think the only way to put an end to such catastrophe
in the future is to demolish and force people out of these risky and vulnerable zones”
(Ngalame 2015). While such decisions are certain to avoid some non-economic
losses, most notably loss of human lives, it may also lead to loss of social cohesion
and agency. This shows how preserving non-economic values is complicated in sit-
uations of necessary trade-offs, which often occur in the context of climate change
and resource scarcity.
The first three reports that have been published on NELD yield a catalogue
of diverse recorded types of NELD that are summarised and categorised in
Table 8.1/Fig. 8.1. (UNFCCC 2013a—same as Fankhauser and Dietz 2014; Morris-
sey and Oliver-Smith 2013; Andrei et al. 2015). The studies rely either on literature
review (UNFCCC 2013) expert knowledge (Morrissey and Oliver-Smith 2013) or
interviews (Andrei et al. 2015).
All authors referenced in Table 8.1/Fig. 8.1 stress that presented types and related
cases are often inter-related with economic losses. Further, it is stressed that the
lists provided are non-exhaustive: Climate impacts in other regional settings and
cultural value systems can in principle result in different and additional types of
NELD than those listed here, depending on respective cultural values. Reporting
bias in the literature maymean that NELD—both types and instances—go unnoticed
either because they are not comprehensively investigated or because losses in regions
where they occur are not assessed. This has led to calls for a stronger involvement
of qualitative climate impact research (Tschakert 2015).
8.3 Conceptualising NELD
In order to better understandwhy such highly diverse NELD as displayed in Table 8.1
is grouped under one activity area under the WIM it is helpful to direct attention
at the shared attributes of non-economic values: (i) context-dependence and (ii)
incommensurability, i.e. the lack of a common unit of measurement (see below).
These attributes also shed light on someof the challenges thatNELDpose to decision-
and policy-making, particularly in the centralised setting of the UNFCCC.
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Table 8.1 NELD impacts reported in the literature
UNFCCC (2013)/Fankhauser
and Dietz 2014 (Table 2)
Morrissey and Oliver-Smith
(2013) (Fig. 1)
Andrei et al. (2015)
Loss of life Loss of life
Health Adverse health impacts Physical and psychological
well-being
Human mobility (Dignity;
Security; Agency)
Territory (Sovereignty; Sense
of place)
Territory abandonment
Cultural heritage
(Social cohesion, Identity)
Indigenous knowledge (Social
cohesion, Identity)
Decline of indigenous
knowledge
Biodiversity Biodiversity loss Biodiversity/species
Ecosystem services Ecosystem services
Destruction of cultural sites
Loss of culturally important
landscapes
Habitat destruction
Loss of identity and ability to
solve problems collectively
Loss of knowledge/ways of
thinking that are part of lost
livelihood systems
Social cohesion, peacefully
functioning society
Education
Traditions/religion/customs
Social bonds/relations
Note Terms in parentheses refer to terms listed as descriptions in UNFCCC 2013 rather than as
losses themselves. Source Adapted from Serdeczny et al. (2016b)
8.3.1 Context-Dependence
Most non-economic values are the result of specific human-environment interactions.
This renders them highly context-dependent. For example, the loss of biodiversity
will be experienced differently by a community whose culture is built around a
particular natural ecosystem than by a community that does not relate to this ecosys-
tem. Kirsch (2001) in his analysis of the legal struggle for compensation for “cul-
ture loss” suffered by Marshall Islanders following nuclear weapons testing by the
United States, reports the specific value that land holds in different contexts. Quoting
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Biodiversity
Intrinsic Values
Dignity (human mobility)
Intrinsic value of biodiversity
Physical and mental well-being
Loss of culturally 
important landscapes
Territory
Habitat destruc?on 
(homes)
Places
Social cohesion, peacefully func?oning 
society
Security (human mobility)
Adverse health impact Health
Physical and mental well-being
Ability to solve problems collec?vely
Ecosystem Service
Sovereignty (territory)
Educa?on
Agency
Intrinsic Instrumental
Loss of produc?ve land
Produc?on Sites
Iden?ty (Knowing/Belonging)
Communal Sites
Destruc?on of cultural 
sites
Cultural heritage
Artefacts
Habitat destruc?on
(markets,religious 
sites)
material
non-material
Tradi?ons/religion/customs
Loss of knowledge/ways of thinking
Decline of (indigenous) knowledge
Indigenous and local knowledge
Loss of iden?ty   Social bonds/rela?ons
Sense of Place (territory)
Sources: ADB 2015; Morrissey&Oliver-Smith 2013; Fankhauser et al.2014
Biodiversity/Species
Biodiversity loss
Loss of life
Human Life
Ecosystem services
Ecosystem Services
Fig. 8.1 Cases and categories of NELD as reported in the literature published by 2015. Source
Serdeczny et al. (2016b)
the anthropologist and Enewetak ethnographer Carucci in his testimony before the
Nuclear Claims Tribunal Kirsch writes:
He [Carucci] noted that Americans move on average six times during their lifetimes and treat
land as a commodity, ‘something that is used, purchased and sold.’ Relationships to place
are temporary, and land is ‘something that one can buy, utilize for a short period of time,
and pass on.’ Our attachment to place, in Carucci’s estimation, is ‘quite modest.’ In contrast,
the Marshallese regard land as a ‘different kind of entity,’ an element ‘of one’s very person’
and an ‘integral part of who people are and how they situate themselves in the world.’ Their
‘sense of self, both personal and cultural, is deeply embedded in a piece of land,’ their weto
or land parcel (Kirsch 2001:173).
Similarly, Morrissey and Oliver Smith (2013) relate the high value of glaciers
to Andean villagers whose culture is composed of a system of traditional knowl-
edge and cultural narratives around these glaciers. Such context-dependence makes
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communication of the relevance of non-economic values for those affected by their
potential loss particularly challenging. Instruments aimed at avoiding or respond-
ing to non-economic losses within a centralised setting like the UNFCCC need to
be able to accommodate such context-dependence of non-economic values. Rather
than relying on a finite set of indicators, standardised assessment rules could deter-
mine what would be officially recognized as loss of non-economic values that merits
international attention and action (Serdeczny et al. 2016a).
8.3.2 Incommensurability
Most non-economic values are considered to be incommensurable. According to
(Chang 2013) “[p]erhaps the most frequently recurring idea that falls under the label
‘the incommensurability of values’ is that values lack a commonunit ofmeasurement”
(p. 5). Thismeans thatwhile individual itemsmight be comparable in terms of priority
or importance ranking or according to an imprecise unit, they cannot be measured
on one unitary scale. In contrast, if all values could be expressed by one unitary unit,
then the difference between them would be merely one of quantity. Chang illustrates
such a case:
For example, if the value of one’s child can be measured by the same unit that measures the
value of a beach vacation, then our attitudes toward the loss of value of each should be a
matter of degree. Insofar as our practical attitudes are driven by the value of their objects,
our attitudes toward our children should differ from our attitudes toward beach vacations
only in quantity, not in quality. (Chang 2013: 6)
A standard unitary unit of value is a monetary numéraire. Monetisation, as the
process of assigning monetary values, effectively puts all values on one scale and
expresses their difference as one in quantity.Which values are considered incommen-
surable is culturally contingent and may change over time. For example, while the
value of ecosystems is frequently expressed in monetary terms (Sukhdev et al. 2014),
some raise objections to such valuation and question the benefits of monetisation for
biodiversity conservation (e.g. Gomez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Perez 2011).
Conceptually speaking monetisation as a valuation technique is thus not com-
patible with the incommensurability of value. Consequently, if incommensurability
of non-economic values is respected then alternative means of valuation, as well as
communication and weighting of values are needed. This presents a challenge to
decision-making particularly in systems where cost-benefit analyses are drawn upon
as the primary method for decision-making (see Box 8.1).
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Box 8.1 Incommensurability and economic valuation
Onewayof integrating non-economic valueswith decision-making that is based on cost-
benefit analyses is through the economic valuation or monetisation of non-economic
values. Methods to do so exist, primarily through revealed preference, which trace
consumer behaviour that indirectly relates to a non-economic good (e.g. health expen-
ditures), or stated preference, where respondents are asked how much they would be
willing to pay to preserve a certain good or how much they would be willing to accept
in compensation for the loss of a good. The application of such methods is not without
controversy and has been subject to much debate and scrutiny (UNFCCC 2013a).
Methodological issues—and moral concerns regarding cost-benefit analyses in gener-
al—aside, it is worth noting that assigning monetary value to incommensurable goods
rests on a number of assumptions which themselves may be in conflict with values
or interests in different cultural and political contexts. Assuming that a price can be
assigned to certain goods or services may bereave them of what constitutes their value,
namely the very fact that they cannot be bought or sold. The value of friendship is
an example of such constitutive incommensurability (O´Neill 2001). Climate change
affects livelihoods across cultures, who may have differing understandings of which
values are undermined by the idea of assigning them market value; the application
of economic valuation effectively imposes one interpretation, namely that there is no
constitutive incommensurability, over any others. Further, the application of economic
valuation masks questions of power and rights to ownership, which are often at the
basis of conflicting values and are of high relevance for decision-making. While it is
not the purpose of economic valuation to solve these issues, the problem is that “its
application assumes that an answer has already been given” (O´Neill 2001:1868). Thus,
while economic valuationmay present a useful way of integrating non-economic values
into cost-benefit analyses, this should be done critically and without diverting attention
away from questions that require political and public deliberation.
Alternative approaches to integrating NELs into cost-benefit analyses could be further
explored. For example, in analogy to attempts of incorporating a rights-based approach
into cost-benefit analyses (Lowry and Peterson 2012), non-economic values could be
integrated into cost-benefit analyses through the establishment of safeguards or output
filters. In the case of output filters, any decisions that are based on cost-benefit analyses
are excluded if they violate certain rights (or losses), e.g. the right to bodily integrity
(or loss of life). However, it should be noted that this might be challenging to apply
for all non-economic values in the context of climate change, resource scarcity and the
virtually unavoidable risks that come with any course of action.
8.4 Developing Solutions
The role of the WIM in promoting instruments to address NELD is still evolving.
In order to get some orientation regarding the scope and level of implementation of
instruments under the WIM it is helpful to review the three function of the WIM as
outlined in Decision 3/CP.18: (a) Enhancing knowledge and understanding of com-
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prehensive risk management approaches to address Loss and Damage; (b) Strength-
ening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholders;
(c) Enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and capacity build-
ing (UNFCCC 2012).With regards to NELD, function (a) is being addressed through
the establishment of an expert group,2 which will likely also positively affect fulfil-
ment of function (b). Function (c) has not yet been addressed. Further elaboration
on this function, agreed upon according to Decision 2/CP.19 (UNFCCC 2013b), (c)
can offer some insights on what might be expected in the future and is worth quoting
in full length:
i. Providing technical support and guidance on approaches to address loss and
damage associated with climate change impacts, including extreme events and
slow onset events;
ii. Providing information and recommendations for consideration by the Confer-
ence of the Parties when providing guidance relevant to reducing the risks of loss
and damage and, where necessary, addressing loss and damage, including to the
operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention, as appropriate;
iii. Facilitating the mobilization and securing of expertise, and enhancement of sup-
port, including finance, technology and capacity-building, to strengthen existing
approaches and, where necessary, facilitate the development and implementa-
tion of additional approaches to address loss and damage associatedwith climate
change impacts, including extremeweather events and slow onset events; (Deci-
sion 2/CP.19)
As is evidenced in the reference to the financial mechanism of the Convention,
guidance and potential standards developed under the WIM can be expected to have
consequences for countries affected by losses anddamages, and by extensionsNELD.
Any financial mechanism is likely to rely on standardised assessment criteria for
deciding which projects to fund. This is for example the case for the Green Climate
Fund, where a set of criteria and sub-criteria has been developed to guide the rating
of project proposals (Green Climate Fund 2014). It is open to question whether con-
sideration of NELD will ever precipitate into concrete rules under which conditions
pre-determined levels of support will be granted explicitly for addressing NELD. In
either case, it is clear that recommendations developed under theWIM in the coming
years are likely to be of lasting effect for the treatment of NELD under the UNFCCC.
Placed under theUNFCCC,NELD is an area of concern for the international com-
munity and responses will be guided by the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility. This means that considerations of fair burden sharing need to accom-
pany the development and implementation of both measures to avoid risks linked
to NELD and measures to respond to unavoided NELD impacts. In the context of
2See http://unfccc.int/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_executive_committee/ite
ms/9694.php.
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such considerations, questions of adequate scales and conditions for support and fair
remedy will be particularly relevant. Insights into the application of comprehensive
risk management and the integration of non-economic values into decision-making
can guide the development of practical guidelines for implementation of preventive
measures. The questions of fair responses to unavoided NELD impacts as well as
fair burden sharing and appropriate scales of support for preventive measures can be
further clarified academically but their response is of ultimately political nature.
8.4.1 Avoiding and Reducing NELD
The literature on comprehensive risk management and decision making offers valu-
able insights into means of integrating non-economic values into decision-making
processes (see also Box 8.1). The technical paper on NELD commissioned by
the UNFCCC lists a number of methods to valuation of non-economic values
and their integration into decision-making. Proposed methods are economic valu-
ation, multi-criteria decision analysis, composite risk indices and qualitative and
semi-quantitative methods (UNFCCC 2013a). The choice of method will ultimately
depend on scale and availability of resources. While the active involvement and
empowerment of local communities has been suggested as the preferable mode of
work with non-economic values (NELD 2015), the qualitative methods that go with
such approaches often hinder large coverage and comparability between cases.
On a country-basis, some countries have started to implement policy measures
safeguarding non-economic values. Faced with the prospect of losing large parts of
inhabitable land, the State of Kiribati has embarked on a programme of “migration
with dignity”, which entails vocational training and support for earlymigrants (Office
of the President Republic of Kiribati 2016). In a situation of future necessity, this
programme introduces an element of choice through the long-term planning horizon
provided to individuals or communities, as well as institutional support. While no
explicit reference is made to the preservation of agency, community ties and social
cohesion, it is clear that such a programme is well suited to preserve such values
that might otherwise be lost in the process of forced and unplanned migration. The
example of Kiribati illustrates how knowledge and understanding of non-economic
values can shape policies aimed at avoiding the risks of climate change at large: If
relocation will have to be an option, then a better understanding of the values that
people care for can guide policies in support of preserving these values. Notably
neither quantification nor monetisation are necessary for the approach chosen by
Kiribati.
Related to the question of support for the implementation of comprehensive risk
management measures, it is not clear whether standards will be developed to account
for the protection of NELD. While Loss and Damage is not treated under the Green
Climate Fund, criteria developed to guide funding decisions show that environmen-
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tal and social co-benefits, which in many cases include non-economic values, are
considered alongside criteria of economic efficiency (Green Climate Fund 2014). It
is, however, not clear how they are weighted with other criteria or what an appropri-
ate weighting would be. More research is also needed on the costs that come with
the integration of NELD into preventive planning. Where integration is cost-neutral,
protection of NELD would be a no-regret strategy and could be implemented by
default.
8.4.2 Responding to Unavoided NELD
It needs to be expected that not all NELD can and will be avoided. This is so par-
ticularly because adaptation to climate change brings with it negative side-effects
which can be considered as losses and damages (Warner and Geest 2013; see intro-
duction by Mechler et al. 2018). Many of the negative side-effects from adaptation
are non-economic in kind. The example of Kiribati is a case in point, where despite
careful measures, sense of place and territory are likely to be lost: With reference
to census according to which most I-Kiribati want to remain on their islands (Uan
2016), officials explicitly frame migration as a last resort (Office of the President
Republic of Kiribati 2016).
Having said this, not all non-economic values will necessarily continue to be per-
ceived as important or mourned by those affected. As people adapt to gradually or
abruptly changing environments it can be expected that their value preferences may
shift as well (Tschakert 2016). Fishermen, for example, losing their traditional liveli-
hoods may find new identities in alternative means of income and social exchange:
new goals and preferences in their lives will likely emerge. However, it is open to
question which of the lost values will continue to be mourned by those affected in
the future and which will prove to be temporary. Nor is it clear whether temporarily
mourned losses, which could have been avoided had climate change been avoided,
can simply be ignored or whether they too merit some form of fair remedy. After all,
those affected are forced to shift to new goals rather than freely choosing to do so.
Questions of what constitutes a fair remedy to unavoided non-economic losses
touch on the means and instruments that are available as responses as well as on
questions of who bears the duty to remedy. Bracketing the question of identifying
the duty bearer it is helpful to approach non-economic values with Goodin´s theories
of compensation (Goodin 1989). Goodin distinguishes between means replacing
compensation, where people are provided with the means to pursue the same ends
that have been lost and ends-displacing compensation, where people are enabled “to
pursue some other ends in a way that leaves them subjectively as well off overall
as they would have been had they not suffered the loss at all” (Goodin 1989:60). In
the case of irreplaceable losses where no substitute can be found, means replacing
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compensation is not possible, leaving ends-displacing compensation as the only
option. Goodin argues for the moral superiority of means replacing compensation
as it does not forcibly interfere with the “unity and coherence in a person´s life”
(Goodin 1989:68) and does not undermine a person´s autonomy. In contrast, in
ends-displacing compensation, people are forced to shift their goals and pursue new
ends, as if their preferences and goals were “one undifferentiated mass” (Goodin
1989:67).
For responses to NELD this means that ways should be sought that allow those
affected to pursue the same goals as prior to the loss. Whether and how exactly this
can be achieved will depend on the loss in question as some but not all incommen-
surable values are irreplaceable. Designing responses to unavoided NELD impacts
will consequently require a thorough understanding of the function that a lost value
had for those affected by its loss. For example, if a community is forced to relocate
and is faced with loss of traditional knowledge then locations for relocation could be
sought which allow asmuch of the knowledge to still be applied as possible. Granting
migrants the rights needed to re-establish their livelihoods according to their own
preferences would be another way of effective means-replacement in order to enable
the pursuit of lost ends.
In cases where no substitute for what has been lost is conceivable, as might for
example be the case with loss of lives or sacred places, it is important to acknowledge
that ends-displacing compensation does not legitimise the policy that led to this
loss (Goodin 1989:73). This does not imply that ends-displacing compensation, as
for example monetary compensation for irreplaceable goods, should be avoided.
Indeed, claims for compensation for culture loss as quoted by (Kirsch 2001) show
that communities affected by such losses seek justice through the form of monetary
recompense despite the perceived incommensurability of culture which conceptually
prohibits its economic valuation. This might appear as conceptual inconsistency or
dishonesty by those affected. However, as O´Neill (2001) argues, forward-looking
economic valuations are distinct from backward-looking ones in that the latter are
associated with notions of rectificatory justice whereas the former are not. Along
these lines, monetary compensation for irreplaceable or incommensurable goods
does not imply that those goods are replaced or that their value can be expressed
on a single scale. Rather, ends-displacing compensation is an aspect of rectificatory
justice and “surely better than nothing” (Goodin 1989:73), but it does not right a
wrong. In the context of climate policy this translates into the clear preference that
needs to be given to measures that prevent the risk of losses and damages, even if
the difference between avoiding and compensating were cost-neutral. Finally, where
losses are irreplaceble and require that those affected are forced to shift their goals,
as will be the case with many of the non-economic values already observed and
projected, it needs to be acknowledged that a residue of moral wrong will remain.
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8.5 Conclusions
The concept of NELD spans a wide range of adverse effects of climate change
that affect both human wellbeing and natural systems. Some of these effects are
standardly considered in public policies on climate change (e.g. adverse effects on
human health or human life) while others (e.g. loss of cultural heritage or social
networks) remain less well reflected. With the particular focus now placed on NELD
under the UNFCCC, the opportunity arises to widen the scope of current approaches
and design comprehensive policies that accommodate the dimension of incommen-
surable values at risk from climate change and that are sensitive to context.
Debates on the most adequate and effective valuation methods, in particular con-
troversies around economic valuation, are likely to continue in the context of NELD.
Here, it will be important to not “jump the gun” and consider to which ends data and
information on non-economic valueswill be needed. In cases of preventivemeasures,
a deep understanding of the values and their functions for well-being that should be
preserved despite choices that threaten these values and that are limited by resource
availability, such as the choice to relocate despite high sense of place, is needed
for an effective design of policies. The economic value of community ties, sense
of place or traditional cultures would add little information to the design of such
policies. Similarly, the identification of possibilities for means-replacing compensa-
tion will not rely on the monetary value of what has been lost but of the goals and
ends that were pursued by those affected by NELD. What is, however, needed and
currently lacking are economic estimates of the costs of preventing NELD impacts
and risks. These will also inform the debate on adequate scales of international sup-
port and burden sharing that have not been addressed in this chapter (see chapter by
Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018).
Raising awareness on NELD and giving it appropriate weight in decision-making
processes will continue to be a challenge. This is particularly the case in the inter-
national setting of the UNFCCC where different cultures are represented and where
decisions on funding and support will likely rely on standardised criteria and cen-
tralised decision-making. The development of dedicated efforts to integrate NELD
in the design and implementation of both preventive and reactive approaches at the
national and regional level can be expected in the coming years. For these instruments
to be effective it will be important to put them on a strong evidence base. Comprehen-
sive geographical coverage of climate impact observations, including contributions
from social disciplines such as human geography and environmental psychology can
provide important insights in this regard. Similarly, academic discussions of the nor-
mative dimensions of NELD and adequate responses can clarify much of the debate.
However, which values will count and how they will be weighed in decision-making
both at the national and international level will in the end always be one of judgment
and as such require political debate and deliberation.
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Chapter 9
The Impacts of Climate Change
on Ecosystem Services and Resulting
Losses and Damages to People
and Society
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Asha Sitati, Erin Roberts and Rachel James
Abstract So far, studies of Loss and Damage from climate change have focused
primarily on human systems and tended to overlook themediating role of ecosystems
and the services ecosystems provide to society. This is a significant knowledge gap
because losses and damages to human systems often result from permanent or tem-
porary disturbances to ecosystems services caused by climatic stressors. This chapter
tries to advance understanding of the impacts of climatic stressors on ecosystems and
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implications for losses and damages to people and society. It introduces a conceptual
framework for studying these complex relations and applies this framework to a case
study of multi-annual drought in the West-African Sahel. The case study shows that
causal links between climate change and a specific event, with subsequent losses and
damages, are often complicated. Oversimplification must be avoided and the role of
various factors, such as governance or management of natural resources, should be
at the centre of future research.
Keywords Loss and Damage · Climate change · Ecosystem services
Livelihoods · Adaptation limits and constraints · Sahel · Africa
9.1 Introduction
Climate change amplifies extreme weather events such as heatwaves and extreme
rainfall, with implications for losses and damages affecting vulnerable populations
around the world. Global surface temperature has increased already on average by
0.85 °C relative to pre-industrial temperature (IPCC 2014), and there is evidence
that even with very ambitious mitigation measures, the Earth’s atmospheric system
may already be committed to warming of approximately 1.5 °C above pre-industrial
levels by 2050 (World Bank 2014). While mitigation continues to be of paramount
importance to limit losses and damages, the extent and magnitude of climate change
impacts will almost certainly increase in the future. Decision makers will need to be
prepared to implement both adaptation and risk reduction measures to avoid losses
and damages and a suite of other approaches within comprehensive riskmanagement
frameworks to address losses and damages that are not averted (see introduction by
Mechler et al. 2018).
Defining Losses and Damages
No universally agreed-upon definition of losses and damages as part of the Loss
and Damage debate exists, and a fit-for-purpose working definition varies by scale
and purpose. This chapter refers to losses and damages as the adverse effects of
climate-related stressors that cannot be or have not been avoided through mitiga-
tion or managed through adaptation efforts (adapted from Van der Geest and Warner
2015). Losses and damages occur when adaptation measures are unsuccessful, insuf-
ficient, not implemented, or impossible to implement; when adaptation measures
have unrecoverable costs; or when measures are maladaptive, making ecosystems
and societies more vulnerable (Warner and van der Geest 2013).
Verheyen (2012) makes an important and policy-relevant distinction between
avoided, unavoided and unavoidable losses and damages (see also Mechler et al.
2018). Avoided losses and damages refer to impacts and risks that have been pre-
vented through mitigation and adaptation measures. For example, if an African rain-
fed farmer has planted drought-resistant crop varieties that yieldedwell in a season of
extremely low rainfall, he or she has avoided adverse effects of drought. Unavoided
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losses and damages refer to impacts of climate change that could in theory have
been avoided but that have not been avoided because of inadequate efforts to reduce
risks or adapt. For example, unavoided losses and damages may result if a coastal
storm and high tide inundate properties because available measures to adapt to sea
level rise were not adopted. By contrast, impacts and risks that are impossible to
avoid through mitigation and adaptation efforts are characterised as “unavoidable
losses and damages” (Verheyen 2012). In reality there is ambiguity around what can
and what cannot be avoided. It depends on technological, social, economic or polit-
ical limits to mitigation and adaptation, which are context-specific and subjective.
Strong disaster mitigation, for example, might be technically possible but not polit-
ically feasible or economically viable. Similarly, if a small, low-lying atoll would
be confronted with 6 m of sea level rise, it could be technically possible to build a
dyke around the island, but the costs of such an effort would probably be prohibitive.
This chapter does not attempt to resolve these ambiguities. However, it is important
to acknowledge that they exist because there are important policy implications. In
some cases, resources would be invested most efficiently in trying to avoid losses
and damages, and in other cases it will be better to accept losses and find sustainable
and dignified solutions for the people who are affected.
A useful concept in the discussion about avoidable and unavoidable losses and
damages are ‘adaptation limits’ (Dow et al. 2013; Preston et al. 2013; Warner et al.
2013). According to the IPCC, adaptation limits are reached when adaptation is no
longer able to “provide an acceptable level of security from risks to the existing
objectives and values and prevent the loss of the key attributes, components or ser-
vices of ecosystems” (Klein et al. 2014). An adaptation limits is considered ‘hard’
when no adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risk, while soft adapta-
tion limits occur when options are currently not available to avoid intolerable risk
through adaptive action (Agard et al. 2014). In practice, it is not always clear whether
an adaptation limit is hard or soft. Similarly, what renders risk acceptable, tolerable
or intolerable is subjective, context-specific and socially constructed (Mechler and
Schinko 2016).
A common way of analysing losses and damages is by differentiating economic
and non-economic losses and damages (NELD). Economic losses are understood to
be the loss of resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets,
such as livestock and cash crops. Non-economic losses and damages involve things
that are not commonly traded in markets (UNFCCC 2013). Examples of NELD in
natural systems include loss of habitat and biodiversity and damage to ecosystem
services. While such items are not traded in markets, there is a strong research
community dedicated to valuing the services ecosystems provide, and hence also to
quantifying losses when they occur (Costanza et al. 2014). Examples of NELD in
human systems include cultural and social losses associated with the loss of ancestral
land and forced relocation. Such climate change impacts are difficult to quantify but
important to address (Morrissey andOliver-Smith 2014; chapter by Serdeczny 2018).
Losses and damages can also be categorised as direct and indirect. Examples of
direct losses and damages include loss of life, land, crops, or livestock–as well as
damage to houses, properties, and infrastructure. Such losses and damages are gen-
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erally quite well covered in disaster loss assessments (Gall 2015; chapter by Bouwer
2018). By contrast, indirect losses and damages are harder to quantify or estimate, so
they are often underreported (UNFCCC 2012). Indirect losses and damages are asso-
ciatedwith themeasures actors implement to adapt to or copewith direct impacts. For
example, if a community is displaced by flooding and has to live in a school building
for six months, there will be indirect effects of the flood on the students’ education
level (Opondo 2013).When copingmeasures are beneficial in the short term but have
adverse effects on livelihood sustainability in the longer-term, we speak of ‘erosive
coping’ (van der Geest and Dietz 2004).
Research Gaps and Outline of Chapter
There is a long tradition of scholarly work on assessing disaster losses, and a small,
but emerging body of literature on losses and damages from climate change. More
research has been done about losses and damages from sudden onset disasters—such
as cyclones and floods—than from slow onset processes—such as sea level rise,
ocean acidification and drought. While scientific conceptualisations and empirical
work on Loss and Damage has focused primarily on human impacts (Warner and
van der Geest 2013; Wrathall et al. 2015), little attention has been given to the
loss of ecosystem services and the cascading impacts on human societies resulting
from this (Zommers et al. 2014). Yet, according to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment
Report, “evidence of climate-change impacts is strongest and most comprehensive
for natural systems” (IPCC 2014). Moreover, adaptation options for ecosystems are
limited (IPCC 2014) and in the case of progressive and permanent change, current
measures are unlikely to prevent loss and damage to ecosystems and their services.
This chapter1 tries to enhance understanding of how impacts of climate change
on ecosystem services result in losses and damages to people and society. This helps
in determining what kind of interventions could reduce such losses and damages
now and in the future. We first present a conceptual framework for studying how
impacts of climate change on ecosystem services can result in losses and damages
to human systems. The next section discusses current knowledge of climate change
impacts on four types of ecosystem services—provisioning, regulating, supporting,
and cultural. A case study follows where we present how losses and damages to
ecosystem services affects human well-being in the drylands of the West African
Sahel. The conclusion section of this chapter summarises key findings and discusses
policy options. As well, we identify two important areas for future research and
evidence gathering.
1This chapter builds on a report published by the United Nations Environment Program, entitled
“Loss and Damage: The role of Ecosystem Services” (UNEP 2016).
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9.2 Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Role
of Ecosystem Services
The working definition we use in this chapter refers to losses and damages as the
adverse effects of climate-related stressors that cannot be or have not been avoided
through mitigation or managed through adaptation efforts (adapted from Van der
Geest and Warner 2015). Following from this definition is the notion that there is
a conceptual difference between climate impacts and losses and damages. Despite
its negative connotation, the concept of losses and damages gives central stage to
the role of mitigation and adaptation and the opportunities that exist for avoiding
harm, as illustrated in Fig. 9.1. However, too many opportunities to mitigate or adapt
are missed because of adaptation constraints, such as due to a lack in understanding,
deficits in long-term commitment andmotivation, and inadequate financial resources
(Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016). Losses and damages result from these failures.
The purpose of this framework is to illustrate the central focus and storyline in this
chapter. It does not elaborate on all elements and relations of the complex reality of
climate change, impacts, and adaptation. Starting at the top of the diagram, climatic
stressors affect human systems and natural systems. Impacts on human systems
can be direct, or indirect through damage to natural systems and the ecosystem
services they provide to society. When human systems are affected—be it directly
or indirectly—adaptation options may exist. If adaptation measures are adopted and
successful, there are no losses and damages. If there are no adaptation options at
all, when adaptation limits have been surpassed, then losses and damages to human
systems is inevitable. If there are possibilities to adapt, but adaptation action does
not materialise or is not efficient because of adaptation constraints, then actors will
also incur losses and damages. Often, successful adaptation is possible in theory,
but doesn’t happen in practice because of adaptation constraints, such as lack of
knowledge, skills, and resources (chapter by Schinko et al. this 2018).
Fig. 9.1 Conceptual framework for understanding the role of ecosystem services
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9.3 Impacts of Climate Change on Ecosystem
Services-Current Knowledge
Ecosystems are collections of macro and microscopic biota that form critical life
support systems. Degradation of ecosystems is occurring worldwide due to over-
exploitation and because of insufficient recognition of the vital importance of the
services that ecosystems provide to human well-being (WWAP 2015; MA 2005).
Climate change has the potential to exacerbate ecosystem degradation and reduce
the efficiency of ecosystem services (Staudinger et al. 2012; Bangash et al. 2013;
Lorencová et al. 2013).
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defines ecosystem services as the bene-
fits that people obtain from ecosystems (MA 2005) and distinguishes four types of
ecosystem services :
• provisioning services (food, water, fuel and wood or fiber),
• regulating services (climate, flood and disease regulation and water purification),
• supporting services (soil formation, nutrient cycling and primary production),
• cultural services (educational, recreational, aesthetic and spiritual).
The quality of ecosystem services increases with the level of intactness, complex-
ity, and/or species richness of ecosystems (Díaz et al. 2006). Many of the negative
consequences human societies experience from climate change are related to the
adaptation limits of individual species that provide us with food, fiber, fuel and shel-
ter, as well as the services provided by whole ecosystems. Dow and others (2013)
provide two telling examples of such adaptation limits. First, there is a limit to the
temperature that rice in South Asia can cope with in the pollination and flowering
phase: After a threshold temperature of 26 °C, every 1 °C increase in night-time
temperature results in a 10% decline in yield. Beyond a night temperature of 35 °C it
is impossible to grow current rice varieties there, which constitutes a hard adaptation
limit beyond which different types actors (farmers, traders, the economy at large)
incur losses and damages due to changes in the ecosystem service (Dow et al. 2013).
The second example demonstrates how a society itself can choose its adaptation
limits: After settling in Greenland around 1000AD, the complex and advanced Norse
society there ended around 1450. The settlements’ collapse can be attributed to their
adaptation limits. When harsh conditions began, Norse Greenlanders adopted new
ways of exploiting marine mammals as declines in agriculture and domestic live-
stock production persisted. But faced with growing competition from Inuit hunters,
declining trade in ivory and fur with Norway as pack ice blocked their access, and
a generally chilling climate, these adaptations were insufficient to maintain risks to
community continuity at tolerable levels. At the same time, the Norse settlers refused
to adopt techniques that proved useful to the Inuit (Dow et al. 2013). Impacts of cli-
mate change on ecosystem services are characterised by high levels of complexity
arising from interactions of biophysical, economic, political, and social factors at
various scales (Ewert et al. 2015). These impacts are often specific to a given context
or place, making generalisations difficult.
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9.4 Case Study: Multi-annual Drought in the Drylands
of the Sahel
While climate change impacts on ecosystem services are already highly localised,
this applies even more to the resulting losses and damages to people and society.
Differences between places in terms of culture, social organization, governance,
development and adaptive capacity cause the local specificity of climate change
impacts in human systems. This section uses a West African case study to further
explore conceptual links between climate change and losses and damages to ecosys-
tem services, and consequently to human well-being. The following questions are
explored:
• What is the weather-related stressor and does climate change play a role?
• How does the stressor affect ecosystems and the services they provide?
• How does the change in ecosystem services affect human systems?
• What are adaptation options, and how effective are these at avoiding losses and
damages?
• What is the evidence on losses and damages?
• What can be done in terms of better preparedness or adaptation to avoid future
losses and damages?
The Sahel and the semi-arid drylands of East Africa are emblematic of climate
change vulnerability. The regions have faced challenges such as crop and livestock
losses, food insecurity, displacement, cultural losses including traditional livelihood
systems, and conflict. A major factor in these challenges is climate variability exac-
erbated by climate change. In contrast with other parts of the world, most agriculture
in Africa is rainfed and therefore crops yields are extremely sensitive to climatic con-
ditions (Zaal et al. 2004). In early 2015 an estimated 20.4 million people were food
insecure as a result of ongoing drought—mostly in Niger, Nigeria, Mali, and Chad
where conflict and poverty compound food insecurity (ReliefWeb 2015). A number
of climatic changes are occurring in the region. For one, it is becoming hotter, and
this is clearly consistent with climate change. Temperature increases vary widely
within the region, up to as much as 0.5 °C per decade from 1951 to the present (or
3.5 °C total) in a large part of Sudan and South Sudan; and are also high, 0.2–0.4 °C
per decade, in large parts of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Uganda (Fig. 9.2).
Recent studies suggest that in some African regions the pace of warming is more
than double the global and tropical average (Cook and Vizy 2015; Engelbrecht et al.
2015). Higher temperatures increase evaporation from soil and water surfaces and
transpiration from vegetation—a process known collectively as evapotranspiration.
Therefore, even in places where rainfall increases, it may not be sufficient to offset
overall soil moisture loss, affecting primary productivity and food production, which
are supporting and provisioning ecosystem services respectively.
In the drylands of Africa, there is high rainfall variability from year to year, and
even from decade to decade. Figure 9.3 shows the rainfall variation for the Sahel
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Fig. 9.2 Temperature change in degrees Celsius per decade from 1951 to 2013. Source UNEP
(2016). Notes Trends are obtained by adjusting a linear trend to inter-annual anomalies (anomalies
with respect to the average over the 63 year observation record), with no other filtering (not removing
any other scales of variability). It is expressed in degrees C/decade
Fig. 9.3 Coefficient of variation of rainfall from 1951 to 2013 (in percent of the long-term average).
Source UNEP (2016)
Fig. 9.4 Difference in the number of years that received adequate rainfall for sorghum and millet
(1990–2009 compared to 1950–1969). Source UNEP (2016)
from 1951 to 2013. Large areas of the drylands have inter-annual rainfall variability
that is ±30% of the mean.
During the 1970s and early 1980s the Sahel experienced a long and widespread
drought that was associated with a devastating famine (Held et al. 2005; Conway
et al. 2009). Trends for the late 20th and early 21st century suggest an increase
in the intensity and length of droughts in West Africa (IPCC 2012), and a decline
in rainfall of between 10 and 20%, with rainfall becoming less dependable (Turco
et al. 2015). The region also has strong decadal variability, related to swings in
ocean temperatures in the North Atlantic. Even controlling for the effect of decadal
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variability, pronounced shifts in rainfall are evident. For example, in the drylands
of Mali and Burkina Faso, the number of years that exceed the minimum required
to grow sorghum and millet has changed over time (Fig. 9.4). During the period
1950–69, generally recognised as a wet period for the Sahel, there was reliable
rainfall for sorghum and millet in many regions, but in the last two decades the
number of years that met the threshold was 60–80% lower. This demonstrates how
climatic variability and change can threaten food production, an important ecosystem
service.
Intra-annual variability is another issue. Within any growing season, large gaps
in rainfall or extreme rainfall events can have important impacts on crop produc-
tion—withering crops after they’ve sprouted or washing them away. The combined
effects of decadal, inter-annual (between years), and intra-annual (within years) vari-
ability have important repercussions for food provisioning, which is an important
ecosystem service.
Research on losses and damages from the 2004 and 2010 droughts in northern
Burkina Faso showed that villagers have become less able to cope with droughts
because of a decline in pastoralism and an increase in cropping (Traore and Owiyo
2013). Pastoralism has long been an important andwell adapted livelihood strategy in
the region; herders could move their cattle to areas where pasture was more abundant
to accommodate localisedwater deficits. Thiswas away of life that brought resilience
to droughts. With recent land use change policies and conflict, severe barriers to
pastoralists’ freedom of movement make themmore vulnerable to droughts. Surveys
found 96 and 87% of respondents felt the negative effects of droughts on crops and
livestock, respectively, and that extreme droughts tend to have cascading effects.
First, the water deficits affect seedling growth and crop yields, which then affects
the availability of food for people and feed for livestock (Traore and Owiyo 2013).
At the geographic center of this large dryland region, for centuries Lake
Chad—centred in Western Chad and straddling the Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon
borders—was home to abundant fisheries and livestock herds. Temperature increase,
rainfall unpredictability, and land use changes have negatively affected the Lake
Chad basin. Once among Africa’s largest lakes, the lake has shrunk from 25,000 sq.
km in 1963 to around 1,000 sq. km (Fig. 9.5) (UNEP 2008).
A ridge that emerged during the drought in the 1970s and 1980s now divides
Lake Chad in two. Despite the recovery of rainfall in the 1990s, the lake never fully
recovered because irrigation withdrawals increased from the primary tributaries to
the south, where rainfall is higher (Gao et al. 2011). The lake once supported a
vital traditional culture of fishing and herding. As the lake receded, farmers and
pastoralists shifted to the greener areas, where they compete for land resources with
host communities (Salkida 2012). This has been compounded by violent conflict
associated with the Boko Haram insurgency, which has spilled across the border
fromNigeria (Taub 2017).Others havemigrated toKano,Abuja, Lagos, and other big
cities. The decline of Lake Chad illustrates how changing climate patterns interacting
with other anthropogenic modifications, conflict and poor governance result in losses
and damages to ecosystems and societies.
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Fig. 9.5 The drying of Lake Chad. Source UNEP (2016)
In other parts of the Sahel, rainfall recovery in recent decades has brought flooding
because the rainfall arrives in more intense cloudbursts rather than in a more evenly
distributed manner (Giannini et al. 2013). In 2007, for example, rainfall extremes
and consequent flooding in Senegal’s peanut basin led to loss of property and crop
loss because farmers often cultivate in and around natural depressions (Fig. 9.6).
Research in eastern Senegal on household perceptions of flood and drought indi-
cate that climate variability brings crop, livestock and other economic losses (Miller
et al. 2014). Over the decade preceding the survey, on average households reported
experiencing 2.5–3 years of drought and 0.2–0.5 years with flooding, with higher
incidence in the north than the south. It is unclear how climate changemight influence
the Sahel in future, with some climate change projections suggesting there might be a
shift to wetter conditions while other projections suggest that conditions will become
much drier (Druyan 2011). Despite the uncertainty about the potential influence of
human-induced climate change in the region, there is ample evidence to demonstrate
the vulnerability to climate shocks, as well as potential shifts in climate.
Adaptationmeasures implemented in the Sahel include crop-livestock integration,
soil fertility management, planting of drought-resistant crops, water harvesting, dug
ponds for watering animals, livelihood diversification, and seasonal or permanent
migration. A number of these methods have been practiced for generations and
are the norm for semi-arid regions. However, in a changing climate such practices
will have to be scaled up and new methods developed, as adaption has not been
sufficient to prevent losses. New methods may include breeding of more drought-
resistant crops, or innovations such as index-based insurance. For the latter, payouts
to participating farmers and herders are not made on the basis of actual losses but on
the basis of changes in rainfall or drought indices, thereby reducing the overhead of
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Flood Water Extent as of 18 Sept 2007
Pre-flood Water Extent as of 7 Mar 2006
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Fig. 9.6 Flooding in the peanut basin south of Kaolack, Senegal (September 2007). SourceUNEP
(2016)
claims inspections (chapter by Schafer et al. 2018). This has been tested successfully
in Senegal, Ethiopia, and Northern Kenya (Greatrex et al. 2015).
In the future, temperature changes may create genuine hard limits to adaptation,
for example, where temperature increases are beyond the limit of crops during critical
points in their life cycle (Ericksen et al. 2011). According to the IPCC, in Africa
Climate change combined with other external changes (environmental, social,
political, technological) may overwhelm the ability of people to cope and adapt,
especially if the root causes of poverty and vulnerability are not addressed (Niang
et al. 2014).
This may lead tomigration as an adaptive response (Mortimore 2010;World Bank
2018), as it has in the past (de Sherbinin et al. 2012; UNEP 2011).
9.5 Conclusions
This chapter tried to enhance understanding of how and when climate change threats
to ecosystems and the services they provide result in losses and damages to people
and society. In doing so it addressed serious gaps in the emerging research and debate
on Loss and Damage from climate change. The first generation of empirical work on
losses and damages has focused primarily on human systems and tended to overlook
the mediating role of ecosystems and the services ecosystems provide to society.
The chapter introduced a conceptual framework for studying the complex relations
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between climatic stressors, impacts on ecosystems, ecosystem services, adaptation
opportunities, limits and constraints and residual losses and damages. A case study
from West Africa illustrated how this works out in a real-world setting.
The case study showed that causal links between climate change and a specific
event, with subsequent losses and damages, are often complicated. Oversimplifica-
tion must be avoided and the role of different factors, such as governance or manage-
ment of natural resources, should be explored further. For example, lack of investment
in water related infrastructure, agricultural technology, or health care services also
increase the risk of losses and damages. In the Sahel, variability in rainfall patterns
influences primary productivity, but barriers to pastoralists’ freedom of movement
have also increased their vulnerability to droughts.
The case also shows that while some adaptationmeasures have been implemented,
losses and damages have nevertheless occurred. For instance, adaptation measures
in DrylandWest Africa include crop-livestock integration, soil fertility management,
planting of drought-resistant crops, water harvesting, dug ponds for watering ani-
mals, livelihood diversification, and seasonal or permanent migration. A number
of these methods have been practiced for generations. However, as climate change
intensifies, promising practices will have to be scaled up and new methods will have
to be devised. A win-win solution will be to invest in ambitious mitigation action to
avoid the unmanageable, and comprehensive and holistic adaptation action to man-
age the unavoidable–including better management of ecosystems and their services,
improved governance, and economic policies that support sustainable development.
Ultimately, a range of approaches is needed to address climate change impacts and
to ensure that resilience building efforts and sustainable development can continue.
This includes policy options to avert losses and damages, and to address losses and
damages that have not been or cannot be averted through enhanced mitigation and
adaptation. These options include risk transfer, which can be used to both avoid
and address losses and damages; risk retention, such as social protection policies;
migration, recovery, rehabilitation and rebuilding in the wake of extreme events; and
tools to address non-economic losses and damages. Approaches to avert and limit
losses and damages as well as to address the residual impacts of climate change will
be more successful if they incorporate inclusive decision-making, account for the
needs of a wide range of actors, and target the poor and vulnerable.
As Loss and Damage is a new and emerging topic in science and policy, there
are more unanswered questions than answers at present. We identify two important
areas for future research and evidence gathering. First, there is a need to increase
understanding of how losses and damages to human well-being is mediated through
losses and damages to ecosystem services and of the specific policy entry points.
This includes more study of the adverse impacts of climate change, including climate
extremes, on ecosystem functioning. Examples may include the effects of extreme
heat and drought on forest ecosystems, the consequences of sea level rise and storm
surge for coastal ecosystems ranging from sea grasses and marshes to mangroves,
and the implications of glacier loss on downstream hydrology and riparian ecosystem
functions.
Second, it is important to document and evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to
avert losses and damages and identify how the efficacy of tools and measures can
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be improved, including how non-economic losses and damages associated with the
loss of ecosystem services can be better addressed. This includes gathering evidence
on the potential for, and the limits to, ecosystem-based adaptation in a number of
areas. Examples may include the ability of intact mangrove ecosystems to limit
coastal erosion from sea level rise and storm surge, the potential for wetlands to
reduce flood damage by absorbing runoff from heavy rainfall and releasing water
gradually, or the potential and the limits for greening urban areas to reduce heat
stress and consequent remediation of health risks. In such evaluations of adaptation
and risk management efforts, it is of paramount importance to include the views
of beneficiaries, particularly when the intended project beneficiaries are vulnerable
people with limited political capital (see also Pouw et al. 2017).
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Chapter 10
Displacement and Resettlement:
Understanding the Role of Climate
Change in Contemporary Migration
Alison Heslin, Natalie Delia Deckard, Robert Oakes
and Arianna Montero-Colbert
Abstract Howdowe understand displacement and resettlement in the context of cli-
mate change? This chapter outlines challenges and debates in the literature connect-
ing climate change to the growing global flow of people. We begin with an outline of
the literature on environmental migration, specifically the definitions, measurements,
and forms of environmental migration. The discussion then moves to challenges in
the reception of migrants, treating the current scholarship on migrant resettlement.
We detail a selection of cases in which the environment plays a role in the displace-
ment of a population, including sea level rise in Pacific Island States, cyclonic storms
in Bangladesh, and desertification in West Africa, as well as the role of deforestation
in South America’s Southern Cone as a driver of both climate change and migration.
We outline examples of each, highlighting the complex set of losses and damages
incurred by populations in each case.
Keywords Migration · Internal displacement · Resettlement · Climate change
Natural disasters · Environmental degradation · Loss and Damage · Refugee
10.1 Introduction
How do we understand displacement and resettlement in the era of climate change?
Scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers have been grapplingwithways to improve
life outcomes for large numbers of refugees and migrants. In particular, the 21st con-
ference of the Parties to the United Nations Climate Convention (UNFCCC) in Paris
created a taskforce to work out recommendations to “avert, minimize, and address
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displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC 2017). In
addressing the role of climate change in displacement, onemust identify theways that
factors pertaining to environmental change generally drive migration, as this rela-
tionship will become all the more important and complex with climate change (IOM
2017b). This chapter addresses the ways that the natural environment relates to the
global flow of people (Bettini and Andersson 2014; Bates 2002; Dun and Gemenne
2008). In addressing this relationship between the environment and displacement, we
first outline the primary debates within the environmental displacement and migra-
tion literature, as well as challenges in the reception of migrants in host communities
and nations. Using cases of climate-related displacement, we then highlight the com-
plexity of the social effects of environmental factors and the process of migration.
10.2 Defining and Measuring Migration
The complexity of environmental migration begins with the process of setting con-
crete, agreed upon definitions, however, defining and subsequently measuring the
process of environmental migration is not uniform throughout the literature (Dun
and Gemenne 2008).
10.2.1 Definitions
To understand the various means by which one can define environmental migration,
we may start by understanding the broader categories used to describe populations
outside their habitual place of residence, including migrant, refugee, asylum seeker,
and internally displaced person. In general, one may classify a person in these dif-
ferent categories based on the circumstances of their leaving their place of residence
and the destination of their movement (outlined in Fig. 10.1). According to the Inter-
national Organization forMigration, migrant is the most general term, encompassing
any person who “has moved across an international border or within a State away
from his/her habitual place of residence” (IOM 2018). By this definition, anyone
who falls within our matrix outlined in Fig. 10.1 is a migrant, but depending on
the circumstances of their movement, more precise labels and terminology can be
used to describe them. For instance, if one flees across an international border due
to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” they can be further
classified as a refugee or asylum-seeker (UN 1951). In addition, one who is forced to
flee their home, but has not crossed an international border is considered an internally
displaced person (IDP) (IOM 2017c; UN 1998).
While the IOM definitions of refugees and IDPs are consistent with UN conven-
tions, the definition of migrant used by the IOM differs from that of the UN, which
uses a more narrow definition of migrant. According to the UN, a migrant is one
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Fig. 10.1 IOMmigration-related terminology by motivation and destination. Source IOM (2017c)
Fig. 10.2 UN migration-related terminology by motivation and destination. Sources UN (1951),
UN (1990), UN (1998)
residing outside the country of which he/she is a national, not including those cat-
egorised as refugees or asylum seekers (UN 1990). By the UN definition, migrant
would occupy only the bottom-left quadrant, shown in Fig. 10.2. This UN distinc-
tion is useful to differentiate the four categories into four separate, non-overlapping
labels—internal migrant, internally displaced person, migrant, and refugee/asylum
seeker—to be determined by two questions: Was the movement domestic or inter-
national? and was the movement voluntary or forced?
At its most simple, moving from migration broadly to environmental migration
specifically entails maintaining the same categories, but restricting to cases in which
the motivating factor for movement was environmentally-related, including those
caused by climate change. The IOM does just this, maintaining the encompassing
definition for migration, defining an environmental migrant as a person who
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for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their
lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do
so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad
(IOM 2017c).
Alternatively, using the more restricted definition of migrant from the UN (vol-
untary, international), an environmental migrant would be one who voluntarily
resides outside his/her country for reasons of changes to the environment, sudden-
or gradually-onset. Internal environmental migrants voluntarily relocate domesti-
cally for reasons of environmental changes. An environmental refugee would be one
who, due to environmental factors, is forced to flee home and cross international
borders, whereas an environmental IDP is also forced to leave home but remains
within the state of which he/she is a national. While these terms may seem well
defined, the process of identifying populations that fall into each category is rife
with complications, leading to scientific and policy debates on the specific criteria
of the definitions. In determining the category into which a person falls, locating the
person as within or without their national borders is the most straightforward, while
determining whether or not that person moved voluntarily and whether or not that
movement was motivated by environmental factors, is cause for much debate in the
literature. The decision to leave a place of residence is multifaceted, comprised of
both push and pull factors (Bronen et al. 2009; Obokata et al. 2014; Renaud et al.
2007;Warner et al. 2010). In the case of slow onset land degradation, with decreasing
crop yields, for example, one could argue that a resident left willingly or was forced
to leave, as well as arguing that said resident left for new economic opportunities in
a nearby city or left for environmental reasons. Whether movement is forced or vol-
untary and whether motivated by environmental or economic reasons encompasses a
primary debate in the scientific literature on environmental migration (Bates 2002).
Additionally, because these definitions constitute legal classifications, identifying
which category a population falls into can carry with it particular sets of entitlements
or binding policy responses. For example, the UN High Commission on Refugees
provides aid and resources to refugees according to their definition of refugees (Gill
2010). Accordingly, environmentally displaced populations may not be eligible for
aid as refugees as they lack a “well founded fear of beingpersecuted” as outlined in the
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Without the inclusion of natural
disasters or climate-related environmental degradation as forms of persecution, those
displaced from these causes do not constitute refugees per this definition (Bronen
et al. 2009; Warner et al. 2010). Despite this understanding from the UN, many
studies have used the term environmental refugees to describe those displaced by
environmental factors (Bates 2002; Myers 2002).
10.2.2 Measurement
A particular scientific implication of the definitional issues relating to environmental
migration is the capacity tomeasure and predict flows of environmental migrants (per
IOM definition). Data and empirical studies on environmental migration differ based
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Fig. 10.3 Migration totals, measured as total foreign-born population. Data SourceUnitedNations
Population Division (2017)
on the criteria used to identify population movements as voluntary versus forced and
environmentally or otherwise motivated.
Looking at international migration generally, data indicate increasing volumes of
migration, but differ depending on the means of measurement. The United Nations,
measuringmigration as the total foreign-born population throughout the world, iden-
tifies the number of foreign-born residents of countries to be over 250million in 2017,
with over 25 million of those categorised as refugees and asylum-seekers (United
Nations Population Division 2017). Figure 10.3 presents the United Nations data
measuring the number of people living outside their country of birth, showing sig-
nificant increases over the past 25 years.
While for foreign-born populations, there is readily available data, studies chal-
lenge this operationalisation of migration, as it fails to capture when people moved
and fromwhere. Abel and Sander (2014), for instance, estimate the volume of migra-
tion flows and direction since 1990, finding that while the stock of foreign-born
populations globally has increased, there has not been a drastic increase in the flow
of migrants in recent years, relative to the global population size or in absolute
quantities. These differences in measurement paint very different pictures regarding
contemporary global migration, with popular narratives often following UN data,
shown in Fig. 10.3, indicating massive increases in migrants.
The process of measurement and analysis is further complicated when attempting
to determine the cause of the movement.
Determining the proportion of international migrants who relocate due to envi-
ronmental changes faces the same challenges as estimating migrant flows, with the
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Fig. 10.4 New internal displacements per year from conflict and natural disasters. Data Source
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016
additional challenges of parsing environmental motivators from economic, social,
and political factors, which influence migration decisions in tandem (Black et al.
2011). Due to this complexity, as well as uncertainty in predicting future adaptive
capacity, predictions of future movements of people from climate change and envi-
ronmental causes vary from 25 million to 1 billion in 2050 (IOM 2017b).
In addition to international movement, populations move internally in massive
numbers in the face of environmental factors, including those affected by climate
change, such as natural disasters, environmental degradation, droughts, and floods.
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates the number of new internal
displacements per year at values far above those estimates of international migration
flows calculated by Abel and Sander (2014). As shown in Fig. 10.4, the number of
internal displacements in 2016was over 30million.Of those displaced in 2016, nearly
25 million were displaced by natural disasters, with large volumes of displacements
occurring in Asia, particularly China, India, and Pakistan, illustrated in Fig. 10.5
(IDMC 2017).
The current volume of displacements, internal and international, due to environ-
mental stressors is striking. With climate change increasing extreme weather events
as well as long-term climate variability, the IPCC finds evidence that current migra-
tion is partly driven by climate change and projects an increased displacement of
people over the 21st century, yet assigns low confidence to quantitative projections
(IPCC 2014).
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Fig. 10.5 Total number of new internally displaced by natural disasters 2008–2016. Data Source
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016
10.3 Understanding Resettlement
Whether internal or international, the effects of displacement continue much beyond
the moment of departure, and as such we briefly address the literature on the process
of resettlement. This section provides an overview of the spaces and challenges faced
by the displaced in the process of resettling, including those for the voluntarymigrant
as well as the refugee.
The figure of the voluntary migrant is often cast as one motivated by rational
choices and systematic decisions.While conversations regarding refugees are framed
largely through questions of the right to asylum and the politics of conflict, themigra-
tion question is consumed by questions regarding their capacity to contribute to the
health and success of the local economy without detracting from local employment
or host community culture (Deckard and Heslin 2016). The framing of migration in
terms of economic contribution categorises the desirability and, subsequently, legal-
ity of migrants in a space (Golash-Boza 2015). Thus, anticipating the ways in which
environmental migrants are received by a host country is a matter of understanding
the economic desirability of that specific group in the country, which is subject to
change with variations in the economic situation of the receiving area or country.
In the United States, for example, immigrants of Hispanic and Latino orig-
in—often crossing the nation’s Southern border escaping a difficult-to-disentangle
combination of degraded natural resources, corruption, gang violence and economic
disarray (Bender and Arrocha 2017)—represent a significant source of migrant labor
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to the nation and are associated with cheap, unskilled labor in the national discourse
(Romero 2006). The inclusion of these migrants is metered by the degree to which
they are seen as contributing to the national economy (Deckard and Browne 2015).
This reality has become so anchored in the hegemonic common sense that a criminal-
ity has been constructed around migrant bodies, which are physically present while
economically surplus (Gunkel and González Wahl 2012). To the degree to which
migrants are seen as costing money in terms of social benefits or use of public goods,
they are viewed as members of an out-group. Conversely, to the extent that they are
perceived to work effectively and contribute to the general economic well-being,
they are seen as meritorious of inclusion in national communities (Armenta 2017;
Golash-Boza and Parker 2007).
The discourse around migrant labor is similar in other wealthy nations—most
notably the construction of the African inWestern Europe. Similar to the push factors
propelling Latino immigrants to the United States, the home country realities of the
French sans papiers vary in their combination of environmental degradation, conflict,
economic hardship and corruption. Also, similarly undocumentedmigrants to France
exist in the interstices of surplus labor and criminal (Schaap 2011). In sharp contrast
to the extensive positive attention given to methods of incorporation for refugees and
legal migrants—those who have been given permission to reside in the nation only
so long as they perform work explicitly required in order to meet national economic
goals—anyneed to integrate the economically surplus generated by global challenges
has, apparently, been addressed with their widespread criminalisation.
In addition to the flows of voluntary migrants internally and internationally, mass
events, such as natural disasters, can abruptly displace those living in a space, often
enmasse.When such large and sudden displacements occur, governments face logis-
tical and political challenges in managing the flow of people internally and across
international borders. In this process, the displaced can seek asylum, often settling
temporarily in refugee camps, beginning a prolonged, indefinite state of transience.
Understanding the role and structure of the refugee camp is an important compo-
nent of environmental migration, as refugee camps represent the political response
to mass displacement, as possible through large scale natural disasters. Through such
events, as well as large scale conflicts, displaced populations can flow into neigh-
bouring countries at rates, which exceed the economic, political, or social capacity or
willingness of the receiving country to accommodate. The structure of the camp itself
speaks to its roots in political expediency for the host country. Following the estab-
lished provisions in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
1967 Protocol, to maintain credibility globally, countries face international pressure
to respond to mass displacement (Black 2001). The refugee camp thus arises out of
the juxtaposition of the international pressure to act charitably towards those in need
and a state’s inclination to keep “space and distance” from the refugees themselves
(Hyndman 2000).
In addressing the losses and damages of environmental displacement, one must
engage with the realities of the refugee camp. Rather than initiating a process of
assimilation, the camp inherently exists as a space of prolonged temporality, which
serves to exclude refugees’ participation in the economic and social activities of the
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host country, aswell as frompolitical representation and participation (Kibreab 2003;
Ramadan 2013). Further, refugee initiatives are often conducted with limited input
from the supposed beneficiaries of the aid (Silverman 2008; Hanafi and Long 2010),
thereby inhibiting the development of refugee communities into societal structures
of the host country and of the global economy at large (Hanafi and Long 2010). In
contrast to refugee camps, asylum policies aim to initiate the process of resettlement
for displaced persons. An asylum-seeker is one who has applied for refuge outside
their own country and is awaiting official refugee status in their new country of
residence. The refugee camp dweller is often not distinct from the asylum seeker,
as applications for asylum start once an individual has arrived in a refugee camp,
but also can begin following arrival to a host country legally by obtaining a work or
student visa.
Asylum-seekers, however, face many barriers in the process of resettlement. First,
because of bureaucratic process and the sheer number of applicants, central to the
experience of the twenty first century asylee is the experience of years of waiting
(Rotter 2016). The asylum-seeking process also requires costs associated with travel
and paperwork fees, often making resettlement inaccessible to many whose liveli-
hoods depend on it (Settlage 2009). Additionally, due to host citizens’ belief that
asylum-seekers take more than they give socially, destination countries may be less
than welcoming in their public policy affecting accepted asylees in an effort to deter
refugees from arriving. A study of the European Union indicates that countries com-
pete in a race to the bottom for provision of services through five areas of asylum
policy: ‘safe third country’ provisions, determination procedures, compulsory dis-
persal policy, welfare vouchers, and obstacles from employment (Thielemann 2004).
Critically, because the nation-state holds exclusive control over the bodies in its
territory, the right of asylum following from international law is generally understood
as a right for the state to grant or deny, rather than the right of an individual to
claim (Boed 1994). To be granted asylum as a refugee, according to the UN 1951
Refugee Convention, one must have a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion” (United National 1951). As outlined above, the construction of
climate-induced calamities as “natural” disasters, therefore, influences the perceived
legitimacy of resulting claims to refugeehood and asylum (Shacknove 1985). That
is, insofar as events such as hurricanes and droughts are interpreted as apolitical
tragedies, the presumed contract between citizen and state that grounds refugee policy
is never broken, thus lacking a sufficient claim of persecution.
10.4 Case Studies of Environmental Migration
The risks associated with climate change vary greatly between different geographic
locations and different social structures (IPCC 2014). Correspondingly, the mech-
anisms by which climate change can influence the flow of people also vary widely
from place to place, with corresponding sets of losses and damages faced by the
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affected populations at the time of departure as well as in the process of resettlement.
In this section, we detail a selection of cases in which the environment plays a role
in the displacement of a population, including sea-level rise, cyclonic storms, and
desertification, as well as the role of deforestation as a driver of both climate change
and migration. We outline examples of each, highlighting the complex set of losses
and damages incurred by populations in each case.
10.4.1 Sea-Level Rise in Pacific Island States
The dominantmedia representation of Pacific Small IslandDeveloping States (SIDS)
is of drowning islands, with rising sea levels compelling residents to move (Barnett
and Campbell 2010). However, this narrative is simplistic for two reasons. Firstly,
while sea-level rise does cause erosion andmore frequent, and intense flooding events
(Nurse et al. 2014), and floods can damage property, destroy crops, contaminatewater
supplies and spread disease through penetrating septic tanks (ADB 2014), it is not the
only climate hazard driving mobility. Changes in rainfall can combine with lack of
aquifers to produce a shortage of water for bathing, drinking, cooking and agriculture
(IPCC 2014) and the increase in CO2 in the atmosphere is contributing to ocean
acidification, impacting on fisheries (Manzello et al. 2017). Secondly, islanders are
not automatons which respond to climate change in fixed way by moving away from
the sea. Instead, they have a degree of individual and collective agency to respond, and
adapt to climate change (Gemenne 2011). It is also true that both climate change risk
perceptions and attitudes towards mobility are nuanced and differentiated within
Pacific SIDS. Recent qualitative research on Kiribati found three distinct shared
viewpoints on the themes. One group seemed to exempt itself from agency in the
matter, claiming that God would decide the fate of Kiribati. Another group believed
that climate change would likely result in some people leaving their islands, while a
final group stressed the existential threats of climate change to islands, populations
and culture (Oakes et al. 2016).
Nonetheless, when the impacts of climate change interact with the physical geog-
raphy and developmental status of the SIDS, human mobility can and does occur and
such movements have implications for Loss and Damage, with a general trend of
the more agential the movement, the less severe losses and damages. Displacement
can occur when an intensive natural hazard such as a storm or flood compels peo-
ple to leave their place of residence. Forcibly displaced persons have little control
over when, where and how they move and as a result are more likely to be subject
to losses and damages. In Kiribati, a survey revealed that almost every household
(94%) reported that they had been impacted by a natural hazard over the period
2005–2015, with sea-level rise affecting 80% of households (Oakes et al. 2016).
The same study found that one in seven of all movements from 2005 to 2015 were
attributed to environmental change (14%), and the vast majority of such movements
were internal (Fig. 10.6). This is despite the fact that international movement is often
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Fig. 10.6 The main reasons for moving in Kiribati 2005–2015. Source Oakes et al. (2016)
seen as desirable, suggesting a lack of choice in destination for people impacted by
a climate-impacted environment.
Losses and damages suffered in the context of such climate change related dis-
placement can be in the form of health, access to services and education, protection
and culture (Unicef UK 2017). In Pacific SIDS, king tides cause frequent floods and
are intensified by sea level rise and La Niña years (Lin et al. 2014). There can be very
short intervals between king tides (Lin et al. 2014) meaning that households have
little time to recover and can be locked into a vicious cycle of recovery. Vulnerable
groups are particularly at risk. Climate change related environmental degradation
has meant that children in Pacific SIDS have been forced to move to islands with
more resilient infrastructure for schooling. Often this involves staying with extended
families, which can place them at risk of all forms of abuse (PRRRT 2014).
Voluntary migration typically makes place as people seekmore secure livelihoods
less impacted by environmental hazards such as changes in rainfall, agricultural
yields and fisheries. In such instances, losses and damages can be less severe. The I-
Kiribati idea of “migration with dignity” has not been defined in a policy document,
but revolves around facilitating voluntary migration through improving education
and developing international networks (Voigt-Graf and Kagan 2017). In this man-
ner, it is hoped that people can migrate, generating remittances to enable adaptation
(IOM 2017a) improve their livelihoods (Gemenne and Blocher 2017) and in so doing
reduce future losses and damages inducing displacement. However, in both Kiribati
(Oakes et al. 2016) and Tuvalu (Milan et al. 2016) international migration is limited
by finances and permits. In the absence of options to move internationally, the major-
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ity of internal movements in these countries are to the capital cities, contributing to
overcrowding and threatening the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals
and other development targets, especially those related to sanitation (Locke 2009;
ADB 2014; Oakes et al. 2016). Such urbanisation may therefore be termed maladap-
tive as it can increase both vulnerability and exposure to hazards (de Sherbinin 2013).
Planned relocation in SIDS takes place when the state or other authority organises
the re-settlement of communities out of harm’s way, often because of encroachment
by the ocean (Charan et al. 2017). Stratford et al. (2013) explain how the Tuvaluan
word “Fenua” is useful for describing the concept of place for communities in Pacific
SIDS:
A set of customary practices and territorial markers, fenua captures the ways in which Pacific
community identity is usually linked to part of an island—such as a valley or bay—and
explains the biographical location of identity in place. Fenua is a term that indistinguishably
bundles together community/people/places. (Stratford et al. 2013:69)
Fenua therefore explains how culture and life itself is often inextricable from
the land, island or part of the island of a people and goes some way to explain-
ing the complexity inherent in relocations. Throughout the 20th century various
relocations took place within the Pacific region, many of which were unsuccess-
ful for not considering livelihoods or cultural differences (Connell 2012) and even
possibly contributing to deaths as people were exposed to new environmental risks
(Donner 2015). Unsurprisingly, proposed relocations have been rejected by the mov-
ing community (Tabucanon and Opeskin 2011). Some people are reticent to move as
potential migrants feel that they will lose a link to their past and their very cultural
identity (Mortreaux and Barnettt 2009). As a result, moving from home can bring
feelings of grief and anxiety (Doherty and Clayton 2011) and people may stay in
objectively risky areas (Oakes et al. 2016). Some recent relocations have been more
successful where processes are participatory and consideration is given to culture
and livelihoods (Tabucanon 2012). Guidelines of good practice have been produced
to improve the experiences of those who relocate which may contribute to better
results for both relocating and host communities (Brookings and UNHCR 2015),
thereby minimising losses and damages.
10.4.2 Cyclonic Storms
Cyclonic storms affect tropical and subtropical regions, in theAtlantic,Caribbean and
North-East Pacific as hurricanes and in North-West Pacific as typhoons and the South
Pacific and Indian Ocean as cyclones. It is impossible to link a particular storm to
climate change, and globallywith increased temperatures, less storms could form due
to changes in wind shear (Vecchi and Soden 2007). Nonetheless climate change will
likely result in higher risk from cyclones through increased average sea temperatures
causing more intense and wetter storms and sea-level rise magnifying the impact of
storm surges—the main killer in cyclones (IPCC 2012). These climatic changes are
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occurring at the same time as economic and demographic changes, which result in
larger, more vulnerable populations living in more exposed areas (Hugo 2011). As
a result, globally millions of people are affected each year, with 12.9 million people
displaced by storms in 2016 (IDMC 2017). Whether human mobility related to a
cyclone is before or after the event, the losses and damages can be extensive.
Poorer countries are typically more exposed to cyclonic storms due to their loca-
tions in tropical regions and more vulnerable to their impacts due to poverty, liveli-
hoods dependent on natural resources and low levels of education and healthcare
(Blaikie et al. 2014). Bangladesh is low-lying and deltaic meaning that each year
millions of vulnerable people are living in areas exposed to cyclones and floods. As
such, according to the World Risk Index, in 2016 Bangladesh was the 5th most at
risk country in the world (Garschagen et al. 2016). Although Bangladesh has early
warning systems, these do not always grant sufficient time for people to leave in a
manner to minimise losses and damages. Moreover, some people may stay to protect
their livelihoods (Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016). There are also cultural barriers which
may contribute to non-evacuation. Some people may be fatalistic about cyclones
and conceptualise evacuation as against Allah’s will (Haque 1995). Unaccompanied
women might not go to the cyclone shelter, as it can be culturally taboo (Paul 2014).
In cyclone shelters, and on the journey to them, women and children are at risk of
disease through insanitary conditions and may even cause themselves harm through
reluctance to go to the toilet in public (Unicef UK 2017).
After repeated displacements Bangladeshis maymove either seasonally or perma-
nently (Unicef UK2017), makingDhaka one of fastest growing city in theworldwith
residents subject to losses and damages. Almost half the population of Dhaka lives in
slums where approximately a third have no access to sanitation (World Bank 2015)
and are exposed to communicable disease (Banu et al. 2013). Children in Dhaka
presented a significantly higher number of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)
than children who had not been displaced (Molla et al. 2014). Seasonal or permanent
migration to a city can bring new or increased risks related to working conditions
(Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016) and children can miss out on school if they are obliged
to find work (Unicef UK 2017).
Rich countries are not immune to losses and damages associated with mobility
related to cyclonic storms. The USA is frequently impacted by hurricanes, with
875,000 people displaced by Hurricane Matthew in 2016 (IDMC 2017). By mid-
October, the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season had produced 15 storms, 10 hurricanes
and5major hurricanes,while themonth of September 2017was the singlemost active
month for Atlantic storms on record (The Weather Channel 2017). Projections for
the North Atlantic show a 45% increase in the number of major hurricanes (category
3 or above) in the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986-2005 and an 11% increase in
related rainfall (Knutson et al. 2010). Hurricanes Irene and Sandy in 2011 and 2012
respectivelymay provide evidence of a shift in the hurricane belt (IPCC 2012), which
could have implications for a population lacking the experience and infrastructure
to cope with hurricanes (Cutter et al. 2007).
The poorest and ethnic minority communities are typically those which suffer
the most severe losses and damages through hurricane displacement. The natural
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and man-made processes which combined for Hurricane Katrina, meant that some
termed the disaster “death by political economy” for the African America residents
of Louisiana (Price 2008). Children are also more likely to be affected by hurricane
displacement. Children displaced by Hurricane Katrina were five times more likely
to suffer from emotional distress (Abramson et al. 2010) and those in a state of
prolonged displacement and unable to return to the city were more likely to suffer
from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression than those who moved within the
city (Hansel et al. 2013). Over a third of children displaced by Hurricane Katrina
were a year or more behind in school (Abramson et al. 2010). There were also
ramifications on school behaviour, attendance, suspension, expulsion and drop-out
rates (Pane et al. 2006; Ward et al. 2008).
In the USA, typically 20–30% of the affected populations fail to respond to evac-
uation orders and remain in the disaster area during storms (Redlener 2006). This
can be attributed to differentiated risk perception, others fail to evacuate prior to the
landfall of the hurricane to avoid perceived losses and damages that leaving entails.
Reasons for not evacuating include the discomfort for elderly or infirm (VanWilligen
et al. 2002) protecting one’s home from looters (Riad et al. 1999), previous problems
with evacuation traffic (Morss and Hayden 2010), anxiety about being arrested for
undocumented workers (Tiefenbacher and Wilson 2012), reluctance to leave pets
(Heath et al. 2001) and the need to be able to clean up after the storm as soon as
possible (Dash and Morrow 2000).
10.4.3 The Desertification of West Africa and the Ascendance
of Boko Haram
Natural disasters—however unnatural—are not the only movers of people across
nations and regions. The changing terrain that accompanies widespread climate
change also shifts geo-political realities, and with them the landscape of conflict.
Here, we consider the ways in which slowly-worsening environmental conditions
change people’s locations and lives, specifically desertification and deforestation.
Desertification hasmade previously fertile agricultural land functionally uninhab-
itable in regions throughout the world (Bettini and Andersson 2014; Owusu 2013;
Vieira et al. 2015). Existing research has linked this phenomenon to man-made cli-
mate change for nearly 25 years (Hulme andKelly 1993; Calabrò andMagazù 2016).
In the case of the Sahara, it has made already tenuous post-colonial regimes even
more vulnerable, as fragile states struggle to maintain basic services while grappling
with the arrival of citizens and migrants in transit (Ferris 2012). Traditional ways of
life have been rendered obsolete as villages are overtaken by the sand of the Sahel
and, in the case of Nigeria, the trend has worked to further impoverish the Northern
provinces of the nation (Mantzikos 2010). In the Maiduguri province of Northern
Nigeria, school teachers were unable to cultivate land or fish during school breaks.
This newly found desperation contributed to their organising of students into the rad-
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ical Islamist organisation referred to as Boko Haram (Deckard et al. 2015; Walker
2012).
With the rise of Boko Haram has come relentless attacks against Nigerian secu-
lar institutions—especially in the North (Mohammed 2014; Agbiboa 2013). Actual
deaths since 2009 number approximately 100,000 (Tukur 2017), and churches
(Michael Kpughe 2017), schools (Aghedo and Osumah 2012) and public spaces
(Maiangwa et al. 2012) have all been targeted. The relentless violence has been
met by similar attacks by the Nigerian military—resulting in thousands more civil-
ian casualties. As of 2017, Boko Haram has displaced an estimated two million
Northern Nigerians, sending families fleeing throughout Nigeria and into the neigh-
bouring countries of Chad and Cameroon (Tukur 2017). Certainly, the actions of
individual Boko Haram and Nigeria military members are to blame for this displace-
ment, but also worth understanding is the way in which slow-moving environmental
degradation has contributed to the conflict between the two parties, and subsequent
displacement of millions. In the stories of the displaced, there is much discussion of
deteriorating conditions and a wish to return to not only the geographical home—but
the traditional one (Jacob et al. 2016). Given the realities of climate change, however,
this traditional home may be considered a fictive one, as livelihoods are no longer
sustainable.
10.4.4 The Deforestation of the Southern Cone
and the Urbanisation of the Campesino
In the consideration of climate change as a driver of migration, we can see the
ways in which natural disasters and sea-level rise displace populations, as well as
consequences of damages to traditional livelihoods in the case of Nigeria. In addi-
tion to examples of displacement and conflict relating to climate change, there are
development-related phenomena that are causal agents of climate change, while also
working to drive migration. In such cases, as people are systematically moved, the
land is cleared for further development, spurring both climate change at the local and
global level and a continued feedback loop of migration and further development.
Here, we treat the specific issue of monoculture-propelled deforestation in South
America’s Southern Cone—a documented cause of the type of slow-moving climate
change that pushes intergenerational movement (Bonan 2008).
Soybean monoculture increasingly defines the landscape of the Southern Cone
and the lives of the people in it (Oliveira and Hecht 2016). The link between soy,
deforestation and changing climate is well-documented in both the scholarly litera-
ture and the collective memory of communities torn apart by soy (Fehlenberg, et al.
2017; Hetherington 2011). As deforestation continues apace, realities for peasant
campesinos in Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil are being upended (Fair 2011).
In response to their wholesale dispossession at the hands of agribusiness and with
the collusion of the various national governments, campesinos have been migrat-
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ing—both to urban areas within their own countries and abroad Parrado and Cerrutti
(2003). The Paraguayan case is particularly instructive, given the nation’s status as
a paradigm of neoliberal governance in its post-dictatorship (Nickson and Lambert
2002; Ezquerro-Cañete 2016). As the state’s “hands off” approach to both export-
oriented agribusiness and migration has allowed the results of deforestation to affect
the nation’s social dynamics in a way that is largely uninfluenced by regulation or
legislation.
Paraguayan campesinos overwhelmingly relocate to informal settlements in the
nation’s three largest urban centres (Hetherington 2011; Reed 2015). These slum
areas, known as bañados, are completely without the presence of the state—with
dwellings having no reliable access to power, no mailing addresses and complying
with no legal building codes (Reed 2015; Cunningham et al. 2012). Despite the
presence of privately built streets of various quality, the communities do not appear on
maps.As indicated by the nomenclature,bañados are located infloodplains—leaving
the residents to evacuate to public parks and street corners on higher ground in times
of flood (Hetherington 2011). Although bañados have no permanent infrastructure,
residences are inhabited multi-generationally, with adults in 2017 living with their
children in themost desirably located bañado homes constructed by the grandparents
as early as the 1930s. Although the families may be understood as displaced, their
current homes are permanently in temporary spaces, and their government has no
demonstrated intention of changing this reality.
10.5 Conclusions
As climate change continues to put at risk the livelihoods and personal security of
populations throughout the world, the movement of people internally and across
international borders will continue. Due to the numerous consequences of climate
change and the ways climate change interacts with other environmental stressors
and existing social structures, the pathways by which changes in climate displace
populations differ greatly between places, overlapping in ways specific to a par-
ticular locale. In this chapter, we outlined examples of these overlapping climate
risks in locations including Pacific Small Island Developing States, West Africa and
the Southern Cone, highlighting the complex interactions between the environment,
natural resources, extreme weather, and society. With the push of populations away
from their homes through sea-level rise, cyclones, desertification, or other environ-
mental change, we draw attention to the ways in which displaced populations are
received and the challenges they face in resettlement. This piece is critical for under-
standing the losses and damages associated with dislocation, as risks to displaced
populations do not end once they have left their homeland. Studies of climate-related
displacement must address where people move to and how the political economy of
the sending and receiving nations affects the capacity of migrants to resettle and
succeed in their new country. Additionally, in considering future climate change and
its effects on populations, we must also acknowledge that in the face of losses and
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damages to livelihoods and safety, not all are able to relocate. Studies of climate-
induced migration will also need to take into account those left behind and whether
they have sufficient resources to address future damages from climate change. In this
way, future studies of climate and displacement must include both the process of
leaving and resettling, as covered here, as well as an investigation into the standard
of living for those who remained.
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Part III
Research and Practice:
Reviewing Methods and Tools
Chapter 11
The Role of the Physical Sciences in Loss
and Damage Decision-Making
Ana Lopez, Swenja Surminski and Olivia Serdeczny
Abstract This chapter reviews the implications of Loss and Damage (L&D) for
decision-making with a special focus on the role of the physical sciences for deci-
sion support. From the point of view of climate science, the question regarding the
estimation of losses and damages associated with climate change can be thought of
in terms of two temporal scales: the present and the future. In both cases the aim is to
establish the links between human-induced changes in climate and climate variabil-
ity, the probability of occurrence of extreme meteorological events (e.g., rainfall),
and the resulting hazard that causes losses and damages (e.g., flood). We review the
approaches used to assess the hazard component of risk, with a special emphasis
on identifying sources of uncertainty and the potential for providing robust infor-
mation to support decision-making. We then discuss tools and approaches that have
been developed in the context of Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) to deal with
uncertainty from climate science in order to avoid a ‘wait and see’ mentality for
decision-making. We argue that these can be applied to some parts of L&D decision-
making, in the same way as suggested for CCA, since the challenges presented by
the need to reduce and manage climate change losses and damages are not very dif-
ferent from the ones presented by the need to adapt to climate change and variability.
However additional challenges for decision-makers, particularly in the context of the
underlying science, are posed by the compensation and burden-sharing components
of L&D for climate impacts that are beyond mitigation and adaptation’s reach.
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11.1 Introduction
Article 8 of theParisAgreement calls for action on ‘averting,minimising and address-
ing Loss and Damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, includ-
ing extreme weather events and slow onset events.’ In response, decisions need to
be made—on a wide range of topics and at various levels of governance ranging
from the global level, where UNFCCC negotiators need to decide how to take this
topic forward, how to allocate funding and to establish possible institutional frame-
works around Loss and Damage (L&D), all the way through to the local level, where
communities need to understand and manage changing risks.
Despite significant progress in scientific understanding and methodological
advances, decision makers face key constraints when making those decisions: lim-
ited data, uncertainty about climatic and socio-economic trends, and the complex
interplay between climate and human behaviour may seem as insurmountable and
lead to inactivity if not addressed properly.
These challenges are well known to those tasked with climate change adaptation
and disaster risk management (Watkiss 2015), and a range of decision-support tools
have been developed in response. However, assessing and addressing L&D suffers
from a further level of complexity: it is a politically charged concept, with blurred
conceptual boundaries (e.g., where do climate change adaptation efforts stop and
where does the L&D remit start?) and amoral and ethical dimension (see introduction
by Mechler et al. 2018; chapters by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018; Schinko et al.
2018; James et al. 2018; Botzen et al. 2018 in this book).
The L&D of climate change officially entered the UNFCCC discussions in 2007,
but the concept itself has a far longer history. Growing awareness of the projected
negative impacts of climate change has been at the core of the emerging mitigation
and adaptation efforts. In the early adaptation literature, there was reference to the
residual impacts after mitigation and adaptation were carried out. In this context, the
idea of L&D associated with extreme events appeared as a consequence of the limits
to current levels of adaptation (Smit et al. 2000; Smithers and Smit 1997).
While L&D under the UNFCCC is foremost a political concept determined by
legal considerations around climate change, the technical dimension of L&D has its
roots in the general risk management methodology, based on a terminology widely
applied originally in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and later on in Climate Change
Adaptation (CCA). UNFCCC (2012a) explores the terminology in detail—highlight-
ing different approaches toL&Das currently applied toDRRandCCA.Most broadly,
‘damage’ is seen as the physical impact and ‘loss’ as monetized values, which could
be direct or indirect (economic follow on effects) (UNFCCC 2012a). Here the focus
is on categorising, assessing and projecting impacts of events—mainly in the context
of disasters, but also in the context of climate change implications for sudden-onset
and slow-onset impacts, over a range of time-scales, and including direct and indirect
economic losses, as well as so-called non-economic losses such as losses of lives and
of eco-system services. In the broader climate change context L&D is often described
as the third cost element of climate change, as outlined by Klein et al. (2007) (see
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also van Vuuren et al. 2011): mitigation costs, adaptation costs and residual damage.
In this context addressing L&D is seen as addressing those losses that are likely to
occur despite adaptation and mitigation efforts.
This academic exercise of framing L&D (see also chapters byMechler et al. 2018
and James et al. 2018 in this book) is replicated amongst policy makers—where
different interpretations of scope and concept are apparent amongstUNFCCCParties,
as highlighted by Kreft (2012): “Some Parties suggest that L&D is the residual risk
when mitigation is insufficient, and when the full potential of adaptation is not met
(Norway)while others frameL&Das the residual losses and damages aftermitigation
and adaptation choices have been made (Gambia). Ghana proposes that the concept
of Loss and Damage from the adverse effects of climate be viewed as additional to
adaptation focusing on challenges of both identifying and addressing the instances
when adaptation is no longer possible. However, Bolivia maintains that Loss and
Damage from the adverse effects of climate change concept is beyond adaptation,
and as such is additional to adaptation, focusing on challenges of both identifying
and addressing the instances when adaptation is no longer possible” (Kreft 2012).
This discourse highlights that stakeholders have different priorities and ambitions
for action on L&D. Those can be broadly summarised in three categories of decision
goals for L&D (Surminski and Lopez 2014):
• To create awareness about the sensitivity of human and natural systems to climate
and the need to respond with appropriate mitigation, adaptation and DRR policies
(UNFCCC 2012b).
• To develop risk reduction and riskmanagement responses, with the goal to enhance
adaptation to reduce vulnerability and build resilience; in this case the evaluation
of climate risk is a necessary component of any adaptation options appraisal. This
category has many analogies with CCA and DRR, addressing the assessment of
and response to risks.
• To inform discussions on fair burden-sharing and compensation arrangements
for L&D. While discussions around compensation underlined debates on L&D
particularly in their beginning, they have lost immediate relevance in the official
discussions since the Paris decision that stated that L&Dwould not provide a basis
for compensation or liability.
In this chapter we consider how climate science can support those three goals and
howuncertainties and limitations arising from the analysis of the climate hazard affect
L&D decision-making. In particular, we discuss the role that existing approaches to
decision making could play when addressing each of the policy goals embedded in
the climate change L&D discussion. We conclude with a commentary and outlook
for the on-going discussions about L&D.
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11.2 L&D from a Physical Science Point of View—The
Challenges of Assessing the Risk
Risk is a function of hazard, exposure and vulnerability. Therefore, any attempt of
assessing the risk of losses and damages from climate change needs to incorporate
two key components and illustrate their interplay: data on vulnerability and exposure,
as well as information on the climatic hazard, including current climatic variability
and future, long-term projections of climate change (UNFCCC 2008, 2012a). From
a physical science perspective the focus is traditionally on the hazard side of risks,
but there is a clear recognition that data needs and limitations for vulnerability and
exposure assessments are equally important for understanding climate change risks.
The information about the climate hazard1 relates to the physical phenomena,
such as large cyclonic storms or long-term reductions in precipitation, and their
consequences, such as flooding or drought. This hazard information contains the
input to estimate the magnitude and frequency of damaging meteorological events
in DRR approaches, or to project changes in climate risks to inform CCA. From the
physical sciences point of view, there are challenges to estimate the hazard part of
the total risk common to all interpretations of L&D.
IPCC’s SREX concluded with high confidence that increasing exposure of people
and economic assets has been the major cause of long-term increases in economic
losses from weather- and climate-related disasters, arguing that the development
pathways of a country or community do influence exposure and vulnerability (IPCC
2012). But understanding the ‘multi-faceted nature’ (IPCC 2012) of both exposure
and vulnerability is still a challenge, due to data limitations and the inherent uncer-
tainty in socio-economic trends (GAR 2011). The data required for assessing vulner-
ability and exposure varies, depending on scope and context. It can include historical
loss information, property databases, demographic data, macroeconomic data such
as debt and fiscal budgets (UNFCCC 2012a). In addition there are the intangibility
aspects of L&D, which are not valued by markets and therefore are often left out of
any assessments. The ability to capture direct and indirect losses is also identified
as a key challenge as highlighted at the 36th Subsidiary Body for Implementation
meeting in May 2012, where it was noted that available estimates on losses typi-
cally lack numbers on non-economic losses such as culture and heritage (UNFCCC
2012b). Government asset databases or sectorial disaster loss data are not available
in all countries, or they may be very limited in scope, not capturing those intangible
impacts (Mechler et al. 2009). This makes assumptions and extrapolations neces-
sary, which add to the degree of uncertainty for L&D assessments. The chapter by
Bouwer (2018) in this book discusses in more detail the interplay between exposure
and vulnerability and observed and expected losses due to anthropogenic climate
change.
1We note that, while the IPCC AR5 refers to ‘physical impacts’ as the impacts of climate change
on geophysical systems, including floods, droughts, and sea level rise, we use the term ‘hazard’
instead to refer to the physical impacts.
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To evaluate the current and changing likelihood of climatic hazards different
sources of information are employed (IPCC 2012, 2013, 2014a, b). Historical records
of climate variables, such as temperature or precipitation, are used to estimate the
hazard probability under historical climatic conditions. Climate models are used
to estimate changes of these variables in the future under different scenarios of
greenhouse gasses’ emissions or concentrations. Hazard and impact models are then
employed to evaluate how changes in climatic variables will produce changes in
natural or human systems, e.g., how changes in precipitation patterns will affect
flood regimes in a given catchment.
In the rest of this section we briefly describe the information and tools utilised to
estimate the current observed hazard probability and its projected changes.
11.2.1 Observed Hazard
Historical records of climate variables must be accurate, representative, homoge-
neous and of sufficient length if they are to provide robust estimates of current
hazard probability. The robustness of the inferred probabilities depends for instance
on the record length; short records of precipitation in a particular location do not
provide enough information about the extreme precipitation events that might have
occurred in the past. Poor quality of data (incorrect records or missing data) can
induce large uncertainties in the estimation of current climatic hazards. While data
for temperature and precipitation is more widely available, other variables such as
soil moisture are poorly monitored, or extreme wind speeds are not monitored with
sufficient spatial resolution.
Paleoclimatology can provide information about rare, large magnitude hydro-
meteorological events in places where long enough observational records are not
available and good proxies to estimate the magnitude of past events such as floods or
droughts can be found. For instance, instrumental records of floods at gauge stations
are limited in spatial coverage and time, with only a small number of gauge stations
spanningmore than 50 years. Pre-instrumental flood data can provide information for
longer periods, however the current availability of this data is scarce particularly in
spatial coverage (IPCC 2012). Paleoclimate data can then provide information about
a range of climate hazards that have occurred in the remote past, often illustrating
the fact that, in many cases, the recent observational records provide very limited
information about the range of the unforced natural variability in a particular location
(Benito et al. 2004; IPCC 2012). However, paleoclimatology can only provide infor-
mation in cases where adequate proxies exist, as for instance tree-ring temperature
and rainfall reconstructions, paleo coastal surges, etc.; but it is not a viable option
for some other variables such as high resolution wind speed.
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11.2.2 Projected Changes in Hazard
Projections of changes in future climate are generally derived using General Circula-
tionModels (GCMs) which simulate the response of the climate system to a scenario
of future emissions or concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols. Even though
the physical and chemical processes in the climate system follow known physical
laws, its complexity implies that many simplifications and approximations have to
be made when modelling them. The choice of approximations creates a variety of
physical climate models (IPCC 2013).
There are different sources of uncertainties in climate model simulations, includ-
ing (anthropogenic and natural) forcing, initial conditions, and model imperfections
(both model uncertainty and model inadequacy) (Stainforth et al. 2007). Climate
forcing or scenario uncertainty is introduced by the fact that, to simulate future cli-
mate, the models are run using different scenarios of anthropogenic forcings that
either represent plausible but inherently unknowable future socioeconomic develop-
ment,2 or could arise as the result of multiple pathways of socioeconomic develop-
ment (Meinshausen et al. 2011). Climate model imperfections and initial conditions
uncertainties are due to our incomplete knowledge of the climate system, the lim-
itations of computer models to simulate it, and the system’s non-linearity (Knutti
et al. 2007; Stainforth et al. 2007). To quantify climate model uncertainty a variety
of climate models have been developed around the world. For instance, the IPCC
AR5 report (IPCC 2013) includes projections from 42 climate models.
The uncertainty in projections of future climate variability is quantified by con-
structing, for a given climate model, a set of projections that are initialised in slightly
different ways (see for instance Deser et al. (2012a, b) for the effect of initialisation
in long term projections for a single climate model, and Kirtman et al. (2013) for
near term or decadal projections). For each possible forcing scenario, ensembles of
different climate models that include various approaches to implementing the com-
ponents of the climate system, and, within each model, different parameterisations
and initialisations, are used to estimate the effect of climate model imperfections and
initial conditions uncertainties in the projections of climate change.
The relative contributions to the total uncertainty from these different sources
depend on the spatial scale, the lead-time of the projection, and the variable of
interest. For instance for precipitation, at spatial scales of the order of 1000 km,
internal variability is the main source of uncertainty in climate model projections for
many regions in the world for lead times up to three decades ahead, while forcing
uncertainty dominates thereafter (Kirtman et al. 2013; Booth et al. 2013; Hawkins
and Sutton 2009).
While GCMs simulate the entire Earth with a relatively coarse spatial resolu-
tion (e.g. they can capture features with scales of a hundred kilometres or larger),
regional climate projections downscaled from GCMs have a much higher resolution
2This is the approach used prior to the IPCC AR5 report, see for instance IPCC (2000), Moss et al.
(2008).
11 The Role of the Physical Sciences in Loss and Damage … 267
(simulating features with scales as small as a few kilometres). Downscaling can be
accomplished through one of two techniques: ‘dynamical’ or ‘statistical’ downscal-
ing (Wilby et al. 2009). ‘Dynamical’ downscaling refers to the process of nesting
high resolution Regional Climate Models (RCMs) within a global GCM (Hewitson
et al. 2014; Giorgi et al. 2015) while ‘statistical’ downscaling relies on using sta-
tistical relationships between large-scale atmospheric variables and regional climate
(often at meteorological station level) to generate projections of future local climatic
conditions. Statistical methods may also include weather generators that simulate
weather events and their extremes. Downscaling approaches do not provide magical
fixes to possible limitations in the data being downscaled (Kerr 2011). In cases where
the large scale GCM signal accurately represents the observed one, downscaling can
add value by incorporating features that are absent in GCMs, such as the effect of
coastlines and complex orography (Hall 2014). However, when for instance differ-
ent RCMs driven by the same GCM show a wide range of responses in precipitation
(Hewitson et al. 2014), the generation of climate projections using downscaling tech-
niques will often increase the level of uncertainty in the original GCM projections,
having significant effects in the estimation of probabilities of occurrence of damaging
events in DRR models and climate change risk assessments.
Climate model projections (and their downscaled versions) provide information
about climate variables such as temperature, precipitation, sea level, etc. The next
step in a climate risk assessment involves understanding how changes in the climate
variables will affect natural or human systems. Hazard models are computational
models that take as inputs observed or simulated climate variables such as tempera-
ture, precipitation, soil moisture content, wind speed, etc., and use them to simulate
the variables that are relevant to analyse a particular weather or climate hazard (IPCC
2012, 2014a, b). For instance, extreme rainfall events can cause floods. But to esti-
mate the extent of the flooded area, hydrological and hydraulic models are used to
generate the flood footprint for each particular event (Ranger et al. 2011; Jha et al.
2012). Some of the limitations of hazard models are similar to those of climate mod-
els: poor representation of the physical processes involved, calibration issues and
computational constraints all contribute to compounding the uncertainties in the cli-
mate inputs with the uncertainties in the hazard model outputs. This is illustrated,
for example, by multi-model assessments of water availability and flood potential,
where a large ensemble of global hydrological models is forced by an ensemble of
GCMs to estimate climate change impacts on water resources. These studies show
that climate and hydrological models contribute to a similar extent to the spread in
relative river flows’ changes globally (Schewe et al. 2014; Dankers et al. 2014).
An alternative approach to estimate the physical impacts of climate change used
when model projections are not available, is the use of ‘analogies.’ Two types of
analogies are possible: spatial analogies whereby another part of the world experi-
encing similar conditions to those expected to occur in the future is used as a proxy
to estimate future impacts in the region of interest; and temporal analogies whereby
changes in the past (sometimes obtained from paleo-records) are used to make infer-
ences about changes in the future. This approach has two limitations. Firstly, expert
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judgment is required to estimate the uncertainty of the projected impacts (Bos et al.
2015; IPCC 2014a, b). Secondly, the applicability of the approach depends on the
climate variable and the location; for example Dahinden et al. (2017) show that it is
often not possible to find analogues in temperature and precipitation simultaneously.
The above discussion refers specifically to the estimation of the hazard component
of risk. As already mentioned, the risk is, however, the probability of occurrence of
the hazard multiplied by the impacts if these events occur. In the IPCC AR5 ‘cli-
mate change impacts’ refer to “the effect on lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems,
economies, societies, cultures, services, and infrastructure due to the interaction of
climate changes or hazardous climate events occurring within a specific time period
and the vulnerability of an exposed society or system” (IPCC 2014a).
Therefore, the study of ‘climate change impacts’ requires impacts models that
combine projections of climate change with socio-economic scenarios. To this end,
the Inter-Sectorial Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP) aims to study
the impacts of climate change on flood hazard, food and water availability, health,
ecosystems and coastal infrastructure, together with their interactions and uncer-
tainties in order to provide a comprehensive picture of climate change risks (see
Schellnhuber et al. (2014) and references therein).
When considering the risk, including exposure and vulnerability, at shorter time
scales, in many cases the current natural variability of the climate system and other
non-climatic drivers of risks will have a higher impact than the climatic changes
driven by changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. For example,
in the near term, changes in exposure such as urbanization and building housing
developments on flood-prone areas could increase significantly the risk of flooding
and damage to the aforementioned infrastructure, independently of climate change.
Over longer time scales, it is expected that anthropogenic climate change will often
play a more significant role (Oppenheimer et al. 2014).
The above discussion about the estimation of the climate hazard is closely related
to, and based on similar discussions in the context ofCCA.However, L&Dalso brings
something distinctly unique to the discussion: embedded in the political concept of
L&D, at least according to some, is the element of burden sharing and compensation,
which could require the estimation of the attributable fraction of losses and damages
to human induced climate change. From the physical sciences point of view, and
focusing on the question of attribution of the climate hazard or physical impact, it is
clear that estimations of changes in its likelihooddonot, a priori, have any information
about whether or not the changing probability can be attributed3 to human induced
climate change. Approaches that attempt to quantify the attributable component of
the changes in the probability of occurrence of meteorological hazards rely heavily
on climate models to compare the likelihood of the weather event with and without
the influence of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. However, as already
3As defined by the IPCC, detection of climate change is the process of demonstrating that climate
has changed in some defined statistical sense, without providing a reason for that change. Attribution
of causes of climate change is the process of establishing the most likely causes for the detected
change, either natural or anthropogenic, with some defined level of confidence (source: IPCC 2012).
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Fig. 11.1 The uncertainty cascade in the modelling chain from climate model forcings to the
estimation of the climate hazard (the physical impact of climate change). An estimation of the
total risk should include vulnerability and exposure scenarios that, in combination with the climate
hazard as inputs for an impact model, outputs the total impact on, for instance, lives, livelihoods,
health, ecosystems, economies, societies, cultures, services, and infrastructure
discussed, climate models have significant limitations to simulate the climate system
at the scales relevant for extreme meteorological events (Trenberth 2012; Trenberth
and Fasullo 2012). Therefore, an evaluation of the climate model skill (Stott et al.
2017) and the statistical reliability of the model-based probabilities (Bellprat and
Doblas-Reyes 2016; Weisheimer et al. 2017) should be carried out to ensure robust
estimates of attributable changes in climate hazards. For a detailed discussion on
attribution we refer the reader to the chapter by James et al. (2018) in this book.
In summary, a comprehensive modelling approach to assess climate change
induced hazards requires the combined simulation of all the domains. For flood risk,
for instance, it requires the modelling of the atmosphere and ocean, catchment river
network, flood plains and indirectly affected areas. As discussed above, and illus-
trated in Fig. 11.1, considerable uncertainty is introduced in each of the modelling
steps involved, including uncertainties about the greenhouse gas concentrations’
scenarios, the representation of physical processes in the global climate model, the
characterisation of natural variability, themethod of downscaling to catchment scales
and the hydrological and inundation models’ structures and parameterizations.
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As a result, the uncertainty associated with a complete modelling chain, from
climate forcing and simulation to estimation of hazard probability, is likely to increase
in each step, and become particularly large at local scales. In addition, uncertainty
estimates are always conditional on the modelling approaches used to obtain them,
and do not capture the full uncertainty (Smith and Stern 2011; Stainforth et al. 2007),
especially at local scales, where current modelling tools to generate projections
cannot produce reliable and robust estimates of future changes (Oreskes et al. 2010;
Risbey and O’Kane 2011). This is particularly important in the case of catastrophic
changes in the climate system that might occur due to non-linear feedbacks and
processes that are not known, or have not been adequately incorporated in the climate
models yet.
Nonetheless, the presence of uncertainties in the estimation of hazards, and the
fact that in some cases these uncertaintiesmight not decrease in time,4 should not stop
decisions being made. In the next section we discuss some of the decision-making
approaches utilised for CCA to deal specifically with this issue.
11.3 Challenges for L&D Decision-Making
L&D—both as a political concept but also in its technical dimension requires deci-
sions to be made at different scales from local to global, and by a range of stakehold-
ers with differing priorities and agendas. These can be broadly grouped into three
categories of L&D decision making goals (Surminski and Lopez 2014): creating
awareness about the sensitivity of human and natural systems to climate change;
developing risk reduction and risk management approaches to enhance adaptation,
reduce vulnerability and build resilience; and informing compensation and burden
sharing mechanisms.
All three require an understanding of the current and future scale and distribution
of climate related L&D.As noted above, decisionmakers are facedwith uncertainties
related to hazard, exposure and vulnerability: projections of future weather patterns
from different climate models often disagree (Heal and Milner 2014), while socio-
economic trends, which influence the impact of climate change, also suffer from
inherent uncertainty (IPCC 2012). For some, this may prove as a potentially welcome
excuse for inaction, for others this might lead to heated, almost unresolvable disputes
about the underlying science. Can this potential paralysation (Dessai et al. 2009) be
avoided?
4For instance, Knutti and Sedlacek (2013) show that the projected global temperature change
from the IPCC AR5 models is very similar to the one reported by the IPCC AR4 models after
taking into account the different underlying scenarios. Similarly, spatial patterns of temperature
and precipitation change and local model spread are also very consistent despite substantial model
development. These authors argue that model improvements often imply more confidence in their
projections, but do not necessarily narrow uncertainties.
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The ability to make L&D decisions depends on skills and know-how for assess-
ing the risks, and institutional capacity as well as funding to address those risks
(UNFCCC 2012a). But given the large uncertainties inherent to the estimation of
risk, the use of a decision-making framework that can make the best use of the
available information to develop strategies to reduce L&D is also key. Two widely
recognised decision-making frameworks have been discussed in the context of CCA:
the ‘top down or science-driven’ and the ‘bottom up or policy-driven’ frameworks.
In the first framework, the process starts with the generation of climate projec-
tions, often downscaled and corrected for possible biases, followed by an analysis
of their physical impacts that, combined with vulnerability assessments, are used
to design policies and adaptation options to mitigate those impacts. Application of
the ‘science-driven’ approach include, for instance, the Stern Review and the IPCC
risk assessments. This approach has been criticised for its heavy reliance on cli-
mate projections that are limited in their ability to represent key drivers of extreme
events and not generally fit for purpose for decision support (IPCC 2012; Smith
and Stern 2011; Stainforth et al. 2007), and for the potential lack of robustness of
the projected impacts due to different methodological issues (Hall 2007; Merz et al.
2010; Tebaldi and Knutti 2007). Uncertainty is clearly one of the key challenges
for decision-makers, especially when competing with concerns about daily lives.
But the uncertainty that comes with this approach does not only stem from climate
change; in fact the climate dimension just adds to the uncertainty derived from the
wide range of socio-economic and environmental factors considered, often referred
to as the ‘cascade of uncertainty’ (Schneider 1983) or the ‘uncertainty explosion’
(Henderson-Sellers 1993). Few science-first assessments have been used to evaluate
real adaptation options, since the ‘uncertainty explosion’ often renders the appraisal
of adaptation options impracticable (Dessai and Hulme 2007; Wilby and Dessai
2010).
The second framework starts with the adaptation problem itself rather than with
climate projections. It is based on risk management approaches that begin by defin-
ing the policy or adaptation goal to be addressed (Ranger et al. 2010a, b; Willows
et al. 2003). This includes delineating the objective or decision criteria, identifying
present and future climatic5 and non-climatic risks that make the system vulnerable,
identifying institutional and regulatory constraints, identifying the possible options,
5Modelling capabilities can be used to generate climate projections that, in combination with socio-
economic scenarios, result in suitable tools to assess vulnerabilities in different regions including,
where possible, the study of vulnerability to changes in frequency of occurrence of extreme events.
In the framework of scenario planning as an approach to support strategic decision-making, sce-
narios are intended to be challenging descriptions of a wide range of possible futures. Therefore,
the combination of climate and socio-economic scenarios we refer to cannot be, by construction,
representative of the full range of possible futures. On the climate modelling side for example,
missing feedbacks and unknown uncertainties in climate models limit the ability to represent all
plausible futures. Notwithstanding these constraints, scenarios can still be used as tools to consider
a range of possible futures, and their associated consequences. Then, an analysis of the options
available could be carried out, and feedback can be provided on what information about the likely
futures would be most valuable for decision makers.
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and only then (if necessary) appraising their appropriateness against a detailed set of
climate projections. In this context, the evaluation of climate risks is just one com-
ponent of the estimations of all the environmental and social stressors and changes
in socio-economic conditions that can induce system failures. Therefore the deci-
sion maker is encouraged to think broadly about the interactions of other risks and
priorities with the adaptation problem and look for strategies that have co-benefits
with other areas such as development and DRR. This approach was adopted in the
Thames 2100 Estuary project (Haigh and Fisher 2010) and includes, for instance,
community-based adaptation approaches.
Due to the complex, diverse, and context-dependent nature of CCA, it is cur-
rently recognised that there is no single approach to adaptation planning, with some
evidence suggesting that the links between adaptation planning and implementation
are strengthened when both, the science-driven and the policy-driven approaches are
combined (Mimura et al. 2014).
The topic of decision-making under uncertainty has received significant attention
in the context ofCCA (Dessai andHulme2007;Gilboa 2009; Lempert 2002; Lempert
and Collins 2007; Ranger et al. 2010a, b; and see McDermott 2016 and Heal and
Milner 2014 for overviews). Despite the fact that in some cases reliable and robust
projections are not possible (in somecases even the signof change is not known), there
are now several decision-making tools that, recognising the inherent uncertainties,
are used to develop public policy, particularly in the context of adaptation and flood
risk management. See Appendix 1 for an overview of some of the main tools.
Examples include adaptive management and scenario planning. Adaptive man-
agement allows for continuous modification of a policy or a strategy to take into
account new learning about future trends and impacts. This involves a high degree
of learning, experimenting and evaluation throughout the lifetime of the strategy or
policy. Scenario planning provides decision makers with a range of different, plau-
sible future scenarios. Policies and strategies can be tested against those scenarios
to assess how they may perform. For adaptation decision-making these approaches
have been developed into options analysis (Haigh and Fisher 2010; Ranger et al.
2010a, b; Dittrich et al. 2016) and portfolio analysis (Watkiss and Hunt 2016;
Dittrich et al. 2016).
Real options analysis was used in the Thames 2100Estuary project, with extensive
sensitivity testing of sea level rise assumptions (i.e. incorporating some elements of
robustness-based analyses) (Reeder and Ranger 2010). Gersonius et al. (2013) also
applied the real options analysis to urban drainage infrastructure in West Garforth,
England.
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Alternatively, decisionmakers can use these different scenarios to identify ‘robust’
strategies that would work well under most of these scenarios (Lempert and Collins
2007; Hallegatte 2009; Ranger et al. 2010a, b; Fankhauser et al. 2013; Weaver et al.
2013). Robust decision-making was applied to water supply management in Califor-
nia (Groves et al. 2008) and Flood risk management in Ho Chi Minh City Vietnam
(Lempert et al. 2013) (see chapter by Botzen et al. 2018).
Other examples of how these strategies have been applied in different countries
and sectors include the Dutch Delta Programme, the Louisiana Master Plan for a
Sustainable Coast, and the Colorado River Basin Supply and Demand Study (see
Lempert and Haasnoot 2017).
Even though these decision-strategies can be of value for L&D decision-making,
their application has remained relatively under-explored in this context.
In a broad sense there is clear merit in both science-driven and policy-driven
approaches for L&D decision making: scientific assessments are important for all
three L&D goals and should underpin and inform the decision process. This is par-
ticularly evident for the first L&D goal: identifying the risks and raising awareness
heavily relies on the underlying science and the socio-economic scenarios and cli-
mate and impacts models used. A top-down or science-driven approach appears most
relevant for this, but the adaptation and mitigation pathways are somewhat locked
by the climate scenario chosen.
However, planning any policies and measures in response will require from deci-
sion makers the need to design flexible adaptation and risk management pathways
that allow for periodic adjustments as new information becomes available, and the
possibility of changing to new routes when or if incremental adjustments are no
longer considered sufficient according to the evidence available at the time (Halle-
gatte 2009; Hulme et al. 2009; Lopez et al. 2010; Wilby and Dessai 2010; Bhave
et al. 2016). Moreover, the planning process will have to consider the fact that the
future might involve climate change events that are not predicted, combined with
unforeseen technological and societal developments. The ‘policy-driven’ approach
encourages the use of measures that are low regret, reversible, build resilience into
the system, incorporate safety margins, employ ‘soft’ solutions, are flexible, and
deliver multiple co-benefits (Hallegatte 2009; Hulme et al. 2009). In this context the
second L&D goal shows a strong parallel with climate adaptation planning: how
to minimise the climate change risk to tolerable levels, and what are the options to
manage what cannot be minimised? Consequently, the challenges presented by the
need to reduce and manage climate change losses and damages are not very different
to the ones presented by the need to adapt to climate change and variability, and the
tools described above seem adequate to address these challenges.
For the third L&D goal of informing discussions on fair burden-sharing and com-
pensation arrangements it is also clear that both approaches are needed.
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The estimation of precise information on attribution of damages to the incremen-
tal risk caused by anthropogenic climate change requires an estimate of the change
in hazard probability that is attributable to anthropogenic climate change. From the
point of view of the decision-making frameworks discussed above, this falls within
the ’science-driven’ approach.Climate simulations are used to estimate the likelihood
of the event under current conditions, with the extra requirement of a simulation of
the counterfactual world, i.e., an estimation of the likelihood of the event had green-
house gas concentrations not increased during the last 100 years or so. Some climate
scientists argue that the science of attribution of climate events could support deci-
sions related to obtaining compensation for damages caused by attributable natural
disasters, since it potentially allows to distinguish between genuine consequences of
anthropogenic climate change from climate events that are a result of internal climate
variability (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2011; Peterson et al. 2012). On the other hand,
Hulme et al. (2011) challenges the idea that the science of weather event attribution
has a role to play in this context, in particular due to the fact that the estimated
changes in attributable risks are based on climate modelling experiments that cannot
provide robust answers. However, Huggel et al. (2015, 2016) argue that even though
attribution is not necessarily a requirement for L&D policies, it is potentially useful
for facilitating a more thematically structured, and constructive policy and justice
discussion. The chapter by Wallimann-Helmer (2018) in this book discusses these
issues in detail.
For the design and implementation of burden sharing or compensation instruments
(technical, financial and capacity building) an estimation of the costs for managing
losses and damages is needed. This would rely on a “policy-driven” approach, taking
as a starting point what are the societal goals (which values to protect), and then an
estimation of the resources needed to do so. Principles to distribute the burden of
managing losses and damages include principles that take into consideration the
causation of outcomes that need to be managed (e.g. the polluter pays principle) and
principles that do not take causation into account (e.g. the ability to pay principle).
The information gained through a science-driven approach can help to approximate
the portion of the hazard that is of anthropogenic origin, which would inform the
discussion on these compensation principles. Importantly, this information may not
need to be precise or event-linked: the growingunderstandingof theoverall likelihood
of anthropogenic footprint in L&D could be enough to justify burden-sharing, for
example if big emitters recognise an overall higher responsibility to provide support
than low emitters, irrespective of precise event-attribution (see also the chapter by
Simlinger and Mayer (2018) on legal issues).
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11.4 Conclusions
The different dimensions of L&D of climate change make this a complex topic, with
a range of interpretations, approaches and responses being considered, while the
political negotiations are in full flow. Reflecting on the current state of discussion we
draw the following conclusions.
To date there are no easy answers to the L&D challenges. This is not only due
to technical and science limitations, but also due to the political dimension and the
uncertainties inherent in this process.
L&D of climate change remains a political concept, developed during the
UNFCCC negotiations (see chapter by Calliari et al. 2018), but with its technical
roots in CCA and DRR. The 2015 Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC recognises “the
importance of averting, minimizing and addressing Loss and Damage associated
with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and
slow onset events” (UNFCCC 2015). This aligns with three goals embedded in the
L&D discussion:
• To create awareness about the sensitivity of human and natural systems to climate,
and the need to respond with appropriate mitigation, adaptation and DRR policies.
• To plan risk reduction and risk management, with the goal to enhance adapta-
tion to reduce vulnerability and build resilience.
• To inform burden sharing for the costs of managing L&D and compensation
arrangements.
Clearly, existing tools and approaches from the fields of CCA and DRR can help
responding to L&D.
The first two goals are common to the CCA and DRR discussions, and lessons
learnt in those areas can be shared here. The lack of data and knowledge should
not be seen as a reason for delaying action—in fact there are a range of existing
instruments and tools that can be applied to assess and manage current and future
L&D. As described above, within the CCA community, tools and approaches have
recently been developed to deal with uncertainty from climate science in order to
avoid a ‘wait and see’ mentality for decision making. In this context, the challenges
presented by the need to reduce and manage climate change losses and damages are
not very different to the ones presented by the need to adapt to climate change and
variability.
The compensation component of L&D, however, offers a different dimension to
the climate change discussion. While not explicitly outlined in the official UNFCCC
language, this is an underlying aim that has been driving the L&D debate since its
beginnings. The focus on compensation for those climate impacts that are beyond
mitigation and adaptation’s reach poses some additional challenges for decisionmak-
ers—particularly in the context of the underlying science, as seen in the discussion
of attribution (see also chapter by James et al. 2018 in this book).
Importantly, the majority of climate change experts (as reflected by the last chap-
ters of IPCC 2012) seem to have come to the conclusion that the onlyway to deal with
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climate change is to take a holistic approach to risk management, using a wide range
of approaches to evaluate expected risks and benefits (IPCC 2014a, b). This there-
fore underlines the importance of comprehensive approaches, incorporating hazard,
vulnerability and exposure elements of risk. It also opens up the question of the
specific role of L&D under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, alongside the institutional set up for adaptation under the UNFCCC and for
DRR under UNISDR’s Sendai Framework. As there are many thematic and techni-
cal overlaps between these areas, it is important for those bodies administering this
at the UN level to recognize the synergies and avoid duplication. This also applies
to other governance levels, from national to local, where far too often disaster risk
management and climate adaptation are kept institutionally apart.
Overall, the physical sciences play a key role in informing all aspects of climate
change L&D discussions. Climate data is important throughout, while there are some
clear shortcomings in terms of accessibility, availability and quality of it. The recog-
nition of limitations and uncertainties in this information is important, particularly
for those who will make decisions around L&D. The recognition of these limitations
should also extend to the information on exposure and vulnerability, which plays a
significant role in determining the eventual losses and damages. Progress is being
made with regards to loss assessments and accounting for indirect consequences as
well as estimating socio-economic risk drivers (IPCC 2012).
However, the idea of L&D for compensation and burden sharing might trigger
increased efforts to dissect the human induced climate change part of the risk. Inform-
ing the discussions on how to share the costs formanagingL&Drelies on two separate
steps: (1) estimating the costs of managing L&D, and (2) informing the causation-
based principles of the debate. Clearly, the caveats and scientific challenges of attri-
bution that have been outlined here need to be part of such discussions. However,
this should not put on hold the efforts to integrate adaptation to climate change with
wider development aims and disaster risk reduction, and the search for innovative
approaches to share the financial burden of current and future losses and damages.
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Abstract This chapter discusses integrated approaches to the management of risks
related to extreme weather and climate change. This is done with the Loss and Dam-
age (L&D) mechanism of the UNFCCC in mind. Relevant insights are provided for
climate policy negotiators and policymakers on how risk management and adap-
tation interact with L&D solutions, and vice versa, on how L&D-related activities
can support risk reduction and adaptation in vulnerable countries. Particular atten-
tion is devoted to how risk management can help society confront the impacts of
weather disasters in relation to anthropogenic climate change. A holistic view of
risk management is presented by discussing: the state-of-the art of risk assessment
methods; (cost-benefit) evaluations of riskmanagement options; household-scale risk
reduction strategies; insurance schemes for residual risk and their relations with risk
reduction; and the design of adaptation pathways to cope with uncertain timing and
intensity of climate change impacts. Each topic is illustrated with concrete case stud-
ies. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the links between disaster risk management,
climate adaptation and the L&D mechanism.
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12.1 Introduction: Integrated Climate Risk Management
in the Loss and Damage Context
The goal of this chapter is to establish the links between the concept of Loss and
Damage (L&D) and climate risk management, with relevance to the L&D mecha-
nism under the UNFCCC. Climate risk management is understood to include natural
disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change (IPCC 2012). L&D was
recognised in the 2015 Paris Agreement as a new pillar of climate policy, next to
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation (UNFCCC 2015). Its purpose
is to address irreversible losses from anthropogenic climate change, and resulting
damages beyond what adaptation can avoid. In this context, efforts are currently
made by the UNFCCC to propose activities under this pillar as part of the new cli-
mate agreement, in order to address L&D. However, various interpretations exist,
which are further discussed in the chapter by James et al. (2018); see introduction
by Mechler et al. (2018a); and the chapter by Bouwer (2018). For the purpose of this
chapter, we will apply the “Risk management perspective” proposed by James et al.
(2015) and further operationalised in the chapter by Schinko et al. (2018).
This implies that L&D refers to impacts ‘beyond adaptation,’ and that adaptation
can prevent L&D (ex ante), while other approaches (such as insurance) can help
dealing with L&D (ex post). Appropriate measures for risk management include
natural disaster risk reduction through engineering solutions or other measures to
mitigate risk, and risk transfer mechanisms, such as insurance. Climate risk manage-
ment in this chapter is narrowed down to include adaptation to anticipated changes
in extreme weather risk due to anthropogenic climate change as well as reduction of
extreme weather risk beyond adaptation (the adaptation deficit). Climate adaptation
according to the IPCC (2012) definition is:
the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems,
adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some
natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its
effects.
In this definition, adaptation would not include dealing with L&D that occur
beyond the prevention of risks, because when L&D occurs, impacts have not been
moderated in some way. In this respect L&D solutions can be viewed as addressing
the residual risk after adaptation. Natural disaster risk is defined as a function of
hazard, exposure and vulnerability. In simplified form this function is often described
as follows.
Risk  Hazard × Exposure × Vulnerability
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Hazard is the natural event, in the case of flooding characterised by frequency and
intensity (water depth, direction, and flow velocity). Exposure is the set of assets,
people and (economic) activities that can be hit by the hazard. Vulnerability indicates
the extent towhich these assets, people and activities can suffer damagewhen ahazard
occurs. Vulnerability is typically expressed as the mean loss (or the full distribution
of losses) for a given intensity of the hazard.
Climate change-related risks, such as weather-related natural disasters, are thus
the result of a complex interplay of natural hazards, like storm and flood condi-
tions, and exposure of assets and their vulnerability, i.e. susceptibility to damage
(IPCC 2012). While climate change may increase the frequency or intensity of cer-
tain natural hazards, exposure and vulnerability are determined by socio-economic
development and human decision-making. It is these latter processes, such as pop-
ulation and economic growth in hazard-prone areas that have been the dominant
drivers of increases in natural disaster losses in the past (Bouwer 2011; IPCC 2012;
see also introduction by Mechler et al. 2018a). Natural hazard risk management can
steer these vulnerability and exposure components of risk and traditionally includes
all activities aimed at minimising impacts of natural hazards before, during and after
an event (Botzen and van den Bergh 2009). Thereby, actions related to anticipated
increased risk levels, because of anthropogenic climate change or other drivers, can
address the prevention of risk (through adaptation), or the minimisation of impacts
during an event (emergencymeasures), or after the event (clean-up, repair, compensa-
tion and rehabilitation). Climate change impacts can be avoided by risk management
policies that limit exposure to natural disaster risk, for example by steering devel-
opment away from hazard-prone areas, by better protecting these developments,
and limiting vulnerability of exposed assets, for example through implementing and
enforcing building code policies that limit wind or flood damages (Aerts and Botzen
2011; Czajkowski and Simmons 2014).
Integrated risk management takes a holistic view (in the sense that it considers
various drivers of risk, and possible mitigation options ranging from structural mea-
sures, to emergency management and risk transfer such as insurance). Moreover, it
uses a variety of approaches for the assessment of risk and evaluation of options, bor-
rowing methods from natural sciences, engineering, economics, ecology and social
sciences. An important cornerstone of successful risk management lies in the appli-
cation of an assessment of risk, and the analysis of costs (of actions) and benefits
(reduced risk) of risk management options in order to identify economically optimal
strategies. These analyses show that it often pays off to prevent disastrous damages,
or at least prepare for managing these damages when they occur (Mechler 2016).
In addition to economic appraisal of risk management options, other considerations
can come into play when deciding about the implementation of risk management
strategies, such as equity, acceptable risk levels and impacts on the environment.
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Fig. 12.1 Layered disaster risk management. Source Mechler et al. (2014a)
The economic efficiency of actions however depends on the frequency and severity
of impacts. For instance, Mechler et al. (2014a) proposed an approach (risk layering)
where frequent (up to a return period of once in 200 years) events are avoided
through risk reduction, while impacts from rare events would need to be covered
by risk transfer which includes natural disaster insurance and regional risk pooling
mechanisms. Extremely rare losses may not be economically efficient to address
with insurance, and may need to partly be compensated by the public sector or the
international community (see Fig. 12.1; chapter by Schinko et al. 2018).
Alternatively, public-private partnerships in financial compensation arrangements
may be needed for covering such extreme risks (Kunreuther 2015). Applied to L&D
fromanthropogenic climate change, thismeans that avoiding the L&Dby greenhouse
gasmitigation or adaptationwill often be a preferred approach, at least to a degree that
this is economically efficient, rather than having to address L&D.Moreover, it should
be realised that important relations can exist between the way L&D measures are
implemented and incentives for adaptation. For example, ill-designed compensation
mechanisms that do not provide financial incentives for risk reduction may result
in moral hazard effects when investments in natural risk reduction decline because
financial compensation for natural disasters from external parties is expected. On
the other hand, adequate financial incentives for risk reduction may be integrated in
L&Dmeasures, for example, when natural disaster insurance arrangements stimulate
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risk reduction by their policyholders through risk-based premiums which reward risk
reduction activities with premium discounts (Bozen 2013). A further discussion of
such incentives related to insurance is provided in the chapter by Linnerooth-Bayer
et al. (2018).
Risk reduction and adaptation will have a pertinent influence on the vulnerabil-
ity of countries to anthropogenic climate change. Various actions exist at present,
including:
• National and local public actors addressing natural hazard risk, including planning
for increased future risk because of climate change, supported by public sector
budgets;
• Private actors reducing their risk and planning for climate adaptation, often sup-
ported by (national) public actors;
• International support to reduce natural disaster risk, such as through coordinating
activities under theUNISDRand through implement disaster risk reduction actions
by donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as development
banks;
• International support to implement climate adaptation actions, including support
from funds under UNFCCC and from other donors.1
This implies that past impacts from extreme weather and climate events cannot be
taken as the norm, because future impacts will be different depending on adaptation
efforts that are expected to reduce vulnerabilities. This is already clear from the
historical record, as can be seen in the chapter by Bouwer (2018). Also, from an
economic perspective adaptation actions and risk reduction need to be considered,
and economically efficient adaptation solutions should be implemented, before L&D
can be accepted as outcome. The underlying reason is that it is cheaper to make
the investment to reduce the impacts than to absorb the impacts in any other way,
including mechanisms set up to deal with residual damages, like L&D.
In this chapter, different approaches for risk management and their effects on
limiting risk from climate change are discussed. An emphasis is placed on case
study insight and actions that avoid damages. Successively, we discuss the following
levels of actions:
• Assessment of weather-related disaster risk, as a basis for decision making on risk
management;
• Cost-benefit analysis of adaptation strategies in which risk assessment methods
are used to evaluate the benefits of adaptation;
• Household-level actions to reduce risk;
• Relations between ex post compensation through insurance and incentives for
household risk reduction;
• Adaptation planning approaches including adaptation pathways.
1For example see https://www.adaptation-fund.org/projects-programmes/.
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The final section provides a synthesis of the different approaches presented in the
chapter, and draws conclusions on the links between climate risk management and
the L&D mechanism.
12.2 Climate Risk Assessment—Case Studies Jakarta
and Ho Chi Minh City
The decisions on adaptation interventions to minimise the impacts of climate change
requires the understanding ofwhat is the amount of risk that can or cannot be reduced.
The amounts of risk that cannot be reduced (residual impacts) will to some extent be
relevant to the L&D mechanism. For risk assessment, two activities are necessary:
(1) to quantify the present and future risk in a risk model framework; and (2) to
quantify the effectiveness of possible mitigation or adaptation measures in reducing
risk.
We present here two recent case studies that apply such assessments for Jakarta,
Indonesia, and for Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, two Asian megacities that display
high vulnerability to natural hazards, in particular floods, and to climate change.
In Jakarta multiple drivers compound the risk of flooding: the huge rate of land
subsidence, due to groundwater extraction, sea level rise and change in precipitation
patterns, both due to climate change. Following the definition of risk reported in
Sect. 12.1. Budiyono et al. (2015) employed a hydrological and hydraulic model
to produce maps of river flood. Moreover, they assembled specific exposure and
vulnerability data for each land use type, by tapping the expert judgement of local
stakeholders. A framework for quantifying flood risk was then build, based on the
Damagescanner model of Klijn et al. (2007), which produced results in good agree-
ment with reported flood damages, and estimated current expected annual damage
in the order of hundreds of thousand USD per year.
A successive study expanded this modelling framework to project the risk assess-
ment into the future until year 2050 (Budiyono et al. 2016). The hazard modelling
incorporated precipitation changes from a combination of four Representative Con-
centration Pathways (RCP) emission scenarios and five distinct climate models, and
a low and a high scenario of sea level rise to explore the probabilities and scenario-
dependency of changes in flooding. Furthermore, the effect of the severe land sub-
sidence rates on hazard, and of land use changes on exposure were included. The
results show that the probability density function of annual damages shifts to much
higher values in the absence of adaptation (see Fig. 12.2). This is primarily due to
the effects of land subsidence, but also the result of sea level rise. Climate-change
induced changes in maximum rainfall, on the other hand, introduce a large uncer-
tainty in the future damages, as some models and scenarios imply an increase, while
others a decrease in hazard. If land use will change according to the government
plans, it will have the potential of reducing risk by some 12%. Finally, Budiyono
et al. (2017) calculated the risk-reducing potential of a planned upgrade of the polder
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Fig. 12.2 Flood risk in Jakarta measured as annual expected damage. The vertical dashed line
represents the present value. The coloured curves represent probability density functions, obtained
by fitting gamma distributions to 20 combinations of climate models and emission scenarios, thus
each representing the uncertainty in future precipitation extremes. Curves are shown with and
without land subsidence, with land use (LU) of year 2009 and LU of 2030, and with low and high
sea level rise (SLR). Source Modified from Budiyono et al. (2016)
system via construction and rehabilitation of dikes. This is done by cutting the risk
curve, also known as the exceedance probability-damage curve, assuming that each
polder will provide a standard of protection expressed as the return period of the
event it can withstand (e.g., a 50-year flood).
For Ho Chi Minh City, the risk of flooding is quantified under present conditions,
and under scenarios of climate and socioeconomic change over the 21st century. This
city already suffers regular disruption to livelihoods and business due to seasonal
floods, mostly due to storm surges from the South China Sea and heavy precipitation
and river discharge.
The assessment includes a number of steps where quantitative information is pro-
cessed (Fig. 12.3). Following, as for Jakarta, the risk definition in Sect. 12.1, the flood
hazard is quantified via hydrodynamic modelling, for four return periods, the expo-
sure is represented by land use and population density maps, and the vulnerability
is expressed in vulnerability curves that are specific of the land use. To simulate the
future, the framework incorporates: in the flood modelling, projections of sea level
rise from regionalised projections relative to two RCP emission scenarios, one of
moderate and one of high greenhouse gas emissions; in the impact modelling projec-
tions of socio-economic growth from two plausible Shared Socioeconomic Pathway
(SSP) scenarios. These pressures are scenario-dependent.
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Fig. 12.3 Conceptual framework of the flood risk assessment of Ho Chi Minh City. Yellow boxes
indicate the points in the modelling where adaptation measures are implemented. Source Modified
from Scussolini et al. (2017)
The next step is the modelling of two main impact indicators: the direct economic
losses, and the likely casualties. Direct losses include damage to different types
of buildings, infrastructure and crops, and are calculated with the Damagescanner
model, by combining flood maps and land use maps (for the present and for the
future) through the use of vulnerability curves. Casualties are modelled based on
the field of flood velocities and depths that is produced by the hydraulic model, and
applying empirical relationships to local information on the number people present
in Ho Chi Minh City.
The following step is the integration of the impacts of floods of each magnitude
across four return periods, to quantity the risk, in terms of average annual impacts. As
can be seen in Fig. 12.4 the already large expected annual damage and the potential
casualties increase substantially until the year 2050 and 2100, depending on the
scenario and if adaptation measures are not taken.
The Ho Chi Minh City case study goes one step further than the Jakarta study by
analysing the risk reducing potential of (combinations of) four flood riskmanagement
measures. These measures are: the construction of a ring dike around the central
districts, the elevation of land in the districts where risk is higher, the retrofitting of
residential and commercial buildings by dry-proofing, and spatial reorganisation of
land use. These are incorporated in the flood hazard and impact modelling (yellow
boxes in Fig. 12.3).
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Fig. 12.4 Increase in flood risk (expected annual damage—EAD—and annual potential casualties)
of floods in Ho Chi Minh City, from the present to year 2050 and 2100, for three combinations
of climate and socio-economic scenarios: RCP4.5 and SSP2, RCP8.5 and SSP5, and the high-end
of RCP8.5 and SSP5. The area of the circles is proportional to the intensity of the impacts. The
different colours indicate how much of the increase (with respect to the present impacts, in the
white circles) is attributed to sea level rise, to economic growth, to population growth, and to the
combination of sea level rise and economic growth. Source Modified from Scussolini et al. (2017)
The analysis shows that appropriate adaptation can considerably reduce losses
and damages (Fig. 12.5), but none of the solutions investigated will reduce impacts
to zero, which means that a residual risk remains. The cost-benefit analysis results of
these measures are reported in Sect. 12.3. These results can inform decision-making
on which adaptation pathway to take.
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Fig. 12.5 Performance of several adaptationmeasures and strategies in reducing the future impacts
of sea level rise, compared to the situation without adaptation (Business-as-usual, BaU). The risk
is displayed in terms of the expected annual damage (not discounted), for the present and for three
combinations of scenarios in the years 2050 and 2100: RCP4.5 and SSP2, RCP8.5 and SSP5,
RCP8.5 High-End (H.E.) and SSP5. Source Modified from Scussolini et al. (2017)
12.3 Cost-Benefit and Multi-criteria Analysis of Risk
Management Options—Case Studies from Ho Chi
Minh City and The Netherlands
After conducting an assessment of natural disaster risk and identification of risk
management options, these options can be appraised using methods like cost-benefit
analysis (CBA). CBA is a widely-used tool for prioritising projects, by assessing the
project’s net benefits to society. In an application to natural disaster risk, CBA can
make use of natural disaster risk assessment methods that can estimate the benefits
(avoided natural disaster losses) of risk management options. The basic question that
is addressed by CBA is: will society as a whole become better off by undertaking this
project rather than not undertaking it, or by undertaking instead any of a number of
alternative projects? (Mishan 1988). CBA is often used to assess and prioritise risk
management options: what are the net benefits to society of this particular option,
should we implement it or should we choose any of a number of alternative options,
including the one of doing nothing? In CBA all the expected advantages (benefits)
and disadvantages (costs) of a project are expressed in money terms, so that they can
be compared and the net benefits (benefits minus costs) can be computed.
A CBA of a project ideally identifies all costs and benefits for all parties that are
affected by the project over the lifetime of the project. The expected costs and benefits
are then valued in monetary terms and the costs and benefits in future time periods
discounted by an appropriate discount rate. Finally, the discounted costs and benefits
are aggregated into one summary statistic: net present value (NPV), benefit-to-cost
ratio (BCR) or internal rate of return (IRR).
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Box 12.1 Decision metrics
Net Present Value (NPV): Costs and benefits arising over time are discounted and the
difference taken, which is the net discounted benefit in a given year. The sum of the
net discounted benefits is the NPV. A fixed discount rate is used for expressing future
values in today’s terms to represent the opportunity costs of using the public funds
for the given project. If the NPV is positive (benefits exceed costs), then a project is
considered desirable.
Benefit-to-Cost Ratio (BCR): a variant of the NPV. The total discounted benefits are
divided by the total discounted costs. By definition, a benefit-cost ratio of 1 means that
the expected discounted benefits of implementing the mitigation equal its costs. Any
measure where a BCR is greater than 1 is considered to be cost-effective and should
be implemented as the benefits exceed costs and a project thus adds value to society.
Any measure with a BCR less than 1 (implying that the upfront cost of mitigation is
higher than the expected discounted benefit) should not be implemented. Due to its
intuitiveness the BCR is often used.
Internal Rate of Return (IRR): Whereas the former two criteria use a fixed discount
rate, this criterion calculates the internal interest rate for which the NPV0, which
is considered the return of the given project. A project is rated desirable if this IRR
surpasses an average return on public capital determined beforehand.
Source Mechler et al. (2014b)
An important benefit category in a CBA of disaster risk reduction measures is
the expected value of avoided damage created (defined as the prevented risk). Disas-
ters are low-probability high-impact risks. They follow extreme event distributions
which are typically very different from normal distributions. Probabilistic analysis is
required to assess the expected flood risk as well as the benefits of risk management
options in terms of reduced damages. As an illustration for the case of flood risk
management in Ho Chi Minh City, Scussolini et al. (2017) used the risk assessment
framework of Sect. 12.2 to estimate the NPV and BCR of different flood risk adapta-
tion strategies, including the construction of a ring dike, and dry-proofing buildings
and elevating areas at high risk. Costs and benefits are calculated until the year 2100.
To ensure that the BCR ranks the adaptation measures in the same order as the NPV,
the BCR was normalised to account for the widely different investment costs of the
measures. The results are shown in Fig. 12.6. The flood risk adaptation measures
appear to yield benefits that substantially outweigh the costs, except for the ring dike
in the high climate change scenario. The ring dike has the lowest BCR and NPV,
while the combination of elevation and dry-proofing of buildings has the highest
BCR and NPV and is, thereby, the optimal adaptation strategy, from a long-term
economic perspective. In evaluating risk management options, the results of CBA
canbe combinedwith other (non-economic) considerations and indicators. Economic
efficiency is usually considered an important aspect of disaster risk management and
adaptation, but often not the only aspect that needs to be considered.
298 W. J. Wouter Botzen et al.
Fig. 12.6 Net Present Value (bars, left axis) and normalised Benefit/cost ratio (diamonds, right
axis) of flood risk adaptation measures for Ho Chi Minh City for three combinations of climate
change and socio-economic scenarios RCP4.5 and SSP2, RCP8.5 and SSP5, RCP8.5 High-End and
SSP5, until the year 2100. Note: discount rate is 2.5%. Source Scussolini et al. (2017)
The development of new flood risk protection standards for the Netherlands illus-
trates the use of CBA in combination with other considerations and indicators (see
Box 12.2). The case below also illustrates how the application of CBA in designing
region-specific protection standards reduced protection investment costs in com-
parison to an earlier official proposal for a nation-wide uniform update of the old
standards.
There are alternatives to CBA that can be applied. Cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA) is a method that can be applied to identify least-cost options to meet a cer-
tain, pre-defined target or policy objective, for example, a certain safety standard.
CEA can also be used if the benefits of alternative options are assumed to be similar
enough that the choice between options can be made on the cost dimension. The use
of CEA is appropriate if the benefits of alternative options are fixed or pre-defined
(such as reducing disaster fatalities or losses to a pre-defined level). The advantage
of CEA is that it does not require to monetise the benefits of options, such as the
monetary benefits of avoiding health or environmental impacts of floods. The dis-
advantage of CEA is that it cannot determine whether an option is economically
efficient, i.e. whether its benefits exceed its costs. Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is
another decision-support method that can be used in certain circumstances. MCA
provides a structured way of comparing benefits and costs that are expressed in dif-
ferent units. For example, benefits may be expressed in “number of lives saved” or
a qualitative indicator of landscape or environmental quality. MCA is sometimes
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called a “qualitative CBA.” Box 12.2 describes how a combination of BCA and
MCA have guided “Room for the River” measures in the Netherlands which have
contributed to improving discharge capacities of rivers as well as environmental val-
ues. Recently, robust decision-making approaches (RDMA) have gained increasing
attention, especially in the context of climate change adaptation (see Watkiss et al.
2015 for a review). RDMA approaches include qualitative and quantitative methods.
They are particularly useful to appraise long-term investments in the face of large or
“deep” uncertainty about the future. In such circumstances it may not be possible to
make optimal decisions (as supported by CBA), but to select options that perform
relatively well across a range of possible futures, and thus to minimise regret about
an option when the future turns out to be very different than originally envisioned.
Box 12.2 The use of CBA and MCA in flood risk protection policy in the Nether-
lands
TheNetherlands is by its geographical disposition notoriously exposed to extremeflood-
ing. More than half of its land area faces flood risks, putting two-thirds of its population
and 70% of its GDP at risk. Flood Protection policy employs a so-called ‘multilayer
safety approach,’ encompassing prevention, spatial solutions (including adaptations to
buildings and infrastructure), and crisis management, whereby prevention of flooding
receives prominent attention. On the request of the Delta Committee, which was com-
missioned 1958 after a huge flood, the mathematician Van Dantzig designed an algo-
rithm to determine optimal dike heights based on the equilibrium between marginal
investment costs and marginal expected avoided flood damage. The first Delta Act of
1958 included flood protection standards for coastal areas, which were partly based on
the work of Van Dantzig (1956). As of the 1970s, safety norms were assigned to rivers
and since 1996 all water safety norms have been written in law. This Water Act deter-
mines flood protection standards for all dike-ring areas (polders) in the Netherlands.
However, the standards of the 1950s did not take account of the possible impacts of
climate change and sea level rise.
In response to near flooding events in 1993 and 1995 an alternative approach to flood
protection using dikes has been promoted in the Netherlands which entails improv-
ing discharge capacities of rivers using land use change, restoration of floodplains and
the creation of wetlands. These alternative flood control policies called “Room for
the River” create side-benefits, such as ecological, recreational and amenity values.
Brouwer and van Ek (2004) applied a CBA and an MCA to appraise the “Room for the
River” measures. These evaluations considered the hydrological, ecological, economic
and social effects. The extended CBA included monetary benefits of environmental and
social benefits of the measures and prevented flood damages. The estimated NPV is
e860 million, which favours investing in these measures. Moreover, stakeholder analy-
sis was used to assess effects of these policies on inhabitants, farmers, the environment,
water supply companies and recreation. These effects were included in the MCAwhich
also positively evaluated the “Room for the River” measures. In the meantime, most
of these measures have now been implemented in practice. A second Delta Committee
advised on an update of the flood protection standards in the light of the growth of
exposed population and assets, and projected sea-level rise. The Committee upheld the
first Delta Committee’s risk-based approach and advised that the new standards should
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be based on three factors: (1) the probability of individual fatalities due to flooding,
(2) the probability of large numbers of simultaneous casualties, and (3) economic and
other damage (to landscape, to natural and cultural heritage values, to the country’s
reputation and to society). To achieve this aim, the committee tentatively advised that
protection levels for all dike rings should be increased by a factor of ten (e.g., if the
current protection level was 1/1,000, it should be increased to 1/10,000).
A cost-benefit analysis to determine optimal protection standards for all dike rings in
the Netherlands was initiated by the CBP Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in 2005
(Eijgenraam et al. 2014). This analysis determined the optimal protection level for a
dike ring as that protection level where the marginal protection costs would equate the
marginal avoided damages. Damages included direct and indirect economic damage,
and loss of life expressed in monetary value through the value of statistical life concept
(Bockarjova et al. 2012).With this approach, optimal protection levels were determined
for all dike rings in the Netherlands (Kind 2014). It is interesting to note that the
investment costs of the economically efficient flood protection standardswere estimated
to be e 7.8 billion: almost 70% cheaper than the investment costs associated with the
advice of the second Delta Committee to increase protection standards everywhere by
a factor of ten (Eijgenraam et al. 2014). The Delta Commissioner, appointed in 2010,
developed flood protection standards up to the year 2050 and takes the potential effects
of climate change on sea level rise and river discharge into account. A number of climate
and socioeconomic scenarios have been explored for use in the Delta Programme. The
underlying climate scenarios were developed by the Dutch Meteorological Institute
KNMI. In the scenario with most climate change, regional sea level rise in 2050 is
35 cm, increasing to 85 cm in 2100. For future river discharge, flood protection policies
in upstream countries are relevant. The maximum river discharge of the river Rhine
in the Netherlands is presently ‘capped’ at 16,500 m3/s, because higher discharge is
made impossible by flooding that would occur upstream in Germany. Due to increases
in the likelihood of extreme precipitation events, the maximum discharge is assumed
to increase to 17,000 m3/s in 2050 and 18,000 m3/s in 2100. Similar calculations have
been made for the river Meuse. The Delta Programme advocates adaptive management
(’adaptive delta management’) to address future uncertainties, including the impacts
of climate change, in a transparent manner. The Delta Commissioner combined the
CPB economic assessment with the other factors that had been suggested by the second
Delta committee, In the first place, the standards should offer a common minimum
level of protection for each citizen to be protected by dikes or dunes by the year 2050.
Secondly, higher standards are offered in locationswhere there is a risk of large numbers
of victims, or of serious damage to vital infrastructure of national importance, or of
high economic damage, as indicated by CPB’s economic assessment. The new flood
protection standards were presented to and adopted by Parliament in 2014. SourceKuik
et al. (2016)
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12.4 Individual (Household) Level Natural Disaster Risk
Reduction—Case Studies Germany and Mexico
In addition to public disaster management policy, like the flood protection policy
described in Sect. 12.3, private actors including companies and households, can take
measures to limit the potential damage of natural disasters. These individual level
measures can be an important component of natural disaster risk management when
public protection is not economically efficient. Thereby, these measures can con-
tribute to climate change adaptation, and limit the residual risk that has to be dealt
with through L&D. Moreover, even when public strategies are in place to limit risk,
individual level measures can be a useful complement to minimise damage when
public strategies fail and a disaster happens. For example, it has been shown that
relatively low-cost measures, like moving furniture to higher floors and placing sand
bags in front of doors andwindowopenings, can save substantial damagewhenfloods
occur due to failure or overtopping of flood protection infrastructure (Kreibich et al.
2005).Moreover, during construction or renovation of buildings it is usually inexpen-
sive to make structural adjustments to reduce a building’s vulnerability to hazards,
like through elevation or applying water-resistant materials (Aerts and Botzen 2011).
Although the importance of natural disaster risk mitigation measures at the indi-
vidual scale is well recognised, relatively few empirical studies have been conducted
to estimate the potential damage savings from these measures and their economic
desirability (Poussin et al. 2015). Exceptions are the studies described in Box 12.3,
which examined this for flood damagemitigationmeasures in Germany. TheGerman
studies (Box 12.3) use mean comparison tests to examine how much flood damage
has been saved when particular flood preparedness measures were implemented by
households during floods of the river Elbe. The results point toward clear damage
savings of up to 50% of some measures.
Even while household level measures to reduce natural disaster risk are cost-
effective, this does not mean that many people will voluntarily invest in these mea-
sures. This may be due to low awareness about risk and mitigation measures, since
damaging natural hazards are often low-probability events that individuals have little
experience with. As a result, building codes and zoning policies can be developed
to guide the implementation of damage mitigation measures. Zoning regulations are
set to control land uses and setting development standards throughout urban areas.
Zoning regulations determine (1) what land uses, or combinations of land uses are
allowed in the available space, and (2) how land uses utilise space (i.e. conditions
for building construction, for instance, including building codes that limit natural
disaster risk). In terms of utilising space for especially urban areas, zoning policies
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and building codes are powerful tools for controlling land use and urban develop-
ment, and hence (changes in-) future land use (Burby et al. 2000). As such, zoning is
increasingly seen as an important tool in climate adaptation and managing changes
in weather extremes due to climate change (Aerts and Botzen 2011).
Zoning encompasses the following general policies related to urban development
and risk management:
• Restrictions: Based on hazard maps and or additional risk information, zoning
policies may indicate that in certain areas urban development is not allowed;
• Conditional development: Urban development is allowed in risky areas, but only
when certain conditions are met, for example, by (a) implementing building codes,
(b) homeowners have purchased insurance against natural hazard risk (c) buffer
zones are respected: building development is only allowed when appropriate dis-
tances between establishments and vulnerable risk areas are maintained.
Box 12.3 Effectiveness of flood damage mitigation measures in Germany
Kreibich et al. (2005) interviewed 1248 households that were affected by the severe Elbe
flood in 2002 in Germany in order to assess the level of preparedness of households for
flooding, and to estimate the effectiveness of damage mitigation measures that house-
holds implemented before and during the flood.Mean comparison tests were conducted
to examine how flood damage differs between households who have, or have not, imple-
mented a specific flood damage mitigation measure. Overall, this study shows that the
potential gains of implementing mitigation measures at the household level can be sub-
stantial. The results show that buildings without a cellar suffer about 24% less building
damage and 22% less damage to contents.Water barriers reduced flood damage by about
29%. Stable building foundation orwaterproof sealed cellarwalls reduced flood damage
to buildings by about 24%. The most effective strategies were flood-adapted building
use and flood-adapted interior fitting. Flood-adapted building use means that parts of
the building that can be flooded (such as the cellar and ground floor) are not used cost-
intensively or include expensive constructions, such as a sauna. Flood-adapted interior
fitting means that only waterproofed building material and furniture and contents that
can be easily moved to higher floors are applied in flood-prone parts of the building.
Flood-adapted building use reduced damage to buildings and contents by, respectively,
46 and 48%, while flood-adapted interior fitting saved damage to both buildings and
contents by 53%. Placing utility and electrical installation on higher floors reduces flood
damage by 36%. These results of the effectiveness of flood mitigation measures in Ger-
many have been confirmed by Kreibich and Thieken (2009) who conducted a similar
survey after floods in 2005 and 2006 in the city of Dresden. The results of this survey
indicate that household preparedness improved before the 2005/2006 floods, compared
with the 2002 Elbe flood, and that this improved preparedness resulted in significantly
less flood damage in the events. Kreibich et al. (2011) show that the implementation
of low-cost mitigation measures, such as the securing of oil tanks and installation of
mobile flood walls, are cost-effective in Germany under a range of flood conditions and
discount rates. Source (Botzen 2013)
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Zoning regulations, and in particular zoning for conditional development, can be
further refined in ‘building codes’ regulations for the development and maintenance
of buildings in risk zones. Building codes are meant for the adaptation of building
structures to lower their vulnerability to natural hazards. Building codes are anchored
in planning law, which is operationalized in legally binding land use- or zoning
plans. These zoning plans lay out in which areas building codes will be enforced
(for examples of building codes in relation to insurance see Sect. 12.5). Building
codes and zoning measures, however, also take quite some time to develop and to
process them through all regulatory bodies. In many instances, building codes are
not yet assessed against expected increases in risk through, for example, as a result
of climate change (e.g. Burby 2006).
In addition to reducing a building’s vulnerability to natural disasters, other mea-
sures at the individual level can contribute to enhancing an individual’s capacity
to cope with natural disaster events. As an illustration, Atreya et al. (2017) show
how individuals in poor communities in Tabasco, Mexico, take relatively low-cost
measures to cope with almost yearly flood events, by protecting belongings, taking
emergency preparedness actions and knowing a safe meeting point to evacuate their
family during a flood threat. As described in Box 12.4, the implementation of such
measures is found to be positively related to community-level policies, such as hav-
ing flood risk maps available to communicate about risk, and creating early warning
systems and shelters. This shows the important role that communities can play in
preparing households to cope with natural disaster impacts.
12.5 Natural Disaster Insurance and Incentives for Risk
Reduction—Case Study Germany
Financial compensation arrangements, like in the form of aid, public insurance,
private insurance, or public-private insurance systems can be designed to provide
financial coverage for residual climate change risks (Botzen 2013). The advantage
of having an adequate financial compensation system in place is that reimbursement
of damage, for example, after a natural disaster, helps people rebuild and limits
negative economic consequences.
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Box 12.4 Adoption of flood preparedness measures in Tabasco, Mexico
Floods in the Mexican state Tabasco occur frequently, almost on an annual basis. Indi-
vidual and community level flood preparedness measures are an important way for local
households to cope with flood events. The last decade floods have become more severe
in this poor region, which suggests that local communities have to improve flood risk
management efforts. Atreya et al. (2017) examined flood preparedness decisions in ten
communities in Tabasco conducting a survey among 664 households with questions
about their flood preparedness decisions. In particular, they focused on the role that
community level measures, such as information provision on risk, play in individual
decisions to prepare for flooding. Important flood preparedness measures that people
take in Tabasco are protecting belongings against flooding, having a safe meeting point
to go to during a flood event, and emergency preparedness actions, such as having a
family emergency plan of what to do during a flood, first aid training or disaster drills.
The figure below shows the percentage of people in these communities who have taken
these measures, from which it is apparent that protecting belongings is the most com-
monly taken measures, while improvements can be made in taking the other measures
which are currently taken by fewer people,
Atreya et al. (2017) conducted statistical analyses to examine which factors influence
individual flood preparedness decisions. These results show that household prepared-
ness actions are positively related with communities having accessible flood risk maps,
early warning systems, and shelters, amongst other factors. This provides insights into
community-level flood risk management strategies that can improve individual flood
preparedness. For example, very few people (about 8%) currently have access to com-
munity’s risk maps, while having such knowledge is found to improve individual flood
preparedness. Moreover, this can be achieved by better communicating about early
warning systems and shelter availability.
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It is important to realise that the financial compensation arrangement should be
designed so that it is complementary to, and facilitates, the undertaking of cost-
effective adaptation measures, and not acts as a substitute or financial disincentive
for implementing such measures. A moral hazard effect can arise when individuals
prepare less for a risk after they have obtained insurance coverage against the risk.
This can occur when policyholders expect to receive compensation from their insurer
irrespective of risk reduction efforts and if policyholders receive no financial incen-
tives, like lower premiums, from their insurer to limit risk. This can pose problems
for the insurer when due to information asymmetries, the insurer does not observe
the heightened risks taken by a particular policyholder. This implies the higher risk
is not adequately reflected in a higher risk-based premium. Moreover, such a moral
hazard effect is evidently undesirable when climate change increases natural disaster
risks since it hampers the implementation of adaptation measures by people covered
by insurance.
Hudson et al. (2017) examined the existence of this moral hazard effect using data
from samples of households living along the river Elbe in Germany. This is done by
estimating relations between flood insurance coverage and the implementation of
flood damage mitigation measures, and by estimating whether flood damage out-
comes differ between the insured and uninsured, while controlling for a diversity of
other relevant explanatory variables. The results show that a moral hazard effect is
absent (Hudson et al. 2017). In particular, flood damages of insured households are
not significantly higher than those of uninsured households when differences in flood
hazard characteristics are accounted for. Moreover, individuals with flood insurance
coverage are more likely to have taken specific flood damage mitigation measures
than people without flood insurance. These insured individuals did not receive a pre-
miumdiscount for taking flood damagemitigationmeasures,which implies that other
reasons explain why the insured were better prepared for flood risk. The results sug-
gest that behavioural characteristics, like high risk aversion, imply that individuals
have preferences for both insurance coverage and risk mitigation.
Although the relations between risk reduction and natural disaster insurance has
received little empirical research (see also chapter by Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018),
the findings by Hudson et al. (2017) do not stand by themselves. Thieken et al.
(2006) also observed that individuals with flood insurance coverage in Germany are
better prepared for flooding than people without flood insurance. Botzen et al. (2017)
find positive relations between having flood insurance coverage and implementing
flood-proofing measures among homeowners in flood-prone areas in NewYork City.
Hudson et al. (2017) show that similar positive relations between insurance coverage
and risk reduction can be found for windstorm risks in several areas in the U.S. that
were impacted by hurricanes Irene, Isaac, and Sandy. These findings are consistent
with positive relations between windstorm coverage and windstorm risk reduction
activities reported in Carson et al. (2013) and Petrolia et al. (2015).
Additional calls have been made to design natural disaster insurance arrange-
ments in a way that they incentivise risk reduction by policyholders. For instance,
insurance could reward investments in damage mitigation measures with premium
discounts (Kunreuther 2015). There are few examples of flood insurance arrange-
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ments which reward policyholders who elevate their homewith lower premiums, like
the National Flood Insurance Program in the US (Aerts and Botzen 2011). Neverthe-
less, most natural disaster insurance systems do not charge risk-based premiums that
incentivise risk reduction. Hudson et al. (2016) examine how much additional flood
damage mitigation can be achieved when German flood insurance companies start
incentivising risk reduction through charging risk-based premiums. For this purpose,
they developed an integrated model of flood risk in all main river basins in Germany,
the insurance sector, and household flood preparedness behaviour. The results show
that the premium incentives for risk reduction limit the expected risk increase that
arise from climate change with about 20% on average until the year 2040. These
findings suggest that financially rewarding policyholders for taking risk mitigation
measures can improve their preparedness for flooding.
In addition to financial incentives provided by insurance, a variety of other mech-
anisms related to insurance systems can be applied to stimulate natural disaster risk
reduction. Insurance systems can be combined with building code and zoning reg-
ulations which limit vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards. For example,
communities in the U.S. which participate in the National Flood Insurance Program
have to limit new construction in floodways and new buildings have to be elevated to
the expected water level of the flood that occurs on average once in 100 years (Aerts
and Botzen 2011). The French natural disaster insurance system is connected with
so-called Risk Prevention Plans which include recommended or compulsory build-
ing code and zoning regulations to minimise flood damage (Poussin et al. 2013).
Such regulations and standards are useful for setting minimum requirements which
are cost-effective for buildings in a specific hazard zone.
12.6 Design of Adaptation Pathways with Policy
Makers—Case Studies New Zealand and Bangladesh
There are important challenges for deciding on climate-resilient investment and
development pathways under conditions of uncertainty and change, such as anthro-
pogenic climate change. In response to uncertain environmental and socio-economic
change, decisionmakers are urged to develop adaptive plans.Anumber of approaches
that address uncertainty and change have been taken up in practice. These include,
real options analysis (Dobes 2008; Ranger et al. 2010), robust decision making
(Lempert et al. 2003), iterative risk management (Haasnoot et al. 2011) and strategic
planning approaches (Roggema 2009). One of these approaches, Dynamic Adaptive
Pathways Planning (DAPP) (Haasnoot et al. 2013), has been used increasingly for
implementing climate-resilient pathways for water management, of which the steps
are shown in Fig. 12.7.
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Fig. 12.7 Steps taken in Dynamic Adaptive Pathways Planning (DAPP)
Within the DAPP approach, a plan is conceptualised as a series of actions over
time (pathways). The essence is the proactive planning for flexible adaptation over
time, in response to how the future actually unfolds. The DAPP approach starts from
the premise that policies/decisions have a design life and might fail as the operating
conditions change (Kwadijk et al. 2010). A risk assessment can illuminate such
adaptation tipping point conditions, as such they can be used to identify up to what
changing conditions (e.g. sea level rise) a measure can reach a preferred risk level.
Once actions fail, additional or other actions are needed to achieve objectives, and
a series of pathways emerge; at predetermined trigger points the course can change
while still achieving the objectives. By evaluating different pathways, considering
path-dependency of actions and visualising them in a pathways map, an adaptive
plan can be designed, that includes short-term actions and long-term options (see
Fig. 12.8). Cost-benefit analysis (Sect. 12.3) can be used to evaluate pathways. The
plan is monitored for signals that indicate when the next step of a pathway should be
implemented or whether reassessment of the plan is needed. It is not only important
to identify what to monitor but also how to analyse it. From a policy perspective
it seems evident to select signposts that are related to norm or design values, since
these are the values upon which the policies are evaluated. However, alternative
indicators (i.e. average river flow in summer half year, instead of the 1:10 year return
flow)—not necessarily policy related—can be used additionally to get timely and
reliable signals for adaptation action. Different levels of assessment are possible to
design pathways, from qualitative expert-based pathways to more comprehensive
quantitative model-based pathways.
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Fig. 12.8 Example of an adaptation pathways map and a scorecard presenting the costs and ben-
efits of the nine alternative pathways presented in the map. An adaptive plan could exist of first
implementing action C, monitor the changing condition, and switch to action D if the future unfolds
according to the high-end scenario. Action B is potentially a lock-in or regret option, as already
after 10 years other actions are needed. If this is the case depends on the amount of the investment
compared in relation to the timing of the tipping points and therefore functional lifetime of the
action. Source Adapted from Haasnoot et al. (2013)
In New Zealand, a combination of serious gaming and development of adaptation
pathways were used in a local government flood risk management decision-setting
(Box 12.5; Lawrence and Haasnoot 2017) (on gaming see also the chapter by Mech-
ler et al. 2018b). The Sustainable Delta Game (Valkering et al. 2012; http://delta
game.deltares.nl) helped participants learn about decision making under uncertain
and changing conditions over time. The game has also been used to discuss climate
and climate change uncertainty (Van Pelt et al. 2014). The aim of the exercise on
the Dynamic Adaptive Pathways Planning (DAPP) approach was to upgrade the
existing flood defence system to 1 in 440 years and maintain that level (‘level of ser-
vice’ (LoS)) over at least 100 years. The discharge related to the 440 year standard
increasing over time as a result of climate change, with a greater change in the higher
emission scenarios. As a result, if the existing system is upgraded only to the current
440 year standard of 2300 cubic meter per second (comics), it will fail to provide the
required LoS over 100 years and further actions will be required. The efficacy of five
optionswere evaluated for their ability tomaintain the protection level over 100 years,
using three climate change scenarios, for meeting development/transport/recreation
objectives, the effect of land use planning measures, and comparative costs of staged
implementation of options. Each option consisted of a portfolio of measures, and for
each portfolio the ‘adaptation tipping point’ conditions were assessed in terms of the
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discharge it can accommodate. Three options were taken forward for further evalua-
tion using theDAPP. The figure scorecard (Box 12.5) shows that Pathways 1, 3, 6, and
7 exhibit the best target effect. Option 4 starts to perform unacceptably (not reaching
the 1:440 objective) after 40–50 years and thus requires a staged decision to move
to Option 2C; Option 2C by itself reaches the target by 2095–2105, and only Option
1 will enable the target to be met going beyond 100 years. The approach of adapta-
tion pathways has been adopted in the national coastal guidance. In Bangladesh, the
adaptation pathways were used to develop an adaptive plan inspired by the adaptive
delta management approach in the Netherlands. The plan should ensure
long term water and food security, economic growth and environmental sustainability while
effectively copingwith natural disasters, climate change andother delta issues through robust,
adaptive and integrated strategies, and equitable water governance (Bangladesh Delta Plan,
in prep; www.bangladeshdeltaplan.org).
This aim illustrates an important difference in the application of adaptation
pathways in the Netherlands and Bangladesh, despite the resemblance in terms
of geographic, hydrological, physiographic and climatic vulnerability. While the
Bangladesh Delta Plan focuses on enabling socio-economic development and food
security, the Dutch Delta Plan is oriented at protecting the socio-economic system
and increasing ecological value of the Dutch water system. In Bangladesh the focus
is thus on investments for achieving development goals that should be robust or
adaptive under uncertain changing conditions. The difference is also expressed in
different criteria that are used to assess risk and evaluate pathways. In addition to
flood risk, criteria such as poverty, health, and gender are considered in Bangladesh.
Like in the Netherlands, the adaptive plan presents preferred strategies/pathways
that exist of short-term (<2030), mid-term (2030–2050) and long-term (2050–2100)
strategies. The short-term strategies aim to address present and near future needs and
development targets to ensure food and water security in order to become a middle
income country. The long-term strategies are based on two iconic end-points, envi-
sioning a delta that is fixed and where water is controlled with dikes and pumps, or a
delta that has still dynamics with nature-based solution and land use measures. The
Bangladesh Delta Plan pathways are still under construction and need further elab-
oration to enable implementation. The Bangladesh Planning Commission (2017)
published initial results. Regarding disaster risk management for the lower Kulna
region, they describe a pathway that starts with construction of sea dykes that may
reach acceptable risk levels up to 2050, and can then be combined with a storm surge
barrier.
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Box 12.5 Adaptation pathways developed for Hutt River City Centre Upgrade
Project, New Zealand
Option 1
Option 2C,
Option 4
Existing situation
High Emissions (A2) 
median 2015 2115
High Emissions (A2) 
90th percentile
Low Emissions (2deg) 
Median
2015 2040 2095
2015 2050 >2115
2045 2105
2095
Transfer staƟon to new policy acƟon
AdaptaƟon Tipping Point of a policy acƟon
Policy acƟon eﬀecƟve
1
2
4
5
6
Pathway
Social 
Impacts-
Target 
eﬀects
----++
Transport
impacts
Environ-
mental
impacts
+++ ++++
3
Side eﬀects
Discharge of 1:440 
protection level (cumec)
---+ ++++ +++
----++ ++++ ++++
0- ++ +
--+ ++++ +++
---++ +++ ++++
7 ----++ ++++ ++++
RelaƟve
Costs
$$$$
$$
$$$$
$
$$$
$$$$
$$$$$
280023001815 3200
Main eﬀects
The Hutt River City Centre Upgrade Project: the adaptation pathways map shows
options, scenarios, decisionmoments, relative costs of options and potential side effects
requiring consideration. Relative impacts are indicated with − and ++; − is negative
impact and +positive impact. All pathways except pathway 5 have negative social
impacts as land has to be purchased.
Option 1: A 90 m river channel and 50 m berm; right and left stopbanks meets the
standard over 100 years in all scenarios; cost $267 m. Option 2C: A 90 m river channel
25 m berm; properties to be purchased; cost of $143 million. Option 4: 70 m river chan-
nel; 30 years of flood protection; lower level of protection (2300 cumecs); properties
purchased after 20 years; cost $114 m until 2035. Staged option: Option 4 to Option2C
will cost an additional $68 million; total cost $182 million).
Source Generated by the Pathways Generator (http://pathways.deltares.nl/) based on
(Boffa Miskell Ltd 2015; Infometrics and PS Consulting 2015). Source Lawrence and
Haasnoot (2017)
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12.7 Synthesis
This chapter has discussed integrated approaches to the management of risks related
to extreme weather and climate change in the context of Loss and Damage (L&D).
We particularly focus on risks from extreme weather, which are expected to increase
in frequency and intensity inmany regions around the globe.We follow the definition
of L&D as strategies that focus on the residual risks that remain after (cost-effective)
adaptation strategies have been implemented. Integrated risk management implies
that a holistic view is taken in interventions aimed at reducing hazard, vulnerability,
and exposure to natural disasters.We discussed a variety of such strategies, like flood-
protection aimed at preventing hazards, individual scale damagemitigationmeasures
that reduce vulnerability of buildings to flood impacts which can be formalised in
building code regulations, zoning policies that aim to limit (growth in) exposure of
properties to natural hazards, and insurance for covering residual risk.
The main conclusions from this chapter can be summarised as follows:
• Risk assessment methods are an important first step in order to identify risk levels
on a spatial scale. The mapping of areas with high hazard and risk can guide
where risk management strategies may be needed. Estimation of future risk under
scenarios of climate change provides insights into the needs for adaptation and
L&D measures to limit possible residual risks, as we illustrated for Ho Chi Minh
City.
• Cost-benefit analysis allows for a prioritisation of risk management interventions
based on economic efficiency criteria. This method allows for identifying econom-
ically desirable risk management strategies and adaptation options. The expected
reduced risk delivered by a strategy is an important benefit category and can be
estimated using a probabilistic natural disaster risk assessment using a variety of
scenarios, as our case study of flood risk inHoChiMinhCity illustrated.Moreover,
the case study for the Netherlands showed that a societal cost-benefit analysis can
also include important intangible welfare effects, like the prevented loss of life
and increased feelings of safety from flood protection. Moreover, multi-criteria
analysis can be used for evaluations of risk management strategies with effects
that are challenging to express in monetary terms.
• In addition to public natural disaster protection measures it is increasingly recog-
nised that measures taken at the individual scale can be important complements
in limiting the impacts of natural disasters. However, few empirical studies have
examined the damage savings that these measures can achieve and their economic
efficiency. Our case studies for Germany illustrated that in the case of flood, the
implementation of household level measures have prevented significant amounts
of damage during flood events. Several low-cost measures exist that are cost-
effective in flood-prone regions. Moreover, our case study of poor communities in
Mexico showed that several low cost-options are available for households to cope
with frequent severe flood events, and how the implementation of such options is
enhanced by community level actions, like raising risk awareness.
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• Although adaptation to climate change will often result in net benefits, completely
preventing the expected impacts of climate change on natural disaster risk may
not be economically efficient. A residual risk remains to be addressed by L&D
options, like financial compensation arrangements which can take the form of aid
or a variety of forms of insurance (see also chapter by Linnerooth-Bayer et al.
2018).
• It should be realised that if financial compensation arrangements are part of L&D
strategies they should be designed in a way that they stimulate and not hamper
the implementation of adaptation measures. Few studies have examined relations
between natural disaster insurance and policyholder risk reduction efforts. The
studies we described for Germany and other countries show that potential disin-
centives (moral hazard) to reduce risk from insurancemay beminor. Opportunities
exist for linking insurance with incentives for risk reduction by rewarding poli-
cyholders who limit natural disaster risk with premium discounts and by linking
insurance with building code and zoning regulations.
• Even though natural disaster risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis provide
important tools for prioritising investments in natural disaster riskmanagement, the
uncertainty of climate change impacts complicates adaptation planning. Design-
ing adaptation pathways with policymakers can deal with these uncertainties, as
illustrated by the New Zealand case study. The Bangladesh case study shows that
risk assessment can be linked to both vulnerability and adaptation pathways to
changing conditions, but also to opportunities to enhance socio-economic devel-
opment.
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Chapter 13
Exploring and Managing Adaptation
Frontiers with Climate Risk Insurance
Laura Schäfer, Koko Warner and Sönke Kreft
Abstract This chapter aims to inform the Loss & Damage debate by analysing the
degree to which insurance can be used as a tool to explore and manage adaptation
frontiers. It establishes that insurance can be used as a navigational tool around
adaptation frontiers in three ways: First, by facilitating the exploration of adaptation
frontiers by contributing to a framework for signalling the magnitude, location, and
exposure to climate-related risks and providing signals when adaptation limits are
approached. Second, by supporting actors in moving away from adaptation limits by
improving ex-ante decision making, incentivising risk reduction and creating a space
of certainty for climate resilient development. Third, by aiding actors in remaining
in the tolerable risk space by facilitating financial buffering as part of contingency
approaches. However, we also find that insurance against the risks of climate change
in market terms possesses several limitations. We therefore suggest the embedding
of insurance in a comprehensive climate risk management approach accompanied by
other risk reduction and management strategies as key principle for any international
cooperation approach to respond to climate change impacts.
Keywords Loss & Damage · Resilience · Climate risk insurance
Comprehensive climate risk management
13.1 Introduction
The idea of adaptation to climatic stressors has emerged as a mainstream risk
management strategy to help maintain human-ecological systems in a “safe oper-
ating space” (Röckström et al. 2009). However, emerging literature underpinning
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Chaps. 16, 17, and 19 of the IPCC 5th Assessment report (Klein et al. 2014; Chamb-
wera et al. 2014; Oppenheimer et al. 2014) point towards limits in the ability of
systems to adapt to climate stressors (Dow et al. 2013a, b; Warner et al. 2013; Adger
et al. 2009). There is evidence that poor and vulnerable people and communities
already exist and persist at the edges of these boundaries and limits (Islam et al.
2014; Warner et al. 2015; Monnereau and Abraham 2013). They find themselves
operating within an adaptation frontier, a “socio-ecological system’s transitional
adaptive operating space between safe and unsafe domains” (Preston et al. 2014).
To successfully navigate adaptation frontiers, these people and communities need
tools that allow them to explore the frontier, stay away from adaptation limits and
continuously move into safer domains.
As the debate around adaptation constraints, limits, and possible associated losses
and damages unfolds, insurance has been promoted as a tool that can help buffer
against the disruptive effects of climate variability and climate change (see chapter
by Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018 in this book; Surminski et al. 2016). Insurance
has been a cornerstone in climate impact related discourses of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) from its establishment in
1992. Several substantive policy proposals were brought forward resulting in insur-
ance being featured in relevant adaptation and Loss and Damage related decisions
and frameworks (compare chapters by Mechler et al. 2018; Linnerooth-Bayer et al.
2018; Schinko et al. 2018 in this book). Insurance is now anchored in major policy
arenas as one tool to address the risk of climate change, including the Paris Agree-
ment and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Additionally, the topic
experienced a boost through the G7’s decision to set up a “Climate Risk Insurance
Initiative” (InsuResilience) during their 2015 summit in Elmau and the 2017 G20
summit acknowledging a “Global Partnership for Climate and Disaster Risk Finance
and Insurance Solution” (G7 2015; G20 2017).
Drawing on research undertaken in the context of the G7 InsuResilience Initia-
tive to assess the potential of insurance to improve risk management for poor and
vulnerable communities (Schäfer et al. 2016), this chapter aims to inform the Loss
and Damage debate by analysing the degree to which insurance can be used as a tool
to explore and manage adaptation frontiers. In a first step, we outline the challenges
related to decisionmaking under climate risk and introduce the concept of adaptation
frontiers. In a second step, we analyse how decision makers can use insurance in a
way to address these challenges and manage adaptation frontiers. In a third step, we
discuss limits of insurance as a climate risk management tool and describe principles
that enable insurance tools to help move poor and vulnerable people and countries
away from adaptation limits into a safer, tolerable risk space.
The chapter concludes that insurance can be used as a navigational tool around
adaptation frontiers in three ways: First, by facilitating the exploration of adaptation
frontiers by contributing to a framework for signalling the magnitude, location, and
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exposure to climate-related risks and providing signals when adaptation limits are
approached. Second, by supporting actors in moving away from adaptation limits by
improving ex-ante decision making, incentivising risk reduction and creating a space
of certainty for climate resilient development. Third, by aiding actors in remaining
in the tolerable risk space by facilitating financial buffering as part of contingency
approaches.However, in order for risk transfer instruments like insurance to approach
their potential as risk management tool in developing countries, seven Pro-Poor
Principles for climate risk insurance need to be met.
13.2 Decision-Making Under Climate Risks
At the beginning of the 21st century, human activities, primarily their fossil fuel use,
have the potential to irreversibly damage the Earth’s climate system and transform it
rapidly into “a state unknown in human existence” (Barnosky et al. 2012). Science
suggests that climate change will cause changes in the “frequency, intensity, spatial
extent, duration, and timing of extreme weather and climate events” as the IPCC
Special Report on Extreme Events (SREX) concludes (IPCC 2012). This change in
climate will lead to “more rapid, larger and more unpredictable changes in risks than
have been experienced in the past” (Ranger and Fisher 2012).
Risk is both an analytical and a normative concept. It can be understood as the
combination of the probability of an event and its consequences that harm things
which human beings value (Klinke and Renn 2002). With the ultimate objective
to maintain risks for valued things at a tolerable level, actors apply risk manage-
ment strategies. They help to identify and evaluate risks, select measures to avoid
and prevent them from happening but also to plan for responding and recovering
from actual impacts. Risk management measures are used to control risks for things
humans value—e.g. livelihoods, ecosystems, cultural assets “with the explicit pur-
pose of increasing human security, well-being, quality of life, and sustainable devel-
opment” (IPCC 2014). The idea of adaptation to climatic stressors has emerged as
a mainstream risk management strategy to help maintain human-ecological systems
in a “safe operating space” (Röckström et al. 2009). Effective adaptation means inte-
grating climate change related risks into actors’ existing decision-making processes
with the aim of maximising the long-term value of today’s decisions (Bouwer and
Aerts 2006). This includes risk evaluation as a first step to assess potential risk to
social objectives and values followed by the decision which risk to actively manage
and which not.
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Box 13.1 Barriers and limits to adaptation through the lens of risk preferences.
Assuming that risk tolerance is socially constructed, Klinke and Renn (2002) suggest
that actors evaluate risks based on one of three categories according to which they
decide if the risks need to be managed or not: acceptable, tolerable, and intolerable.
Acceptable risks are low-complex, well understood risks that are deemed so low that
no additional efforts for risk reduction are justified (ibid). Tolerable risks relate to
“activities seen as worth pursuing for their benefit” (Dow et al. 2013a) but where
additional efforts to risk reduction are required to keep risk within reasonable levels.
Dow et al. (2013a) describe how the scope of risks that fall within this area is heavily
influenced by adaptation opportunities and constrains and therefore the categorisation
of risks varies spatially, jurisdictionally, and temporally. Constraints may limit the range
of available adaptation options creating the potential for residual damages for actors,
species, or ecosystems. Within the tolerable risk space, the risk of residual damage may
be viewed as an acceptable or tolerable trade-off under some circumstances (de Bruin
et al. 2009). Intolerable risks go beyond socially negotiated norms and values although
adaptation action has been taken (Dow et al. 2013a). At this stage, adaptation options
that are practical or affordable to keep valued social objectives or goods within the norm
are no longer available. These risks represent threats to core social objectives regarding
health, welfare, security, or sustainability (Klinke and Renn 2002; Dow et al. 2013a).
Emerging literature underpinning Chaps. 16, 17, and 19 of the IPCC 5th Assess-
ment report point towards limits in the ability of systems to adapt to climate stressors
(Dow et al. 2013a, b; Warner et al. 2013; Adger et al. 2009). Adaptation limits—for
example “soft limits” related to institutions and planning processes, and “hard limits”
relating to physical characteristics of a system-constitute a point at which existing
adaptation options can no longer protect the objectives and needs of actors and sys-
tems against intolerable risks (Adger et al. 2009; see also Mechler and Schinko
2016; introduction by Mechler et al. 2018 and chapter by Schinko et al. 2018 in
this book). At the limit between tolerable and intolerable risk, the risk must either
be accepted, the objective itself must be abandoned, or adaptation must be transfor-
mative to avoid intolerable risk (Dow et al. 2013a). Figure 13.1 depicts acceptable,
tolerable and intolerable risks, separated by limits of acceptable risk and adaptation
limits. The turning space before an adaptation limit is reached, can be described
as an adaptation frontier. Preston et al. (2014) define it as the “domain between a
socio-ecological system’s safe operating space and its unsafe operating space”. The
adaptation frontier is a domain where feasible and affordable adaptation action is still
available and has the potential to secure objectives and needs of actors and systems
(ibid.) However, the frontier is characterised by uncertainty if the available option is
used in an efficient and timely manner which is needed to stay away from adaptation
limits (Dow et al. 2013a).
According to Preston et al. (2014) and underpinning literature (Mechler and
Schinko 2016; chapter by Schinko et al. 2018 in this book) adaptation can offer
two types of benefits to systems on the frontier: On the one hand, reducing the vul-
nerability of systems to move them away from the edge of the frontier. On the other
hand, enhancing resilience, enabling systems to persist despite the continued pres-
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Fig. 13.1 Acceptable, tolerable and intolerable risk. Source Dow et al. (2013a)
ence of and exposure to pressures. In the face of potentially growingweather extremes
and profound shifts in natural systems driven by climate change, all countries will
require pathways that reduce vulnerability and lead to a more climate resilient devel-
opment. These strategies should complement and facilitate the design of approaches
to address longer-term incremental adverse effects of climate change. Increasing
comprehensive risk management capacity for dealing with today’s extreme climate-
related events can provide the basis for managing both current climate variability
and long-term shifts in climate patterns. Climate resilient sustainable development
pathways run along a spectrum of those things decision makers can plan for and
pre-empt, complemented by a suite of contingency measures to help manage climate
risks and impacts that have not been accounted for or addressed through planning
and risk reduction. This chapter argues that insurance has a role to play across this
spectrum.
13.3 Insurance Related Instruments as Navigation Tools
for Adaptation Frontiers
Insurance is the transfer of risk of a loss from one entity to another in exchange for a
payment which is called premium. The insured person (policyholder) is trading the
possibility of a loss for a guaranteed cost to a risk taking entity (the insurer). Insurance
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works by pooling losses, transferring risk of fortuitous losses and indemnification
(Rejda and McNamara 2017). By spreading risks among people and over space
and time, insurance-related tools allow to collectively manage losses that would
overwhelm individual members of a group, limiting the need for members to take
costly individual action. In this arrangement, the premium replaces the “uncertain
prospect of losses with the certainty of making small, regular premium payments”
(Churchill 2006). In case of a loss which is covered by the insurance policy, the
insured holds the right to claim compensation.
Based on these principles, disaster risk insurance is a facilitativemechanismwhich
provides post-disaster financial support against the loss of assets, livelihoods, and
lives at an individual, community, national, and regional level. “Climate risk insur-
ance” refers to a special type of disaster insurance, covering losses and damages
caused by extreme weather events, which are intensified and increased in frequency
by climate change. Climate risk insurance schemes may be both direct and indirect.
Direct insurance approaches are those in which the insured benefits directly from
transferring risk to a risk taking entity (such as an insurer). In the event the insurance
agreement is triggered, the insurance payout is directly transferred to the insured.
Indirect insurance approaches are those where the final intended target group benefits
indirectly from payments intermediated by an insured government or from being a
member of an institution that has insurance (Schäfer et al. 2016; see also chapter by
Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018 in this book).
This chapter argues that insurance can support people and communities on the
frontier of adaptation in several ways, helping them in
• exploring adaptation frontiers by contributing to a framework for signalling the
magnitude, location, and exposure to climate-related risks and providing signals
when adaptation limits are approached;
• moving away from adaptation limits by improving ex-ante decisionmaking, incen-
tivising risk reduction and creating a space of certainty for climate resilient devel-
opment;
• remaining in the tolerable risk space by facilitating financial buffering as part of
contingency approaches when climate-related risks exceed current capabilities to
manage.
In the following, the different roles of insurance in exploring andmanaging adapta-
tion frontiers are described in detail. It has to be noted, however, that transferring risks
in a cost-efficient way through insurance is only one step in a systematic process. The
effective management of adaptation frontiers, aimed at enabling climate-resilience
development, requires a comprehensive approach to riskmanagement. This approach
should involve a portfolio of actions aimed at improving the understanding of dis-
aster risks, reducing and transferring risk as well as responding to and recovering
from events and disasters—as opposed to a singular focus on any one action or type
of action (see Fig. 13.2).
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Fig. 13.2 The role ofinsurance in managing adaptation frontiers. Source Author’s own
13.3.1 Insurance as Part of a Risk Signalling Mechanism
To be able to make informed decisions in a world of increasing climate risks, actors
need to explore adaptation frontiers. Therefore, countries and people need reliable
information about the magnitude, location, and exposure to climate-related risks as
well as signals to determine their leeway regarding adaption limits. Risk transfer
tools like insurance can support risk signalling mechanisms in the following two
ways.
Catalysing Risk Assessment to Signal the Magnitude, Location and Exposure to
Climate-Related Risks
Assessing the risk of losses and damages is a prerequisite for identifying needs
and policy priorities. Risk assessment brings attention to the hazard potential, the
exposure and vulnerability, and in this way it can raise awareness and expose new
options for managing the risks (Warner and Spiegel 2009). Publicly collected and
open source data and risk assessments, as well as open source hazard modelling, can
contribute meaningfully to national and regional risk-management and investment
decisions. However, risk assessments are often not performed in developing coun-
tries (Collier et al. 2009). Being the precondition for calculating premium levels for
policyholders, risk assessment is a vital part of insurance. Accordingly, insurance can
be oneway to facilitate regional and international data analysis—such as establishing
data standards, methods and data repositories—and can therefore be a catalyst for
risk assessment. Thereby, insurance-related tools can help set up a framework for
signalling the magnitude, location, and exposure to climate-related risks.
At country level, the African Risk Capacity’s (ARC) risk modelling and early
warning software platform, Africa RiskView, uses satellite-based data to estimate
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the impact of weather events on vulnerable populations—and the response costs
required to assist them—before a hazard season begins, and as it progresses. This
instrument provides the hard triggers for ARC’s insurance mechanism. But it also
allows countries to monitor and analyse rainfall throughout the continent and esti-
mate the impact of weather developments on vulnerable populations in-season, “thus
providing ARC Member States and Partners with an innovative early warning tool”
(ARC 2015). At micro level we find plenty examples where weather data was col-
lected together with policy holders (e.g. through rain gauges) during the design and
set up process of insurance products. This data ultimately contributed to increasing
farmers’ sensitivity to changing rainfall patterns and helping them develop a better
understanding of the likely impact ofweather on yields (Sharoff et al. 2015;Hellmuth
et al. 2009).
Limits of Insurability as Means to Signal When Adaptation Limits Are Approached
In the context of increasing climate risk, the concept of insurability plays an important
role. Vulnerability to rising climate change risks is not only of importance to people
but also the insurance industry is vulnerable to rising risks. Increasingly catastrophic
losses made private insurance companies in developed countries pull out of some
markets, making insurance unavailable for affected households (Botzen and van den
Bergh 2008). Herweijer et al. (2009) therefore conclude that “climate change has
the potential to threaten the widespread availability and affordability of insurance
for people and their property in many regions, that is, the insurability of the risk.”
Stahel (2003) defines the concept of insurability as the “natural borderline” between
the market economy and nation states: risks that cannot be insured need not to
be legislated; uninsurable risks, however, have to be dealt with by nation states.”
Thereby, increasing limits of insurability can provide a strong signal that actors
or systems reached the upper end of adaptation frontiers, existing on the edge of
adaptation limits. This information could incentivise large scale governmental action
to effectively reduce risk and increase insurability in a way that wouldn’t be feasible
or affordable for individual actors.
13.3.2 Improving Ex-Ante Decision Making with Insurance
Increasing risk of extreme weather events driven by climate change strengthen the
need for a more forward-looking approach to disaster risk management, with greater
focus on reducing risk before a disaster strikes (Ranger and Fisher 2012). Moving
away from purely ex-post responses, actors need to manage risk proactively, before a
disaster strikes. This includes reducing risk ex-ante and building long-term resilience
against extreme weather events.
Price Signals as Means to Incentivise Risk Reduction?
Insurance can play a role as messenger of climate change impacts through its terms
and price signals. Insurance companies have an incentive to ‘risk price’ as much
as possible so that they can accurately predict the probability of a claim, and the
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likely cost of that claim. Through the technical risk pricing of contracts, insurance
can provide valuable information for societal and economic actors in understanding
the risks and how risk cost may be changing. When the risk is priced correctly “the
price itself indicates the risk level, which can help people and firms make better-
informed decisions about risk taking and risk mitigation investments” (Ranger and
Fisher 2012). In an ideal scenario, insurance thereby incentivises risk reduction
behaviour, e.g. by making it a prerequisite for reducing premiums or providing the
option for people to work for their insurance cover by engaging in community-
identified projects to reduce risk and build climate resilience. In this way, insurance
could contribute to preventing losses and damages. In a theoretical example, the high
costs of insurance against flood would provide an incentive for an actor, wanting to
buy a house in a flood prone area, not to buy. Instead, if investing into risk reduction
measures directly, this leads to a reduction in premium price and insurance might
provide a strong incentive for the actor to invest into risk reduction activities. In
this way “insurance can create powerful incentives for people to manage their risk
better and reduce losses” (ibid.). However, the evidence on actual insurance schemes
incentivising risk reduction is weak. Surminski and Oramas-Dorta (2013) found
that only a few already existing schemes show an operational link between risk
transfer and risk reduction (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta 2013). Chambwera et al.
(2014) moreover show that local and state regulations might undermine incentives
to decrease risks, for example by prohibiting fully risk adequate insurance rates.
A Space of Certainty Allowing for Improved Ex-Ante Planning and Decision Making
Insurance-related approaches, in combination with a wide range of others at local,
national, regional and international levels, can contribute to creating a space of cer-
tainty within which improved ex-ante decision making is possible (Skees et al. 2008;
Hoppe and Gurenko 2006). By creating a secure investment environment, insurance
instruments can enable productive risk-taking on the part of individuals and govern-
ments, and in this way contribute to mitigating disaster-induced poverty traps and
foster climate-resilient development.
To limit their exposure, poor households often try to avoid risks. Therefore, they
choose activities with lower risk, but also lower returns, and forego income oppor-
tunities (Cole et al. 2012). Researchers observed in Tanzania that poorer farmers
grew more sweet potatoes (which is a lower-risk, lower-return crop) than richer
farmers—resulting in a reduction of up to 25% average earnings (Dercon 1996). To
be prepared in the event of a shock, the poor also tend to diversify their income-
generating activities, assets or choice of crop or accumulate precautionary savings.
While this is certainly a sensible measure to decrease risk, it can also lead to a loss of
profits as people cannot afford to specialise in the more profitable options. In general,
these informal strategies to manage climate risk usually cover only a small propor-
tion of the loss, so “the poor have to patch together support from various sources”
(Churchill 2006). By reducing the residual risk that could not be reduced by mea-
sures already taken, insurance can help lessen financial repercussions of volatility
and, in the longer-term, help people to adapt to climate change. Insurance represents
predictable and manageable costs—the insured party does only pay the insurance
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premium instead of risking unmanageable costs due to disaster losses. These pre-
dictable costs and the security of a payout in case of a disaster create a space of
certainty and allow for longer-term planning, investment and development activities.
Thereby, insurance can incentivise “positive risk taking” (Mobarak and Rosenzweig
2013), which is essential for innovation and growth. There are first indications that
at the micro level, insurance can help to unlock opportunities and may help increase
savings, increase investments in higher-return activities and improve credit worthi-
ness (see e.g. Jensen et al. 2015; Cai et al. 2015; Madajewicz et al. 2013; Luxbacher
and Goodland 2010). At the macro level, research suggests that insurance may con-
tribute to economic growth by allowing for more effective risk management (Lester
2014; von Peter et al. 2012; Melecky and Raddatz 2011).
We also see that the way risks are currently managed in developing countries is
often not effective. The mainly ex-post risk management strategies are not timely
and can lead to financial burdens as well as volatility and uncertainty in decision-
making. They can ultimately threaten the resilience of poor and vulnerable people,
(re-)enforce poverty cycles and impede sustainable development. At the political
level we find indications that insurance could help countries to reshape the ways in
which risks are managed ex-ante. This can be facilitated by eligibility criteria that
insurance companies can define as a precondition for people and countries wanting to
purchase their products. These criteria can foster the selection of nationally appropri-
ate risk reduction priorities, and help develop a culture of prevention and resilience.
For example, we find indications that requesting contingency planning as eligibility
criteria for the ARC has influenced the process of disaster relief programmes in the
relevant countries, shifting paradigms away from crisis to risk management. ARC
Member States currently pay insurance premiums through national budget processes
and receive payouts only for pre-approved contingency plans. Before the countries
are allowed to buy ARC insurance policies, they have to submit contingency plans,
defining how the money will be used in case of a payout. ARC supports the countries
in developing the contingency plans with in-country capacity-building programmes
(ARC 2015). By providing incentives for governments to invest in their emergency
planning and response capacities, ARC could contribute to shaping a culture of
data-driven, prevention-focused risk management in their member countries in the
long-term.
However, we have to be cautious about drawing conclusions from these first
indications both at micro and macro levels. Evidence with regard to the impact of
insurance is scarce as most schemes are still in their early stages of implementation.
So far, most of the research is based on small case numbers, the cases and the results
being highly context specific. Constant analysis and long-term monitoring and eval-
uation of project outcomes will be crucial to track potential impacts of insurance in
the years to come. We also need to note that in all of the cases examined, it was not
insurance alone but the interplay of insurance with other risk management activi-
ties and social protection tools that improved opportunities and created incentives.
Without this relationship, supporting investment in higher-risk activities might also
lead to maladaptation by encouraging people to undertake activities that should be
avoided when considering longer-term climatic impacts. This “false sense of
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security” (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta 2013) might reduce the urgency for risk
prevention and reduction, and thereby increase vulnerability to extreme events.
13.3.3 Insurance as a Support Tool for Actors to Remain
in the Tolerable Risk Space
Effectively managing increasing climate change risk is a precondition for actors to
remain within the tolerable risk space (Mechler and Schinko 2016). Insurance can
support risk management strategies ex-post as safety net and buffer for people and
countries, particularly for low frequency and moderate to high severity risks.
Providing a Safety Net and Buffer: Insurance as Part of Contingency Strategies
Contingency strategies, managing unexpected shocks from climate stressors which
could not have been reasonably anticipated through pre-emptive actions, can provide
a key means for actors to remain within the tolerable risk space. These strategies are
needed, in addition to planning and pre-emptive undertakings, as some climate-
related impact are unforeseeable at the time of planning or the magnitude of climate-
related impactsmight surpasses estimates.Also, in caseswhere unforeseen impacts or
costs arose from transboundary climate change impacts or responses or impacts were
foreseeable, but response actions were economically or technologically unfeasible
at the time of planning, contingency approaches are necessary. The strategies should
complement and facilitate approaches to address longer-term incremental climate
impacts, risks, and vulnerabilities associated with climate change.
Insurance plays an important role as part of contingency strategies. By providing
timely finance that improves financial liquidity shortly after a disaster, insurance can
play a role as a safety net and buffer for people and countries shortly after an event
(Warner et al. 2012). Under these circumstances, insurance can help the insured to
better absorb shocks, as they may not have to resort to coping strategies that might
impede sustainable development (Okonjo-Iweala andThunell 2015). Timely and reli-
able payouts enable households to protect their livelihoods when a disaster strikes:
It can help individuals to cover losses and damages, stabilise their income, purchase
food and other necessities and avoid costly asset depletion, ultimately allowing peo-
ple to choose alternative means of coping with negative shocks (Dercon et al. 2005;
Barrett et al. 2007; Skees and Collier 2008). There is significant evidence that insur-
ance tools can help people to reduce distress asset sales and to increase food security,
both enabling faster recovery after a shock (Greatrex et al. 2015; Bertram-Hümmer
and Kraehnert 2015; Reyes et al. 2015; Janzen and Carter 2013). Based on the timely
finance, insurance can also help to avoid business interruptions and fiscal deficits and
post disaster loans (e.g. CCRIF SPC 2010). By reducing the residual risk that could
not be reduced by measures already taken, insurance can help lessen financial reper-
cussions of volatility and, in the longer term, help people to adapt to climate change.
Insurance is an adaptation measure when it reduces the burden of climate impacts,
risks, and vulnerabilities, if not the average loss (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2010).
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The given examples clearly illustrate how quick and sufficient payouts are key for
insurance to realise its potential within a contingency strategy. A poorly designed
insurance product that neither covers a sufficient amount of the damage nor pro-
vides incentives for risk reduction behaviour might lead to perverse incentives and
increases the risk of people slipping (back) into poverty or staying poor. Although
we find sufficient examples for quick payouts, there are also cases to be found where
timely finance could not be provided by insurance products due to different reasons.
Moreover, on the macro level, a fast payout to a government doesn’t necessarily con-
vert in timely support for the ultimate beneficiaries, being reliant on slow external
processes, for example a sedate humanitarian system. Hence, constantly monitoring
errors and challenges as well as learning from them to improve processes is crucial
for the success of risk transfer tools like insurance as part of contingency strategies
in the long-term.
Insurance for Low Frequency and Moderate to High Severity Risks
There are different layers of risks that risk management measures need to respond
to. An efficient risk management system involves assigning an instrument or set of
instruments to each layer, consistentwith the selected strategy (reduction, retention or
transfer). Financial instruments, in combination with risk prevention and reduction
measures, should be selected on the basis of frequency and severity of disasters.
This suggests that for weather-related risks which happen often (high frequency) but
which are less serious (low severity), preventative and risk reduction activities may
be the most cost-effective. The costs of preventing these events are typically much
lower than the losses that would occur without investments in prevention measures.
Alternatively, prevention measures for high-impact, low-frequency events can be far
costlier with respect to the losses prevented. These more severe and less frequent
risks, which cannot be reduced in a cost-effective manner, could be transferred to
private and public insurance markets. Evidence from developed countries shows that
insurance instruments have been effective in providing financial compensation for
losses from extreme events to avoid the distress caused by the financial aftermath
without financial protection (Arent et al. 2014). However, it is important to note that
despite adaptation strategies, climate change may bring some residual risks which
cannot be transferred to the insurance market cost-efficiently (Warner et al. 2012).
Governments also need to adopt approaches to address these residual risks, “the
losses and damages that remain once all feasible measures (especially adaptation
and mitigation) have been implemented” (ibid). The following Fig. 13.3 illustrates
a risk-layering strategy on the basis of the frequency and severity of the event (see
also chapter by Schinko et al. 2018).
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13.4 The Need for Comprehensive Risk Management
and the Limits of Insurance: Seven Principles
to Design Effective Pro-poor Insurance Products
Section three elaborated on how decision makers can use insurance tools to explore
and manage adaptation frontiers. However, in the context of comprehensive plan-
ning and pre-emptive activities to manage climate risks, insurance is not a universal
remedy for all types of climate impacts, risks, and vulnerabilities associated with
climate change. It has limitations with regard to its applicability for some type of
risks as it cannot cover all losses and climate change may pose a threat to insura-
bility. These limitations have led to one of the most important insights for how this
tool can contribute to addressing the adverse effects of climate change: Insurance
should always be embedded in a comprehensive climate risk management system
with a focus on risk reduction, and ex-ante planning. A combination of measures
that include insurance can reduce maladaptation, and reduce immediate losses and
long-term development setbacks from adverse climatic impacts. But beyond com-
prehensive risk management, there are other factors that need to be met in order
for insurance tools to effectively support the risk management efforts of developing
countries, a team from the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII) found. After
having dealt with the limits of insurance, this section will describe these factors in
detail.
13.4.1 Limits of Insurance
Experience reveals multiple limitations of traditional forms of insurance (Hoff et al.
2005): it is not applicable for all types of risks, does not prevent or reduce the
likelihood of direct damage and fatalities from extreme weather events and does not
cover all losses. Potential un-insurability associated with increasing frequency and
magnitude of extreme weather events poses an additional limitation. Moreover, it
is not always the most cost-effective or affordable approach and actor’s behaviour
towards low probability, high impact events can make the application of insurance
approaches challenging.
Insurance Is Not an Appropriate Measure for All Types of Risks
Insurance options can support adaptation and risk resilience for extreme weather
events, but are not appropriate for many, usually slower-onset, climate-induced
impacts, that happen with high certainty under different climate change scenarios.
The losses from long-term, foreseeable risks, such as sea-level rise, desertification
and the loss of glaciers and other cryospheric water sources, are estimated to be sub-
stantial in the future (IPCC 2012). Even for weather-related events, insurance would
be an ill-advised solution for disastrous events that occur with very high frequency,
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such as recurrent flooding. Resilience-building and prevention in such instances may
be cost-effective ways to address these risks.
Insurance Cannot Cover All (Types of) Losses
Insurance can only cover a percentage of losses, and evenwhen policies are in place to
offer coverage, basis risk can result in farmers being less protected than they expected
to be. Basis risk can be understood as the risk that insurance claims do not adequately
reflect the losses incurred; in other words, an individual suffers a loss and does not
receive a payment for it because the insurance threshold was not triggered. In this
way, even households that are fully insured end up bearing a significant amount of
uninsured risk. This is particularly a problem for weather index insurance products
(which currently make up the bulk of climate risk insurance schemes) as they pay
based on the measure of weather or area yields.
Additionally, we have to note that not all types of losses and damages can be
expressed in monetary terms. Insurance cannot address these types of non-economic
losses and damages—context-dependent types of losses that don’t have market price
and cannot be easily given a monetary value. For example, there is no payout that
could compensate for the loss of culture, identity or biodiversity, all of which may
be results of climate change related events.
Climate Change May Make Some Risks Uninsurable
As climate change will increase the intensity and frequency of extreme weather
events, there may come a time when some risks become so severe that they are unin-
surable. An increased risk for currently insurable perils, such as crops and livestock,
will lead to higher premiums, whichmight ultimatelymake the product too expensive
for the poor and the actors who pay premiums on behalf of them.
One determinant of increasing premiums is the rising uncertainty about climate
related risks. To assess risks and calculate premiums, the insurance industry relies
on weather data which are so far based on historical records of hazard occurrences
(Herweijer et al. 2009). However, climate change projections include a high level
of uncertainty as besides predicting impacts of future extreme events, anticipating
future vulnerability, socioeconomic trends and the way complex systems might react
to new stressors is challenging (Ranger and Niehoerster 2012). This leads to greater
uncertainties of insurers about the frequency and magnitude of future claims. Sci-
ence indicates that the greater the uncertainty of the probability of an event and the
magnitude of losses, the greater will be the insurance premium charged (Kunreuther
1996). However, if premiums “necessary to cover a disaster in a climatically changed
world are greater than homeowners and businesses are willing or able to pay, the pri-
vate insurance market will collapse” (Cousky and Cook 2009). On the other side, if
insurers under-price risks, the accumulation of capital may be inadequate to cover
losses threatening the solvency of insurers (Herweijer et al. 2009). Insurers therefore
have to adjust in particular their underwriting practices that are mostly based on
immediate past experience.
It is not known how the private markets would react to rising risk levels in the
future, particularly in developing countries. Cousky and Cook (2009) point to the
fact that “if risk is increasing over time, such that insurers do not believe they can
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accurately estimate expected losses, a key condition of insurability is violated.”
Kunreuther and Michel (2008) therefore conclude that only a requirement by law
will make insurers provide coverage for climate-related risk that have a high enough
potential for causing catastrophic losses in specific areas.
Behavioural Factors: Why People Don’t Insure Against Big Risks
It has often been observed that homeowners don’t purchase disaster insurance.While
budget constraints are one explanation for this behaviour, another explanation is peo-
ple’s tendency to understate the probability of a rare events and catastrophes for them-
selves. Kunreuther and Pauly (2004) could show that “people don’t insure against
low-probability high-loss events even when it is offered at favourable premiums.”
Due to a pre-disaster “It will not happen tome” perception, people don’t feel the need
to voluntarily purchase insurance coverage (Hertwig et al. 2004). Kousky and Cooke
(2012) conclude that “homeowners, facing a budget constraint and a constraint that
their utility with insurance exceeds that without it, may find the required loadings
too high to make insurance purchase an optimal decision.”
13.4.2 Seven Principles to Design Effective Pro-poor
Insurance Solutions
This chapter is based on the observation that poor and vulnerable people and com-
munities already exist and persist at the edges of adaptation limits, operating within
adaptation frontiers. To successfully navigate adaptation frontiers, these people and
communities need tools that allow them to explore the frontier, stay away from
adaptation limits and continuously move into safer domains. So far, this chapter
established that insurance can be used as a navigational tool around adaptation fron-
tiers, however has limits that have to be taken into account when applying insurance
instruments. Based on these findings, the final part of the chapter examines success
criteria for instruments like insurance to approach their potential as risk management
tool in developing countries.
In describing these success criteria we make use of an analysis of 18 existing
insurance schemes with regard to success factors and challenges for climate risk
insurance for the poor and vulnerable, conducted by a team from the MCII. Based
on this analysis, the MCII team distilled seven Pro-Poor Principles for Climate Risk
Insurance (Schäfer et al. 2016). The principles can aid decision makers and prac-
titioners in reaching poor and vulnerable people with effective insurance solutions.
They can guide the design process of new insurance schemes that target the poor
and vulnerable in particular by following the suggested steps or help with the iden-
tification of existing insurance schemes to be supported by climate risk insurance
initiatives. Additionally, the principles can be used to support climate risk insurance
practitioners in assessing and/or improving their current operations. The principles
are described in Box 13.2 and further discussed below.
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Box 13.2 Seven Pro-Poor Principles for Climate Risk Insurance
1. Facilitating comprehensive-needs based solutions: Solutions to protect the poor
from extreme weather events must be tailored to local needs and conditions. It is
imperative to embed insurance in comprehensive risk management strategies that
improve resilience.
2. Offering Client value: Providing reliable coverage that is valuable to the insured
is crucial for the take-up of insurance products.
3. EnsuringAffordability:Measures to increase affordability for poor and vulnerable
people are paramount to the success of an insurance scheme and also important to
satisfy equity concerns.
4. Maximising accessibility: Efficient and cost-effective delivery channels that are
aligned with the local context are key for reaching scale.
5. Allowing for Participation, Transparency & Accountability: Successful insur-
ance schemes are based on the inclusive, meaningful and accountable involvement
of (potential) beneficiaries and other relevant local-level stakeholders in the design,
implementation and review of insurance products, creating trust and providing a
basis for local ownership and political buy-in.
6. Generating Sustainability: Safeguarding economic, social and ecological sustain-
ability is crucial for the long-term success of insurance schemes.
7. Creating an enabling environment: It is vital to actively build an enabling envi-
ronment that accommodates and fosters pro-poor insurance solutions.
Comprehensive, Needs Based Solutions
The poor and vulnerable face multiple risks that get in the way of opportunities to
reduce poverty. For many of the analysed insurance schemes, the key to success
has been offering comprehensive solutions to mitigate weather risks. Three impor-
tant factors were identified in the analysis of 18 existing insurance schemes: (1)
implementing risk, needs, demand and context assessments, (2) linking insurance to
ex-ante climate riskmanagement, and (3) fostering locally driven and owned schemes
(Schäfer and Waters 2016). The Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) is a good example
for this principle. R4 currently reachesmore than 37,000 farmers with four integrated
risk management strategies: risk transfer, risk reduction, prudent risk taking, and risk
reserves. While the risk transfer enables the poorest farmers to purchase a weather
index insurance against drought, farmers can pay insurance premiums in cash or
through insurance for assets (IFA) schemes that engage them in risk reduction activ-
ities. IFA schemes are built into government safety net programmes or World Food
Programme food assistance for assets (FFA) initiatives. Additionally, individual or
group saving enable farmers to build a financial base. Providing a self-insurance for
communities, group savings can be loaned to individual members with particular
needs (R4 2015).
Client Value
Ensuring that coverage is reliable and that critical risks are not under-insured is critical
for the take up and success of insurance products that target the poor (Schäfer and
Waters 2016). Bundling the insurance product, where appropriate, with additional
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services that are valuable to the client and the active reduction of basis risk, which
remains a challenge for index products, were found as effective means to increase
client value. SANASA in Sri Lanka is a good example for adding client value through
bundlingwith additional services. Theuniquepart of their index-based crop insurance
product is that it is bundledwith other covers like accidental death and hospitalisation
which catered to various needs of the farmers and offered a good coverage for both
production and livelihood risks (Prashad and Herath 2015).
Affordability
Most insurance-related approaches targeting poor and vulnerable people or countries
have not been started and performed without some form of financial support, often
in the form of premium support (Vivideconomics et al. 2016). Affording risk-based
premiums remains a major challenge for this target group, and measures to increase
the affordability of products are paramount to the success of insurance schemes.
Finding solutions for this challenge is the precondition for establishing solidarity
and human-rights-oriented insurance schemes that respond to concerns of equity
(Schäfer and Waters 2016). When applied, premium support should always be smart
in a way that it’s reliable, flexible and long term, that distorts incentives as little as
possible, and that makes the client aware of the true risk costs.
Accessibility
Efficient and cost-effective delivery channels that require minimum input but ensure
a widespread reach are key for reaching a large client base and scale (Schäfer and
Waters 2016). Oneway to achieve this can be by building on natural aggregators, such
as associations, cooperatives, mutuals, federated self-help groups, and savings and
credit groups, which have established successful and trusted delivery mechanisms
and align the insurance scheme with the local context. Investing in tech-leveraged
secure client identification and targeting as well as payment systems to reduce fraud
and improve the timeliness of payouts were identified as success factors by the
case study analysis. Moreover, it proved successful to utilise social protection pro-
grammes, where appropriate, to implement large-scale development of insurance for
the poor and vulnerable.
Participation, Transparency and Accountability
Target group ownership and trust are essential for the effective use of insurance as
a risk management tool. It is crucial to include the insured and beneficiaries in the
design and implementation of insurance solutions and disaster risk reduction activi-
ties to ensure products truly work. Participatory approaches to product development
can create trust, help with capacity building andmake sure that the insurance actually
meets the real needs of people at risk, thus creating client value. The case study results
showed that it is important to actively support and build partnerships, networks and
communication channels that allow for inclusive and meaningful involvement of the
poor and vulnerable (Schäfer and Waters 2016). Organisations and structures that
have deep roots within the local context are favourable partners. Schemes moreover
need to ensure that the design and implementation processes are transparent and
accountable. An effective monitoring and evaluation framework that measures out-
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puts, outcomes and impacts to ensure that the insurance schemes actually reach and
benefit poor and vulnerable people is crucial.
Sustainability
Safeguarding financial, social and ecological sustainability is crucial for the long-
term success of insurance schemes. This includes providing a long-term perspective
on project planning and financing as setting up insurance schemes is a multi-year
effort. Reliable flows of money accompanied by a long-term perspective helps to
create a safe environment for key actors to engage in. It also involves making sure
that insurance schemes do not incentivise practices that are not environmentally
sustainable and incentivising risk reduction and prevention through the design of
the insurance scheme, including risk-based premiums. From a social perspective,
ensuring the participation and inclusion of women in climate risk insurance policy
and programming is key (Schäfer and Waters 2016).
Enabling Environment
An enabling environment is a set of interrelated legal, organisational, fiscal, infor-
mational, political and cultural conditions that facilitate the successful development
and implementation of an insurance scheme. Although the criteria for an enabling
environmentwill be inevitably contextual, it is vital to actively build an enabling envi-
ronment that accommodates and fosters pro-poor insurance solutions. Key factors of
an enabling environment include capacity-building of key stakeholders, appropriate
regulatory framework, strong, long-term partnerships and availability of data and
technology (Schäfer andWaters 2016). First, capacity building is needed to improve
the financial and insurance literacy and risk awareness of the insured, local insurers,
distribution channels and governments. In the context of pro-poor insurance solutions
it is important to use capacity building tools that respond to the needs of the target
group and are suitable to educate clients with lowwritten literacy about the complex-
ity of index insurance. Second, successful insurance schemes need functioning regu-
latory and legal frameworks that govern themarket, support the effective functioning
of the scheme and allow growth by actively working with national governments and
regulatory agencies. Third, strong, long-term partnerships, in particular public–pri-
vate partnerships, which foster a clear allocation of roles is an important component
of an enabling environment. The Index-Based Livestock Insurance Project (IBLIP) in
Mongolia was first introduced in 2006 and provides herders with insurance through
partnering with local private insurance companies. Insurance protects herders from
climate-related losses to their livestock.With IBLIP there is a risk-layering approach
to holistic risk management, combining self-insurance, market based insurance and
a social safety net. Herders only bear the costs of small losses that do not affect
the viability of their business; larger losses are transferred to the private insurance
industry and the final layer of catastrophic loss is borne by the Government of Mon-
golia. The combination of the public disaster response product (a social safety net
for herders offered by the government) and the private base insurance product (com-
mercial product sold by private companies) proved to be highly successful for IBLIP.
Fourth, freely accessible data and technology as well as hazard/weather monitoring
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infrastructure are essential for effective and efficient design and implementation as
well as for ensuring the uptake, distribution and payout of insurance products.
13.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we established that the potential contribution of insurance as a naviga-
tional tool around adaptation frontiers can be conceptualised around three different
ways: First, through facilitating the exploration of adaptation frontiers by contribut-
ing to a framework for signalling the magnitude, location, and exposure to climate-
related risks and providing signals when adaptation limits are approached. Second,
by supporting actors in moving away from adaptation limits by incentivising risk
reduction and creating a space for climate-resilient development. Third, by aiding
actors in remaining in the tolerable risk space by facilitating financial buffering as part
of contingency approaches. The conceptual debate around adaptation frontiers—in-
cluding limits to adaptation—has been connected to the UNFCCC Loss and Damage
discussions both in political and academic terms (e.g. Dow et al. 2013b). Given the
potential contribution that insurance offers, this calls for a comprehensive reflection
of insurance as part of the Loss and Damage policy space. Enhancing the interna-
tional cooperation around the aspect of insurance as a climate risk management tool
would allow to move forward several important aspects of the L&D debate, even
in the absence of consensus around the different political stands of Parties e.g. the
distributive and compensatory justice considerations of increasing climate impacts
(Schinko et al. 2018 in this book).
We see, however, that insurance in market terms against the risks of climate
change possesses several limitations. Among others these are limited insurability
against some climate risks, the inability to cover events on a full loss basis, afford-
ability issues as climate change impacts drive loss expectations. Moreover, reduced
insurance demand can be a result of clients discounting rare events psychologi-
cally. We therefore suggest the embedding of insurance in a comprehensive climate
risk management approach accompanied by other risk reduction and management
strategies as key principle for any international cooperation approach to respond to
climate change impacts. Moreover, client value, the accessibility, affordability and
sustainability of products, participation and transparency, as well as an accommodat-
ing enabling environment are key principles described in this chapter. We propose
that risk transfer instruments like insurance need to comply with these principles in
order to approach their potential as navigational tool around adaptation frontiers for
developing countries.
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Abstract This chapter looks at what we can learn about possible Loss and Dam-
age (L&D) and finance needed to address it using economic Integrated Assessment
Models (IAMs), which calculate economically optimal responses to climate change
mitigation and adaptation in terms of maximising welfare (GDP) a few decades into
the future. Interpreting modelled residual damages as unavoided L&D, a few results
emerge from the analysis. First, residual damages turn out to be significant under
a variety of IAMs, and for a range of climate scenarios. This means that if adapta-
tion is undertaken optimally, there will remain a large amount of damages that are
not eliminated. Second the ratio of adaptation to total damages varies by region, so
residual damages also vary for that reason. Third, residual damages will depend on
the climate scenario as well as the discount rate and the assumed parameters of the
climatemodel (equilibrium climate sensitivity) as well as those of the socioeconomic
model (damage functions). These uncertainties are very large and so will be any pro-
jections of residual damages in the medium to long term. The chapter raises other
aspects that could influence estimates of L&D. An important one is that, since actual
adaptation is very unlikely to be optimal, the amount of Loss and Damage may be
influenced by the sources from which adaptation and Loss and Damage programs
are financed. The level and structure of current limited financial resources is likely
to result in adaptation that is significantly below the optimal level and thus result in
significant L&D.
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14.1 Introduction
The bulk of the literature on finance for addressing climate change in developing
countries relates to mitigation and adaptation measures. The UNEP Emissions Gap
Report (2015) and the Adaptation Gap Report (2016) provide a synthesis of the cur-
rent available finance from different sources for activities under these categories, as
well as likely finance needs in the future. There is little documented data on the dif-
ference between the adaptation needs and the levels of estimated impacts of climate
change. This difference is generally referred to in the economics of climate change
literature as the residual damages (Chambwera et al. 2014), and also in some of the
literature, as the ‘unavoided losses and damages (L&D) from climate change’ (see
introduction by Mechler et al. 2018). Few estimates of the residual damages using
economic modelling exist and there has not been sufficient discussion of the method-
ological choices and robustness of these model estimates. This chapter presents the
underlying analytics and reviews the estimates of total climate change damages as
gauged in the economic Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) literature1 for differ-
ent mitigation scenarios as a basis for calculating residual damages. It discusses the
uncertainties surrounding these estimates and provides interval estimates by region
and (where possible) by country for selected countries. Uncertainty, discount rates
and other methodological choices play an important role. We discuss these but focus
on two important ones: sources of uncertainty inherent to IAM-Equilibrium Climate
Sensitivity and damage functions, and how these will increase uncertainty of the
damages and residual damages.
It is important to state that, while the damages from climate change are estimated
here using IAMs and top-down damage functions, there is a far-reaching debate
as to the proper economic methods to use for assessing economic damages and
the cost of adaptation. Other methods utilised in the economics of climate change
impacts (see Burke et al. 2016) range from improvements in bottom-up estimation
of damages (Carleton and Hsiang 2016) to expert elicitation approaches (Pindyck
2016). Particularly,more research is nowdevoted to represent “non-market” damages
such as changes in human health and biodiversity that could be sizeable, but are
largely omitted from current estimates (see also Chambwera et al. 2014). Combining
the estimates of total damages with those for adaptation, based on the same set of
models, the chapter derives a set of estimates of possible L&D for selected dates and
under different RCP scenarios. Several issues challenging the robustness of these
estimates are discussed in the chapter, including: ex ante versus ex post losses and
damages, non-monetary damages, irreversibility and the role of economic growth in
the affected countries. The chapter concludes with a discussion on what the IAM
estimates imply for climate finance in the short andmedium term, given themandates
and programmes of the main financing institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund.
1The economic IAM literature is to be distinguished from a scenario-based IAM literature where
models, rather than calculating optimal responses to warming building on economic rationality,
project future warming building on key drivers of climate change, including demographic variables,
economic output, lifestyle and technology (see e.g. Nakicenovic et al. 2000).
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14.2 Estimation of Residual Damages in Economic
Integrated Assessment Modelling
14.2.1 IAM-Methods and Models
Economic IAMs are a widely used class of models that explore the economic conse-
quences of different growth paths in the presence of climate changewith the objective
of maximising social welfare (measured by GDP) over a specific time horizon (Ortiz
and Markandya 2009). Several IAMs have been used in this field, with differences
that are in part a matter of subjectivity in the modelling design.2 The IAMs tend to be
quite aggregated, with a single measure of output (GDP), which increases over time
through capital investment, population growth and technical change. In the model
set-up, GDP is reduced as a result of losses or damages caused by climate change.
These damages are included through functions that link damages in monetary terms
to climate variables such as temperature or precipitation (typically temperature is
the variable most commonly used). These functions and monetary damage estimates
then feed into the model set-up to calculate the impact of the damages on economic
output and growth, globally and for given world regions. Overall, the IAMs select
levels of the control variables so as to maximise the discounted present value of wel-
fare (usually represented by GDP or an adjusted version of GDP) over the chosen
time horizon (usually 2100 or beyond). The key control variable has been the level
of mitigation, but more recently adaptation has been added (the level of adaptation
expenditures, which reduce climate-related damages). Levels of the control variables
are selected as part of a dynamic welfare maximising exercise (generally in 10 year
time steps and often until the year 2100) based on a trade-off between the costs cli-
mate change imposes and the reduction it makes to climate-related damages: as long
as adaptation costs are smaller than damages avoided, climate change damages are
reduced. The damages remaining after the adaptation has taken place are referred to
as residual damages.
14.2.2 IAM Mechanics: Relation Between Adaptation
Expenditures, Loss and Damage and Residual Costs
Figure 14.1 is a guide to understanding the links between total climate damages,
expenditures on adaptation and residual damages. The vertical axis represents the
value of damages in monetary terms. They can be thought of as damages in a single
period or the present value of damages over the planning horizon. In the latter case
additional issues arise about interpretation, which we discuss later. OD is the value
of these damages in the absence of any adaptation.
2Further see Ortiz and Markandya (2009) for a detailed literature review of previous versions of
IAMs for climate change analysis with damage functions mentioned here.
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Fig. 14.1 Total damages, residual damages and adaptation expenditures
The horizontal axis measures total expenditure on adaptation, again either in a
single period or as the present value over the planning horizon. The curve DA gives
the damages corresponding to different levels of adaptation expenditure. It is convex
to the origin because initial expenditures on adaptation yield greater reductions in
damages than subsequent expenditures. As adaptation expenditure increases each
unit generates less reduction than the unit before. It is also important to note that the
curve starts with a slope of greater than one in absolute terms. This means that each
million dollars spent on adaptation generates a reduction in damages for more than
one million dollars. That is another way of saying that investment in adaptation, at
least initially, has a cost that is less than the benefit.
The optimal level of adaptation expenditure is given by the distance OB, where
the slope of the adaptation curve is equal to -1. Further expenditure would have a
cost greater than the reduction in damages, while less reduction on adaptation would
not fully exploit the potential net benefits to be gained.
At this optimal level of adaptation expenditure damages fall by the amount EG,
leaving a residual damage equal to GB. We can see the net benefits of adaptation as
the difference between the reduction in damages (EG) and the cost (OB = EF, by
construction). Hence FG is the net benefit from the adaptation. Of course, damages
‘beyond adaptation’ are still very important—and at the heart of the Loss andDamage
debate. With optimal adaptation they are equal to GB, and this could be a very
large amount, especially when adaptation is not optimal but even when it is. The
above analysis is based on adaptation being undertaken in an optimal fashion. Note
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that it implies some residual damage and, furthermore, it implies a total cost of
climate damage after adaptation that is less than it would be with no action, even
after accounting for adaptation expenditures. When adaptation is less than optimal
residual damages will be larger.
The above analysis also has a time dimension, which can be simplified by assum-
ing that damages and adaptation expenditures are represented in present value terms.
In doing so we abstract from the problem of when the adaptation expenditures are
to be made and when the residual damages will occur. The dynamic solution to the
adaptation programme is, as we see in the next section, partly a function of the dis-
count rate. The higher the discount rate taken, the less mitigation is undertaken and
the greater are total damages likely to be. This implies some more adaptation but
the net effect on residual damages, while not totally clear, is likely to be higher than
with the lower discount rate. Since there is no agreement on the choice of discount
rate there will also not be one on desired adaptation in the future and on residual
damages that form the basis of the case for Loss and Damage.
Finally, the choice of adaptation versus residual damages for a given country
will be influenced by what is financed internally and what is financed externally. If
adaptation is likely to be more fully covered from external funds than compensation
for residual damages the incentiveswill be to go for a higher level than the optimalOB
shown inFig. 14.1.On theother hand, if residual damages aremore fully compensated
and adaptation has to be financed to a greater degree from internal sources, the
incentive will be to aim for a lower level of adaptation than OB. All these factors
will play a role in determining how much adaptation actually takes place and how
much residual damage arises as a result of climate change.
14.3 Estimating Residual Damages as a Measure of Loss
and Damage
14.3.1 Model Set-Up
In this section we provide estimates of residual damages from a range of IAMs,
taking account of uncertainty in the damage functions. The basic model ensemble is
that of Bosello et al. (2010), which gives perhaps the most detailed time profile for
adaptation costs and residual damages from a range of IAMs. The steps involved in
making the estimates are the following:
The Base Cases considered are ones in which the temperature increases by 2.5 °C
by the end of this century, which is consistent with concentrations stabilising at
around 650 ppm (IPCC 2014) and implies moderate success in limiting emissions to
the ‘low damage’ scenario. We can also refer to this as the low emissions scenario.
By contrast, in the high emissions/high damage scenario the equivalent temperature
increase is around 3.4 °C. In addition, the discount rate, which represents a societal
preference for enjoying (consuming) any economic gains today rather than in a distant
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Fig. 14.2 Temperature pathways for low and high damage scenarios
future, specifies the level that future additions to welfare are reduced—a standard
procedure in economics, however with heated debate as to the level of discounting
(see further below).
Figure 14.2 shows the temperature pathways for four scenarios: (i) low dam-
age/low emissions with a low discount rate (LDAM-LDR), (ii) low damage/low
emissions with a high discount rate (LDAM-HDR), (iii) high damage/high emis-
sions with a low discount rate (HDAM-LDR), and (iv) high damage/high emissions
with a high discount rate (HDAM-HDR). The high discount rate case is the onewhere
the rate is set initially at 3% and then declines over time as in the IAMs WITCH,
DICE and RICE (see Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). The low discount rate is case is the
one where the rate is set as 0.1% and then declines as in Stern (2007). To keep the
analysis simple we consider only versions (ii) and (iii) of their analysis and use them
to calculate residual damages over time. This provides a broad range of estimates.
For these cases Bosello et al. (2010) developed a version of the WITCH model to
predict total damages. The model developed by Bosello et al. has 12 world regions
(see regions further below in Tables 14.1 and 14.2). The model is run to obtain time
profiles to 2100 for total global damages and expenditures on adaptation. Residual
damages are only given globally, and in the model the regional share is assumed to
be proportional to the regional share of damages. In order to obtain residual damages
by region we take figures of total damages by region, which are reported for three
IAMs: Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), AD-WITCH and the Bosello et al. (2010) model
for the entire period. The average share of these total damages by region is calculated
and then applied to the total residual damages by time period as given in Bosello
et al. to obtain residual damages by region and time period for each scenario (all
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Fig. 14.3 Residual damages estimates for the case of a) low damages-high discount rate; b) high
damages-low discount rate (in billion 2005 US)
estimates are given in billions of USD in 2005 prices). Damages are calculated for
12 regions and for every decade from 2020 to 2100.
14.3.2 Results
The estimates are shown in Tables 14.1 and 14.2. Table 14.1 gives residual damages
in the high-damage/low discount rate case and Table 14.2 does the same for the
low damage/high discount rate case. As stated, in each case the figures are for the
averages of the three IAMs mentioned above. The last column in the two tables
gives the range of damages across the three models, reporting the maximum as a
percentage of the minimum.3 Finally the last row of Table 14.1 shows how much
damages vary between the high and low damage cases by reporting the high damage
as a percent of the low damage. The same information on regional damages is also
shown in Fig. 14.3.
The figures show residual damages to vary significantly by region. Since we are
interested in those damages that would need to be financed from a possible L&D
facility we can focus on the following regions, where the countries belong mainly
to the non-Annex I group: MENA, SSA, SASIA, China, EASIA and LACA. Total
residual damages for these regions range from $116–435 billion in 2020, rising to
$290–580 billion in 2030, $551–1,016 billion in 2040 and 1,132–1,741 billion in
2050. Thus, even in the low damages case the residual cost figures are substantial
3There are further variations in damages to consider for a given discount rate and a given temperature
profile. These arise from the choice of key parameters of the IAMs and are discussed further in the
next section.
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and in the high damage case they are more than double for the selected years to 2030.
Over time the gap between the low damage and high damage estimates declines but
by 2100 the high figure is still 150% of the low damage based residual cost.
The next point to note is the range of residual costs across IAMs. For the three
models considered here, the highest estimates are 5–50% greater than the lowest
ones, with the exception of two regions: China and East Asia, where the range is
much larger—around 100%. This arises because the AD-WITCH model has much
higher damage cost estimates for these two regions. Overall, the two sets of figures
indicate two things: the fact that if L&D is to be based on residual costs the amounts
involved will be significant, but the range of figures is still very wide.
Loss and Damage-Residual Costs Versus Adaptation Costs
It is also instructive to compare the residual costs with the adaptation cost estimates
from the same modelling exercise. This will help put L&D figures in context, given
the focus on finance for adaptation. To keep the tabulations simple we limit the
comparison to the Bosello et al. (2010) model. Tables 14.3 and 14.4 report both
adaptation costs and residual costs as percent of adaptation costs. This is done only
for the six regions/countries where L&D finance is likely to be an issue.
The tables and figures show that adaptation expenditures are relatively low com-
pared to residual costs, which are 3–20 times higher to start with in 2020, but then
decline, so that by 2100 they are 40–400% higher. There are also significant differ-
ences in the ratio of adaptation to residual costs across regions and scenarios. For
China the difference is smallest, implying a larger share of costs are eliminated by
adaptation, while in LACA, SASIA and SSA the ratios are very high, implying a
relatively small contribution of adaptation to reducing climate damages. With the
exception of estimates for 2020, the difference between residual costs and adap-
tation costs is greater with the low damage/high discount rate than with the high
damage/low discount rate case; it appears that more adaptation is undertaken rela-
tive to total damage in the latter than in the former. The same information is also
presented in Fig. 14.4.
14.3.3 Implications of Higher Emissions and Greater
Climate Impacts on Residual Damages
The analysis presented has focussed on the case where equilibrium temperatures
increase by 2.5–3.4 °C, implying some mitigation, but less than is required under the
Paris accord. How much difference does it make if a lower reduction in temperature
is attained? According to the IPCC AR5 report (Arent et al. 2014) estimates of
global annual economic losses for additional temperature increases of ~2 °C are
incomplete, but lie in the range of between 0.2 and 2.0% of GDP (±1 standard
deviation around the mean) (medium evidence, medium agreement). Losses are more
likely than not to be greater, rather than smaller than this range (limited evidence, high
agreement). Additionally, there are large differences between and within countries.
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Fig. 14.4 Residual costs as percentage of adaptation costs for the case of a) low damages-high
discount rate; b) high damages-low discount rate (in billion 2005 US)
Losses accelerate with greater warming (limited evidence, high agreement), but few
quantitative estimates have been completed for additional warming around 3 °C or
above.
At a regional level Bosello et al. (2010) find that the effects of increasing temper-
ature are greatest for South Asia, followed by East Asia and Sub Saharan Africa and
then by the Middle East (MDE). The sector most sensitive to temperature increases
is agriculture, followed by tourism. Costs related to energy decline with temperature
in this range (as reduced demand for heating dominates the increased demand for
cooling). One can expect therefore a decrease in the temperature target to 2 °C or even
1.5 °C to result in residual costs that are correspondingly lower than the estimates
given in Table 14.4.
We conclude this discussion by noting that these estimates are indicative of the
results one gets from IAMs. Other models will generate different numbers, but we
believe that the broad conclusions drawn from the review carried out here will remain
valid. In the next sectionwe focus on two relevant aspects of the IAM literature further
to see why the results for climate damages and residual costs can vary so much.
14.4 Discussion of Results
The debate on the costs of climate change andfinance generally, aswell as specifically
for L&D is complex and has several dimensions,many ofwhich are notwell informed
by the IAManalysis of residual damages. To put the discussion into context, estimates
of damages, adaptation costs, L&D and current available finance are worth noting.
The estimates of adaptation costs for developing countries have been estimated in
a number of recent IAM studies, summarised in the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report
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(UNEP 2016). It states that the current internationally accepted best estimates for
adaptation costs are in the US$70 billion to US$100 billion per year range for devel-
oping countries by 2050, according to a World Bank (2010) study. This compares
with the range of US$147–970 in the Tables 14.3 and 14.4. The UNEP report notes,
however, that the World Bank (2010) study is outdated and more recent work based
on two IAMs (AD-RICE and AD-WITCH) comes up with estimates of US$200–450
billion (AD-WITCH) and US$570–970 billion (AD-RICE). Thus, our range from
the Bosello et al. analysis is similar to that of the UNEP (2016) report.
Other data on costs of adaptation and on L&D damages worth noting are Bond
(2016) and Richards and Schalatek (2017), who cite the following estimates:
• UNEP’sAdaptationGapReport (2014) estimates the indicative costs of adaptation
and the residual damages (losses and damages) for LDCs at ~USD50 billion/year
by 2025/2030 and possibly double this value (USD100 billion/year) by 2050 at
2 °C.
• Baarsch et al. (2015) suggest Loss and Damage costs (not needs) for developing
countries of around $400bn in 2030, rising to $1–2 trillion by 2050.
• DARA (2012) estimates these costs to be $4 trillion in 2030.
• AMCEN/UNEP Africa’s Adaptation Gap 2 Report (2015) with all cost effective
adaptation in Africa losses and damages are estimated at ~USD100bn per year by
2050 for warming below 2 °C, at least double that if warming goes above 4 °C.
These estimates can be compared to the residual damages figures we have given in
Sect. 14.2, which range from $20–580 billion in 2030 to $1.1–1.7 trillion in 2050. As
Bond (2016) also notes, further work is required on the methodologies and processes
for estimating L&D and associated finance needs, as well as non-economic losses.
It is in relation to these that the next section addresses some of the key outstanding
issues. These include (i) issues relating to the time horizon under consideration and
related uncertainty, and (ii) the relationship between adaptation expenditures and
L&D.
14.5 Uncertainties in the Estimation of Future Damages
from Climate Change in IAMs
Recently, significant debate has emerged about the uncertainties (Pindyck 2013)
associated with the quantification of the damages from climate change by IAMs. In
the previous section, we provided a range for the residual damages under “standard”
climatic conditions. In this section, we show these damages (and, therefore, the
residual damages) would change significantly if “tipping points” are considered in
the analysis (Lenton et al. 2008, 2012). There is much uncertainty related to these
processes and, therefore, they have recently started to be captured in IAM literature in
terms of implications for adaptation (Stern 2016) and mitigation (González-Eguino
et al. 2016, 2017). We illustrate this through two key sources of uncertainty: the
Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) parameter and the damage function.
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14.5.1 Climate Sensitivity and Damage Functions
Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) is one of the key parameters in climate sci-
ence. ECS is defined as the equilibrium change in global temperature due to a dou-
bling of atmospheric CO2 over its preindustrial value. This measure is typically char-
acterised as a distribution due to underlying uncertainty in the behaviour of some
aspects of the climate system. Studies based on observations, energy balancemodels,
temperature reconstructions and global climate models (GCMs) have concluded that
the probability density distribution of ECS peaks at around 3 °C, with a long tail of
small but finite probabilities of very large temperature increases. According to the
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2013), estimates of the ECS indicate that it
is likely to be in the range of 1.5–4.5 °C (with high confidence) and very unlikely
to be greater than 6 °C (medium confidence). The extreme temperature outcomes
of the distribution function are sometimes referred to as “fat tails.” Some authors
(Weitzman 2009, 2012) have proposed that decisions on climate policy should actu-
ally be based on trying to avoid extreme outcomes of low probability. The uncertainty
range of ECS has not been reduced substantially in the past three decades and it is
not expected to be reduced in the near future (Roe and Baker 2007). Typically IAMs
use the most likely value for ECS (3 °C as in Sect. 14.3.2), but it is important to
perform a sensitivity analysis for different values for ECS.
The other major sources of uncertainty, in this case from climate change eco-
nomics, is the way in which the damage function from global warming is represented
(see Sect. 14.3.1). Damage functions are recognised as being one of the weakest links
in the economics of climate change (Pindyck 2013), because it is very difficult to
obtain empirical data and because results can be very sensitive to its functional form,
particularly when high temperatures are considered. One of the most well-known
damage functions is the one used by Nordhaus (DICE4 model, Nordhaus and Sztorc
2013), which has been recently adopted by the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA 2010) to provide values for the social cost of carbon. However, in order to cap-
ture the possibility of “tipping points” and abrupt climate change, Weitzman (2012)
has proposed a different damage function that captures large impacts beyond a 4–6 °C
threshold based on an expert panel study involving 52 experts according to which
at this temperature change three out of five important tipping points are expected to
emerge (see Lenton et al. 2008). These authors mention different processes such as
irreversiblemeltdown of theGreenland ice sheet, disintegration of theWest Antarctic
ice sheet, reorganisation of Atlantic thermohaline circulation, among others. Some
of these processes may have a significant probability of occurring this century for
climate conditions involving medium warming (between 2 and 4 °C) and even low
4It is important to mention that DICE damage functions include the impacts after adaptation has
occurred, so adaptation is already included. Some authors (see, for example, Bruin et al. 2009) have
included the possibility of reducing damage through adaptation in IAMs so that they can therefore
capture the trade-off between adaptation and mitigation.
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Fig. 14.5 Damage (% GDP) for different damage functions and ECS parameters
warming (<2 °C5). Most modellers advise that at higher temperatures the damage
functions go beyond their useful limits. Nordhaus, for example, suggests that we
have insufficient evidence to extrapolate reliably beyond 3 °C (Nordhaus and Sztorc
2013). However, it is also true that there is a significant risk of temperatures rising
above 3 °C in the course of this century.
Figure 14.5 shows the combined effect of the damage when the uncertainty in
the ECS and in the damage function choice is considered. We show, using the DICE
model, the damage (as % of global GDP) for the Nordhaus and Weitzman damage
functions and for three values for the ECS-1.5, 3 and 4.5. The damages are estimated
for a low and high emission pathway scenario (RCP 4.5 and RCP 6), which are close
to the ones reported in Sect. 14.3.2. We can see that the range of the damages is low
before 2050 but then expands substantially at the end of this century. The damage
per annum by 2100 in the low emission pathways could be 0.8% in the best case
scenario (Nordhaus and ECS  1.5) and 9.5% in the worst (Weitzman and ECS 
4.5). Similarly, the damage in the high emission pathways could range between 1.2
and 25% in the more extreme situations.
Finally, and although IAMs have been helpful in illustrating the economic dam-
age from climate change under different circumstances (Lenton and Ciscar 2012;
Ackerman et al. 2010), these large uncertainties need to be recognised. Although the
possibility of crossing a tipping point during this century is far from clear, it must be
considered a possibility in any L&D mechanism that could be designed. Similarly,
any finance mechanisms implemented will need to be designed in the most flexible
manner and considering this extreme situation so when new information is available
it can be incorporated quickly as we will analyse in the following section.
5This is the case for example of the abrupt loss of Arctic summer sea ice or permafrost thawing
(González-Eguino and Neumann 2016; Gonzalez-Eguino et al. 2017).
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14.5.2 Time Horizon and L&D Estimates
With respect to the time horizon the following points are relevant: IAMs can help to
provide anorder ofmagnitude estimate for the resources thatwill be necessary tomeet
losses and damages estimates, but a bottom-up sector-by-sector analysis of existing
and projected losseswill be necessary. The challenge is to link the two approaches. At
present we have the IAM analysis that draws on the bottom-up data in a rather crude
way. The current bottom-up analysis for sectors such as agriculture, health etc. is
more detailed but does not generally take account of the overall economic profile for
the country or region. Uncertainty regarding future damages from climate change
is very large in the long-term (2050–2100), especially if some tipping-points are
crossed, but moremoderate in the near (2020–2030) andmedium-term (2030–2050).
Thus, the longer the time horizon being considered the greater the uncertainty about
the possible level of Loss and Damage. Some of these uncertainties are reduced
significantly when mitigation is undertaken but also through adaptation. Previous
sections show that low emission mitigation pathways can reduce future damages
remarkably and their uncertainty range, and that adaptation measures can reduce
residual damages.
In viewof these facts one of thefirst objectives in the near term is for aL&Dfinance
mechanism to get established with the sufficient amount of monetary resources to
cover the current existing losses directly attributed to climate change (not to natural
variability). In the medium and the long term, it is important that the current design
of financing mechanism is flexible enough in order to scale up the financing if and
when necessary.
14.6 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to see how much we can learn about possible
losses and damages- and finance needed by employing economic IAMs, which are
key analytical tools at the heart of economic analysis of the damages caused by
climate change andof economically optimal responses to these damages.We interpret
modelled residual damages as unavoided L&D.
The current state of knowledge about damages has many gaps and we are not
by any means at a stage where the results of these models can form the basis of
financial packages of Loss and Damage. On the other hand, a few results stand out
as relatively robust and credible, and provide a useful contribution to the Loss and
Damage debate.
The first is that residual damages turn out to be significant under a variety of IAMs,
and for a range of climate scenarios. This means that if adaptation is undertaken
normally, there will remain a large amount of damage that is not eliminated. The
figures for that damage vary by region and sector and provide a useful source of likely
financial needs. Second the ratio of adaptation to total damages varies by region, so
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residual damages will also vary for that reason. Third, the residual damage figures
will depend on the climate scenario, as well as the discount rate and the assumed
parameters of the climate model (equilibrium climate sensitivity) as well as that of
the socioeconomic model (damage functions). These uncertainties are very large and
no one can make any meaningful projections of residual damages in the medium to
long term.
The additional discussion in this chapter raises other aspects that could influence
the levels of Loss and Damage. One is the fact that, since actual adaptation is very
unlikely to be optimal, the amount of losses and damages may be influenced by the
sources from which adaptation and L&D programs are financed.
These findings may seem rather meagre in terms of informing the Loss and Dam-
age debate, but we would contend that they still provide a useful guide to issues that
need to be resolved. Certainly, there is scope for much more use of economic tools to
understand economically efficient responses to future climate impacts. In the mean-
time, however, since financial commitments for L&D are unlikely to be determined
for more than 5 years ahead at any time, the models should focus on the potential
Loss and Damage during that period, taking as given the adaptation programs that
are relatively well determined for that period. As new information comes in, climate
related damage estimation will improve as will the design of adaptation programs
leading to improved use of these tools over time.
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Part IV
Geographic Perspectives and Cases
Chapter 15
Understanding Loss and Damage
in Pacific Small Island Developing States
John Handmer and Johanna Nalau
Abstract Pacific Island states occupy the top categories in the World Risk Index
for natural hazards, with Vanuatu consistently at the Number One spot. For some
low-lying island states climate change poses an existential threat, and the region is
increasingly recognized as the most immediately vulnerable area to potential mass
migration and relocation due to climate change. This chapter aims to localise the
global debate by focusing on the issue of Loss and Damage in Pacific SIDS. It also
provides a commentary regarding the risk and options space in the Pacific SIDS
context where many of the livelihood activities are subsistence-based, reliant on the
current climate and its variability, and already seriously disrupted by extremeweather
events.
Keywords Loss and Damage · Pacific · Adaptation · Disaster risk reduction
Relocation · SIDS
15.1 Introduction: Localising Global Loss and Damage
Frameworks
Pacific Island states occupy the top categories in the World Risk Index for natural
hazards, with Vanuatu consistently at the Number One spot (Birkmann et al. 2011).
For some low-lying island states climate change poses an existential threat, and
the region is increasingly recognised as the most immediately vulnerable region to
potential mass migration and relocation due to climate change (Nurse et al. 2014).
This chapter aims to localise the global debate by focusing on the issue of Loss
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and Damage in the Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS).1 It also provides
a commentary regarding the risk and options space in a PacificSIDS context where
many of the livelihood activities are subsistence-based, reliant on the current climate,
and seriously disrupted by extreme weather events. We use the case of Tropical
Cyclone Pam that hit Vanuatu in March 2015, the first recorded category 5 cyclone
in the country, to illustrate some of the points of this global debate. In doing so we
take the climate risk and adaptation capacity analysis in IPCC’s fifth assessment
report (AR5) to another level of detail (for the chapter on the SIDS, see Nurse et al.
2014).
One of the conceptual frameworks to illustrate Loss and Damage (L&D) as inte-
grated into a climate risk management framework has been proposed byMechler and
Schinko (2016) drawing on Nurse et al. (2014) and UNFCCC (2015). This frame-
work has been applied to the group of SIDS globally (see chapter by Schinko et al.
2018). It focuses on current risk exposure and future risk scenarios where the intol-
erable risk space is seen as being relevant already today and becoming even more
critical in the medium to longer term (2030–40 and 2080–2100). We discuss how
for some PacificSIDS, there are already cases where communities find themselves
impacted by intolerable climate-related risk, and where the risk management options
suggested in the graphic are already being deployed (see Fig. 15.2).
Mechler and Schinko’s argument is for a broad-based risk management approach
including both ‘standard’ and transformative DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction) and
CCA (Climate ChangeAdaptation) actions as well as options. Under their approach,
support, including funding, would be allocated on the basis of current needs for
dealing with climate variability and change, as well as attribution of losses and dam-
ages to anthropogenic climate change. At the global level attribution, for example
in regards to sea level rise, can be quantified at high levels of confidence (see IPCC
2014). However, in the Pacific Island countries observed change is a mix of both
global as well as local environmental changes, declining crop yield and fish resource
reliability, as well as demographic and socio-economic factors. In these country con-
texts, the options space may also be very constrained, as many people in PacificSIDS
have subsistence or semi-subsistence livelihoods, and national economies are very
narrowly based. For example, the majority of PacificSIDS base their economies on
tourism and foreign aid (Kuruppu and Willie 2015). However, transformative action
might be possible and is occurring slowly for example throughmigrating or travelling
to take seasonal work elsewhere, and through remittances.
15.1.1 The South-West Pacific
The South-West Pacific region (see Fig. 15.1 on the South Pacific) is increasingly
recognised as themost immediately vulnerable region to potentialmassmigration and
relocation due to climate change impacts (Campbell 2008; McAdam 2012; Weir and
1Where the term SIDS is used it is mostly referring to Pacific Small Island Developing States.
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Fig. 15.1 Map of the South Pacific. Available at: http://www.scidev.net/global/water/feature/ocea
n-science-development-sids-facts-figures.html
Virani 2011). Small atoll countries, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, have provided vivid
images of the possible inundation projected for the future (Connell 2011; Mortreux
and Barnett 2009). The atoll countries have also been vocal about the plight of island
nations (McAdam 2012), in particular in the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations through the Alliance of Small Island
States (AOSIS) commanding significant media attention.
Recent studies have also emphasised the close linkages between climate change,
disasters and conflict in the Pacific, and suggest that relocations due to climate change
might become frequent in the region already by the 2040s (Weir and Virani 2011).
Fiji announced recently that it had identified 676 coastal communities in need of
relocation out of which 42 need to be relocated within the next decade (Fiji News
2014). However, Campbell et al. (2005) also list 86 cases of existing community
relocations in the Pacific, which signifies the movement of people historically in the
region—note that many of these are partial and local. We now analyse the risk and
options space for the South-West (SW) Pacific Island states.
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15.2 Charting Out the Loss and Damage Risk Space
for Pacific Island States
The risk spaces ofmost concern globally are those identified as “tolerable” and “intol-
erable” byMechler and Schinko (2016). Tolerable risk, as defined here, is a risk level
that the affected community is adjusted to, or can adjust to, for example, by (further)
implementing sea walls, building codes or style and ecosystem management. Over
time, losses associated with the risk and the costs of adjusting and adapting would
be expected to rise and could, along with increased frequency of severe disruptive
events, lead to risk becoming intolerable.
In the risk space context, a common definition of “intolerable loss” is that it
defines an adaptation limit. Dow et al. (2013) define this limit from an actor’s (an
individual, community or other entity) perspective as “the point at which an actor’s
objectives cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions” (Dow
et al. 2013, p. 4). This means that an individual is no longer able to reach his or
her objectives in the given context (see also introduction by Mechler et al. 2018).
This is in line with Barnett et al. (2015, p. 223) who argue that limits to adaptation
“involve irreversible losses of things individuals care about, either due to climate
change impacts or as outcomes of climate change policies.” Adaptation limits, in
other words, are instances where a radical transformation is likely required, which in
most cases means addressing loss and damage of those activities, assets and values
which people hold important.
In the PacificSIDS, “intolerable” carries the implication of relocation and reset-
tlement given the major biophysical challenges that many of these SIDS face (Nurse
et al. 2014). This also includes loss of biodiversity and species specifically needed
for traditional practices, such as the disappearance or reduction in kava (Vanuatu,
Fiji, Solomon Islands, Samoa), difficulties in cultivating taro and yam (most coun-
tries in the Pacific), reduction in species that are used for customary handicrafts
(pandanus) and traditional medicine (Melanesian countries, Solomon Islands, Papua
New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji in particular). The loss and/or contamination of water
resources (or significant reduction due to strong El Nino effects) also determine the
fate of many remote communities who might not have options to otherwise continue
their subsistence-based livelihoods in particular places.
The risk space in some Pacific island states, we argue, could already be at the
tolerable/intolerable interface, which is closer to today’s reality than a potential sce-
nario that might or might not take place in 2080 (see Table 15.1 and Fig. 15.2).
Shortage of water and degradation of agricultural lands is one factor in the relocation
of some Solomon Islands communities from a number of provinces to Honiara. Also,
low-lying communities such as Ontong Java, Sikaiana and Reef islands and settle-
ments built on water such as Kwai, Ngongosila and Lau are already facing increasing
difficulties due to environmental change (Republic of Solomons 2008).
Slow onset processes, such as water and food scarcity (including declining food
garden yields), and environmental degradation, which are amplified by natural haz-
ards, can and have triggered relocation. Other factors include a lack of access to
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Table 15.1 Loss & Damage concepts applied to the SW Pacific
Concept Definition Pacific—risk context Pacific—option space
Adaptation
constraint
Impediment to progress
adaptation, which often can
be overcome by changes in
operational and policy
instruments
Lack of alignment between
different governance
structures, e.g. between
customary governance and
Westminster systems; lack
of capacity in adaptation
expertise; lack of funding to
implement adaptation
actions e.g. community
projects, water projects
Changes in operational and
policy instruments e.g.
closer alignment of
customary governance and
Westminster systems;
increased adaptation
capacity; monitoring and
evaluation of adaptation
activities and ‘building back
better’
Adaptation
limit
Inability to fulfil objectives
and goals (in line with
intolerable risk space)
Permanent loss of places
(atolls, coastal areas),
livelihoods (subsistence
farming with particular
crops e.g. taro, yam); loss of
cultural items for
ceremonies (kava, palm
leaves)
Relocation and resettlement
likely away from the most
hazardous coastal areas;
changes in livelihood types
Avoidable
risk
Risks, which can be
avoided/reduced due to the
implementation of
adaptation strategies
Higher temperatures;
changes in seasons and
impacts on crop quality and
timing → impacts on
cultural practices and
validity of traditional
knowledge
Climate resilient crops;
increased investments in
coastal protection strategies
(seawalls, ecosystem-based
adaptation); local/in-country
relocation; integration of
traditional knowledge and
Western science
Avoided risk Risks, which have been
avoided/reduced by the
implementation of
adaptation strategies
Flood risks Warning systems, building
styles, village location
Unavoidable
risk
Risks, which cannot be dealt
with due to locked in
climate change impacts
Sea level rise; contamination
of water resources.
Increased risk of severe
cyclones and droughts
Tolerable risk Risks which communities
can deal with by
implementing strategies
Low level sea level rise and
inundation; infrequent
storms and storm surge
Building seawalls,
strengthening building
codes, investing in early
warning systems; changing
traditional building
techniques
Intolerable
risk
Risks which (involuntarily)
force individuals and
communities to leave their
places of living or transform
their livelihoods
Increased hazards, leaving
atolls due to constant and/or
permanent inundation; loss
of drinking water resources;
loss of livelihoods
The focus for low-lying
areas is on involuntary
relocation & resettlement. In
some cases, engineering &
structural approaches might
be possible; remittances
could be used in place of
local livelihoods
Sources Based on Dow et al. (2013), Klein et al. (2014), Mechler and Schinko (2016). For discussion of more
detailed definitions see the introductory chapter by Mechler et al. (2018)
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Intolerable
Tolerable
Acceptable
Activities aimed at ‘holding the line’, enabling 
livelihoods to continue, while curative, reactive 
efforts are required to support the additional cost 
attributable to climate change
Baseline Residual Risk
Whatever measures have been 
implemented regarding current risks
curative part becomes 
involuntary, forced migration
Voluntary and Involuntary
2 C 
2080-2100
Present Near term
2030-2040
4 C 
2080-2100
Adaptation & DRR
Curative L&D
Risk space Options space
Activities aimed at ‘holding the 
line’, enabling livelihoods to 
continue, while curative, 
reactive efforts are required to 
support the additional cost 
attributable to climate change
Fig. 15.2 Visualisation of risk and options spaces for the SW Pacific. Drawing on Mechler and
Schinko (2016)
services such as health and education. Natural hazards can be the final trigger for the
relocation process for communities already suffering from environmental degrada-
tionor lackof access to services,who thendecide tomove (Connell 2011).Commonly
identified additional push factors for migration for example in Micronesia include
earnings at home, potential earnings abroad, and the costs of migration…poverty
and hardship; unemployment; low wages; high fertility; poor health and education
services; conflict, insecurity and violence; governance issues; human rights abuse;
and persecution and discrimination (Pacific Institute of Public Policy 2010, p. 3).
Much has been written on relocation and climate migrants and refugees in the
Pacific context (Barnett and O’Neil 2012; Campbell et al. 2005; McAdam 2012),
however much of this discussion has not necessarily fed into the L&D agenda or
to research and policy on adaptation limits (Barnett et al. 2015; Nalau and Leal
Filho 2018). The concept of adaptation constraints in the Pacific context relates to
factors, which currently impede progress in implementing adaptation (Klein et al.
2014). Such constraints could in principle beovercomeby, for example, strengthening
institutional cooperation and closer alignment of relevant policies and frameworks,
such as integrating climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction (Nalau et al. 2016)
or increasing the availability and capacity to access relevant information for decision-
making (Nalau et al. 2017a).
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15.2.1 Attribution
Attribution is particularly complex in the Pacific Island countries due to the scarcity
of data and knowledge, which could be used to monitor and understand change.
For example, some resource and environmental management practices have been
detrimental on the islands and as such are contributing to negative impacts in the form
of coastal and catchment erosion. Such practices are not directly the cause of climate
change but rather human-induced, and some of these have also long historical roots,
e.g. stemming from colonial practices on the islands, such as resource extraction. For
estimating L&D linked to anthropogenic climate change, there needs to be a solid
understanding how this can or is measured and what proxies can be used in cases
where the necessary data does not exist (Conway and Mustelin 2014).
15.3 The Loss and Damage Options Space in the Pacific
Our analysis suggests that the options-policy space may be very constrained—espe-
cially when dealing with extreme or intolerable losses and damages (see Table 15.1).
Most Pacific Islanders, up to 80% or more in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, are
wholly or partly dependent on subsistence farming and fishing. People depending on
subsistence, especially those in remote locationswith very limitedmarket economies,
cannot simply change their livelihoods. This is the case even though the food gar-
dens can be increasingly unproductive, or unable to provide for changing demands
and lifestyles, such as health, education, and technology expenses—with consequent
rising food insecurity.
Constraints to adaptation are most obvious in isolated and remote rural areas,
however they also exist in urban areas. Increasingly a substantial part of the urban
populations in most SW Pacific countries live in informal settlements, character-
ized as “urban villages” where many of the attributes of rural villages are reproduced
(Jones 2016), including foodgardens as an essential livelihood strategy. Formost peo-
ple in most Pacific Island countries economic opportunities are very limited, because
of “the combination of remoteness, small size, geographic dispersion, and environ-
mental fragility” (World Bank Group 2017). As a consequence, many PacificSIDS
have seen only very limited increases in per capita incomes over the past 25 years
(World Bank Group 2017). This all acts to limit the options space.
Within this context, we examine what options exist or might need to be developed
for SW Pacific Islands states, under the headings of tolerable and intolerable risk
(Fig. 15.2). At present there are still tolerable risks, which can be managed largely
through better climate changeadaptation, development and disaster risk reduction
strategies. The option space can therefore appear to be broad, but is constrained
as described above. Tolerable refers here to the circumstances people are dealing
with today, while intolerable refers to developing circumstances, but includes cases
where people are already faced with the choice of relocation, and decisions that will
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potentially transform their lives. However, some locations are already experiencing
risks generally assumed not to be a problem until 2030–2040. These locations are
facing the prospect of forced relocation, but there is still space for voluntary actions,
especially in terms of how relocation proceeds.
By 2080–2100, assuming a 2-degree world, however, the options space is already
much more limited, whereas in a 4-degree world, it would no longer be possible to
pursue voluntary relocation or alternative livelihood strategies in some of the islands.
It should be noted that this view does not take account of potential future innovations
in the adaptation and options space. There are also differences between sub-regions
ofMelanesia,Micronesia and Polynesia in the extent that geographical features (e.g.,
higher mountains) enable some communities and countries to have broader option
spaces than others. The figure is nevertheless useful in localising the issue of loss
and damage in the SW Pacific context.
15.3.1 Managing Tolerable Risks
It is important to appreciate that many island communities to a greater or lesser
extent depend on subsistence farming and fishing for their livelihoods, and endure a
significant level of everyday risk for food and livelihoods. Some communities have
seasonal food shortages and malnutrition is widespread (Toole 2016). In some areas,
such as the “Weather Coast” of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, livelihoods are
very marginal with a seasonal “hungry time” (Kastom Gaden/Terra Circle 2005).
This is to make the point that even though starvation is not an issue, food security is,
and in some areas is a chronic concern. Water security is also an issue, especially on
atolls where fresh water is easily contaminated by the sea.
Climate change, demographic change, and changing expectations, are superim-
posed on top of these existing situations (Khrisnapillai 2017; Kuruppu and Willie
2015)—within the tolerable day-to-day risk and option spaces. A recent extreme
event, Cyclone Pam, is used to illustrate some of these issues later in the chapter.
Insurance for natural hazards in the Pacific is very limited, with most people having
no coverage. The idea of a regional insurance or solidarity pool to support govern-
ment expenditure in disasters has been raised often. The Pacific Catastrophe Risk
Assessment and Insurance Initiative (PCRAFI) was established to provide improved
data and understanding of hazards, and now also provides funds to governments in
the event of disaster. However, the amounts are very small.
15.3.2 Dealing with Intolerable Risks
There are already cases where communities find themselves impacted by intolera-
ble climate related risk and where risk management options, often only suggested
as future possibilities, are already being deployed. In the Pacific, the extent of irre-
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versible loss is prominent as people are abandoning low-lying homes and villages
given the increase in storm surges and higher tides, and rising water and food inse-
curity. Some of the earliest cases of climate change-linked migration in the Pacific
are the Carteret Islands (Papua New Guinea) and Vanua Lava in Vanuatu, and the
planned relocation ofTaro, the provincial capital ofChoiseul Province in theSolomon
Islands. In this case, we could argue that these communities have to some extent faced
an adaptation limit, and that such “intolerable” loss would include irreversible loss
where the people and communities have little option but to leave or abandon the
places where they currently live and the kinds of lives they lead in that physical
environment. Nevertheless, relocation in these cases has been voluntary. In the cases
of Taro there is, and for the Carteret Islands there was, considerable planning (even
though the relocation is widely seen as a failure). In preparation for much more
population movement, Vanuatu, in conjunction with the International Organization
for Migration (IOM), has developed a draft National Policy on Climate Change and
Disaster-Induced Displacement (Vanuatu & IOM 2017).
The emphasis of options when faced with intolerable risk, is on involuntary relo-
cation (Fig. 15.2). However, transformative action might also be possible through
migrating or taking seasonal work elsewhere. Remittances from relatives working
elsewhere inVanuatu or overseas are also a possibility, although currently such oppor-
tunities for South-West Pacific islanders are limited. Yet, remittances in particular in
the Pacific region are a major source of income and a major enabling factor in how
communities can continue to thrive even in difficult circumstances and post-disaster
settings (Brown 2015). Aid, remittances, modern communication technology, and
local structural engineering and changes can enable communities to reside in places
where otherwise they could no longer sustain themselves (Handmer and Mustelin
2013; Jamero et al. 2017).
15.3.3 Case Study: Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015
as an Example of Coping with Current Risk
Many Pacific Island countries are especially prone to disaster triggered by climate
and weather events, for example, Vanuatu has long ranked number one on the World
Risk Index (Birkmann et al. 2011; Garschagen et al. 2015). As extreme events in
the Pacific are frequent, attribution is more complex. The 2015 Category 5 Tropical
Cyclone (TC) Pam was the second most intense tropical cyclone ever in the South
Pacific basin (Fig. 15.3).
The lack of baseline data is also relevant here: for example after the cyclone hit,
although damage assessments and estimations were done (Government of Vanuatu
2015), providing a clear figure on informal loss and damage was very difficult as the
latest population censuswas done in 2009 and the full extent of asset damage is largely
unknown (Barber 2015; Nalau et al. 2017b). Nevertheless, there were significant
impacts on most sectors of the economy, in particular food crops, infrastructure and
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Fig. 15.3 Damage from tropical cyclone Pam in 2015 in north Efate island, Vanuatu. Photo John
Handmer
buildings. About 80% of the national housing stock was damaged or destroyed (SPC
2015). Telecommunications ceased functioning inmost areas. Infrastructure and food
crops were badly damaged, with many tree crops lost. Water supplies were damaged
or contaminated with salt water leaving nearly half the population (110,000) in need
of clean drinking water (OCHA 2015; Handmer and Iveson 2017).
Given that most of the rural population lives in traditional housing made of palm
leaves, bamboo and other local materials, in hard monetary terms losing these struc-
tures would amount to little. However, when people’s access to income is low and
there is much ecosystem damage (Vanuatu 2015); for example on Tanna Island,
the assessment of loss and damage becomes much more complex when the houses
cannot be rebuilt and the medicinal plants have been lost. In addition, integrating
such elements as sense of place into loss and damage assessments is another hurdle
when intangible values do not convert easily into monetary forms (see chapter by
Serdeczny 2018; Magee et al. 2016).
A recent gap analysis of L&D in Vanuatu (Talakai 2015) found that none of
the existing projects, programs or policies explicitly considered risk issues, although
there is recognition that the main economic impacts are to tourism and to both formal
and informal sector agriculture. Where L&D is considered, it is mostly related to
cyclone damages and there are currently no metrics or data to even make statements
on slow onset events such as droughts (Talakai 2015). Volcanic ash is one of the
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prominent concerns across sectors although it is recognized as a non-climatic impact.
Some of the risk estimates have been for example informed by the Tropical Cyclone
Pam related assessments, e.g., within the tourism sector and by national assessments.
There is a need to recognise where loss and damage occur across sectors and
groups: for example, the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) after TC Pam
found that 69% of all disaster effects was found in the private sector (private enter-
prises and individual ownership) with the rest occurring in the public sector. This
is clearly a significant finding, which demonstrates the importance of understanding
the private formal and informal sector better in the Pacific region. Asset ownership
levels and variance therefore could form an important baseline consideration for
assessing loss and damage for example from tropical cyclones in the region. The
PDNA covered both the formal and informal sectors of the economy.
While TC Pam illustrates the many dimensions of L&D practicalities, from the
livelihood point of view it also raises the question of the inter-linkages between an
extreme rapid event and slow onset processes, and what these mean in measuring
loss and damage. On Tanna island, which was hit the hardest in Vanuatu by TC Pam,
the food crops in particular were badly damaged and it took at least a year for them
to recover and to support communities again in terms of food security and building
materials. This can be partly attributed to El Nino, which strengthened at the time
of TC Pam leading to drought conditions with significant decreases in soil moisture
and rainfall impeding livelihood and food security recovery. Seedlings planted after
TC Pam were not able to grow and produce adequate food crops. Without available
vegetables from the gardens, some remote communities, who do not necessarily have
access to monetary income, experienced significant food insecurity with increased
health problems. Should then, a decline in health status be assessed as losses/damages
if inadequate levels of nutrition cause a permanent decline in health of people in the
communities? Also, if the same place and same people are hit by a sequence of events
in a relatively short timespan, would the loss and damage then be calculated from
healthy intact ecosystems or from the already degraded ones after the most recent
event?
What this illustrates is the interconnectedness between rapid onset extremes and
slow onset processes in creating loss and damage in a particular context. This also
poses a dilemma to international mechanisms, which are trying to assess for example
the level and scale of loss and damage due to particular impacts and events. In the case
of Vanuatu, one could argue that while the PDNA does give some kind of estimate
of the damage and loss (which is an underestimation as per the report), it provides
a snapshot of the impacts and would require longer term monitoring and reporting
that then can be used to determine to what extent loss and damage have become
irreversible/permanent, and in which sectors, places and activities (Government of
Vanuatu 2015).
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15.4 Conclusions
This chapter has situated the discussion of L&D within the context of the South-
west Pacific Small Island Developing States. A key conclusion of this chapter is
that limits are being reached already in some locations. Regional and local loss and
damage assessments are needed. These could draw on the PDNAs (Post-Disaster
Needs Assessments) to create a baseline against which further assessments could be
compared, and as such be used to operationalise the L&Dmechanisms on the ground.
By using the L&D risk and options space as a conceptual framework and metric,
countries could provide a national assessment of L&D with respect to activities
and communities mapped against risk and option spaces. For example, communities
having to involuntarily relocate could be recorded andmapped on the intolerable risk
space that could then be part of the L&D reporting process.
Understanding the interaction of rapid onset extremes and slow onset processes is
crucial to understanding loss and damage in the Pacific context. Justice dimensions
are also fundamental for climate research and policy: for example, most develop-
ing and least developed countries do not have the strong long-term scientific evi-
dence base that underpins robust climate policy (Huggel et al. 2016; see chapter by
Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018). There is much effort in the Pacific region devoted to
increasing capacity and systems of information and knowledge management, which
can aid in addressing some of these issues. However, more needs to be done in order
to develop the evidence base for adaptation and L&D.
There is a need for a closer integration of the L&D, disaster risk management and
the adaptationcommunities both within and outside the Climate Change Convention.
A better understanding, for example, of the concept of ‘adaptation limit’ can inform
the L&D debates while also keeping in mind the difficulties in attribution in particu-
lar in contexts where the necessary data is not readily available (Huggel et al. 2016).
A more nuanced understanding of where adaptation limits have become a reality,
why and how is also essential as decision-making processes might be already taking
place due to other stressors than climate change impacts alone (Leal Filho and Nalau
2018; Mortreux and Barnett 2009). The current reliance in the Pacific on hard infras-
tructures, such as seawalls, also needs re-visiting in identifying how effective such
investments are and where these might be better served through ecosystem-based
adaptation approaches (Mackey and Ware 2018).
As Moser and Boykoff (2013) also note, it is rarely enough to assess and focus
on one type of a risk. Increasingly, attention should be paid on the multitude of
risks and changing risk profiles due to particular adaptation actions. In the case
of relocation, one approach could be to use destination vulnerability and exposure
assessments, which consider new and potentially emerging risks for the community
being relocated. Such assessments could include socio-economic, political and cul-
tural dimensions including existing land rights and entitlements, extent of existing
services, cultural context, access to labour market and potential for pursuing partic-
ular livelihoods, and geophysical risks. Added infrastructure needs in the receiving
place need to be also included in such assessments (Aerts 2017). While this sounds
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scientific and heavily dependent on economic assessments, one should not lose sight
of such dimensions such as people’s sense of place, that should also be captured at
some level and what losing particular places means.
In the Pacific context, understanding the traditional governance arrangements
and decision-making processes remains a missing dimension as most of the adapta-
tionscience focuses on the Westminster system of governance (Nalau et al. 2017b).
However, adaptation decisions, and decisions regarding L&D, are also very much in
the realmof traditional chiefly systems at the community level in countries likeSamoa
(Brown 2015; Parsons et al. 2017b). Ensuring robust climate risk management, and
the availability and robustness of options, needs to ensure that both systems of gov-
ernance are involved. This also includes the role of Traditional Knowledge and how
it together with scientific knowledge can be used to make adaptation more relevant
in the Pacific context (Parsons et al. 2016, 2017a; Chambers et al. 2017).
External support to boost the climate risk management options space could use-
fully take the form of additional opportunities for employment overseas, and support
to develop local markets to enhance people’s livelihood choices. In the realm of food
security, there are a number of strategies and initiatives, which can influence people’s
opportunities to sustain agriculture-based livelihoods on the islands. Under the frame
of climate riskmanagement, investing and experimentingwithmore climate resistant
crops is a strategy, which development agencies, such as GIZ (German agency for
international development), have begun to use in order to increase food and liveli-
hood security in Vanuatu. There are also strategies such as drip irrigation, which can
potentially transform someof the apparent adaptation limits facing populations today.
New technological solutions are forthcoming and hence any discussion on adapta-
tion limits and L&D should also consider those potential innovative approaches that
enable communities to thrive under apparent constraints and limits.
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Chapter 16
Climate Migration and Cultural
Preservation: The Case
of the Marshallese Diaspora
Alison Heslin
Abstract Potential land loss in Pacific island countries from rising sea levels raises
many concerns regarding how nation states will continue to function politically and
economically in the event of climate-induced relocation of their populations. This
piece expands that conversation, addressing the impacts of relocation on cultural her-
itage, drawing on data from interviews with migrants from the Marshall Islands to
the United States. The study seeks to understand the challenges and opportunities of
cultural preservation among theMarshallese diaspora.Marshallese accounts of life in
the United States indicate many opportunities for cultural preservation, particularly
for those living in communities with large Marshallese populations, while also pre-
senting challenges based on social, economic, and geographic differences between
the U.S. and the Marshall Islands. Understanding the means through which Mar-
shallese migrants maintain cultural traditions and the challenges current migrants
face, can help us address potentially irreversible, but avoidable losses of cultural
traditions in the event of mass displacement.
Keywords Cultural heritage · Migration · Non-economic losses · Marshall
islands · Diaspora
16.1 Losses and Damages in the Pacific Islands
For the low-lying islands of the Pacific, climate change poses an existential risk
(see also chapter by Handmer and Nalau 2018). In particular, increased sea level
and temperature threatens the islands and atolls with floods, erosion, groundwater
degradation, and coral reef damage (Nurse et al. 2014). Under the Representative
Concentrations Pathway (RCP) scenarios, by 2100 mean sea levels will increase
0.44 m (under RCP 2.6) up to 0.74 m (under RCP8.5) with regional variations
that could further increase sea levels in the Pacific (IPCC 2013). Based on these
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projections, low-lying islands will be severely negatively affected and uninhabitable,
necessitating the relocation of their populations within the next 50 years. These
impacts will have economic, political, and cultural consequences for the populations
of many Pacific nation-states.
With rising seas and increased sea temperatures, islands face challenges to their
economic production. Warmer oceans can damage coral reefs, decreasing tourism
and fish production (Asian Development Bank 2013; Rosegrant et al. 2016), and
changes in rainfall and salt water inundation can affect fresh water lenses and crop
production such as copra and taro (Barnett 2011; Patel 2006; Terry and Chui 2012).
Additionally, out-migration from the islands removes higher-skilled laborers from
the domestic labour pool (Brown and Connell 2004). Politically, the complete relo-
cation of island populations raises questions of sovereignty. Where will the popula-
tions move to, how will their governments function outside their national territory,
and what rights will island citizens have in new countries (Barnett and Adger 2003)?
The short and medium-term projections of climate change raise many such polit-
ical and economic questions for islands nations. While the challenges related to
economic Loss&Damage and political sovereignty are indeed severe and worthy
of attention, understandings of climate related Loss&Damage must also take into
account non-economic losses, including the effects of climate change on cultural
heritage and preservation. Even if existing states agree to host relocated populations,
the movement of populations can result in the loss of sacred or culturally signifi-
cant locations and can affect cultural identity, language, and social structures (see
chapter by Serdeczny 2018). Losses of culture or struggles of cultural integration
are important for individual and community well-being and can also, in turn, affect
the economic and political capacity of the population. Understanding the challenges
and opportunities faced by existing Pacific island diasporas offers valuable insight
into the potential future of displaced island nations.
16.2 Methods
This study seeks to identify the avoidable and unavoidable risks posed to cultural
heritage in the event of displacement. To do so, this study draws on in-depth inter-
views of members of the Pacific Islands diaspora to understand the ways in which
they maintain cultural heritage outside of their country of origin. Using the Marshall
Islands (Republic ofMarshall Islands, RMI) as a case study for potential relocation of
populations, interviews were conducted with Marshallese citizens who had migrated
to the United States. The participants answered questions regarding what motivated
them to move to the United States, what aspects of life differed markedly from the
Marshall Islands, and what challenges and opportunities they faced in adapting to
living outside of the Marshall Islands. Participants in the interviews were selected
through convenience and snowball sampling, ensuring to include participants from
multiple areas of the U.S., not strictly those with large Marshallese diaspora com-
16 Climate Migration and Cultural Preservation … 385
Fig. 16.1 The Republic of the Marshall Islands. Source https://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.phpid=
8080
munities. Participants had all lived in the Marshall Islands, and currently lived in
multiple locations within the United States, including Arkansas, Washington, and
Ohio.
16.3 The Marshall Islands
The Republic of the Marshall Islands presents an important case study for under-
standing risks to cultural loss for low-lying islands facing relocation in the immediate
future. Situated on average just 2 m above sea level, the 29 coral atolls and five coral
islands that comprise the Marshall Islands (shown in Fig. 16.1) have little capacity
to withstand even minor increases in sea level and tides. In addition to the immedi-
ate dangers of increased tides on residents’ lives and property, salt-water intrusion
threatens already scarce freshwater resources and warmer oceans damage the atolls’
protective reefs. In the longer term, the islands face increasingly intolerable risks,
leaving limited adaptive options, mainly voluntary resettlement or displacement (see
also chapter by Schinko et al. 2018; Mechler and Schinko 2016).
Currently, nearly a third of the population lives outside of the Marshall Islands.
These high levels of contemporary migration from the Marshall Islands can help
in anticipating future challenges faced by those displaced by sea level rise. The
primary destination of movement out of the RMI is the United States, due to the
provisions under the Compact of Free Association (COFA). Under the COFA, the
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United States hasmilitary access to particularMarshallese islands and ocean territory,
while Marshallese citizens may live, work, and study in the United States without
a visa (U.S. Department of State 2016). As of the 2011 Marshall Islands census, a
total of 53, 158 people lived in the Marshall Islands (Economic Policy, Planning,
and Statistics Office 2011), while 22, 434Marshallese lived in the United States. The
significant proportion of Marshallese living in the United States occurred rapidly,
with fewer than 7,000 Marshallese living the U.S. in 2000, increasing more than
threefold by 2010 (Hixson et al. 2012). Marshallese migrants to the U.S. have settled
primarily in Hawaii (33% as of 2010), Arkansas (19.3%), and Washington (9.8%).
16.3.1 Challenges
While many relocate to Hawaii, nearly 2/3 of the Marshallese in the U.S. live in
geographic locations and climates, which differ markedly from theMarshall Islands,
including eastern Washington state and Springdale, Arkansas. With cultural signifi-
cance tied to a history of ocean navigation (including outrigger canoeing, shown in
Fig. 16.2), subsistence from skilled spear-fishing, and handicrafts and local dishes
made from tropical crops including banana and coconut, Marshallese face serious
challenges of cultural preservation when removed from their island homes. Particu-
larly, those interviewed commented on their families’ homes and serene landscape
(Fig. 16.3), aspects lacking in the U.S. context. While migrants to the U.S. can still
return to the Marshall Islands to visit, they are seldom able to given the price and
duration of the flight, with tickets from the mainland U.S. costing up to $2,000 and
totalling over 50 h in transit time. Additionally, in the event of further sea-level rise,
travel to the Marshall Islands would become infeasible, resulting in the unavoidable
loss of the significant physical locations and landscapes described by those inter-
viewed. While damage to the islands would destroy many physical locations with
residents have attachments to, migrants to the U.S. did indicate finding particular
traditional foods like breadfruit and coconuts from local Latin American grocers,
allowing for the continued consumption of traditional foods, particularly for holi-
days and celebrations. In addition, Marshallese can still send and receive packages
fairly easily, as the US postal service operates in the RMI. This allowsmigrants to the
U.S. to receive traditional clothing and handicrafts even while living the abroad. In
the absence of continued family ties to the islands, however, this mechanism of cul-
tural preservation would no longer be possible, requiring production of these items
outside of the Marshall Islands if materials are accessible.
In addition to geographic differences, Marshallese in the U.S. face a very different
social structure than that, which exists on the remote Pacific atolls. Marshallese
families generally live in extended family households, lacking linguistic distinctions
between mothers and aunts, siblings and cousins. Even when families do live in
separate houses, children often move back and forth between households, cared for
by parents, aunts, uncles, and grandparents. This fluidity of family and guardian
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Fig. 16.2 Outrigger Canoe traditionally used in ocean navigation, Majuro Atoll, Republic of the
Marshall Islands. Photo A. Heslin
distinctions differs rather sharply from the U.S. norm of single-family households,
as well as the legal guardianship afforded to biological parents.
The relocation of Marshallese to particular communities in the U.S., however,
does allow for continued community support. Springdale, Arkansas and Seattle,
Washington for example, have large Marshallese communities, with Marshallese
churches and cultural events. While a location like Arkansas is lacking many of
the meaningful geographic components of maintaining island culture, the presence
of a large Marshallese community was noted to maintain aspects of the language
and culture. Interview respondents in Arkansas and Washington indicated having
Marshallese friends in their communities and attending Marshallese celebrations on
holidays. The capacity for Marshallese migrants to maintain certain aspects of their
culture, including language, religious practices, and holiday celebrations is tied to
access to Marshallese communities. Support for these activities and cultural centres
can stem the avoidable cultural losses for these activities not explicitly tied to the
physical landscape.
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Fig. 16.3 Typical landscape, Arno Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands. Photo A. Heslin
16.3.2 Opportunities
While an involuntary relocation of the Marshall Islands’ population would mark a
tragic and regrettable failure of the global community in addressing climate change,
the established diaspora community in the United States offers some opportuni-
ties to the Marshallese community. Marshallese migration to the U.S. has afforded
employment and education opportunities not available in the RMI, as evidenced by
the large-scale migration that has occurred over the past 20 years. Migration to the
U.S. offers an alternative to many challenges faced in the RMI, which include scarce
opportunities for employment, with remittances from the U.S. totalling an estimated
25 million dollars in 2015 (Pew Research Center 2016). Additionally, population
growth has increased the need for imported foods in the RMI. This reliance on
imported food, and the consumption of the least expensive imported options, has
caused serious health consequences in the Marshall Islands, with over 20% of the
population suffering from diabetes and over two-thirds being overweight or obese
(Ichiho et al. 2013; World Health Organization 2016). Migration to the U.S. offers
access to additional medical services, though at a substantially higher cost than those
in the RMI. One must view the opportunity for additional employment and health-
care within the context of the RMI’s history, as many health and economic maladies
suffered by Marshallese can be traced back to international involvement in the Mar-
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shall Islands—as a location of conflict, recipient of food aid, site of nuclear testing,
and base for the U.S. military (Ahlgren et al. 2014).
16.4 Conclusions
Severe damage to theMarshall Islandswould result in an irreversible loss of culturally
and personally significant locations and activities. The geography of the Marshall
Islands is so uncommon, that the possibility for relocating populations to similar
landscapes, which would limit the cultural loss, seems almost impossible. While
many geographically tied cultural practices face irreversible loss, the sizable and
established population base in the United-States provides an opportunity for some
cultural preservation outside of the RMI. Marshallese residents in the U.S. can con-
tinue to speak Marshallese, eat Marshallese foods, and spend time with the Mar-
shallese communities when living in a city with a Marshallese population. With
many established family and friendship ties to people living in the United States,
the cultural transition involved in moving could occur more smoothly. Many current
Marshallese residents in the U.S. indicate having moved to join family or staying
with family when first arriving in the U.S. The possibility of this form of reloca-
tion on a larger scale, however, requires the continued terms of the Contract of Free
Association, which has allowed for free movement between the two countries since
the 1980s. Additionally, should migration become permanent and irreversible, the
political circumstances ofMarshallese residents in the U.S. would need engagement,
as they currently lack guaranteed access to certain federal social programs afforded
to U.S. citizens, including Medicaid, as well as representation in government.
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Abstract There has been increasing interest in the potential of effective science-
society partnership models for identifying and implementing options that manage
critical disaster risks “on the ground.” This particularly holds true for debate around
Loss and Damage. Few documented precedents and little documented experience
exists, however, for suchmodels of engagement.How to organise such partnerships?
What are learnings from existing activities and how can these be upscaled?We report
on one such partnership, the Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance, a multi-actor part-
nership launched in 2013 to enhance communities’ resilience to flooding at local
to global scales. The program brings together the skills and expertise of NGOs, the
private sector and research institutions in order to induce transformational change for
managing flood risks. Working in a number of countries facing different challenges
and opportunities the program uses a participatory and iterative approach to develop
sustainable portfolios of interventions that tackle both flood risk and development
objectives in synergy. We focus our examination on two cases of Alliance engage-
ment, where livelihoods are particularly being eroded by flood risk, including actual
and potential contributions by climate change: (i) in the Karnali river basin in West
Nepal, communities are facing rapid on-set flash floods during the monsoon season;
(ii) in the Rimac basin in Central Peru communities are exposed to riverine flooding
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amplified by El Niño episodes. We show how different tools and methods can be
co-generated and used at different learning stages and across temporal and agency
scales by researchers and practitioners. Seamless integration is neither possible, nor
desirable, and in many instances, an adaptive management approach through, what
we call, a Shared Resilience Learning Dialogue, can provide the boundary process
that connects the different analytical elements developed and particularly links those
up with community-led processes. Our critical examination of the experience from
the Alliance leads into suggestions for identifying novel funding and support models
involving NGOs, researchers and the private sector working side by side with public
sector institutions to deliver community level support for managing risks that may
go “beyond adaptation.”
Keywords Flood risk · Resilience · Science-society partnerships · Boundary
objects · Adaptive management · Learning
17.1 Introduction: The 2015 Policy Imperatives
and the Implications for the Loss and Damage Debate
International policy as well as local risk and resilience practice are increasingly
challenging the scientific community to provide actionable knowledge for identi-
fying acceptable and efficient responses through risk analysis, policy insight and
governance studies that help to build resilience. It has been well understood that
implementation needs to be multi-scalar involving partnerships between civil soci-
ety, private sector and government entities (ENHANCE 2016).
17.1.1 Global Policy Imperative-Reducing Risks
and Building Resilience
Policy related to climate risk and resilience in recent years has made great strides
forward. TheWorld Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, which led to the Sendai
Framework for Action, demonstrated increasing recognition that a broad-based
approach is necessary to incentivise risk reduction, avoid risk creation and generate
additional co-benefits that go beyond the direct and indirect gains from reducing
risk (UN 2015). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), passed as well in 2015,
constitute a universal set of 17 goals and 169 targets defining development aspiration
and ideally transformation in an integrated fashion (UN 2105). A need for transfor-
mation is being seen as increasingly relevant for the climate discourse, and at the
end of 2015, Paris saw the full endorsement under article 8 of the Warsaw Loss and
Damage Mechanism (WIM), created at COP19 to “deal with climate-related effects,
including residual impacts after adaptation” (UNFCCC 2015).
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Demand for broad-based risk and resilience science insight is thus strong with
the post 2015 agenda in full swing: the Sendai Framework for Action is seeing fur-
ther implementation at various levels, SDGs are being assessed, mainstreamed and
linked to developmental programming and project implementation; the Paris ambi-
tion will need to be operationalised in terms of transforming energy and mobility
systems towards complete decarbonisation by 2050, as well as strongly supporting
climate adaptation (CCA). However, there is robust evidence to suggest that current
action and ambition is insufficient to keep climate change at “non-dangerous” levels.
Compared to the ambition voiced in the Paris agreement to limit anthropogenically-
inducedwarming to below 2 °C, respectively 1.5 °C, current climatemitigation ambi-
tion is projected to lead to significantly greater warming, 3 °C if national pledges are
implemented, 4 °C if business as usual is continued, adding to climate-related impacts
already experienced across the globe (Climateactiontracker 2018). As discussed in
other chapters in this volume (see chapters by Handmer and Nalau 2018; Heslin
2018; Landauer and Juhola 2018) high-level warming would mean pushing some
social systems and ecosystems over their adaptation thresholds. As a consequence,
there is demand for global evidence to support ramping up efforts for dealing with
risks beyond adaptation. This perspective has strong overlaps with the attribution
question as laid out in the introduction (chapter by Mechler et al. 2018).
17.1.2 Local Practitioner’s Imperative—Learning to Live
and Thrive with Floods While Reducing Risk
Calls for assessing and managing risks “beyond adaptation” are being echoed by a
practice perspective dealing with severe risks linked to current climate variability
already. A key challenge identified and to be addressed by development practitioners
working on risk and resilience issues is the nagging feeling that a disaster could wash
away generations of hard work by a community in seconds. The limitation for the
humanitarian sector is a focus on urgent needs and getting the community back on
track, without having the luxury of remaining with the community as they start to
rebuild their lives. Thus, the transition fromDisaster Risk Preparedness/Management
into Community Development, that is ideally sustainable and long-term, is widely
recognised as a critical challenge in international development. At the same time,
for communities around the world wellbeing is dependent on the ability not only to
respond to hazards but also to make the right choices about their future development
(see Fig. 17.1 for an example on flood risk).
Large-scale disasters, such as—floods, cannot completely be avoided, but there
are measures that can be taken to ensure they do not diminish hard-earned economic
and development gains. Learning to live, and thrive, with floods means considering
flood risk in planning and investment decisions right from inception, as well as taking
steps to protect assets already at risk. It also means planning for response and recov-
ery, which protects and even enhances development and growth potential. Contrary
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Fig. 17.1 The practice imperative—connecting disaster preparedness and livelihood development.
Figure Source McQuistan (2015)
to popular belief, judiciously managing flood risk does not have to mean a reduc-
tion in economic well-being. Learning to be flood resilient means identifying and
taking action where flood risk can be mitigated and development can be enhanced
in mutually reinforcing ways (see also Keating et al. 2016a). This involves consid-
ering transformational change as part of risk management responses (see chapter by
Schinko et al. 2018).
17.1.3 Crafting Effective Science-Society Partnerships
that Inform Policy and Practice
How to bring these perspectives together at the different scales that they operate at?
In order to inform these policy and practice imperatives there is increasing interest
in forging science-society partnership models for effectively managing disaster risks
across scales. This particularly holds true for debate around Loss and Damage. We
report on one such partnership, the Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance, a partnership
launched in 2013 to enhance communities’ resilience to flooding at local to global
scales. The programbrings together the skills and expertise ofNGOs, research institu-
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tions and the private sector to work to transformation action on managing flood risks.
The program uses a participatory and adaptive management approach to develop sus-
tainable portfolios of resilience-building interventions that tackle both flood risk and
development objectives in synergy for communities exposed to erosive risks. It has
been working in various countries and cases characterised by different challenges
and opportunities. The partnership builds its science-society interventions innova-
tively around a systems perspective for understanding risk and resilience, which
takes account of a shifting disaster risk discourse that emphasises disaster resilience
as “bouncing forward” and considering transformative approaches (Keating et al.
2016a).
This chapter, reporting and reflecting on the experience of the Alliance in light of
theLoss andDamage debate, is touching on the following questions:How to organise
such models and partnerships?What are learnings from existing activities? How can
learning be upscaled?
We outline processes and evidence created via a number of case studies conducted
as part of the Alliance work. We focus our examination and discussion on two cases,
where livelihoods are particularly being eroded by flood risk with amplifications
by climate change: (i) in the Karnali river basins in Nepal, communities are facing
rapid on-set flash floods during the monsoon season, (ii) in the Rimac basin in Peru
communities are exposed to riverine flooding, which periodically is magnified by
the El Niño phenomenon.
The chapter is organised as follows: Sect. 17.2 presents themethodological frame-
work underlying the science-society partnership model and our evaluation in this
chapter. Section 17.3 presents the Flood Resilience Alliance in some more detail.
Section 17.4 outlines methods and models developed, whose applications to the
Alliance work and cases is the topic of Sect. 17.5 before Sect. 17.6 finally reflects
and derives implications.
17.2 Methodological Framework for Science-Society
Partnerships: Implementing a Systems Approach
for Dealing with Critical Risks
The methodological framework underlying our further discussion builds on several
entry points, which can be aligned using a systems approach. With emphasis on pro-
viding useful knowledge for informing sustainability transitions and transformations
has come a call to the research community to organise knowledge creation that cuts
across scales. As an important key reference, Turnheim et al. (2015) reflect on key
analytical traditions and suggests a need for a joint framework and bridging across
various approaches. The authors identify 3 dominant research traditions that are of
high relevance for the sustainability discourse involving various scales and analytics
as well as outcomes and interactions.
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1. Coupled human-physical systems modelling to provide broad scenarios for pro-
jecting the future along a few decades-applied at global to regional scales;
2. An empirical approach for identifying past and current national patterns and
trajectories of change-typically targeting national scales;
3. Locale-specific evidence creation on local initiatives and experimentation taking
a backward-looking perspective and often building on heuristics-the local scale.
The literature broadly and the paper specifically emphasise that these methods
and models are building on different ontologies and epistemologies. Thus, seam-
less integration across scales is not possible. Rather, proper boundary processes for
effectively aligning these different research traditions are considered conducive in
order to provide useful information. Criteria for “usefulness” the following can be
generally identified (McNie 2007).
• Saliency: Useful information must be salient and relevant to the specific context
in which it will be used. Salient information appropriately considers ecological,
temporal, spatial, and administrative scales and timeliness.
• Legitimacy: Useful informationmust be legitimate in that thosewho produce it are
perceived to be free frompolitical suasionor bias. Thismeans it is (i) demanddriven
and involves (experts from) relevant stakeholder groups in the scoping, preparation,
peer-review and outreach/communication; (ii) transparent, in that the information
is produced and/or transmitted in a way that is open and observable. (ii) builds
on relationships between producers and users of the information characterized by
mutual trust and respect; (iv) builds social capital through successful relationships
and social organization leading to mutual trust, credibility, common rules, norms,
reciprocity, and mutual respect.
• Credibility: Useful information must be credible and dependable in that it is
perceived by the users to be accurate, valid, and of high quality. Peer review is often
considered the sine qua non of credible information yet in many instances, other
types of published information (“grey literature”) also can satisfy the credibility
criterion.
Importantly, useful information is not only about content, but emerges as the
product of an effective process. Useable information needs to have a substantive
core in which the information must be useful to the policy maker or actionable for
the practitioner. It includes a procedural dimension that provides a mechanism for
transmitting knowledge from the scientific community to these different but inter-
dependent worlds. Also, such information provides for agency in terms of social
learning and policy-making. We will consider these criteria further on in the discus-
sion.
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Fig. 17.2 Partners and roles in the Flood Resilience Alliance. Source Zurich 2014
17.3 The Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance:
A Comprehensive Science-Policy-Practice Partnership
There has been an upspring of partnerships covering the boundary space from sci-
ence to policy to practice, particularly in relation to disaster riskmanagement, climate
adaptation and resilience. The Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance (ZFRA), a unique
alliance with leading partners from the development and humanitarian NGO sectors,
academia and the private sector has embarked on a journey to help build resilience
to flood risk in communities across the globe in order to make a difference for at
least 250,000 flood prone households up to mid 2018, households which are often
facing erosive risks shaped importantly by climate change. The multi-year initia-
tive set up and co-generated by Zurich Insurance aims to operationalise, measure,
and help build the resilience of communities to floods—the most devastating nat-
ural hazard globally. This extensive action and research program brings together
expertise and skills on risk modeling and systems science as applied by the research
partners IIASA and Wharton Business School with risk engineering expertise of
Zurich and on-the-ground presence of the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) plus the international development NGO, Practical
Action (Fig. 17.2). The Flood Resilience Alliance aims to enhance community flood
resilience by exploring innovative ways to reduce risk before a flood strikes. NGO
collaborators have used research findings to aid in the design and implementation of
interventions to benefit communities.
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Focus: Flood Risk
Theworld is facing increasing risks as globalisation connects people, economies, and
ecosystems. Globally, the number of people exposed to floods each year is increasing
at a higher rate than population growth. People are drawn to live on flood plains partly
because of economic opportunity (World Bank 2013). However, it is increasingly
recognised that communities cannot totally avoid risk and that living with risks is the
imperative. Future socioeconomic and climatic changes are expected to exacerbate
flooding and undermine humanwellbeing. Flood risks are increasing, interconnected
and interdependent and cannot be enhanced by one stakeholder alone. To date, the
development and the disaster risk management (DRM) communities have relied on
a mix of interventions to help communities cope with flooding: “hard” interventions
like building a dam or flood evacuation routes and, to a much lesser extent, “smart
and soft” interventions like land use planning, insurance, and early-warning-systems.
Flood-risk management is dominated by single interventions, many of which fail to
meet their objectives because they do not consider the wider socioeconomic system
within which they operate. In some instances interventions can even be counter-
productive in resilience terms, inadvertently undermining development or actually
increasing risk in another way.
Focus: A Systems Perspective on Resilience
The engagement in the ZFRA is organised around concepts and methods linked to
the notion of resilience. While not a new concept (theory and methods have been
developed in the 1970s, importantly coined by thinking on ecological resilience), the
resilience discourse has recently been strongly revived, partially also triggered by the
aftermath of the global financial crisis. Emphasis in this field has been on identifying
synergies with developmental challenges, systemic risks and actions. While some
consider resilience the ‘new sustainability,’ it remains to be seen how this promis-
ing, if broad conceptualisation may help to stimulate necessary action on climate
change and disaster risks, while seeking to foster an integration of social, ecologic
and economic dimensions of sustainability challenges. It is well understood that dis-
asters increasingly impair sustainable development, yet DRM has often looked at
corrective measures (rebuilding the status quo and old vulnerabilities), rather than
prospective efforts tackling underlying risk drivers, such as unplanned urban sprawl
and asset location in harm’s way. The concept of resilience provides a chance to take
a systems’ perspective and tackle prospective risk creation by integrating notions of
up-and down-side risk avoidance and management with upside risk taking. Keating
et al. (2016a) document the on-going evolution within the extreme event risk man-
agement community towards embracing the concept of resilience. The authors also
suggest a novel conceptualisation and operationalisation to help jointly tackle the key
challenges discussed above, and see resilience as the “ability of a system, commu-
nity or society to pursue its social, ecological and economic development and growth
objectives, while managing its disaster risk over time in a mutually reinforcing way”
(Keating et al. 2017).
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Fig. 17.3 Flood risk context in the Karnali river basin in Nepal (left panel) and the Rimac river
valley in Peru (right panel). Photo Sources Practical Action and A. Keating
17.3.1 Joint Boundary Objects: Case Studies
for Co-generating Universal Insights
The ZFRA case studies for co-generating insights and implementing sorely needed
projects have been carefully chosen. Case studies are generally characterised by
severe flood risk and limits to disaster risk management and adaptation interacting
with significant development challenges (see Fig. 17.3).
In the Karnali river basins in Nepal, rural communities are facing rapid on-set
flash floods during the monsoon season often leading to massive impacts to lives and
assets. Therefore Early Warning Systems, improved disaster management coordi-
nation between communities and local and national governments, creation of emer-
gency plans and implementation of alternative livelihoods are part of the interven-
tions. In the Rimac basin in Peru, communities are improving their preparedness for
the El Niño season by identifying evacuation routes and emergency plans, capacity
building of brigades and supporting communities to engage with local governments
on DRR planning.
As well, other case studies, not further discussed here, have focussed on Indonesia
and Mexico. Along the Ciliwung, Bengawan Solo and Citarum rivers in Indonesia,
there is a huge need to improve waste management, reforestation and to connect the
impact of upstream behavioural patterns with flooding in downstream communities.
In the region of Tabasco in Mexico, communities located in wetlands with flood
seasons lasting for over three months have been in need of improved water and san-
itation protection, community centres that can also function as emergency shelters,
and new livelihood options that can withstand prolonged flood seasons.
The Flood Resilience Alliance is using a participatory and iterative learning
approach to identify and develop for the representative (“universal”) cases sustain-
able portfolios of interventions that tackle both flood risk and development objectives
in synergy. The strategies communities use to pursue their development and well-
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being objectives have a profound impact on risk. Likewise, the way a community
approaches its disaster risk has a profound impact on development and wellbeing.
The trick is to get these two working in a virtuous cycle, rather than undermining
each other. Entry points for developing this iterative, cyclical approach are effective
community-level processes and a shared vision of adaptive learning discussed in the
following.
17.4 Entry Points for Integrating Methods and Models
for Putting Flood Resilience into Practice
17.4.1 Participatory Vulnerability Capacity Assessments
For working with communities on implementing DRM activities, the International
Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and Practical Action use participatory assess-
ment processes to gather, organise and analyse information on the vulnerability
and adaptive capacity of communities, which can subsequently be used for joint
decision-making. These processes are broadly referred to as Participatory Vulnera-
bility Capacity Assessments (P)VCA. In order to measure vulnerability of commu-
nities and households in 1989 Anderson and Woodrow developed the Capacity and
Vulnerability Analysis matrix. This largely qualitative, participatory and monitoring
approach came to be widely accepted and used by many NGOs in their work on
DRM forward (see ActionAid 2005; Davis 2004).
The participatory approaches are particularly valuable in helping to understand
the key challenges discussed above namely: (1) The multitude of benefits and local
values attached to these; (2) The historical perspective not only in regard to major
disasters but also the less intense but recurrent minor shocks and stresses; and (3)
Providing an opportunity to link community perceptions including locally-derived
knowledge with what science and policy makers are predicting to occur in the future
due to existing underlying issues and climate change. This merger of traditional with
scientific knowledge adds great value to planning approaches that attempt to consider
multiple hazards and accommodate increasing uncertainty.
Overall, VCAs/PCVAs aim to support communities to (i) identify key vulner-
abilities of communities; (ii) understand communities’ perceived and actual risks;
(iii) analyse the resources and capacities available to reduce said risks; and (iv)
develop action plans to address identified vulnerabilities and risks. In working with
communities on implementing DRR activities, Practical Action has been identify-
ing and estimating the historic and potential natural hazard situation and has been
workingwith communities to estimate the social, environmental and economic losses
expected in the area of interest through their PCVA process. These processes are usu-
ally completed with the collection of secondary information to provide a baseline of
communities’ risk to different hazards.
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Fig. 17.4 Adaptive management cycle used in the ZFRA to foster Shared Resilience Learning.
Source IIASA and Zurich 2015
17.4.2 Boundary Processes for the Methodological
Framework: Adaptive Management for Shared
Resilience Learning
It is well understood that enhancing (flood) resilience is a learning process, which
can also be described through an ‘adaptive management cycle’. The adaptive man-
agement cycle contains the steps required in any process to enhance community flood
resilience. In order to linkDRMandCCAinpractice, the literature hasmoved towards
suggesting amore reflexive-participative approach. Acknowledging the uncertainties
and complexities inherent in social–ecological systems impacted by climate-related
risks, analysts have started to emphasise iterative and adaptive learning (see, e.g.,
O’Brien et al. 2012; Mochizuki et al. 2015). Lavell et al. (2012) suggest a learning
loop framework that integrates different learning theories, such as experiential learn-
ing (Kolb 1984), adaptive management (Holling 1978) and transformative learning
(Mezirow 1995). This framework distinguishes three different loops according to
the degree that these processes support transformational change of CRM strategies.
Figure 17.4 shows the key stages and tools of the learning cycle, which for the
Alliance work was termed the “Shared Resilience Learning Dialogue.”
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Before the cycle is initialised, the first step requires that the organisation(s) driv-
ing the development process (including but not limited to NGOs and governments)
analyse the situation to identify the development change expected, ensuring that it
will address a clear flood risk. The next step is to assess how development and flood
risk are linked. This is done together with as many stakeholders as possible. This
assessment is designed to explore the current situation, and identify stakeholder’s
roles and the potential for change. Based on the outcome of this assessment, the
organisations select a development plan in line with stakeholders’ priorities. This
plan will incorporate a suite of solutions to improve community flood resilience.
One or more solutions are then chosen as the ones to implement, emphasising a
practical (‘learning-by-doing’) approach.
Those involved in the process monitor and evaluate activities to track how they
unfold, test the assumptions uponwhich the choicesweremade and see if they deliver
results as planned, and to capture lessons that are fed back into assessment. At the
centre of the diagram is an iterative learning process,whichworks cyclically as a loop.
This process emphasizes continuous learning and innovation among stakeholders
(as opposed to the implementing organisation); the organisation interacts within the
‘adaptive’ management cycle and ultimately brings about lasting change.
17.4.3 Detecting and Supporting the Management of Risk
and Resilience at Scale Around a Learning
Framework
For the Loss and Damage discourse and the work reported on in this chapter, we thus
propose to employ a learning framework building on risk detection and resilience
management. Learning and awareness is fundamental to better understand risk and
resilience. The adaptivemanagement framework, as it co-generates insight from local
to global scales, can be useful to identify the need for action across time and a scale
from incremental (traditional DRR and climate change adaptation) to transformative
(fundamentally different livelihood strategies supported by novel policy options),
when faced with risks beyond the limits of adaptation. Figure 17.5 links the adaptive
learning cycle to a representation of risks today as well as of risks at different levels
of warming.
The left panel in exemplary fashion visualises risks and risk tolerance (rang-
ing from acceptable to tolerable to intolerable) for different levels of global warming
(complete boxes). The black arrows show the increments to risk with climatic change
as a driver. The dashed boxes identify parts of the risk that can further be reduced
either by conventional DRR or CCA options (blue-green arrows) or transformative
measures as part of responses linked to Loss and Damage (white arrows). The right
panel further shows the adaptive management cycle as facilitating single-double and
triple-loop learning. It suggests, that in the short-term incremental adjustments to
risk and resilience can be taken by (i) monitoring the effectiveness of existing policy
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options, scientific evidence regarding climate change, risk and resilience informa-
tion; (ii) analysis of climate-related risks, such as using flood risk modelling; (iii)
appraisals of the resilience of capacities; and (iv) implementation of options and
solutions that further build resilience (such as raising flood risk protection). Impor-
tantly, going through the incremental adjustment cycle allows for identifying risks
beyond standard adaptation calling for fundamental and transformative adjustments.
Fundamental adjustment options may be to provide more room for the river, so peak
floods levels can be absorbed. Transformative adjustments may involve resettling
flood-prone households.
In this fashion, the loop-learning framework sets out a continuous process for
identifying and generating sequential adjustment to changing risk and resilience
conditions, which benefits the communities at risk as well as, if projected for levels of
global warming, provides insight regarding the stresses imposed by climate change,
thus underlining the need for stringent mitigation efforts and support for resilience
building.
17.5 Application of Methods and Models
We now turn to presenting some of the methods and tools used for the Alliance’s
Shared Resilience Learning Dialogue. As laid out, the Alliance is working with
communities in Mexico, Nepal, Indonesia, and Peru in order to design advanced
modelling techniques that are robust, user-driven, and user-friendly. The work and
findings aim at not only helping communities directly at risk, but also eventually sup-
porting local, national, and international policymakers,NGOs, and donorsworldwide
to mainstream risk reduction against multiple natural hazards.
17.5.1 Understanding Risk: Risk Geo Wiki
and Crowdsourcing
Communities need flood-related risk information to prepare for and respond to
floods—to inform risk reduction strategies and strengthen resilience, improve land
use planning, and generally prepare for the case when disaster strikes. But across
much of the developing world, data are sparse at best and not fit for the purpose
for understanding the dynamics of flood risk. The IIASA Risk Geo-Wiki online
platform provides for a risk crowdsourcing approach and acts not only as a repos-
itory of available flood-related spatial information, but also provides for two-way
information exchange. The platform provides digital technology in terms of crowd-
sourcing and citizen science in order to integrate local/traditional knowledge and
expert-sourced knowledge to better understand flood vulnerability of households
and communities, scaling up community-level information to river basin level and
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Fig. 17.6 Screenshot of Risk Geo-Wiki. Modelled global flood risk data overlaid on satellite
imagery at the regional level for the Karnali, Nepal
more. The portal is intended to be of practical use to community leaders and NGOs,
governments, academia, industry and citizens who are interested in better under-
standing the information available to strengthen flood resilience. This is particularly
useful for communities and in locations where accurate topographic maps are not
available or the elevation mapping is so course that flood inundation modelling for
examples is meaningless.
As a starting point, a variety of global expert-sourced flood datasets (e.g., the
GLOFRIS model, Ward et al. 2013) included in the Risk Geo-Wiki can be displayed
exhibiting an estimate of flood hazard, exposure and risk based on various flood
frequencies/return periods—see Fig. 17.6 for a view of the Karnali basin. This infor-
mation is a starting point for global and regional analyses to conduct risk-based
analysis and broadly identify hotspots.
However, as this figure shows, global expert-based modelled data is by necessity
coarse in terms of spatial resolution and often not directly applicable to community
level needs. Hence, what is needed is the ability to capture local community level
information in a global context.
As introduced, Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment is a widely
used tool to collect community level disaster risk and resilience information and to
inform DRR strategies, yet it is not linked to digitised information and broadly avail-
able. The Risk Geo-Wiki effort has developed a general methodological approach
that combines community-based participatory mapping processes, which have been
widely used by governments and non-government organisation in the fields of natural
resourcesmanagement, disaster risk reduction and rural development, with emerging
internet-based collaborative digital mapping techniques. The project digitised a set
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Fig. 17.7 Community and NGO members mapping into OpenStreetMap with mobile devices in
the Karnali basin, Nepal. Photo Source W. Liu
of existing maps on disaster risk and community resources where the locations of,
for example, rivers, houses, infrastructure and emergency shelters are usually hand-
drawn by selected community members. Such maps provide critical information
used by local stakeholders in designing and prioritising among possible flood risk
management options. Communities in Nepal, Peru, and Mexico have uploaded data
to the site and are working on developing it further. For local communities who have
uploaded spatial information to the site, it allows them to visualise their information
overlaid upon satellite imagery or OpenStreetMap (OSM) (Fig. 17.7).
In collaboration with Practical Action, IIASA researchers worked side-by-side
with in-country professionals and communities to demonstrate the value andpotential
of this general participatory and collaborative digital mapping approach in the flood-
prone lower Karnali River basin in Western Nepal. As Fig. 17.8 shows, the new
digital community maps are richer in content, more accurate, and easier to update
and share than conventional hand-drawn VCA maps. The process engaged a wide
range of stakeholders to generate geographic information on resources, capacities
and flood risks of pilot communities based on their local needs. This approach, as an
inclusive form of risk knowledge co-generation, can make important contribution to
evidence-based understanding of disaster risk and thus enhance disaster resilience
at all levels. The work has since been taken forward with the collaborators to map
communities in Western Nepal, Peru and the Tabasco region in Mexico.
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17.5.2 Measuring Resilience
Comprehensive risk information is one starting point for guiding disaster risk reduc-
tion actions that build resilience. In this regard, a proper understanding of risk in
qualitative and quantitative terms is essential, but has not sufficiently permeated
resilience research and resilience building to date. Arguably, this is why there has
been little concrete, measurable progress on the ground. The resilience measurement
initiative of the ZFRA around developing the Flood ResilienceMeasurement Frame-
work for Communities (FRMC) has been focused on benchmarking and tracking the
underlying sources of resilience and the long-termoutcomes (seeKeating et al. 2017).
For the flood-prone communities involved in the study, this means shedding light on
why one community may fare better than another in the same disaster, despite seem-
ingly identical levels of development and vulnerability. With the information and
resources acquired in this work, communities will not just be able to bounce back
after a disaster. They will be able to actually bounce forward in terms of making
progress on important development objectives. The tool will help communities and
development partners review available options andmake judgements on how to build
resilience, helping communities with limited resources decide what to invest in, such
as increasing and strengthening livelihoods, investing in preparedness measures or
building requisite DRR infrastructure.
The FRMC approach to measuring resilience involves measuring the sources of
resilience pre and post-disaster, operationalised around key capacity indicators of a
community’s socio-economic system (Fig. 17.9). The resilience framework, build-
ing on detailed literature review aligns resilience systems thinking (Bruneau 2006)
with the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) adopted by development agencies
for broadly tracing achievement of development objectives in communities (DFID
1999). Overall, the approach consistently considers communities‘ assets, interac-
tions and interconnections across, what we call, 5 capitals (or capacities): human,
natural, social, physical and financial. The measurement of capital groups builds on
a set resilience sources, overall, for the 5 classes there are a total of 88 sources of
resilience in this so-called 5C-4R framework. Sources are qualitatively graded from
A-D based on available data depending on context and need, e.g. from household
surveys, community focus group discussions, expert informants, and other third-
party sources. To assure validity of measurement, sources are assessed and graded
by specially trained NGO experts embedded in the respective communities, while
data are collected globally via an integrated mobile and web-based system. Build-
ing on measuring potential resilience of a community, projecting actual outcomes
of resilience after an event considers observed impacts (losses and time for getting
back to ‘normal’).
The measurement framework has been rolled out globally, and in addition to the 4
case locations of the ZFRA, other NGOs have been enlisted as additional boundary
partners to the ZFRA, contributing data from communities in Afghanistan, East
Timor, Indonesia, Haiti and the United States amounting to more than 100 currently
graded communities with more than 1 million data points.
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Fig. 17.9 Zurich Flood Resilience Measurement Framework implementation process. Source
Keating et al. (2017)
The FRMC framework ismeant to consistentlymeasure dynamic progress (or lack
thereof) over time given internal and external resilience determinants. It can also be
applied at a fixed point in time, as done for Nepal in order to statically assess and
compare resilience with average resilience across all communities (see Fig. 17.10).
17.5.3 Towards Truly Informing Decision-Making:
Decision-Support Techniques
Resilience is generally built by implementing efficient, effective and acceptable mea-
sures. There are a variety of decision-support tools for evaluating such options (see
Table 17.1). Ultimately, economic efficiency underlying Cost-Benefit-Analysis is
only one decision-making criterion of relevance for prioritising DRR flood risk
reduction investments. Decisions on investments to increase flood risk resilience
are likely to be made based on a number of criteria, some of which are more or less
transparent (Mechler 2016). Criteria such as risk-effectiveness, robustness, equity
and distributional concerns, and acceptability have been found to be key for deciding
on implementing DRR projects. There are other decision support techniques such as
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Fig. 17.10 Measuring resilience in Nepal as compared to the global measurement. Source Laurien
2017
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), multi-criteria analysis (MCA), robust decision-
making and serious gaming approaches that can be used to measure achievement
of these criteria. These tools can be used to make a more comprehensive case for
DRR. As a challenge, they do not lead to easily communicable metrics for pre-
senting the results, such as benefit-cost ratios. These tools inform various types of
decisions in many different contexts, including project appraisal, evaluation, infor-
mational/advocacy studies and iterative decision-making. Table 17.1 summarises the
key advantages, challenges and applicability ofCBA,CEA,MCA, robust and gaming
approaches. The table illustrates that no tool is perfect for each and every situation.
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Table 17.1 Characteristics and applicability of different decision-support tools for ex-ante and
ex-post disaster risk management
Decision support tool Advantages Challenges Application
CBA Rigorous framework
based on comparing
costs with benefits
Need for monetising
all benefits, difficulty
in representing plural
values
Well-specified
hard-resilience
projects with
economic benefits
CEA Ambition level fixed,
and only costs to be
compared. Intangible
benefits part. loss of
life do not need be
monetised
Ambition level needs
to be fixed and agreed
upon
Well-specified
interventions with
important intangible
impacts, which should
not be exceeded (loss
of life etc.)
MCA Consideration of
multiple objectives
and plural values
Subjective judgments
required, which hinder
replication
Multiple and systemic
interventions
involving plural values
Robust approaches Addressing
uncertainty and
robustness
Technical and
computing skills
required
Projects with large
uncertainties and long
timeframes
Gaming/Policy
Exercise
Truly engaging
stakeholders to inform
decisions
Extensive facilitation
skills and ability to
manage complexity of
social interactions
Community level
interactions to inform
decisions with
stakeholders and
decision-makers
Note CBA Cost benefit analysis; CEA Cost-effectiveness analysis; MCA Multi-criteria analysis
Each has its strengths and weaknesses and is suited to different decision-making
contexts.
These methods and metrics mostly require some expert facilitation. However,
the information-action gap inherent in providing expert input to working with local,
national and international stakeholders for selecting options is well known. Failures
to produce useful insight often resulted from over-reliance on biophysical data and
inadequate appreciation of the diversity of ways decisions are made at all levels of
society. Yet, understanding and analysis of complex policy issues is often hampered
by the high costs of gathering data about how various members of society actually
think and decide about such issues. Similarly, scientists and policy makers often
must invest years to gain experience critical to managing systems that change and
evolve without undertaking real risk (Sterman 1994). This raises the question: How
can we lower the costs of learning through experience? “Serious gaming” and policy
exercises (also known as Open Simulations) have emerged to fill this gap (Duke and
Geurts 2004). Such exercises use social simulation tools that combine computational
models and participation of real actors. Particularly when actions are contested and
broad participation in knowledge co-generation and decision-making is required (as
is the case for the Loss and Damage discourse), serious gaming approaches become
relevant and have been tested and applied in the ZFRAwork (see Box 17.1 on serious
gaming objectives).
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Box 17.1 Objectives of serious gaming to support resilience assessment and build-
ing through engagement
• Demonstrating the benefits of ex ante disaster risk reduction and preparedness. The
game can be used in case studies to test responses of different actors to policy inno-
vations thereby helping to improve them by reducing potential negative side effects.
Games can especially draw attention to the ‘invisible’ indirect and intangible impacts.
• Fostering flood risk protection through enhancing participatory decision-making.
The game can help stakeholders to build flood resilience buy-in.As a tool it has unique
potential to change how people perceive and understand resilience. Through intel-
lectual and emotional engagement in an interactive environment, stakeholders may
start to see how important flood resilience becomes for their security and livelihoods.
It will also contribute to building social capital by increasing trust and collaboration.
• Knowledge dissemination and outreach. Games, by engaging participants, can
become a very successful dissemination instrument—with broader outreach than
traditional reports. The games developed in the project for stakeholders can be later
used for disseminating project insights to broader audience.
• Supporting the integrated assessment for flood resilience. Decision-making rules
are of the most difficult modelling tasks (either in system dynamics or agent-based
models). Gaming exercises can provide a better understanding of decision making of
actors that can influence flood resilience. Because they provide context and engage
participants emotionally, they are more reliable than questionnaires in eliciting stake-
holder responses in a way that can be translated into modelling language.
These exercises mediate collaboration between actors and scientists in analysing
how problems emerge in complex systems and where points of intervention may
lie. Because they are experienced as something that feels real, more information
is retained, learning is faster, and an intuition is gained about how to make real
decisions and improve policies. Ideally, if the right actors can be brought together
gaming allows the exploration of real issues and provides a neutral platform for
different stakeholders to understand conflicting opinions and perspectives in a safe
space. The sophistication of the approach allows even non-trained actors to engage
in highly complex decisions.
The focus of using policy exercises for the ZFRA, conducted in collaboration
with the Centre for Systems Solutions (CRS) in Wroclaw, Poland, has been to apply
simulation games and policy exercises to support the activities in the FloodResilience
project. A Flood Resilience Game has been developed, which is a board-game played
by 8–16 players, who each take on a role as a member of a flood prone community.
Direct interactions between players create a rich experience that can be discussed and
analysed in structured debrief sessions. This allows players to explore vulnerabilities,
risks and capacities—citizens, local authorities and NGOs together—leading to an
advanced understanding of interdependencies and the potential for working together.
The game draws on research on the complex challenges of reducing flood risk and
fostering sustainable development. It allows players to experience, explore, and learn
about the flood risk and resilience of communities in river valleys. Players experience
the simulated impacts of flood damage on housing and infrastructure, as well as
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Fig. 17.11 Application of the Flood Resilience Game provoking discussion at an NGO workshop
in Jakarta
indirect effects on livelihoods, markets, and quality of life. It lets them experience the
effects on resilience of investments in different types of “capital”—such as financial,
human, social, physical, and natural (see Fig. 17.11).
Finally, players can explore the complex outcomes on the society, environment
and economy from different long-term development pathways. This highlights the
types of decisions needed to avoid creatingmore flood risk in the future, incentivising
action before a flood through enhancing participatory decision-making. Overall, the
learning generated in these interactions in a “safe-space” environment provides a
platform for subsequently exploring real-life decisions.
17.5.4 A Systems Model for the Integrated Assessment
of Resilience
As an effort to support the development of the gaming approach as well as provide
an integrated perspective on flood resilience, the Flood Resilience System Frame-
work and Model (FLORES) has been designed to help provide a first step towards
understanding the complexity of the community decision context. The first version of
the system dynamics model developed is based on successful collaboration between
IIASA and Soluciones Practicas (Peru).1 The knowledge and experience of Solu-
ciones Practicas’ staff has been critical to develop a model that helps to answer
1Soluciones Practicas is the Practical Action country organisation for Peru.
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Fig. 17.12 Flood Resilience Systems Framework (FLORES)—a simplified view
strategic questions about improving flood resilience in the Rimac river valley in
Peru. FLORES enables users to visualise this complexity to start to learn about how
the system behaves, thus helping to unwrap the layers of complexity associated with
community-level resilience.
The main purpose of the model has been to explore the medium to long-term
dynamics of risk and options for risk management (that is to say: potential hazards
and conditions of vulnerability and capacities) of the vulnerable communities with
respect to hazardous events (here: huaycos and floods in the Rimac Valley). This
perspective has been fundamentally underlying the development of a more compre-
hensive resilience framework anddynamicmodel for understanding the relationships.
The framework has been discussed and further co-generated with local experts and
stakeholders in the Rimac basin in Peru in a workshop setting (see Box 17.2 and
Fig. 17.12).
In the case of the Rimac Valley river basin system, community members voiced
demand for information that helps to understand how trends in El Nino patterns,
climate change, economic development andmigration interactwith land use, building
(new settlements) and transportation in hazard zones and disaster risk reduction
activities over a time horizon of 20–50 years. This means different scenarios need to
be developed to see how the system will evolve under different policy choices. The
system dynamics modelling developed is meant to support interactive simulations
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(policy exercises), which, in later stages of the community interactions may inform
the evaluation and selection of options and solutions.
Box 17.2 The Systems dynamics model FLORES investigates the following prob-
lems
• Modelling medium to long-term dynamics of risk (that is to say: potential hazards
and conditions of vulnerability and capacities) of the RimacValley communities with
respect to huaycos and floods.
• Exploring the effects of damages (direct impacts on housing and infrastructure) and
losses (indirect impacts) on livelihoods, markets and quality of life, using different
modelling scenarios.
• Investigating the influence of different disaster management capacities: emergency
preparedness, response, reconstruction, exposure, physical vulnerability (fragility)
and risk reduction measures on flood/huayco resilience of communities in the Rimac
Valley.
• Analysing the social and economic effects of the El Nino disturbance (including
possible migrations) within different climatic and policy scenarios.
• Analysing the effects of institutional arrangements (formal but also informal includ-
ing illegal settlements, building and transportation) on flood resilience of the Rimac
Valley communities.
• Identifyingmedium-long-term development pathways that avoid creating a flood risk
catastrophe (prospective risk reduction).
The model is planned to be further used by Soluciones Prácticas staff to explore
the critical variables and long-term drivers of resilience and change, and how these
interact to produce risk and development outcomes. This might assist in identify-
ing critical entry points (intervention options) for project planning, and to produce
advocacy materials/messages to be used in engaging with the disasters and devel-
opment sectors in Peru. The model has a relatively user-friendly interface and can
be computed very quickly, which makes it possible to use it in a workshop setting
together with disaster experts or other stakeholders to analyse different scenarios,
as well as modify assumptions to produce and examine new scenarios and/or policy
options. Modelling workshops can support experts and policy makers to understand
the problem space, and develop new, evidence-based policies addressing long-term
challenges. Based on the developed model, a policy exercise can be developed where
a group of stakeholders can examine step by step the consequences of their decisions,
resulting both from the biophysical dynamics and social interaction.
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17.5.5 Understanding Past Impacts for Projecting Future
Risk: Forensics and Scenario Analysis
Projecting future risk and resilience requires a good understanding of observed
events and factors driving impacts. Disaster forensics, the study of root causes, has
seen increasing attention; as a key work element the Flood Resilience Alliance over
the last few years developed and applied its forensic approach, termed Post-Event
Review Capability (PERC) to an increasing number of flood disasters around the
world2 (Venkateswaran et al. 2015; Keating et al. 2016b; Zurich 2014a, b, 2015a, b).
The point of departure for disaster forensics, an inter- and transdisciplinary research
effort, has been the understanding that the wealth of disaster risk information avail-
able has not been sufficiently effective to help halt the increase in risk. A number of
propositions have been suggested by forensics to work towards actionable informa-
tion to reduce risk and build resilience-all of which are of fundamental importance
for the Loss and Damage Debate (see IRDR 2011): (i) Risk reduction: More probing
research coupled with actors’ roles visibility and transparency will lead to increased
investment into risk reduction; (ii) Integration: More integrated (inter-and transdis-
ciplinary) and participatory research will produce more useful and effective results;
(iii) Identification and Communication of Risk Management Roles: More effective
and sustained communication of findings is required.
One entry point for taking retrospective disaster forensics forward to inform Loss
and Damage tackled in the Alliance has been to explore its integration with prospec-
tive scenario analysis. Scenario analysis is a technique and structured process for
projecting out key variables of interest (in this case disaster risk and resilience) as a
function of its drivers based on shared narratives about future socio-economic devel-
opment and other inputs. Scenario analysis has been widely used for global problems
(e.g., IPCC climate scenarios) as well as applied in local-participatory context to
explore solutions to local problems (Notten et al. 2003). It has neither been widely
used for problems related to disaster and climate-related risks nor applied in forensics
studies. Building on substantial forensics work undertaken in the Alliance, we tested
a forensics approach for understanding and dealing with the impacts brought about
by the El Nino Phenomenon in Peru in 2016/17 (see French and Mechler 2017).
The El Nino Phenomenon generally and particularly in Peru has brought about
large disaster impacts about the affected. Impacts are recurrent and highly variable,
with a cycle of 7–14 years. Other hazards interact and recently a so-called coastal El
Nino hit Peru leading to major devastation (Fig. 17.13). The forensics work, building
on other PERC and disaster forensics studies (Venkateswaran et al. 2015; Keating
et al. 2016b), and utilising desk-based research and analysis, semi-structured and
unstructured key-informant interviews, empirical risk analysis and risk modelling,
took the large uncertainty associated with El Nino as a point of departure in order to
better understand the history and future evolution of ElNiño impacts and linkedDRM
efforts in Peru. The research has been building on empirically grounded insights and
2see www.floodresilience.net/solutions/collection/perc.
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Fig. 17.13 Prospective forensics for projecting flood risk in Peru. Source French and Mechler
(2017)
learning from past experience in order to identify future resilience pathways. It went
beyond analysing the discrete events of 1997–98 and 2015–16 to understand the
evolution of the key risk drivers hazard, exposure and particularly vulnerability over
the past and the future using a scenario approach. This forward-looking analysis,
termed projective forensics, thus linked retroactive PERC assessment with a future-
oriented scenario approach for risk and resilience building for flood risk in Peru. As
guiding question the team askedwas:Given the risk drivers and actions implemented
or considered, how would future risk in Peru evolve over the short to medium-term
horizon-up to 2030 as compared to today and what additional actions to take?
Building on risk projections given by a prominent flood risk model (Ward et al.
2013) to also consider the socio-economic portion, trends identified in the past were
used to project the future using different scenarios as detected locally: (i) Ad hoc
response (reactive)-only prioritising DRR when an event is predicted/imminent;
(ii) Engineered safety (corrective)-investing in hard infrastructure projects; and (iii)
Resilience under uncertainty (prospective)-investing heavily in planning, zoning and
relocation. As shown in Fig. 17.13, future risk associated with these pathways differs
markedly. None of these scenario projections is likely to exactly see implementa-
tion, yet they provide a projection space, and thus may, as one application, support
gameful policy exercises, help to identify and motivate further actions today and in
the short-medium-term for building resilience.
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17.6 Reflections and Implications: Providing Insight
at Scale for Detecting and Managing Erosive Risk
Our reflection on the ZFRA experience started out by asking how analytical methods
and tools can be co-generated and used by experts, practitioners and those at risk
in order to build resilience against climate-related hazards (here flooding). Employ-
ing an adaptive management learning framework (the Shared Resilience Learning
Dialogue) as the boundary process for integration, we presented a variety of differ-
ent demand-driven tools and methods co-generated and used at different learning
stages and across temporal and agency scales in this science-society partnership.
Figure 17.14 graphically charts out the various tools and methods across time and
agency scales. Many tools focus on present and future insight, while PVCA pro-
vides evidence on past identification of hazards and risks, and the forensic scenarios
work from the past to projecting the future. Community-level tools, such as PVCA,
crowdsourcing, resiliencemeasurement ‘speak’ to efforts positioned at higher agency
levels, such as the RiskGeo-Wiki and flood riskmodelling. Gaming exercises and the
FLORES model are nested between scales as potential connectors between global
and local insight. Seamless integration of the tools and methods is often not possible,
but the Shared Resilience Learning Dialogue generated throughout the partnership
provides the boundary process that connects the different tools and methods, and
particularly links these up with community-led processes.
The Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance is further gaining knowledge and experi-
ence to use these tools to enhance community flood resilience. The tools outlined
here are being refined in joint collaboration with partners Practical Action, IFRC and
Zurich insurance and other boundary partners working with the Alliance. The tools
are compatible with, and being applied in conjunction with established community
Fig. 17.14 Tracing methods and tools developed in the Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance in time
and space connecting risk and resilience research with practice
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initiative process-based tools such as vulnerability and capacity assessment, partici-
patory capacity and vulnerability analysis, stakeholdermapping, hazardmapping and
vulnerability assessments, household economic analyses, political economic anal-
ysis, etc. The ZFRA case studies all deal with marginal communities that have to
face erosive flood-related risk in Nepal, Peru, Mexico and Indonesia. The charge
is to support incremental with fundamental and transformative adjustments across
the risk spectrum to support DRR and CCA practice as well as Loss and Damage
policy debate. Global policy, such as on Loss and Damage is increasingly faced with
demands for local, i.e. subnational to community-level engagement to deliver “on the
frontlines of climate change.” The partnership model described shows one effective
model for doing so. It also shows that seamless integration of tools and methods
across partners is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not fully feasible, as partners
follow different theories of change building on differences in ontological perspec-
tives. It is not desirable as these differences in worldviews are mutually enriching
and conducive for action at appropriate scales (local to global). The lack of seamless
integration can be effectively dealt with by the adaptive learning approach imple-
mented through the Shared Resilience Learning. Continuous learning for partners
and stakeholders allows for identifying options and solutions that work across scale,
are acceptable, efficient and above all, effective for those dealing with increasing
risks from climate change now and in the future.
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Chapter 18
Loss and Damage in the Rapidly
Changing Arctic
Mia Landauer and Sirkku Juhola
Abstract Arctic climate change is happening much faster than the global average.
Arctic change also has global consequences, in addition to local ones. Scientific
evidence shows that meltwater of Arctic sources contributes to sea-level rise signifi-
cantly while accounting for 35% of current global sea-level rise. Arctic communities
have to find ways to deal with rapidly changing environmental conditions that are
leading to social impacts such as outmigration, similarly to the global South. Interna-
tional debates on Loss and Damage have not addressed the Arctic so far. We review
literature to show what impacts of climate change are already visible in the Arctic,
and present local cases in order to provide empirical evidence of losses and damages
in the Arctic region. This evidence is particularly well presented in the context of
outmigration and relocation of which we highlight examples. The review reveals a
need for new governance mechanisms and institutional frameworks to tackle Loss
and Damage. Finally, we discuss what implications Arctic losses and damages have
for the international debate.
Keywords Arctic · Climate risk · Adaptation · Vulnerability · Indigenous
people · Communities · Policy
M. Landauer (B)
Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland
e-mail: mia.landauer@ulapland.fi; landauem@iiasa.ac.at
M. Landauer
Risk and Resilience Program and Arctic Futures Initiative, International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria
S. Juhola
Ecosystems and Environment Research Programme, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
S. Juhola
Department of Thematic Studies, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
S. Juhola
Helsinki Sustainability Science Institute (HELSUS), Helsinki, Finland
© The Author(s) 2019
R. Mechler et al. (eds.), Loss and Damage from Climate Change, Climate Risk
Management, Policy and Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72026-5_18
425
426 M. Landauer and S. Juhola
18.1 Introduction
Dangerous climate change increases the need for emergency preparedness mech-
anisms, disaster risk responses, and climate adaptation strategies in case of losses
and damages. To avoid dangerous climate change, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has called for action within a
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner (UNFCCC 1992, Article II).
Crowley (2011) has criticised this Article II because it does not consider the
international human rights principles when interpreting what “dangerous” climate
changemeans. For example, the ability of ecosystems to recover naturally has already
been compromised in many places in the Arctic, and these changes are threatening
food security and traditional livelihoods already, especially those of indigenous peo-
ples. Liability and compensation are under debate in international climate policy
discussions (Huggel et al. 2015). Financing mechanisms to support adaptation or
transformative actions can be provided from local, national, regional and interna-
tional sources. However, this requires consensus between responsible parties and
potential beneficiaries. It is also problematic that losses and damages cannot always
be compensated by technical or financial support, if they include, for example, loss
of culture and tradition. In these international debates, little attention and support
has been given to Arctic vulnerable communities so far. These communities have to
find ways to deal with rapidly changing environmental conditions, either by adapting
or taking actions that can lead to social impacts similarly to global South, such as
outmigration (e.g. Wolsko and Marino 2016).
Arctic climate change is happening much faster than the global average (Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment 2005; IPCC 2007; AMAP 2017). According to AMAP
(2017: 3), “The Arctic … has been warming more than twice as rapidly as the world
as a whole for the past 50 years”. The Arctic has often been referred to as “the
canary in the coalmine” (Chinowsky et al. 2010), “climate hotspot” (Hare et al.
2011), or “harbinger of change” (Carmack et al. 2012). The Arctic represents a place
where the impacts of climate change are already visible. Both scientific evidence
(e.g., attribution studies and vulnerability analyses of Arctic communities, including
the most recent reports of the IPCC) and traditional knowledge (e.g., indigenous
discourses and field observations of Arctic residents) indicate that climate change
has severe impacts on theArctic and risks and impacts also have global consequences.
Recent scientific evidence shows that meltwater of Arctic sources contributes to sea-
level rise significantly while accounting for 35% of current global sea level rise
(AMAP 2017).
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According to Carmack et al. (2012) examining the Arctic is particularly important
for four reasons. First, understanding change in the Arctic may reveal lessons of
how change happens in complex systems and improve our understanding how to
deal with these. Second, changes already taking place in the Arctic are likely to
have irreversible impacts regionally and locally, leading to limited possibilities of
communities to adapt, and significant consequences to the global economy as well.
Globally, Arctic climate change has been estimated to cost between 9 and 70 trillion
U.S. dollars over the period 2010–2100 (AMAP 2017:13). Third, climate change is
advancing faster in the Arctic than anywhere else, and finally, responses to climate
change through adaptation are manifold, and can be tested in the Arctic in the face
of rapidly approaching tipping points.
In this chapter, we examine what “dangerous climate change” means in the Arctic
context, by identifying critical risks and impacts in the region in general, and then
presenting cases from the literature that are beyond Arctic communities’ capacity
to adapt, in particular. The examples provide evidence on Arctic regions’ need for
institutional support to cope with the consequences of climate change, despite being
part of developed countries. So far, neither the United Nations Climate Change Con-
ference of the Parties (COP) nor the subsidiary bodies under the UNFCCC have
discussed Arctic climate changes in detail (Duyck 2015a, b). Yet, changes already
affect Arctic communities, questioning whether they are in fact bearing a “dispropor-
tionate or under abnormal burden” (cf. UNFCCC, Article II). Examples of losses and
damages more broadly are climate change affecting critical infrastructure and tradi-
tional livelihoods (Bronen 2015) as these harms can affect societies across genera-
tions (Sejersen 2012;Himes-Cornell andHoelting 2015). Similar actual and potential
losses and damages are under discussion in developing countries too. Their capability
to adapt to change or transform their livelihoods to something that still allows them
to maintain their land, livelihoods and culture, is critical to affected communities. If
this is not possible, and the residents have to leave and abandon their livelihoods,
they are faced by Loss and Damage in its “narrow” sense. Thus, we review Arctic
studies to understand what losses and damages mean in the Arctic context, what are
global consequences of Arctic change, and what implications these changes have for
the international Loss and Damage debate.
18.2 Rationale for Including the Arctic in the Loss
and Damage Debate
Internationally, the debate on Loss and Damage has predominantly concentrated
on discussing the risks and impacts of climate change on developing countries so
far. International climate negotiations have been the main arena and as other chap-
ters in this volume show, a consensus on the definition of Loss and Damage is yet
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to emerge (Mechler and Schinko 2016; see introduction by Mechler et al. 2018;
chapter by James et al. 2018). A broad definition in the literature makes a distinction
between avoidable, unavoided and unavoidable impacts of climate change, where
“irreversibility” refers to ‘losses’ and “impacts that can be alleviated” refer to ‘dam-
ages’ (see Mechler and Schinko 2016: 290). In essence, this means that Loss and
Damage can be narrowly defined as the “residual, adverse impacts of climate change
beyond what can be addressed bymitigation and adaptation” (see Huggel et al. 2015:
454). Here, we employ this definition of Loss and Damage related to climate change
impacts that are unavoidable.
18.2.1 Little Responsibility of Emissions
On a global scale, Arctic traditional and indigenous lifestyles have hardly contributed
to greenhouse gas emissions, although traditional livelihoods of the Arctic commu-
nities take place in high-emitting first world countries, and fossil fuels extracted
from Arctic regions contribute to global GHGs and serve all countries (Pechsiri et al.
2010). Global mitigation responsibility of all countries, developed countries, emerg-
ing economies and developing countries, is not only important to reduce vulnerability
of communities of global South but also of the Arctic communities. This has been
shown by empirical evidence in the IPCC 4th assessment synthesis report (IPCC
2007).
18.2.2 Identifying the Most Vulnerable by Following Human
Rights Principles
From the climate justice point of view (see chapter byWallimann-Helmer et al. 2018),
and as considered by Inuit political leaders (see Ford 2009; Crowley 2011), climate
change is primarily a human rights issue because it puts the ecosystem services-based
traditional livelihoods at risk, and leads to social and economic impacts inArctic com-
munities (Maldonado et al. 2013). Marginal livelihoods, especially those located in
Arctic coastal areas, face both slow-onset and extreme events that heavily affect crit-
ical infrastructure, and cause harm to local and traditional livelihoods (Huggel et al.
2015). Some traditional ways of living, for example, can no longer be practiced due
to changes in sea ice conditions (Sejersen 2012; Shearer 2012; Bronen and Chapin
III 2013; Bronen 2015). Yet, international roles and responsibilities to deal with Loss
and Damage are not clear, and current national level legal frameworks seem not to
provide “optimal” solutions to support adaptation of vulnerable Arctic communi-
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ties—and in fact, even limit adaptation in many ways. According to the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, nation state governments have
the responsibility to enhance protection of vulnerable groups, minorities, and sup-
port work to advance human rights (ICISS 2001, cited in Bronen 2015). But still,
the UNFCCC Parties are not meeting their international legal obligations under the
Article II (see Crowley 2011; chapter by Simlinger and Mayer 2018).
18.2.3 Unequal Distribution of Risks and Limits
to Adaptation
In the current Loss and Damage debate of the UNFCCC, the global North is consid-
ered to have high responsibility and liability for dealing with climate-related risks
affecting vulnerable communities in the South. In general, countries in the global
North are considered to have high adaptive capacity, due to national and regional
financial and technological resources that should also support sustainable trans-
formation of societies. But as the case in many southern regions too, neither are
climate-related risks distributed equally among the population and geographically in
the northern circumpolar region, nor do those in need necessarily have access to these
resources (Larsen et al. 2014). Also, considering unforeseen future conditions, Arctic
ecosystems cannot adapt to climate change naturally, and this hampers the provision
of ecosystem services, which provide the basis for traditional livelihoods (White
et al. 2007; Larsen et al. 2014). Climate change forces people to make choices and
face situations that lead to radical, but not necessarily sustainable transformations of
society (Sejersen 2012). Marino (2012) has pointed out that federal, state and local
authorities in the US identify today nearly all 200 Alaskan native villages as being
“under threat” or “immanent threat” due to erosion and/or flooding. To tackle these
kinds of challenges Arctic communities would need decision-making power, access
to information and financial resources. One example is relocation actions, which are
costly and require careful planning in order to lead to positive outcomes (Lopez-Carr
and Marter-Kenyon 2015). Especially Arctic populations in remote locations need
institutional and financial support and assistance in adaptation planning (Ford 2009;
Dengler et al. 2014) to be able to successfully implement adaptation actions that
should end up with positive outcomes—forced or poorly planned relocation actions
cannot be considered as such.
430 M. Landauer and S. Juhola
18.3 Review of the Impacts of Climate Change
and Vulnerability in the Arctic
We conducted a systematic literature review of Arctic scientific studies found
mainly in Scopus database. Out of 3,473Arctic studies we found 164 studies address-
ing issues related to risks and impacts of climate change that relate to losses and dam-
ages more broadly. Categories of these can be found in Table 18.1. We could also
identify examples that fit the narrow definition of Loss and Damage, while providing
examples of climate risks and impacts that are ‘beyond adaptation.’ Instead of trying
to identify all examples that belong to the “narrow” category, we selected examples
from the literature that have been found particularly relevant for the global South
and developing countries, and are also discussed in the international Loss and Dam-
age debate: relocation and outmigration. For instance, climate-induced migration is
explicitly covered in the United Nations Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC)
conferences, the Conference of the Parties (COP), and the Executive Committee
on the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM), which has a
mandate to establish a migration facility.
Based on the literature review, the impacts of climate change can be divided into a
number of different types from ecological to socio-cultural and economic, whereby
joint impacts can also reinforce eachother. For example, there are biophysical impacts
when changes in climate affect the biogeochemical cycles in the Arctic and change
the prevailing conditions in the region, which in turn affects the ability of Arctic
communities to engage in economic, social and cultural activities. Alternatively,
there are socio-economic developments that can amplify ecological impacts through
new migration patterns or use of natural resources, for example. Impacts can also
be described as local, regional or global, with the first two being climate change
impacts happening in the Arctic and the third impacts that occur elsewhere but have
consequences in the Arctic and vice versa.
Table 18.1 Categories of
Arctic studies
focusing on risks and impacts
of climate change (N=164).
Especially
the climate-induced
relocation and migration
studies provide indications of
Arctic Loss and Damage
Categories Number of
studies
Dangerous climate change: risks, hazards,
disasters, extreme events
13
Infrastructure impacts and costs 6
Climate-induced relocation and migration 18
Vulnerability, resilience, impacts, adaptation 70
Human rights, equity, climate justice, gender
issues, generations
8
Research tools and methods: monitoring,
assessments, use of traditional knowledge in
research
27
Human health impacts 22
Total 164
18 Loss and Damage in the Rapidly Changing Arctic 431
Research on socio-economic impacts has also shown that biophysical changes are
impacting anthropogenic activities in the Arctic directly, but also indirectly through
increased economic interests, such as in mineral exploitation and other industrial
developments, affecting traditional land use and causing pollution. There are number
of strands in the impacts and vulnerability literature and many of these categories
touch upon the topics included in the international Loss and Damage debate, which
we place in seven loosely defined categories (Table 18.1). The classification is based
on the main focus of the studies as indicated by title, abstract and keywords. Studies
modelling the changes or impacts of climate change focus on the Arctic as a whole.
Smaller scale ecological or biological studies tend to be site-specific with varying
considerations given to their generalisability across areas. Themajority of studies that
address socio-economic aspects, either through vulnerability or adaptation, tend to
consider a specific community or country. As part of these studies, North American
analyses were very well represented whereas there were fewer studies from the
Nordic Arctic (Finland, Sweden, Norway) and Siberia (Russia).
Figure 18.1 presents these Arctic studies as a “keyword mining” visualisation
made by means of VOSviewer software. The term map is based on a text corpus
option to visualise the main topics found in the articles. The figure shows the essen-
tial keywords most frequently encountered terms related to Arctic climate impacts
and risks topic, extracted from the article titles and abstracts. 83 terms that met
the threshold of appearance 10 times were selected. The size of the circles indi-
cates frequencies of keywords. Circle colours indicate close relatedness of the terms
(substance-wise). The terms marked with the same colour form a cluster of related
terms that can be seen as a topic. Lines express co-occurrence of the terms between
the clusters either in the article title, or abstract, or both.
As can be seen from the terms that emerged, much focus has been placed on
research into impacts related to infrastructure and vulnerability. Both of these have
implications for the debate on Loss and Damage, even though the debate itself has
largely been ignored in the context of the Arctic. Studies have centred on identifying
the impacts of climate change on Arctic societies in terms of both infrastructure and
socio-economic conditions, and their ability to adapt. These analyses can be used to
identify to what extent communities are able to adapt or whether they will experience
losses and damages arising from impacts that they are not able to adapt to.
18.3.1 Biophysical Impacts
Since the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it has been recently estimated that the decrease of
Arctic sea ice is more rapid than according to previous estimations (Hare et al. 2011)
and the Arctic melting will significantly affect sea level rise globally (AMAP 2017).
Climate change effects on sea ice-based ecosystems are likely to have significant
consequences, including possible extinction of some species (Johannessen andMiles
2011). Another significant long-term trend in the Arctic areas is the thaw of the
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permafrost, which contributes to the slow release of carbon in the atmosphere (Schuur
and Abbott 2011), resulting in global consequences.
It is worth noting that not all biophysical impacts are uniform and that the Arctic
covers many different types of landscapes and societies. There is a shift from tundra
to continental climate in Alaska, Canada and North-Eastern Russia and a shift from
continental to temperate climate in North America: these are examples of a global
decrease in cold areas and in Alaska and Siberia, which are on top facing the risk
of desertification (Spinoni et al. 2015). Other Arctic areas, such as western Siberia,
are facing hydrological risks and permafrost thaw causing floods and mudflows and
increasing the risks to industry and urban centres (Zemtsov et al. 2014).
There are slow-onset events, such as tundra decline, tundra shrubification, per-
mafrost thaw, tree line advance, deforestation, loss of palsamires inNordicArctic; the
Arctic region is also facing albedo changes and diminishing sea ice, soil and coastal
erosion, sea-level rise, and desertification. Further direct impacts are extreme events,
such as storms and wildfires, floods, and landslides. It is estimated that increases
in precipitation will affect snow events in Alaska and increase the likelihood of
avalanches and landslides in the mountainous areas (Hansen et al. 2014). All these
biophysical impacts can be disruptive to wildlife and ecosystems, and the provision
of ecosystem services, and cause serious damage to people and critical infrastructure
also, as well as emergency preparedness systems and monitoring systems (Crowley
2011). They can also cause impacts on (traditional) food and water security (White
et al. 2007), but also tourism (Lemelin et al. 2012). Arctic livelihoods and lifestyles
are closely connected to the environment, and dependent on the prevailing conditions
of ecosystem services. For example, risks associated with loss of sea ice and its con-
sequences on practicing traditional activities, such as seal hunting and ice fishing,
are increasing and local communities have to adapt to these changes (Giles et al.
2013), and if adaptation is not possible, try to move away.
18.3.2 Socio-economic Impacts
Further reading of the literature reveals that there are studies that focus on under-
standing and mapping socio-economic vulnerability of Arctic communities, soci-
eties, culture and lifestyles. Among these are studies that approach vulnerability
within a specific sector and focus on modeling or providing cost estimates related
to climate change impacts and adaptation. We also found several studies indicating
health impacts driven by climate change. For example, hydrological cycle changes
are an example of emergent changes that cause lack of ice for long periods of time in
Russia. This has health consequences because the people cannot access health ser-
vices and also the “social fabric” is being affected, according to Amstislavski et al.
(2013).
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The literature also shows evidence of socio-cultural consequences of climate
change in the case of relocation and climate-induced migration. These studies indi-
cate that across the Arctic regions, and especially in the coastal areas, climate change
increases the vulnerability of local and indigenous communities. It has already led
to outmigration (“climigration”) and related cultural loss and demographic changes
in the region. The interest in studying the Arctic from the perspectives of climate
justice, intra- and intergenerational issues has been growing, particularly in terms
of relocations and human rights. As outmigration and relocation can have multiple
negative consequences, the question remains whether these actions should be con-
sidered as adaptation, or whether they are rather ‘beyond adaptation,’ i.e. related to
Loss and Damage given that currently outmigration and relocation are key issues of
the international Loss and Damage debate.
18.3.3 Economic Models and Impact Analyses
Economic models and impact studies place emphasis on estimating potential local
impacts and costs (or costs and benefits) associated with climate change, mainly
in the context of Alaska, although there are some Nordic studies as well. These
studies focus on a variety impacts, such as coastal erosion (Radosalvjevic et al. 2015)
and temperature changes (Chinowsky et al. 2010). Many of the studies model the
impacts on infrastructure, for which the costs of climate change are likely to increase
significantly as conditions change (Instanes 2006; Larsen et al. 2008; Hatcher and
Forbes 2015). Arctic infrastructure is already tailored to specific conditions and
now maintenance and replacement costs under any adaptation scenario is likely to
increase about 10% (Chinowsky et al. 2010), so adaptation might technically be
possible, but it is too expensive. A number of economic studies estimates potential
damages either through modeling or by analysing historical events and its costs. It
is argued that there is a continuous need to monitor and develop responses through
emergency management (Brunner et al. 2004). Immediate impacts and related costs
due to damage on critical public infrastructure have been estimated and modeled
with an economic point of view towards losses and damages (e.g. Instanes 2006;
Larsen et al. 2008; Ford and Pearce 2010; Chinowsky et al. 2010; Karvetski et al.
2011; Radosavljevic et al. 2015). So, it is very simple to understand that if costs are
exceedingly high and financial resources not available, adaptation is not possible;
the residual risks and impacts remain ‘beyond adaptation,’ and thus belong under the
narrow definition of Loss and Damage.
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18.3.4 Societal Impacts
We also found studies that focus on understanding the socio-economic and cultural
vulnerabilities ofArctic communities in-depth. These studies provide a socio-cultural
angle on climate impacts, and include non-monetary impacts, such as loss of culture
and tradition. These are often case studies of specific communities undertaken with
ethnographic methods (e.g. Carothers et al. 2014). Many contributions in this field
focus on the role that traditional/indigenous knowledge has played in adaptation of
Arctic peoples in the past, yet find that the knowledge now is eroding, and affecting
their culture and traditions. We also found a strand of literature that takes a more
critical view on conceptualising vulnerability by stressing the historical background,
which reinforces current vulnerability and places barriers to adaptation in the future.
For example, due to a multitude of changes in the past and currently, traditional
knowledge has had to make place for wages, hunting regulations, for example, due
to colonialism in the past and due to ongoing industrial developments today (Cameron
2012).
However, studies which take into account traditional knowledge now seem to have
gained more importance in research to better understand Arctic change and adapta-
tion to it (e.g. Riedlinger and Berkes 2001; Maynard et al. 2010; Douglas et al. 2014;
Cuerrier et al. 2015; Vinyeta and Lynn 2013; Golden et al. 2015). Also, special
attention in this literature has been placed on recognising the impacts to indige-
nous communities and institutional frameworks related to strategies to deal with the
impacts, such as community-based adaptation strategies and participatory planning
(Tremblay et al. 2008; Hovelsrud and Smit 2010; Pearce et al. 2012; Champalle et al.
2015). As amatter of fact, the resources of indigenous communities to increase adap-
tive capacity have been diminishing due to reduced possibilities to make decisions
and practice traditional ways of living (Roberts and Andrei 2015) and consequently,
studies on outmigration (or “climigration”) and (forced) relocations have started to
emerge (Table 1).
The focus on vulnerability due to climate impacts has indeed drawn some cri-
tique for its narrow view. Many studies are considered to ignore the colonial legacy
in the Arctic and its effects in terms of inducing social change with negative impli-
cations (Cameron 2012; Whyte 2016). So, there are also new social, political and
economic settings emerging and “blocking” the traditional ways to adapt to changes,
as traditional livelihoods are now being regulated from “outside,” such as changes in
governance of resource use, land use, and land ownership. It has been proposed that
more public participation, co-management and self-governance of local communi-
ties is needed in decision-making and planning, and new (participatory) governance
mechanisms to tackle the transformation of the Arctic region (Nuttal 2007; Bronen
and Chapin III 2013). Ford et al. (2007) have argued that without financial support
provided by larger-scale actors, such as the UNFCCC, for example Inuit commu-
nities and regions cannot successfully adapt. Indigenous peoples often have limited
decision-making power, and both environmental and social changes are more rapid
than they have been before. Integrated understanding of science, people, and cross-
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scale information networks to increase Arctic resilience is needed to respond to the
rapid changes (Carmack et al. 2012) and identify what remains beyond adaptation,
i.e. Loss and Damage, and why.
In summary, this reviewed literature shows that many kinds of risks and impacts
on societies can already be seen in the Arctic, and some of them fall under the
“narrow” category of Loss and Damage, in the literature typically defined as the
“residual, adverse impacts of climate change beyond what is addressed bymitigation
and adaptation” (see Huggel et al. 2015: 454). Climatic changes affect societies that
are already much more vulnerable than the general population in these developed
countries. Arctic societies need to find options to tackle drivers of environmental,
economic, social and cultural transformation, but at the same time they also have to
find ways to deal with the residual losses and damages that are ‘beyond adaptation’
to climate change. In the next section we delve deeper into these ways by providing
examples.
18.4 Loss and Damage in the Context of the Arctic
Throughout the history, Arctic ecosystems and dependent local and indigenous com-
munities with varying needs, perceptions and values, have been adapting to climate
variability. However, due to rapid climate change and global change, limits to adap-
tation have started to emerge. The Arctic literature show limits to adaptation due to
institutional, political, organisational and jurisdictional factors hindering implemen-
tation of adaptation to climate impacts, leading to Loss and Damage. The threshold
of adaptation also depends on current socio-economic, cultural and political settings.
A schematic depiction is shown in Fig. 18.2. The Arctic examples of relocation and
migration show very well that due to negative societal and cultural impacts related
to these actions, they can be considered as being ‘beyond adaptation,’ i.e. Loss and
Damage.
Inadequate institutional and financial frameworks to deal with Loss and Dam-
age are considered to imply important challenges (Lopez-Carr and Marten-Kenyon
2015). This becomes clear throughout the Arctic examples, albeit mainly fromNorth
America (Alaska) that highlight the need for new governance mechanisms and insti-
tutional frameworks to tackle climate change. One problem is, that sometimes not all
types of impacts are included in jurisdictional frameworks. For example, in case of
(climate change related) disaster mitigation, Bronen and Chapin III (2013) think that
one factor considering gaps in post-disaster and hazard mitigation statutory frame-
work is erosion. Even though it is one of the most significant climate change related
hazards in the region, it is not included in the official lists of major disasters, such
as in the Stafford Act in the US. Shearer (2012) studied climate adaptation assis-
tance in Kivalina, Alaska and found that indigenous communities face intra-national
inequalities while not receiving adaptation assistance, which is only available to
formal state actors. Another problem is insufficient allocation and availability of
financial resources. Bronen and Chapin III (2013) also found that resources are allo-
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cated for rebuilding homes as part of the post-disaster recoverymeasures only in their
current location, not in a new location. This creates a problem if the land is lost for
good, such as in the case of coastal erosion or sea level rise (see also Bronen 2015).
Full integration of hazard mitigation planning into comprehensive risk assessments
is considered expensive, and time intensive. Also, allocation of funding is based on
cost-benefit ratios which means that for example Alaskan communities, such as in
Newtok cannot compete for hazard mitigation funds due to their remote location and
low population density, which equals to high costs and low benefits (Bronen and
Chapin III 2013). These kinds of barriers (more examples in Table 18.2) represent
drivers of Loss and Damage because they hinder implementation of adaptation.
They act as limits to adaptation and can thus lead toLoss andDamage because they
prevent communities from taking action. Interpreted in this way, Loss and Damage
can arise not only from climate impacts per se, but also from the socio-economic
constraints that hinder adaptation of local communities.
In the next subsection, we present examples of relocation and outmigration in the
Arctic showing examples when adaptation in situ is not possible and leads to (forced)
relocation and outmigration and can cause societal and cultural Loss and Damage.
These examples provide evidence that with insufficient institutional, organisational
and jurisdictional support relocation and migration actions cannot be considered as
adaptation.
Fig. 18.2 Institutional and jurisdictional framework, as well as socio-economic, cultural and polit-
ical settings affect adaptation threshold of Arctic communities, and can be drivers of Loss and
Damage
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Table 18.2 Examples limiting Arctic communities to adapt to climate change
Examples preventing adaptation or leading to negative
consequences of adaptation actions
Author (publication year)
Inadequate institutional and financing mechanisms such as
federal funding procedures for disaster prevention and
recovery
Bronen (2015)
Disabilities to determine and evaluate when preventive
actions needed
Bronen (2015)
Slow implementation of actions or statutory and institutional
barriers in implementation
Bronen (2015)
Lacking governance framework for the evaluation of risks
and impacts
Bronen (2015)
Government funding does not reach Arctic communities Lopez-Carr and Marten-Kenyon
(2015)
Inequity and injustice related to current actions Kingston and Marino (2010)
Mis- and under-representation of local voices in political
arenas
Marino (2012)
Lack of adaptation assistance when only available for formal
state actors
Shearer (2012)
Inadequate accommodation of climate change scenarios into
disaster risk protocols
Marino (2012)
Unclear responsibilities of government or lacking
government body to implement actions
Shearer (2012)
Lack of preventive disaster programs and funds Shearer (2012)
Missing international support regarding capacity building for
adaptation actions
Marino (2012), Shearer (2012)
Traditional and indigenous knowledge not considered in
planning actions
Shearer (2012)
Lacking networks of multiple and diverse organisations to
build adaptive capacity and balance between different
interest groups
Bronen (2015)
Migration strategies not considered in disaster risk reduction
and adaptation programs
Dengler et al. (2014)
Difficulties to monetise loss of health and social cohesion Dengler et al. (2014)
Unclear or inadequate allocation of funding for disaster
mitigation (for example, erosion not included, although it
can be one of the most significant hazards in some regions)
Bronen and Chapin III (2013)
Full integration of hazard mitigation planning into
comprehensive risk assessments is considered too expensive
and time intensive
Bronen and Chapin III (2013)
Allocation of funding often based on cost-benefit ratios
which leaves out remote communities with low population
densities (seen as high costs and low benefits)
Bronen and Chapin III (2013)
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18.4.1 Relocation and Outmigration as Adaptation or Part
of Loss and Damage?
At themoment, it is yet unclear towhether relocation is considered to be an adaptation
measure and thus it would be integrated in states’ adaptation strategies, or whether
it is something that needs to be undertaken separately when impacts are beyond
adaptation, i.e. part of the Loss and Damage agenda. As can be seen from above,
many Arctic regions are highly vulnerable to climate change and there are places
where adaptation is not possible for local communities. However, they are forced
to abandon their livelihoods and traditional residential areas due to increased risks
and lack of governance mechanisms and resources to manage risks. Bronen (2015)
argues that nation states are required to protect vulnerable populations from climate
change impactswithin its jurisdiction. But the literature reveals that nation states have
often failed to do so: relocation is considered a massive challenge for governments.
Our review shows that both perspectives on relocation can be found in the literature.
Relocations due to colonisation and natural disasters have been experienced in the
Arctic throughout the history, but now climate change also plays a more intense
role as a driver of relocations and outmigration. Several studies have found that
independent of the drivers of change, relocations will have effects on culture, and
maintenance of tradition. We illustrate the challenges of relocation by presenting an
example from the Alaskan village Kivalina, see Box 18.1.
Similar issues have been experienced in the other Alaskan regions King Island
and Shishmaref, that are also at risk of climate change and need to consider reloca-
tion. Relocation can also lead to a sense of loss of place and have emotional impacts
as found in the study based on King Islanders’ experiences (Kingston and Marino
2010). In the case of Shishmaref, Marino (2012) found that colonial history and
historical inequity is linked to contemporary exposure to hazards and vulnerability
of climate change. The author also identified mis- and under-representation of local
voices in political arenas to discuss relocation planning. According to Bronen (2015),
permanent relocation can be considered as one adaptation strategy only if culture and
traditions can be secured in the long-term, so the implementation of it requires new
governance tools. Currently existing institutional mechanisms are often considered
inadequate and unable to determine when preventive relocation is needed and how
it should be organised (Bronen 2015; see Box 18.1). Some disaster risk reduction
and adaptation programs do not necessarily consider migration strategies at all (Den-
gler et al. 2014). Given that it appears that existing mechanisms, i.e. adaptation, is
insufficient, one could label this as part of Loss and Damage.
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Box 18.1 Why is community relocation so challenging: Example from Kivalina, Alaska
Kivalina is a village in theNorthwestArcticBorough inAlaska, theUnited States. It has about
400 inhabitants (mostly Inupiats) that are now being forced to relocate due to risks of rising
sea levels and coastal erosion and also impacts of permafrost thaw and heavy snowstorms
(Gregg 2010; Washington Post 2015; NOAA 2017).
The village has been planning relocations for 20 years already, detailed in the Kivalina
Relocation Master Plan published in 2006. Despite this, potential relocation options have
not been considered suitable, due to high costs, social and cultural objections or because the
sites under discussion are geotechnically inappropriate (Gregg 2010). Efforts to respond to
climate impacts through adaptation have been made: such as building a rock revetment to
postpone the relocation in 2010. The decision on relocation is to be made in the upcoming
decade (NOAA 2017). Difficulties in financing relocation is a common problem. In Kivalina,
relocation has been estimated to cost between 95 and 125 million US dollars (IAW 2009
cited in Lynn and Donoghue 2011).
The Alaskan ecosystem services-based communities have been able to adapt to changing
conditions in the past, but institutional, financial and political barriers have hindered local
communities to participate in decision-making—examples of these are lacking government
agency in charge of relocation, and funding allocated to disasters (e.g. for rebuilding) but
not for relocation (ADN 2016).
Forced relocation can lead to cultural damage, such as loss of traditional livelihoods (Lynn
and Donoghue 2011). It is hard to put a price to cultural loss, but efforts have been made to
maintain the culture and traditions of Kivalina residents, despite relocation. This is done, for
example, by creating projects that enable the communities to share thoughts about local ways
of life and locate, connect and educate new relocation partners and networking with global
community to shape the discourse on climate displacement (see: www.relocate-ak.org).
Fig. 18.3 Risk and Indigenous Peoples in Alaska
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In the following examples from the literature, insufficient allocation of funding is
driving Loss and Damage. Lopez-Carr and Marten-Kenyon (2015) studied manage-
ment of climate-induced resettlements in the United States’ territory of the Arctic
and found that although governments have spent considerable amounts of money on
erosion control nationally, funding has not reached the Arctic communities. Also in
the case of Kivalina, financing coastal erosion protection has failed, and at the same
time tens of thousands of people in Alaska’s native villages are under threat due to
damages to water supply and waste-storage systems that affect food and water secu-
rity (ibid.). Whether the discussion is about climate refugees or climate migrants,
there is a need for an effective institutional framework to reduce bureaucracy to allo-
cate resources, access funding and provide technical assistance at the community
level (Dengler et al. 2014).
In countries like the United States, governments have resources for disaster pre-
paredness, insurance payouts and infrastructure repairs, but there is no governance
framework to evaluate climate change risks and impacts and the needs for relocation
actions (Bronen 2015). Dengler et al. (2014) state that lacking access to finance cre-
ates one of the main constraints for communities to take action and leads to inability
to take lead on disaster risk responses. For example, building of new infrastructure,
which is considered very costly especially in remote locations such as in the Arctic, is
difficult. Sometimes resources are being allocated to technical solutions rather than
solutions where potential and obstacles for organised relocation, and other measures
are considered more holistically and sustainably, as revealed by the literature review.
Other challenges are the difficulties to monetise loss of health or social cohesion,
and excluding indigenous knowledge in planning of disaster risk and adaptation
schemes. Furthermore, inequity and injustice in climate risk governance characterise
Loss and Damage from climate change. This is already known from developing
countries experience (see chapters by Wallimann-Helmer and Serdeczny 2018).
18.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we reviewed the Arctic risk, vulnerability and impacts literature in
order to find evidence that losses and damages are distributed across very different
geographical areas and affect vulnerable communities in the Arctic as well. The role
of the Arctic has changed due to climate change: enormous resources have become
available and land and sea transport has become easier due to less ice and snow,
and better technology to access the areas and natural resources (oil and gas, and
minerals, for instance). The Arctic has become a common good, serving various
needs of the global community. But Arctic indigenous communities are among the
least responsible for climate change and they are facing harm caused by economic
developments, those that are mainly driven by climate change directly, and indirectly
by easier access to natural resources at the same time, leading to environmental and
social impacts (Maldonado et al. 2013).
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Why should we include the Arctic region in the Loss and Damage debate? One
answer is that if socio-economic indicators were compared between Inuit regions and
Small Island Developing States, also many of the Inuit regions would be considered
as “developing” regions and should gain assistance from the UNFCCC for instance
in form of an international fund (Ford 2009). In Kivalina, Alaska, the communities
are considered as first victims of climate change, facing also migration pressures
and displacement, which can lead to political instability, and cultural loss, similar to
examples from developing regions such as the Maldives (Wolsko and Marino 2016).
Because of direct impacts and relocations, other, indirect impacts have increased,
such as post-traumatic disorders affecting health and wellbeing. Even though the
people can survive disasters by relocation, there are still differences between indi-
viduals regarding how well, if at all, they can adapt, due to differences in health,
cultural integrity and sense of place (ibid.) Although sometimes seen as an adaptation
strategy, outmigration has caused problems because young generations are “pushed”
away from their land, and traditional livelihoods are eroding (Himes-Cornel and
Hoelting 2015). In other cases, such as shown in Newtok, Alaska, relocation plan-
ning has been going on for so long that one generation has experienced it, but still it
has not lead to implementation of relocation actions (Bronen and Chapin III 2013).
The case of Kivalina shows clearly that, although the community is located within a
developed country, it is vulnerable, but it is not getting the assistance it would need
from the state and internationally. There are examples showing that, once relocated,
there is no turning back. This is when the land has been literally lost due to sea level
rise, for example.
As found in many local studies from the Arctic, the current institutional and
financial frameworks are insufficient to tackle the consequences of climate risks and
impacts, leading to Loss and Damage. Furthermore, inclusion of local communities
in planning and decision-making is lacking (Marino 2012; Lopez-Carr and Marten-
Kenyon 2015). It is also problematic that indigenous communities are not always
considered as part of nation states and thus, do not enjoy the same rights as the
general population, which raises questions around ethical aspects (see Huggel et al.
2015). We found several legitimacy and justice issues that support our argument
that Arctic Loss and Damage should be discussed in the international climate policy
arena. This includes (re-) interpretation of human rights principles, identification
of roles and responsibilities, liability, and compensation mechanisms, as well as a
need for international institutional support to reduce limits to adaptation. There is a
lack of a proper international institutional framework and lack of local capacity to
organise relocation (e.g. Dengler et al. 2014; Maldonado et al. 2013). On the other
hand, forced relocation is one consequence ofweak risk governancemechanisms, but
relocations represent actions that could be supported nationally and internationally
to respond to climate risks if guided by international actors and implemented by
Arctic communities themselves, who have the local knowledge to reduce negative
consequences to culture and society.
Lack of financial resources is one of the main factors why relocation or building
new infrastructure cannot be implemented. The costs of relocation or rebuilding and
new technology in the Arctic are very high considering the remote location and other
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construction-related difficulties. Furthermore, some indigenous communities do not
even have cash economies. Although economic losses have been calculated forArctic
villages and cities, and adaptive climate cost models have been created (e.g. Chi-
nowski et al. 2010) regarding damages to physical assets such as infrastructure (e.g.
Larsen et al. 2008; Chinowsky et al. 2010), more information on costs of relocations,
health impacts and especially non-economic losses is needed (Roberts and Andrei
2015). In addition to financial and technical issues the remaining question is social
justice: how to maintain viability of the communities and how viability is actually
perceived by different communities (Sejersen 2012).
According to Duyck (2015a, b), the UNFCCC has not yet considered Arctic vul-
nerability issues in the international debate on Loss andDamage, and this was still the
case in 2018. Thus, the responsibility of Arctic states themselves should be clarified:
they should make sure the voices of Arctic vulnerable communities will be heard and
communicated in international climate policy negotiations. Also, Arctic States and
the Arctic Council should clarify and improve their national communications and
the statements from ministers at UNFCCC deliberations. So far, Arctic states have
not sufficiently considered Arctic Loss and Damage issues, and the Arctic Council
has not been represented sufficiently in the Arctic states’ documents and statements
presented to international bodies (ibid.).
Based on the empirical evidence of Arctic literature, we consider that the inter-
national Loss and Damage debate should include the Arctic as an example when
considering what “vulnerable” and “dangerous climate change” means and what
should be taken into account when trying to reduce vulnerability. For example, non-
economic losses and ways to measure these are also relevant to the Arctic, such as
loss of sense of place and belonging (Roberts and Andrei 2015), and loss of culture
and traditions, but they are not adequately considered in the current international
Loss and Damage debate. If the international human rights principles lense were
to be used to define the vulnerable, then violations of these rights regarding Arc-
tic indigenous communities would be evident, based on the results of our literature
review. More in-depth local level studies are needed to examine in detail what is
perceived as “dangerous climate change”. According to Sejersen (2012), the ways
Arctic societies perceive transformations in society and seek for opportunities to
adapt to change are very heterogeneous; this is owing, among others, to different
histories of colonialism or different types of livelihoods practiced in the Arctic, but
also due to different values and perceptions, as well as cultural backgrounds.
Under the conditions of rapid change in theArctic, current institutions and govern-
ment mechanisms are not found sufficient to deal with these multiple challenges and
dynamics of change: climate change, deterioration of environment, pressure of new
industries and businesses entering the Arctic region, and intra- and inter-generational
changes for example when outmigration causes unbalanced age and gender popula-
tions in remaining communities. Furthermore, the climate refugee problem can first
be seen locally (local responsibility to tackle with), but it will have international con-
sequences (global responsibility) and needs international attention and rethinking of
relocation policies.
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It has been argued that in order to understand limits to adaptation, the tradi-
tional instrumental and management-oriented view of adaptation in social systems
should be revisited (Sejersen 2012). Nowadays, climate change is used as a platform
to address issues of justice, development and self-determination, which are issues
already known from the past, where, however, scales, causations, and agency dif-
fered as pointed out by Sejersen (2012). In case of adaptation (whether due to climate
change or other changes), the focus is on moving from “how to adapt”, to “who to
become” when adapting (ibid:195). One question should be added to this list: what
happens ‘beyond adaptation’? But what these changes and impacts of climate change
in the Arctic mean globally is still unknown to many. What we know is that more
knowledge and resources to deal with climate change impacts faced by vulnerable
communities is needed and learning from the Arctic could be a forerunner case for
the international debate on Loss and Damage.
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Part V
Policy Options and Other Response
Mechanisms for the L&D Discourse
Chapter 19
Towards Establishing a National
Mechanism to Address Losses
and Damages: A Case Study
from Bangladesh
Masroora Haque, Mousumi Pervin, Saibeen Sultana and Saleemul Huq
Abstract This chapter presents a case study of setting up a national mechanism
to address losses and damages in Bangladesh—a highly climate vulnerable country
facing significant losses and damages, putting its domestic resources and expertise
together to respond in a way that looks ahead and beyond the conventional responses
to climate change. The efforts underway to establish the national mechanism build
upon existing institutions and frameworks and are an example of collaboration across
ministries, and a break-away from working in silos. The proposed mechanism is an
attempt to embed climate change perspectives into disaster policymaking, to address
the gaps in the current policy framework and to design a comprehensive system
to for a stronger response to losses and damages from climate impacts. A national
mechanism to address losses and damages not only responds to the needs within
the country, it also reaffirms Bangladesh’s commitment to the national targets and
indicators within the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030.
Furthermore, the functions of the national mechanism replicate the work areas of the
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WIM, signalling Bangladesh’s commitments to the Paris Agreement. For a resource
constrained LDC country, the efforts made by researchers, the development commu-
nity and policymakers show resourcefulness, proactiveness and agency that can be
replicated in countries facing similar vulnerabilities and resource constraints.
Keywords Loss and Damage · Sea level rise · Cyclones · Flooding · National
policy · Disaster risk reduction · Adaptation · Technical committee
19.1 Introduction
Despite being heavily impacted by climate change, Bangladesh has made laudable
strides in enacting laws, policies and procedures to deal with climate related hazards.
The geographically small nation has been historically prone to heavy rainfall, floods,
cyclones and river erosion due to its geographical location, low-lying topography and
tropical climate. Bangladesh now ranks as the 6th most affected by human induced
climate change according to Kreft et al. (2017). Given the country’s high population
density and multidimensional poverty, this risk is further exacerbated (Wright 2014).
Hijoka et al. (2014) finds food productivity and food security especially threatened
by climatic stressors such as heavy rainfall leading to floods, sea level rise and
heatwaves. Floods cause high human and material losses, sea level rise threatens the
coastal region’s ability to produce rice, and heat stress has already reached critical
levels unsuitable for rice production. Increased frequency and intensity of heat waves
increases the spread of infectious diseases such as cholera, increases mortality and
morbidity among poor and vulnerable populations.
Faced with the increasing impacts of climate change and recognising that gains in
development and poverty alleviation could be severely hampered by climate change,
all levels of the Bangladeshi government are committed to reducing vulnerability and
building the resilience of its people. Disaster risk reduction falls under the purview
of the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MODMR) and climate change
adaptation under the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF). Responding to
disasters and implementing adaptation programs also involve related ministries such
as Agriculture, Health and Finance. The MODMR and the MOEF have established
policies and procedures to deal with their respective portfolio and responsibilities
and both ministries have committed significant domestic resources. Civil society,
NGOs, community organisations, researchers, academics, development practitioners
are active contributors in generating knowledge and implementing adaptation and
disaster risk reduction strategies.
However, despite the success and competencies in dealing with climate-related
risks, losses and damages fromclimate change are projected to increase and gaps exist
in the current policy and response framework that needs to be addressed proactively.
This chapter is a case study of the efforts of the Bangladesh government and experts
collaborating to address losses and damages from climate change by establishing a
newmechanism from current domestic institutional arrangements and resources. The
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proposed newmechanismwill be a centralised framework for accounting, coordinat-
ing, disbursing finance, monitoring and evaluating programs that address losses and
damages from climate change. The proposed mechanism will facilitate and incorpo-
rate climate induced losses and damages into both climate and disaster policies and
address these losses and damages for a more comprehensive and long-term response
to climate change.
This chapter is divided into four parts: (i) A discussion of the losses and damages
facing Bangladesh from various climatic hazards; (ii) A presentation of policies
and procedures of MoDMR including the national plan, laws governing disaster
management and the procedures immediately following a disaster; as well as (iii)
An elaboration of the policies of the MoEF including the laws, institutions and
strategic plans that govern climate change within the ministry; and (iv) Reflection
on current efforts undertaken by the government, researchers, experts and NGOs
towards establishing a national mechanism to address loss and damage.
19.2 Losses and Damages from Climate-Related Hazards
Facing Bangladesh
Bangladesh is affected by both slow- and rapid-onset climatic events and experiences,
among others flooding, cyclones, drought, sea-level rise, shifting patterns in rainfall
and rising temperatures (seeFig. 19.1 for amulti-hazardmap).The following captures
the evidence on observed and projected losses and damages1 faced by the country.
Flooding
Being the most common climatic hazard facing the country, floods inundate nearly
25%of the country every year and a severe flood occurs every 4 or 5 years submerging
over 60% of the country (Nishat et al. 2013; see Fig. 19.2). Floods result in loss of
lives, crops, homes and damage to infrastructure and assets. Observed data from the
Bangladesh’sMeteorologicalDepartment show that rainfall is becoming increasingly
erratic. With increasing global temperatures above 2 °C, rainfall could increase with
a significant impact on flood levels (Mirza 2002).
On the other hand, Nishat et al. (2013) posit that over the years the death toll from
extreme events including cyclones and flooding has decreased, as has the severity of
1Although many definitions of losses and damages exist, for the purpose of this chapter, we first
break down the conc ept into the two terms: losses and damages (for definitions, see also see chapter
by Mechler et al. 2018). We define losses as impacts that “are lost forever and cannot be brought
back once lost, “and damages as harm to something “that can be repaired, such as a road or building
or embankment.” (Durand andHuq 2015). This approach highlights the different implications of the
two types of impacts, and may create a policy space to enable different supportive responses. When
we tie these two concepts together, Durand and Huq’s definition of losses and damages holds when
the costs of adaptation are not recuperated; or when adaptation efforts are ineffective, maladaptive
in the long term or altogether impossible. Warner and Van der Geest andWarner’s (2015) definition,
“the negative effects of climate variability and climate change that people have not been able to
cope with or adapt to,” is also relevant in our understanding of the issue.
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Fig. 19.1 Multi-hazard map of Bangladesh. Source Huq et al. (2016)
general impacts (see also chapter by Bouwer 2018). This can be attributed to better
macroeconomic performance, increased resilience of the poor, the implementation
of protective infrastructure and generally better disaster management (see Fig. 19.3
for an example of riverine flood protection).
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Fig. 19.2 Areas at risk of flooding in Bangladesh. Source Bangladesh Agricultural Research
Council 2000
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Fig. 19.3 River embankment in Bangladesh. Source Bangladesh Climate Change Trust
Cyclones
Cyclones cause untold damage to livelihoods, property and livestock of the most vul-
nerable people (World Bank 2010). One severe event occurs every 3 years according
to the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP). Cyclone
Sidr, which hit the Southern coast in 2007, caused total economic losses of USD
1.7 billion, or about 1.2% of annual GDP in Bangladesh (GoB 2008). The country
lost an estimated 6% of GDP to storms from 1998 to 2009 (Wright 2014). Although
the death toll from cyclones has been reduced significantly, the destruction, both
economic and non-economic, is still prevalent today.
Drought
Most prevalent in the northwest of Bangladesh, drought has often caused famine in
the region. The past 50 years have seen about 20 drought periods with almost roughly
23.000 sq. km of land affected by drought each year during the second dry season
occurring between June to October (Nishat et al. 2013). Droughts affect about 47%
of the land and 53% of the population.
Sea Level Rise
Rising sea levels impact the agricultural productivity of arable land and has an impact
on livelihoods of people living in the coastal region of Bangladesh. The IPCC reports
that approximately 27 million people are estimated to be at risk from sea level rise
by the year 2050 in Bangladesh. According to Rabbani et al. (2013), sea levels at
the coast of the Bay of Bengal, which lines the Southern coast of Bangladesh, have
already risen by an average of 2.5 mm per year since 1950 and by an average of
5.3 mm per year from 1977 to 2002. The authors also cite projections that show that
by 2030 sea levels could rise by a further 30 cm and by 2050 by 50 cm. Further
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projections show that by 2080 about 43 million people would be affected with a
62 cm rise in sea level inundating about 16% of the country.
Overall Picture of Losses and Damages in Bangladesh
The climatic impacts mentioned above translate to tangible and intangible losses and
damages for the country. The World Bank (2011) estimates that climate change will
lower the nation’s agricultural GDP by 3.1% per year, for a cumulative $36 billion
in losses between 2005 and 2050. An Asian Development Bank report (2014) states
that Bangladesh would suffer yearly economic costs equivalent to 2% of its GDP
by 2050, widening to 9.4% by 2100. The report goes on to explain that a mix of
floods, cyclones, heat stress, drought and shorter growing seasons could threaten
agricultural livelihoods and food security in the country. Hijoka et al. (2014) suggest
Bangladesh would see a net increase in poverty of about 15% by 2030. Alongside
obvious economic losses and damages, research in affected communities also reveal
non-economic losses and damages (NELD) such as loss of biodiversity, cultural
norms and practices, physical and psychological wellbeing, education and loss of
ecosystem services (Andrei et al. 2014).
19.3 Linking Climate Adaptation and Disaster
in the Context of Losses and Damages
Given these climate-induced losses and damages faced by the country, the impacts on
food security and development are evident. Reducing poverty, increasing growth and
graduating tomiddle income status by2021 is of utmost importance to theBangladesh
government. Since 1991 and 2005 Bangladesh has made steady gains in economic
growth and reduced poverty levels by 19% (Government of Bangladesh 2009). The
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan states that the severity and
frequency of storms, floods, cyclones and droughtwill increase in the future stymying
the country’s economic growth and potentially hindering poverty reduction. Disaster
risk reduction and climate adaptation are united in their mutual interest in addressing
losses and damages arising from climatic events (Shamsuddoha et al. 2013). Linking
climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction results in a stronger response to the
climatic hazards facing the countrywhen theory and practice are combined to address
losses and damages faced by the country (Ibid). Bangladesh has made great strides in
developing appropriate disaster management and climate policies and the following
section highlights the policies, laws, frameworks and institutions that govern these
two domains.
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Fig. 19.4 Institutions, policy frameworks and organisations comprising the disaster management
system in Bangladesh
19.3.1 Policies and Procedures Governing Disaster
Management and Relief
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies inBangladesh arewell established and involve
institutions at the national and sub national levels involving both political and regu-
latory institutions (Ibid) (see Fig. 19.4).
At the political level, the National Disaster Management Council (NDMC), led
by the Prime Minister, formulates national policies. The Inter-Ministerial Disaster
Management Coordination Committee (IMDMCC), led by the Minister of Disas-
ter Management and Relief, conducts implements, coordinates and supervises the
work of those implementing relevant policies. At the regulatory level, the Ministry
of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) is the primary governing body that
aims to pursue comprehensive risk reduction policies and ensure food security to
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affected communities during disasters (MoDMR 2014). The ministry’s main func-
tions include: (i) Formulating the laws, policies and action plans for disaster risk
reduction, emergency response and disaster management; (ii) Preparing policies and
plans for urgent humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation program, preparation and
preservation of all social safety net program; (iii) Preparing disaster risk reduction
plans, undertaking activities for training and research, and coordination, monitor-
ing and evaluating activities among local, regional and international development
partners; (iv) Undertaking humanitarian assistance to ensure food security through
the implementation of food for work program (FFW), gratuitous relief (GR) and
vulnerable group feedings program (VGF); and (v) Ensuring employment for the
ultra-poor during lean period of the year to reduce poverty risk and vulnerability.
The Department of Disaster Management (DDM) is the technical arm of the
MoDMR which delivers and implements interventions on the ground. The DDM
ensures that disaster risk reduction (DRR) considerations are mainstreamed into
the policies, plans and programmes of related ministries and departments. It fur-
ther coordinates research, capacity building, and awareness raising on DRR related
activities (Shamsuddoha et al. 2013). Key development policies and plans of the
government such as the Bangladesh Perspective Plan 2010–2021, Sixth Five Year
Plan 2011–2015 and National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) emphasise
implementing the National Plan on Disaster Management (NPDM) in line with the
national plan. The Seventh Five Year Plan 2016–2020 calls for building resilience of
the poor and reducing their exposure and vulnerability to geo-hydro-meteorological
hazards, environmental shocks, man-made disasters, emerging hazards and climate
related extreme events.
The Disaster Management Act of 2012 aims to mitigate the overall impacts of
a disaster and reduce vulnerability. The Act governs post disaster rescue and reha-
bilitation programs, humanitarian assistance to enhance the capacity of poor and
disadvantaged, programs undertaken by various government and non-government
organisations (GoB 2012). The aim of Disaster Management Policy is to strengthen
the capacity of the Bangladesh disaster management system to reduce unacceptable
risk and improve response and recoverymanagement at all levels. It makes references
to relevant sector policies, operational guidelines and procedures.
The Standing Order on Disaster (SOD) was first issued in 1997 to act as a guide-
book during an emergency for concerned ministries, departments, line agencies,
local government bodies and communities to understand and perform their duties
and responsibilities during a disaster. The SOD has been revised in 2010 to include
sector development plans, and those having emergency management responsibilities
to prepare their own contingency plans and train their staff accordingly. Moreover, to
maintain coordination amongst the concerned ministries, departments, line agencies,
local government bodies (LGD) and communities, the government has formulated a
set of mechanisms for council and committees from national down to the grass-root
levels. Established by the National Disaster Management Council, the National Plan
for Disaster Management 2010–2015 (NPDM) aims to reduce the risk of people,
especially the poor and the disadvantaged, from the effects of natural, environmental
and human induced hazards. The plan puts in place an efficient emergency response
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system capable of handling large scale disasters and has been embedded in govern-
ment high level policy and operation documents.
The Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) performs specialist functions and
ensure coordination with line departments/agencies and NGOs by convening
meetings every three months with teams of the Disaster Management Training and
Public Awareness Building Task Force (DMTATF), the Focal Point Operational
Co-ordination Group on Disaster Management (FPOCG), the NGO Co-ordination
Committee on Disaster Management (NGOCC), and the Committee for Speedy
Dissemination ofDisaster RelatedWarning Signals (CSDDWS). Coordination at dis-
trict, thana and union levels (sub national levels) are done by the respective District,
Sub-district (Thana) and Union Disaster Management Committees. The DMB will
render all assistance to them by facilitating the process. Inter-related institutions, at
both national and sub-national levels have been created to ensure effective planning
and coordination of disaster risk reduction and emergency response management.
19.3.2 History of Damage Assessment and Current Practices
After Cyclone Sidr in 2007, the Local Consultative Group (the forum for develop-
ment dialogue and donor coordination) agreed to conduct a Joint Damage-Loss and
Needs Assessment (JDNLA). This assessment identified priority areas to support
the Government of Bangladesh in cyclone recovery efforts and recommended inter-
ventions for a long-term disaster management strategy. Based on the assessment, a
15-year long-term strategic plan of action was developed supported by the World
Bank. A Damage-Loss and Needs Assessment (DNA) cell was established within
the DMB to provide emergency relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction for vic-
tims of natural disasters. The cell is responsible for strengthening the existing data
collection by using a standardised template (FORM-D) and to build the capacity
of relevant agencies and administrative levels to conduct DNA. In 2011, after the
cyclone Mahasen, the Department of Disaster Management gradually shifted to a
formal damage and loss assessment in the name of Joint Needs Assessment (JNA).
The JNA approach has embedded in it a national coordinationmechanism and has the
buy-in of a broad range of stakeholders including the DDM and MoDMR. The JNA
initiative is now managed by CARE for the humanitarian community in Bangladesh
with ACAPS working as a key partner providing technical inputs and assessment
coordination. DDM in partnership with INGOs, CDMP II and other government
departments developed loss and damage resource maps using the 4 W (what, where,
when, and who) database to make disaster information and assessments more avail-
able.
According to Shamsuddoha et al. (2013), under the MoDMR, the Comprehensive
Disaster Management Programme (CDMP), one of the largest initiatives ever imple-
mented in the country to deal with disaster management, is “currently undertaking
efforts to “harmonise” DRR and CCA in its work to reduce disaster risk. In addition,
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Fig. 19.5 DisasterManagementRegulatory Framework ofBangladesh. SourceShamsuddoha et al.
(2013)
the CDMP has begun to recognise the importance of addressing loss and damage in
its agenda” (p. 15).
The Local Disaster Risk Reduction Fund (LDRRF), a component of CDMP pro-
vides some resources and financial support to the most vulnerable communities
affected by a climatic disaster. Approximately USD 5 million was disbursed to local
governments in the 2013–2014 fiscal year from this fund. In addition to the LDRRF,
the MoDMR also runs several social safety net programs meant to support climate
affected communities such as Food For Work (FFW), Test Relief, Bridge and Cul-
verts (FFW), Execution of Risk Reduction Programme, Relief and Rehabilitation
Programme, Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) and Vulnerable Group Development
(VGD). Other disaster and relief related programmes include the National Relief
Fund and Prime Minister’s Relief Fund (Huq et al. 2016) (Fig. 19.5).
19.3.3 Climate Change Policies in Bangladesh
Bangladesh was an early mover amongst Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to cre-
ate a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and a dedicated national
policy on climate change. Stemming from the NAPA process, the Ministry of Envi-
ronment and Forests, alongwithDFID and other partners, formulated theBangladesh
Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) in 2009. The document guides
climate change policies, programs and projects in the country and is in line with the
government’s vision to eradicate poverty and achieve economic prosperity for its
people. The document stresses,
462 M. Haque et al.
We will achieve this through a pro-poor, climate resilient and low-carbon devel-
opment, based on the four building blocks of the Bali Action Plan—adaptation to
climate change, mitigation, technology transfer and adequate and timely flow of
funds for investment, within a framework of food, energy, water and livelihoods
security (BCCSAP 2009, p. 2).
The BCCSAP identifies six thematic areas of work where interventions to adapt
andmitigate climate change are to be focused: (1) food security, social protection and
health; (2) comprehensive disaster management; (3) infrastructure; (4) research and
knowledge management; (5) mitigation and low-carbon development; (6) capacity
building and institutional strengthening. There are 44 programs identified under these
six areas. Although there is no holisticmention of addressing Loss andDamage in the
way it is defined in this chapter, the pillar on Comprehensive Disaster Management
lends some scope for synergies. The document does identify a programme for risk
management against loss of income and property under the comprehensive disaster
management theme. One of the programs of the Comprehensive Disaster Manage-
ment theme is to manage risk against loss of income and property. The objective
of this program is “to put in place an effective insurance system for risk manage-
ment against loss of income and property” (BCCSAP 2009). The program promotes
working with NGOs and insurance companies on three action areas:
1. Devise an effective insurance scheme for losses in property due to climate change
impacts
2. Develop an effective insurance scheme for loss of income from various sources
to persons, households and enterprises
3. Pilot the insurance schemes and if successful, establish insurance systems for
lowering risk of adverse impact of climate change (Ibid).
Climate migration and displacement is an action area of the work plan of the
Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM). The BCCSAP makes several references
to migration, cautioning that displacement of millions of people, livelihoods and
long-term health of the population will be affected under the worst-case scenario.
19.3.4 Government Funds to Support the Climate Change
Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP)
To fund the projects and activities under the BCCSAP, two funds were established by
the government in 2010, the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) from
the government’s own resources and the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience
Fund (BCCRF) from donor funding and managed by the World Bank.
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The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust
Climate change work in the government, falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Environment and Forests (MOEF). The Climate Change Unit (CCU) under the
MoEF coordinates and facilitates the implementation of the BCCSAP under the over-
all guidance of the National Environment Committee chaired by the Prime Minister
and the National Steering Committee on Climate Change (Shamsuddoha et al. 2013).
The CCU’s main objective is to use the trust fund, provide management, adminis-
trative and monitoring support to the trustee board and its technical committee. In
2010, the government enacted the Climate Change Trust Act to conduct the functions
of the BCCTF according to the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Annual Report
2014–2015. The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust (BCCT) and its functions are
governed by a 17-member Trustee Board which is the highest decision-making body
for the Fund. It comprises of the minister of Ministry of Environment and Forests as
the chair and 16 other members including 10 ministers/state ministers, cabinet secre-
tary, governor of the central, finance secretary, member of Planning Commission and
two experts appointed by the government. The secretary, Ministry of Environment
and Forests, acts as the board’s member-secretary (Ibid). To assist the trustee board,
there is a technical committee headed by the Secretary, Ministry of Environment and
Forests. It committee comprises thirteen members including experts/representatives
from the Planning Commission, Department of Environment, Department of For-
est, and Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS)
and social organisations/NGOsworking on climate change. The technical committee
provides recommendations to the trustee board on the different projects submitted
for approval.
According to the 2014-105 Annual Report of the Bangladesh Climate Change
Trust, specific functions of the BCCT include overall management of the trust fund;
to provide administrative support to the trustee board and the technical committee;
to send project proposals to the technical committee (after preliminary screening)
and to place the proposals to the trustee board after the recommendation from the
technical committee; implementing the decision of the trustee board; and monitoring
and evaluation of projects.
The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF)
The Trust Fund created in fiscal year 2009–10 specifically funds the 44 programs
specified under the six thematic areas of BCCSAP. 66% of the funding from the trust
fund is utilised in the projects and 34% is held in reserve in a fixed deposit account
(Ibid). About 77% of all climate finance projects in Bangladesh are financed from the
domestic budget (Faruque and Khan 2013). The Government of Bangladesh has to
date allocated BDT 3100 crore (US$400 million approximately) to BCCTF during
the last eight fiscal years (Table 19.1).
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Table 19.1 Annual allocations to the trust fund are as follows (BCCT)
Fiscal year Allocation (BDT in crore) Allocation (USD in millions,
approximate figures)
2009–2010 700 902
2010–2011 700 902
2011–2012 700 902
2012–2013 400 515
2013–2014 200 258
2014–2015 200 258
2015–2016 100 129
2016–2017 100 129
Total 3100 399
Source Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund
As per Climate Change Trust Act, 2010, a maximum of 66% of the allocated
amount can go towards the projects. The remaining 34%, approximately totaling
USD 135 million or BDT 1054 crore, is kept in a fixed deposit account in various
private and public banks. One of the reasons why the government has kept a certain
portion in reserve is that in the future the interest can create the possibility of funding
climate change projects without allocating an amount from the annual budget. As of
July 2016, 431 projects have been undertaken—368 projects are being implemented
by the government, semi-government and autonomous agencies, 63 projects are
being implemented by NGOs. A GCF accredited national organisation called the
Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) manages the portion of funds that goes
towards NGOs. Projects have to satisfy the environmental and social safety standards
as recommended by the technical committee in order to receive funding from the
BCCTF. Major projects under the BCCTF include construction of coastal sea dykes,
embankments, river protection work; development of cyclone resilient houses and
multipurpose cyclone shelters in vulnerable areas; establishing agro-met stations;
water supply for irrigation; excavation/re-excavation of canals and construction of
drains at different rural municipalities; afforestation projects to protect coastal areas
and conserve biodiversity; biogas plants; improved cook-stoves; solar home systems
are mitigation projects funded from the trust fund. In the fiscal year 2014–15 the
Ministry of Local Government and Engineering department was awarded the highest
number of projects, followed by the Ministry of Water Resources (see Fig. 19.6).
The financial management and accounting procedures are maintained in strict
adherence to existing government financial rules. BCCTF has been audited by the
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and no objection has been received.
There is an Internal Audit Committee headed by the Secretary of BCCT that audits all
files with financial implications and adopts corrective measures. The external audit
is done by the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh as per
the direction of Climate Change Trust Act of 2010.
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Fig. 19.6 Allocation of funding for projects by the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund
(BCCTF). Source Kamruzzaman (2015)
Themonitoring of projects funded by the BCCTF are the responsibility of the con-
cerned implementing ministries. The Monitoring and Evaluation Branch in BCCT
also receives monthly progress report from the project directors, sends inspection
team for field visits, and convenes regular monitoring meetings with Project Direc-
tors. Headed by the Managing Director of the Trust, there is also a Monitoring
Committee that analyses the monitoring reports and puts forward its recommenda-
tion for proper implementation of the projects. According to the Trust’s website,
local administration is involved in the monitoring process to ensure local oversight.
The administrative officers and elected representatives also discuss these projects in
the district coordination meetings. Completed projects are evaluated by the Imple-
mentation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Ministry of Planning.
19.4 Towards Establishing a National Mechanism
to Address Climate Induced Losses and Damages
in Bangladesh
Both economic and non-economic losses and damages from climatic events are being
experienced in Bangladesh currently, with the impacts expected to grow according
to future projections. As explained in the first section of this chapter, climatic events
are changing their patterns, frequency and intensity, which is expected to negatively
affect the country’s economic growth, food security and public health. The main gap
that exists in the current climate-related policy framework in Bangladesh is a lack of
legislative, institutional and policy-related mechanism that explicitly address climate
induced losses and damages. A system that documents or accounts for the extent of
losses and damages, both monetary and non-monetary and provides for longer term
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support does currently not exist. Losses and damages affecting the most vulnerable
communities are addressed tangentially and disparately organised throughMoEF and
MoDMR. To respond to the experienced and future losses and damages a proactive
and robust system of collecting evidence, proving support to communities whose
livelihoods, assets and quality of life have been most affected by climate change is
much needed.
Over the years, Bangladesh has well established, but separate laws, institutions,
rules and procedures to respond to climatic events. DRR and adaptation share a
common mandate to reduce vulnerability and enhance the resilience of affected pop-
ulations. Policymakers in theMoDMRandMoEFare both concernedwith protecting
lives, livelihoods, food security and minimising of losses and damages of the most
at-risk populations. Despite these commonalities, the disaster and climate change
policy realms in Bangladesh operate in silos, with little collaboration or cooperation.
Shamsuddhoa et al. (2013) highlights that “bureaucratic demarcation of responsibil-
ity” and “institutional silos” of climate adaptation and DRR policy-making hinder
cross-sectoral cooperation. To address losses and damages more effectively and effi-
ciently, climate adaptation approaches and perspectives need to be integrated into
DRR policy-making.
The competency and success of disaster reduction strategies in Bangladesh have
focused on immediate response and relief. There is an expressed need for com-
munities on the frontlines to adapt and receive support for the impacts of climate
change that they cannot adapt to. Long term support to rebuild and build back better
requires the integration of DRR and climate adaptation approaches and perspectives.
According to Shamshuddoha et al. (2013), “the incorporation of DRR expertise in
implementation could help to increase the pace at which CCA efforts move from
planning to action DRR can also learn from the long-term perspectives of CCA in
order to ensure that DRR activities align with shifting climatic realities, and not just
historical experience” (p. 27).
Slow onset events, salinity intrusion, increased intensity of cyclones and non-
economic losses and damages are not accounted for in the current national policies
of the MoDMR. There is currently no provision in the legislative framework in
either MoDMR and MoEF that address slow onset events such as sea level rise and
non-economic losses and damages. Different projections show various scenarios
of inundation and the population affected under sea-level rise and there is a need
to systematically understand, document and prepare for this hazard. Non-economic
losses and damages have not received mention in policy frameworks and procedures,
but evidence shows that there are profound psychological, environmental, social and
cultural impacts of losses and damages from a variety of climatic stressors. Current
disaster preparedness procedures do not take into account future climate projections
and the systems that need to be put in place so that losses and damages are minimised
in the future.
The above highlight the need to address the gaps in the current policy and legisla-
tive framework and build a more robust response to climate-induced losses and dam-
ages. Efforts are now underway in Bangladesh to bring policy-makers in MoDMR
and MoEF in coordination with one another to build a national mechanism that
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addresses losses and damages more holistic and comprehensive manner. A scoping
paper (Huq et al. 2016) on developing a national mechanism offers a framework to
address Loss and Damage and documents the current efforts being undertaken to
establish such a system. According to Huq et al. (2016), to develop local, national
and international policy and institutional frameworks to address Loss and Damage,
it is first essential to identify, measure and characterise losses and damages faced in
Bangladesh. Understanding and quantifying losses and damages experienced from
various climatic events, taking into account the social, economic and geographical
contexts in which they occur is the first step towards building a national mechanism.
The scoping paper argues for a centralised mechanism that facilitates the coordina-
tion betweenMoDMRandMoEF, disburse financing,monitor and evaluate programs
to address climate induced losses and damages in Bangladesh.
Over the years, Bangladeshi policymakers and practitioners have acquired knowl-
edge and expertise on disaster management and climate adaptation, making them
highly capacitated to plan, strategise and execute climate policies. Both the politi-
cal/bureaucratic and technical spheres involved in the climate and disaster sector are
motivated and committed to preventing the worst of climate impacts impeding the
development of the nation. The Bangladesh delegation is an active member of the
LDC negotiating bloc in the UNFCCC. Moreover, a senior bureaucrat of the MoEF
currently sits on the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism
on Loss and Damage (WIM).
In 2012 the Government of Bangladesh initiated the “Loss and Damage in Vul-
nerable Countries Initiative,” a pioneering study on understanding the issue. The
initiative commissioned a number of studies on losses and damages, which brought
together climate change researchers, academics, practitioners and NGOs and deep-
ened their knowledge, capacity and expertise on this issue. The initiative created
awareness, understanding and a systematic body of work that laid the foundation for
an intellectual and practical understanding of losses and damages.
The human and institutional capacity and common mandate of the MoEF and
MoDMR to reduce vulnerability and build resilience means that there is much poten-
tial to establish a mechanism to address climate Loss and Damage. This reserve fund
of approximately USD 135 million or 34% of the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust
Fund creates a financial resource base to setup such a mechanism with domestic
resources. Huq et al. (2016) recommends developing the national mechanism on
Loss and Damage based on the country’s current adaptation and disaster risk finance
frameworks. This section further highlights the current efforts being undertaken in
the country to establish such a national mechanism to account for climate induced
losses and damagesmore holistically looking inward at the competencies that already
exist in the country.
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19.4.1 Unpacking the Warsaw International Mechanism
on Loss and Damage in the National Context
of Bangladesh
On February 16, 2016, the MoDMR hosted a workshop on Loss and Damage sup-
ported by the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), Action Aid
Bangladesh, C3ER andNACOM inDhaka. The event was primarily targeted towards
MoDMR staff and aimed at helping staff understand how national mechanism to
addressLoss andDamage could formpart of the disaster risk reduction strategy (Khan
2016). The workshop brought together the minister of MoDMR, senior bureaucrats,
policymakers, field professionals fromMoMDR along with civil society, researchers
and experts working on DRR and loss and damage to start discussions on how the
WIM can be translated at the national level. The workshop identified gaps, syner-
gies and opportunities in addressing losses and damages within the MoDMR’s DRR
framework and the way forward on establishing a national mechanism. Highlights of
the discussions included Strengthening the assessments of key sectors impacted by
climate disasters by modifying current disaster assessments conducted by MoDMR
through various scientific tools; Improving coordination and monitoring among rel-
evant institutions and ministries to address and account for loss and damage; Estab-
lishing a national coordination cell and a legal framework to implement climate
induced loss and damage related policies; The need for adequate financial support to
conduct research, gather and quantify data on loss and damage. The workshop was a
first step to bring on board key stakeholders to understand and agree on establishing
a national system/mechanism to deal with climate induced losses and damages. The
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief has agreed to lead the process of the
mechanism with input and support from the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Ministry of Land, Ministry of Water Resources.
19.4.2 National Consultations
Following the aforementioned workshop on loss and damage, four sub national con-
sultations took place in the Sylhet, Rangpur, Khulna and Chittagong districts with
relevant stakeholders including the Deputy Commissioners of MoDMR of those
regions in September 2016 (Huq et al. 2016). These nationwide consultations took
stock of the current practices to address losses and damages from disasters, possi-
ble responses when climatic events are intensified and the support needed from the
national level to aid the local level to respondmore effectively. Since climate impacts
are experienced at the local level, these regional consultations were extremely valu-
able in gathering the local level’s insight on how the mechanism should be devised
(Huq et al. 2016). Recommendations from the regional consultation included:
• A need for DRR responses within the MoDMR to include protection of assets and
livelihoods of those affected by climatic disasters;
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• A need for enhanced coordination at the local level;
• Establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive database of people and assets.
Related to the database, a pre-assessment mechanism is recommended;
• Education and awareness of climate induced losses and damages;
• Human and financial resources dedicated to build capacity of local government to
deal with increased frequency of disasters or a large scale single event (Ibid).
Following the regional consultations, a national consultation took place in Octo-
ber 2016, organised jointly by CARE Bangladesh and Action Aid Bangladesh with
key MoDMR policymakers including the Director General of the Department of
Disaster Management in Dhaka. The consultation presented the findings of the field-
level consultations along with discussions on taking the mechanism forward. Several
areas of further research emerged from the consultation which look to better under-
stand Loss and Damage in the country and the information needed to build a holistic
national mechanism. The central recommendation that emerged from this consulta-
tion was that the Government of Bangladesh should consider setting up a national
mechanism on Loss and Damage through a new technical team with specific terms
of references. Also presented at the consultation was a scoping study which articu-
lated the details on the process of establishing a national mechanism on losses and
damages prepared by ActionAid Bangladesh, CARE Bangladesh, the International
Centre for Climate Change andDevelopment andNature ConservationManagement.
The study included proposed functions and activities of the national mechanism and
an institutional structure comprising of a national steering committee and a technical
working group to oversee the development of the mechanism.
19.4.3 National Steering Committee and Technical Working
Group
The scoping study proposed to establish a national steering committee comprising
of high level policy makers and relevant experts to oversee the development of the
mechanism. The mandate of the steering committee would be to formulate positions
for the UNFCCC negotiations on Loss and Damage, make decisions on national
policy for Loss and Damage and oversee, approve and monitor the work of the
technical working group (Huq et al. 2016) (see Fig. 19.7).
The scoping study also recommends forming a technical working group compris-
ing of sector experts to conduct specific activities. The tasks of the working group
include: to provide technical guidance/recommendations to national steering com-
mittee; to identify thematic areas and activities of the national mechanism; to develop
a work plan to implement the activities of the thematic areas identified; to recom-
mend a panel of experts, approving their work plan and monitoring and evaluating
the of implementation work plans.
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Fig. 19.7 Proposed functions of the national mechanism to address climate induced loss and dam-
age. Source Huq et al. (2016)
19.5 Conclusions
This chapter highlighted the case of Bangladesh, a highly vulnerable country facing
significant losses and damages, which is putting its domestic resources and expertise
together to respond in a way that looks ahead and beyond the conventional responses
to climate change. The actions taken to establish a national mechanism to address
losses and damages builds upon existing institutions, mechanisms and frameworks
and is an example of collaboration across ministries, departments and a break away
fromworking in silos. Working towards a holistic mechanism embodies a systematic
approach to understanding the different perspectives of relevant stakeholders, where
the gaps lie and crafting a system to address the gaps for a stronger response to loss and
damage from climate impacts. The coordination of the work through the Ministry
of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) and Ministry of Environment and
Forests (MoEF) signify that the issue of climate change has broader acceptance
and recognition among policymakers in the Bangladesh. Recognising that climate
change is not just an environmental issue, but it has implications on the work of the
disaster community, MoDMR’s activities described above signifies an acceptance
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of responsibility to respond to Loss and Damage from climate change. Moreover,
establishing the mechanism will significantly aid in much needed coordination and
collaboration between MoDMR and MoEF. As of April 2018, the Government of
Bangladeshhas formedan inter-ministerial committee headedbyMoDMRtodevelop
a 2-year pilot phase for exploring the National Mechanism on Loss and Damage.
A concept note has already been developed and a detailed workplan for the 2-year
pilot phase is being developed. The government of Bangladesh intends to make a
public announcement of the National Mechanism on Loss and Damage at COP24 in
December 2018.
A national mechanism to address Loss and Damage not only responds to the
needs within the country, it also reaffirms Bangladesh’s commitment to the national
targets and indicators within the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015–2030. Furthermore, the functions of the national mechanism replicate the work
areas of theWIM, signalling Bangladesh’s commitments to the Paris Agreement. For
a resource constrainedLDCcountry, the effortsmadeby researchers, the development
community and policymakers display a resourcefulness and creativity that can be
replicated in countries facing similar vulnerabilities and resource constraints.
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Chapter 20
The Case of Huaraz: First Climate
Lawsuit on Loss and Damage Against
an Energy Company Before German
Courts
Will Frank, Christoph Bals and Julia Grimm
Abstract The civil law case brought forward in 2016 by the Peruvian Saúl Luciano
Lliuya with the support of the NGO Germanwatch against the German energy com-
pany RWE is the first climate lawsuit in Germany. It addresses the question whether
and how the biggest greenhouse-gas emitters, such as energy suppliers, may be held
liable for losses and damages caused by climate change. Specifically, the plaintiff
sued the company for a contribution to safety measures that help avoid the outburst
of a glacial lagoon fuelled by glacial retreat linked to anthropogenic climate change.
The requested support for necessary risk management measures at the lake to reduce
the risk of flooding are commensurate with the causal contribution of the company’s
share in historical CO2 emissions, approximately 0.5%. After having been rejected
by a district court in November 2017, the Court of Appeals accepted the case and
took it forward to the evidentiary phase. This decision marks the first time that a
court acknowledged that a private company is in principal responsible for its share
in causing climate damages. The lawsuit has raised the issue of responsibility of
large energy companies, and other emitters of greenhouse gas emissions, for climate
change in terms of liability for nuisance caused to private property. The acceptance
of the case and its entering into the evidentiary phase has written legal history and
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the case may act as a model for lawsuits in other countries. Comparable legal bases
for similar cases exist in numerous countries around the world. The decision thus
may have implications for the responsibility of great emitters all around the globe
in terms of communicating the relevant litigation risks to shareholders and building
adequate financial reserves.
Keywords Litigation · Civil law · Glacial lake outburst flooding · Causation
Peru · Huaraz
20.1 The Case of Huaraz and Its Civil Law Dimension
Loss and Damage caused by climate change has a civil law dimension (see book
chapter by Simlinger and Mayer 2018). The case of Saúl Luciano Lliuya brought
forward in 2016 against the German energy utility RWE is the first climate lawsuit in
Germany that addresses the question if greenhouse gas emitters, such as big energy
suppliers, may be held liable proportionally for safety measures necessary to protect
others against the dangers to life and property caused by the consequences of climate
change, such as through the accelerated retreat of glaciers and rising water levels of
glacial lagoons.
The plaintiff, Saúl Luciano Lliuya, who lives in theAndean city of Huaraz in Peru,
owns a house just belowPalcacochaGlacier Lake (see Fig. 20.1). Globalwarming has
led to dangerous increases in the lake’s volume. At any time, a glacial ice avalanche
may cause a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) from the lake (Rivas et al. 2015).
Saúl Luciano Lliuya’s family and house along with large parts of the city of Huaraz
are at risk of being hit by such a wave. There are precedents of GLOFs causing death
and destruction in the region: since 1941 such disasters have killed more than 30,000
people in the Cordillera Blanca region (Carey 2005). To ensure protection from the
hazard, water levels of the glacier lake need to be reduced by upgrading the pumping
system and strengthening the current protective moraine dam (see Fig. 20.2).
The intent of Saúl Luciano Lliuya’s climate lawsuit, brought forward in 2016
against the German energy company RWE, is to get the company to make a con-
tribution to safety measures at the lake in order to reduce the risk of flooding. This
contribution is to be commensurate to the causal contribution of the company’s
share in historical CO2 emissions, approximately 0.5% (Heede 2014). As an affected
landowner, Saúl Luciano Lliuya bases his claim against RWE on § 1004 of the Ger-
man Civil Code (BGB 2002), which reads as follows:
If the ownership is interfered with by means other than removal or retention of possession,
the owner may require the disturber to remove the interference. If further interferences are
to be feared, the owner may seek a prohibitory injunction.
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Fig. 20.1 Location of Lake Palcacocha and the city of Huaraz. Source Rivas et al. (2015)
20.2 The Question of Causality
For any claim based on § 1004BGBa legally relevant causal link has to be established
between the respective activity of the defendant and the nuisance suffered by the
plaintiff. The claim asserts that such a causal link can be established between CO2
emissions generated by the power plants operated by RWE and the imminent harm
to the claimant’s property. In German Civil Law the test for causality is the “conditio
sine qua non” rule: Accordingly, causality is established if a certain consequence had
not occurred fully or partially “but for” the said activity. Additionally, the principle
of “adequacy” has to be fulfilled. Consequences which are so unlikely that their
occurrence reasonably cannot be anticipated, are not imputed.
Causality in the Huaraz Case is strongly linked to scientific confidence as
established e.g. by the assessments of the International Panel of Climate Change
(IPCC 2013; Cramer et al. 2014). As shown in Fig. 20.3 of the IPCC Report of
2014, building on its detection and attribution framework (Cramer et al. 2014), the
IPCC assigned high confidence that glacial retreat in South America is linked to
anthropogenic climate change (item 1 in the figure; Magrin et al. 2014).
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Fig. 20.2 Palcacocha Glacier Lake with the provisional pumping system in need of upgrading.
Source Noah Walker-Crawford 2016
Fig. 20.3 Detection and attribution for climate impacts in Central and South America. Source
Magrin et al. (2014) (IPCC 5th assessment report)
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20.3 The Ruling
The First-Instance Judgement
In late 2016, the district court of Essen dismissed the case in the first instance denying
the existence of legally-relevant causation between the greenhouse gas emissions by
RWE and the endangerment of the claimant’s property. Basically, the court argued
that the processes of climate change and its consequences are so complex that it
is virtually not possible to prove an individual causal link between CO2 emissions
of single emitters and specific climate change impacts. The court further argued,
with reference to the principle of “adequacy”, that there are many contributors to the
overall greenhouse gas burden in the atmosphere, and consequently the share of a
single emitter is irrelevant for the specific climate change impacts caused.
The Appeal
In the appeal lodged with the next-higher instance, the Higer Regional Court
of Hamm, North Rhine-Westphalia, the claimant asserted that the lower court mis-
judged the issues concerning causality.He argued that there is a scientifically provable
causal chain between CO2 emissions from RWE’s emissions and the increasing dan-
ger to the claimant’s property being exposed to a possible outburst flood caused by a
glacial ice avalanche. This causal chain can be established around four clearly defin-
able steps: (1) A certain definable proportion of CO2 emissions from RWE power
plants end up in the atmosphere. They contribute to higher concentrations of green-
house gases in the entire atmosphere—irrespective of the origin of emissions—as
described by physical laws (Cubasch et al. 2013); (2) Due to the increasing concen-
trations of greenhouse gases, radiative forcing in terms of the absorption of solar
radiation increases, which correlates with an increase in average global temperature.
In the Peruvian Andes, specifically, this has led to regional warming and no other
reasons have been observed for the rise in average temperature (Magrin et al. 2014);
(3) Increased temperature leads to accelerated glacial retreat and heavily increases
the probability of glacial ice avalanches (Magrin et al. 2014); (4) Due to accelerated
glacial melting the glacial lake’s volume increases which consequently further raises
the risk of harm to the claimant’s property by an outburst flood caused by glacial
ice avalanches. Additionally, the claimant—referring to the principle of adequacy,
as used by the court, asserted that the contribution of RWE, the largest emitter in
Europe to climate change, is not as low as not too carry weight. Accordingly, the
claimant demanded a contribution from RWE to risk management measures at the
lake commensurate with the company’s contribution to global CO2 emissions. The
claimant asserted that there is no legal reason why a large emitter, such as RWE,
should be exempt from its climate-related legal responsibilities, and that a big emit-
ter should not be treated like the numerous collectively irresponsible small emitters,
whose individual contributions to climate warming are indeed not measurable.
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The Decision to Accept the Case
On November 13th 2017, the Higher Regional Court of Hamm in North Rhine-
Westphalia accepted the case Lliuya against RWE. This decision marks the first
time that a court acknowledged that a private company is in principal responsible
for its share in causing climate damages. This applies if concrete damages or risks
to private persons or their property can partly be assigned to the activities of the
relevant company. On November 30th 2017, the case formally entered into the next
stage—the taking of evidence. Now that the court accepted the legal argument of
this case, the task for the plaintiff is to provide evidence for his claim before the
court. The following questions play a central role and will need to be addressed in
the hearing
• Is Saúl Luciano Lliuya’s home in fact acutely endangered by a glacier outburst
flood?
• Do RWE’s historical emissions really amount to half a percent of global emissions
since the beginning of industrialisation—and if not, to how much?
• Is there proof that these emissions contributed to accelerated glacier melting and
the risk of flooding in Huaraz?
20.4 The Outlook
The lawsuit raises the issue of responsibility of large energy companies for climate
change in terms of liability for nuisance and losses and damages. It may act as a
model for similar lawsuits in other countries. The acceptance of the case and its
entering in the evidentiary phase itself has already written legal history, says lawyer
Roda Verheyen:
The OLG Hamm confirmed its vote of the oral hearing on November 13th 2017:
Major emitters of greenhouse gases can be held liable for protectivemeasures against
climate damages. The decision establishes a solid argument for legally relevant
causality in cases that were not accepted before, notably in reference to a nega-
tive ruling of the Federal Supreme Court on acid rain in 1987. Now we can prove
in a concrete case that RWE contributed and continues to contribute to the risk of a
local glacier outburst flood in Huaraz (Germanwatch 2017).
Beside the claimant’s concrete concern about climate change impacts in Huaraz,
the lawsuit, which is financially supported by the Foundation Zukunftsfähigkeit and
technically supported by the NGO Germanwatch, qualifies as a legal test case. It
addresses responsibility of energy suppliers with regard to bearing the social costs of
using fossil fuels, costs which have been largely externalised. In addition to confirm-
ing the need for political solutions with regard to climate change induced Loss and
Damage, the case has also shown to investors that they ought to consider the potential
costs of legal liabilities in their energy investment decisions. These costs may fall on
large emitters, effectively serving as a disincentive to continuing investing in fossil
fuel-based energy production.
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Similar legal rules—from which climate responsibility of big greenhouse gas
emitters may follow—exist in other countries around the world. The decision in the
Huaraz Case will thus have implications for great emitters all around the globe in
terms of them having to communicate the relevant litigation risks to shareholders
and building adequate financial reserves. Investors will have to take those risks into
account when taking investment decisions.
Of course, we do not consider it a long-term solution that the most vulnerable
people around the world exposed to climate change related losses and damages have
to file legal actions in order to defend their rights. Germanwatch thus emphasises the
need for acting on responsibility and expects, as a consequence of litigation action,
a strengthening of political will to protect affected people and hold big emitters
accountable (Schäfer et al. 2018).
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Chapter 21
Insurance as a Response to Loss
and Damage?
JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer, Swenja Surminski, Laurens M. Bouwer, Ilan Noy
and Reinhard Mechler
Abstract This chapter asks whether insurance instruments, especially micro-
insurance and regional insurance pools, can serve as a risk-reducing and equi-
table compensatory response to climate-attributed losses and damages from climate
extremes occurring in developing countries, and consequently if insurance instru-
ments can serve the preventative and curative targets of the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM). The discussion emphasises the substantial
benefits of both micro-insurance programs and regional insurance pools, and at the
same time details their significant costs. Beyond costs and benefits, a main message
is that if no significant intervention is undertaken in their design and implementa-
tion, market-based insurance mechanisms will likely fall short of fully meetingWIM
aspirations of loss reduction and equitable compensation. Interventions can include
subsidies and other types of support that make insurance affordable to poor clients;
interventions can also enable public-private arrangements that genuinely catalyse
risk reduction and adaptation. Many such interventions are already in place, and the
chapter highlights two potential success stories for insurance instruments serving
the most vulnerable: the African R4 micro-insurance program and the African Risk
Capacity (ARC) regional insurance pool. While support to these and other insur-
ance programs continues to be framed as humanitarian aid based on the principle
of solidarity, discussions on the G7 initiative to insure vulnerable households, as
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well as on ARC’s initiative to link international payments to climate risks, raise the
question whether the narrative will evolve from solidarity to responsibility based on
the principle of developed country accountability.
Keywords Risk transfer · Financial instruments · Climate change · Catastrophic
loss · Safety nets · Disaster risk reduction · Equity · Liability · Compensation
21.1 Introduction
Insurance has played a central role in discussions on adapting to the impacts of
climate change, dating back to the early 1990s, when the Alliance of Small Island
States (AOSIS) proposed a global insurance fund to compensate small islands for sea-
level rise (see introduction byMechler et al. 2018). Taking stockof this history, aswell
as the accumulated experience with catastrophe insurance instruments, this chapter
asks if insurance mechanisms can help serve the intent of the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) and Article 8.1 of the Paris Agreement of
‘averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse
effects of climate change, including extremeweather events and slowonset events…”
(UNFCCC 2015, Article 8). The focus is on weather and climate extremes, including
droughts, floods, windstorms and other hazards impacted by anthropogenic climate
change, which occur in particularly vulnerable developing countries.
Although the precise intentions of the WIM are still unclear, and especially its
distinction from climate adaptation (see chapters by Mechler et al. 2018; Schinko
et al. 2018), the WIM Executive Committee (2016) emphasises the role of insurance
in furthering climate risk management, or more specifically its role in proactively
reducing and transferring risks. In addition, and importantly, discussions on Loss
and Damage (L&D) and the WIM have extended to adaptation limits and ‘beyond
adaptation‘ (Schäfer et al. 2018). According to the UNFCCC, loss and damage
“includes, and in some cases involves more than, that which can be reduced by
adaptation” (Decision 2/CP.19, UNFCCC 2014). This has been interpreted by many
WIM commentators, and especially developing country parties, to suggest compen-
sation for climate-attributed losses and damages experienced by the most vulnerable
communities (see Mace and Verheyen 2016). A legal obligation to compensate for
residual loss and damage (the climate-attributed losses and damages that remain
once all cost-effective and socially/politically feasible measures have been imple-
mented (UNFCCC 2012) is ruled out in the Paris Agreement (Paragraph 52), yet not
for the broader debate, where residual losses and damages resulting from climate-
related extremes raise ethical issues concerning retribution or (non-legally binding)
compensation (see also Simlinger and Mayer 2018). In line with the discussion in
Mechler and Schinko (2016) and the chapter by Schinko et al. (2018) we refer to
risk reduction and (non-legally binding) compensation as preventative and curative
responses, respectively, and explore the role of insurance instruments in promoting
these responses.
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In simple terms, insurance allows one party (the insured or policyholder) to trans-
fer the risk of future economic losses to a second party (the insurer) willing to bear
this risk for the payment of a premium. By transferring the risk ex ante, insurance
clients are guaranteed payments for the agreed upon losses and damages from events
ex post. In this way insurance, as one of a number of risk financing instruments, pro-
vides reimbursement in return for the payment of a premium such that households,
businesses, governments and whole regions can recover in a timely way from the
damages from extreme events. In addition, many argue that insurance goes beyond
post-disaster reimbursement to pro-actively prevent damages from occurring (see
chapter by Schäfer et al. 2018). By ‘pricing’ risk and requiring preventative mea-
sures, insurance provides (in theory) incentives or conditions for clients to adopt
damage-reducing behaviour and make investments to reduce their risks.
Insurance thus appears to serve the goals of disaster risk reduction (DRR) as well
as post-disaster reimbursement. If insurance payouts are viewed as compensation
for losses and damages, insurance serves as a preventative and curative instrument,
therefore responding to WIM aspirations as (differently) voiced by developed and
developing country parties (see chapter by Calliari et al. 2018). It is not surprising,
then, that insurance has figured so prominently in the L&D discussions and work
plan. However, while these insurance characteristics have motivated the discussions
on insurance as a tool to address climate-attributed losses and damages, they raise
questions essential to the WIM deliberations. Most fundamentally, can insurance
be viewed as an equitable curative measure for climate-attributed impacts and risks
incurred by poor communities in vulnerable countries? This in turn raises questions
concerning burden sharing: How are premiums determined and who pays them?
Another central question concerns the disaster-risk-reduction (DRR) potential of
insurance. Are insurance instruments, as they are currently practiced, effective in
encouraging prevention and risk reduction by incentivising or requiring adaptation
and resilience investments?
By examining these and other questions, this chapter explores the extent to which
insurance—provided through private markets or public institutions—can meet the
differentiated WIM ambitions of reducing and compensating for Loss and Dam-
age. The discussion focuses on recent evidence from micro-insurance and regional
sovereign insurance pools as these are the most common types of catastrophe insur-
ance currently operating in developing countries, which has given them a particular
standing the L&D discussions.
After an overview of catastrophe insurance and its role for loss and damage
from climate change (Sect. 21.2), the discussion turns to the benefits and costs of
insurance (Sect. 21.3), before it examines insurance as a tool for preventing the
economic impacts from extreme weather events (Sect. 21.3) and for reimbursing
the residual loss and damage (the curative aspect) (Sect. 21.4) with examples from
micro-insurance programs and regional insurance pools. The chapter concludes (in
Sect. 21.5) that insurance instruments based on the ‘mutuality principle’ (premiums
reflect risk plus markup or ‘load’) will fall short of meeting the ‘preventative’ and
‘curative’ aspirations underlying theWIMand Paris Agreement; however, insurance
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based on the ‘solidarity’ and ‘accountability’ principles accompanied by significant
outside interventions can indeed support WIM objectives.
21.2 Insuring Climate Risks: An Overview
21.2.1 Brief History
Reference to insurancewas firstmade by theAlliance of Small IslandStates (AOSIS),
which suggested in 1991 that an international insurance pool funded by industrialised
parties be established to compensate small-island and low-lying developing nations
for impacts resulting from sea level rise (INC 1991; chapter by Mechler et al. 2018).
The insurance mechanism proposed by AOSIS was not aimed at establishing private
sector risk transfer, but geared towards a compensation fund to address L&D from
sea level rise. As such, it was not strictly insurance in a technical sense, but a com-
pensation mechanism (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2003). What remained from these
early discussions is reflected in Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC, which calls upon Par-
ties to “consider” actions, including those related to insurance, to meet the specific
needs and concerns of developing countries with respect to the adverse impacts of
climate change (United Nations 1992). In subsequent years, AOSIS as well as other
organisations, such as the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), developed
proposals for the use of insurance mechanisms to address climate change impacts
and risks (AOSIS 2008; MCII 2008). Notably, both the AOSIS and MCII propos-
als brought a compensatory or curative mechanism for loss and damage in through
the back door by including a risk layer in the insurance arrangement that would be
fully financed by developed countries; although not differentiating between climate-
change attributed impacts and other risk drivers. In addition, both proposals called for
increased financing for DRR projects as part of a holistic climate risk management
approach. The proposals informed the negotiating text at COP 15 in Copenhagen
in 2009, and went on to influence negotiations on the L&D mechanism at COP 19
in Warsaw in 2013. Subsequently, insurance has featured prominently on the WIM
agenda, most notably on the workplans of the WIM executive committee (ExCoM)
(UNFCCC 2014, 2016).
Recognition of insurance as a potent response to climate risk has been subse-
quently underscored by the G7 InsuResilience initiative, and recently upgraded to
theG20 andV20 partnership (most vulnerable 20 countries), which ambitiously aims
at insuring 400 million currently uninsured people in vulnerable countries by 2020
(G7 2015; InsuResilience 2017). Interestingly, these efforts to enhance the role of
insurance in addressing disaster and climate risks in developing countries occur pre-
dominantly outside the UNFCCC’s L&D discussions and are increasingly presented
as part of broader development support.
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Fig. 21.1 Overview of ‘risk management applications’ of insurance, in the context of loss and
damage . Adapted from Warner et al. (2012)
21.2.2 Can Insurance Cover All Loss and Damage
from Climate Change?
It should be emphasised that insurance cannot provide financial protection against all
impacts from climate change (Warner et al. 2009). As shown in Fig. 21.1 insurance
is an instrument for financing the recovery from extreme and non-gradual climate
events, like floods, windstorms and droughts, but is not suited for managing the dam-
age caused by slow-moving or gradual changes that include, among other impacts,
sea-level rise, desertification, loss of habitat, loss of biodiversity, erosion, ocean
acidification and glacial retreat (chapter by Bouwer 2018). At the same time, these
slow climatic changes can becomemanifest through insurable rapid-onset events, for
example, sea-level rise exacerbates storm surge levels and coastal flooding. Equally
difficult to insure are small-scale events for which damages are mostly expressed in
the cumulative wear-and-tear of assets and infrastructure (Moftakhari et al. 2017).
Insurance thus has clear limitations, as it can only cover those events that are suf-
ficiently random and infrequent in their occurrence. Finally, as shown in Fig. 21.1,
the range of loss events (rapid-onset to gradual) is accompanied by a range of pol-
icy support instruments for risk reduction or reimbursing impacts—from support
for insurance instruments (e.g., public subsidies or reinsurance) or insurance-linked
prevention, to reparations for gradual onset impacts.
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21.2.3 Spectrum of Ex Ante and Ex Post Financing
Instruments
Insurance is not the only measure to ensure post-disaster financial resources, and in
some contexts other mechanisms can be more appropriate and cost-effective. It is
therefore important not to view insurance as a stand-alone solution but consider if
and how it can be part of a holistic climate risk management approach. In contrast to
wealthy countries, insurance mechanisms for providing catastrophe cover are still in
their infancy in the developing world. The percentage of losses from natural hazards
covered by private or public insurance in 2014 in the US and Europe were 42 and
34%, respectively, compared to only 1.4% in Africa and 12.5% in Asia (Swiss Re
2015). The extent to which insurance can be offered is risk and country-specific and
dependent mainly on income.
Table 21.1 provides an overview of financial instruments and arrangements avail-
able to cover disaster risks facing (i) households, farms and small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) operating at the local or micro scale, (ii) financial- and donor-
organisations operating at the intermediary scale, and (iii) governments operating at
the national or macro scale.
Table 21.1 Examples of risk financing arrangements at micro, intermediary and macro scales
Micro-scale
Households/SMEs/Farms
Intermediary-scale
Insurers/financial
institutions/donor
organisations/NGOs/Agro-
Businesses/Cooperatives
Macro-scale
Governments
Insurance
instru-
ments
Indemnity–based
property, crop & life
insurance, index-based
(parametric) property,
livestock & crop
insurance, weather
hedges, national insurance
programs
Indemnity and parametric
insurance for NGOs,
co-ops, Re-insurance for
direct insurance providers,
catastrophe bonds,
sidecars
Sovereign risk transfer
(e.g., sovereign
re-insurance, catastrophe
bonds, sidecars),
contingent credit, regional
catastrophe insurance
pools
Solidarity Government assistance,
humanitarian aid
Government
guarantees/bail outs
Bi-lateral and multi-lateral
assistance, EU solidarity
fund
Savings
and credit
Savings, micro-savings,
micro-credit, fungible
assets, food storage,
money lenders
Emergency liquidity funds Reserve funds,
post-disaster credit
Informal
risk
sharing
Kinship and other mutual
arrangements, remittances
Diversions from other
budgeted programs
Source Adapted from Linnerooth-Bayer et al. (2010)
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Lacking insurance, vulnerable households and other local actors have tradition-
ally financed post-disaster recovery with a combination of savings and credit, infor-
mal kinship arrangements, government relief and international donor support. Sav-
ings can take the form of stockpiles of food, grains, seeds and marketable assets,
which serve to smooth consumption during crises. The most common form of assis-
tance is remittances, which are more than three times the size of official develop-
ment assistance (World Bank 2016), and can be a significant contribution to post-
disaster recovery. Banks, insurers and othermonetary financial institutions (MFIs), as
intermediary-scale actors, can also protect their post-disaster liquidity by purchasing
reinsurance, relying on bail outs from the government, or support from institutions
like the African Emergency Liquidity Facility (OMTRIX 2005) or the World Bank.
Governments as national operators can meet their obligations to repair public
infrastructure and support needy households with ex post and ex ante instruments.
Typically, and as detailed in Table 21.2, public authorities seek financing after dis-
asters occur, for instance, by issuing tax increases, re-allocating funds from other
budgeted activities, or borrowing through issuing bonds. Governments of highly
exposed countries may also rely on assistance from the international community.
An example of the latter is the significant support provided by the World Bank,
and in Europe the European Union Solidarity Fund provides post-disaster support to
governments to support their recovery (Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 2017).
In addition to these ex post instruments, governments increasingly anticipate dis-
aster events with ex ante financing or risk transfer as shown in Table 21.2. Risk
financing at sovereign level includes a wide range of tools such as national reserve
funds, sovereign insurance (also offered through regional pools), and credit and cap-
ital market products, such as catastrophe bonds, where bond purchasers agree to
forfeit interest or principle if a pre-defined hazard or disaster occurs (see Cardenas
et al. 2007). Such a catastrophe bond (150Million USD), for example, was triggered
by the 2017 Oaxaca earthquake (ARTEMIS 2017b). Insurers make use of other types
Table 21.2 Financing instruments for protecting government budgets
Financial and budgetary instruments
Goal Ex ante instrument
[arranged before a disaster]
Ex post instrument
[arranged after a disaster]
Risk retention
[changing how or when one
pays]
Contingency fund or
budget allocation
Budget reallocation
Line of contigent credit Tax increase
Post-disaster credit
Risk transfer
[removing isk from the
balance sheet]
Traditional insurance or
reinsurance Indexed insurance,
reinsurance, or derivatives
Discretionary post-disaster
relief
Capital market instruments
Source Clarke and Dercon (2016)
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of alternative instruments, such as reinsurance sidecars, where investors act directly
as reinsurers, and risk swaps, options and loss warranties. Most of these alternative
instruments provide an opportunity for investors in the capital markets to take a more
direct role in providing insurance and reinsurance protection.
21.2.4 Types of Insurance
Insurance, whether for health, unemployment or climate-related disasters, is a central
feature of most wealthy countries; yet, institutional arrangements can differ signifi-
cantly depending particularly on the degree of private-market responsibility. In this
discussion, we distinguish between private-market insurance, public-private insur-
ance arrangements, and public assistance. Private-market insurers underwrite the
risks, and clients are asked to pay their full or close-to-full risk-based premium,
albeit often with cross-subsidies from low-risk to high-risk clients that keep the pre-
miums affordable (e.g., flood insurance in Germany, Norway and the U.K.). At the
other end of the spectrum is public assistance, which can take the form of a catas-
trophe reserve fund financed from general taxes (e.g., in Austria) from which loss
reimbursement can be legally binding (e.g., earthquake relief in Italy) or non-legally
binding and ad hoc (e.g., in Hungary). In between these two ends of the spectrum
are many public-private arrangements. Public institutions are active, for instance, in
underwriting insurance (e.g., the US National Flood Insurance Program), providing
subsidies and other support to private insurance programs (e.g., the Austrian crop
insurance system), or supporting commercial insurers with reinsurance arrangements
(e.g., the French all-hazard insurance system).
Insurance can be indemnity-based, where products are written against actual
losses, or parametric, where products are written against a physical index (e.g.,
soil moisture), that is, against events that cause loss, not against the loss itself.
A parametric instrument disburses funds based on a triggering event that reaches
a pre-determined threshold of a quantifiable measure (for example, wind speed or
precipitation), which importantly is not conditional on an on-site loss assessment.
Semi-parametric schemes are also written, where the trigger is a combination of a
hazard and its calculated/modelled impact based on known exposures and vulnera-
bilities (Molini et al. 2007).
Because they target themost vulnerable in the developingworld and have featured
prominently in the L&D discussions, two types of insurance are highlighted in this
chapter: (1) micro-insurance that offers cover to households, farms and SMEs, and
(2) regional sovereign risk pools providing support for national governments. The
intent of micro-insurance is to make insurance accessible by avoiding the high costs
of traditional insurance in order to service resource-poor markets, usually by offering
limited cover and greatly reducing transaction costs (Mechler et al. 2006). The intent
of regional sovereign risk insurance pools, including those already formed in the
Caribbean, Pacific Islands and Africa, is to ensure needed and timely liquidity post-
disaster.
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21.3 The Benefits and Costs of Insurance
21.3.1 Benefits of Insurance
The central feature of insurance is its risk-pooling capacity. By pooling risks from
a sufficiently large and independent number of individual households, farms, busi-
nesses and even sovereign states, insurance collectively reduces loss volatility (math-
ematically speaking, the variance of losses) and in this way can guarantee post-
disaster liquidity to those individuals at risk (Kunreuther 1998). The assurance
of post-disaster liquidity, in turn, can reduce impacts, including disaster-induced
bankruptcy, hunger, selling of productive financial assets or taking kin out of school
with long-term impacts on human capital formation. If correctly implemented insur-
ance thus delivers risk pooling over space and time; faster and more efficient recon-
struction; certainty about post-disaster support; and can reduce immediate welfare
losses and consumption reductions (Brainard 2008; von Peter et al. 2012).
An important advantage of insurance over many other types of risk financing is
the timeliness of the post-disaster payments. A study by Clarke and Hill (2013) sug-
gests that rapid payouts and prompt assistance to affected populations can reduce the
impact of disasters and enable poor and vulnerable people to recover more quickly.
Examining experience of pro-poor insurance instruments shows that they have been
an effective risk management tool in terms of providing timely payments post-event
(Arent et al. 2017). Moreover, an insurance contract can be a more secure and timely
means of coping with disasters than dependency on ad hoc and often delayed gen-
erosity of governments and donors. To add to these benefits, insurance can render
clients more creditworthy, and in so doing promote investments in productive assets
and higher-risk/higher-yield activities, in turn reducing disaster-related poverty traps
(Hallegatte et al. 2016).
Turning to governments, sovereign disaster risk financing instruments including
insurance pools aim at protecting public budgets in the wake of disasters. Due to lim-
ited tax bases, high indebtedness and low uptake of insurance, many highly exposed
developing countries cannot fully recover by simply relying on limited external donor
aid. Ex post liquidity through insurance enables governments to provide relief to the
most vulnerable and to invest in reconstruction and recovery, thus reducing long-
term losses and development setbacks from disasters. Sovereign risk transfers can
also indirectly benefit households and other victims of disasters. With internation-
ally backed risk-transfer programs, developing country governments will rely less
on debt financing and international donations, and assured funds for repairing criti-
cal infrastructure can attract foreign investment. Finally, and importantly, insurance
instruments may provide incentives to reduce risk (Newsham et al. 2011; Heltberg
et al. 2009a, b), but only if they do not encourage behaviour that neglects to reduce
risks in a cost-effective way, a common concern in insurance applications often
referred to as ‘moral hazard.’ The preventative capacity of insurance instruments is
the topic of Sect. 3, where we examine their risk-reduction potential in practice.
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21.3.2 Costs of Insurance
While there are substantial benefits provided by privately or publicly offered insur-
ance, the costs of insurance are considerable. The average financial cost of insurance
generally surpasses average losses, meaning that un-subsidised insurance premiums
are greater than what the client expects to lose. For this reason, clients should care-
fully consider the costs and benefits, and rely on insurance only after considering the
alternatives, or in the words of Vaughan and Vaughan (2008, p. 62), only as a last
resort. Indeed, without outside subsidies and other forms of support policyholders
can expect, on average, a higher financial burden in the long run with insurance
than without it. That insurance results, on average, in greater costs to those insured
is often not appreciated and needs further explanation.
The insurance premium tends to be inflated above the ‘actuarially fair value’ or
‘pure premium’ (expected losses) due to the fact that on top of the annual expected
losses a risk premium is charged. As shown in Fig. 21.2, the risk premium is deter-
mined by two factors: expense load and risk load (Pollner 2000). Additionally, in the
case of private insurance a profit margin is charged. In general terms the expense load
reflects the costs of the insurer doing business, and the risk load includes the cost of
holding capital, reinsurance and of assuming uncertain contracts for high-level risks.
The risk load distinguishes catastrophe insurance from other types of insurance, like
life and health, since insurers covering catastrophic risks must be prepared to pay
claims for disasters that affect whole regions or countries at the same time (co-variate
risk). Still, if insurers are sufficiently diversified, the risk load will not only insulate
them from large losses at one time, but will also in the long run result in significant
profits.
Fig. 21.2 Costs contributing to catastrophe insurance premium Source Adapted from Cummins
and Mahul (2009)
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The ratio of the premium paid versus the coverage obtained gives an indication
of the insurance cost, particularly when comparing insurance to other risk financing
tools. Using this ratio, Ghesquiere and Mahul (2010) found that risk transfer is very
costly compared to most other financial instruments (Ghesquiere and Mahul 2010;
Clarke andDercon 2016).As a case in point, in theCaribbean region annual insurance
premiums (paid mostly by businesses) were estimated to represent about 1.5% of
GDP during the period 1970–1999, while average losses per annum (insured and
uninsured) accounted for only about 0.5% of GDP (Auffret 2003).
If insurance premiums cost clients on average more than their anticipated losses,
and in the case of co-variant catastrophic events significantly so, why do house-
holds, businesses and governments insure? This question is particularly pertinent
for resource-poor households and governments, where premium payments can have
high opportunity costs. The textbook rationale for purchasing insurance, verified by
evidence on insurance penetration, is based on the concept of “risk aversion”. Risk-
averse persons and entities (generally people who cannot cope with large losses) are
willing to pay more than they expect to lose on average to avoid catastrophic losses.
Households and farms in developing countries are likely to be highly risk averse since
large losses can threaten livelihoods and lives (and thus have severe costs and other
implications beyond the sheer financial loss). The same holds for the public sector
since disasters can significantly affect development if governments do not have the
means for rapid reconstruction and relief efforts (Mechler 2004).
For middle- to high-income earners in developed as well as developing coun-
tries an insurance value proposition can often be discerned as shown by substantial
insurance demand, yet it is pertinent to ask how insurance mechanisms can serve
resource-poor clients facing high risk? As current programs demonstrate, insurance
premiums are made affordable by targeting higher income clients, implementing
cross subsidies, limiting coverage, providing outside support and forming partner-
ships (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2010). Whereas most discussions focus largely on
making insurance affordable, it should be recognised that it may not be advisable
from a benefit-cost perspective. Indeed, reliance on alternative financial arrange-
ments, like donor solidarity, savings, credit and remittances, can be considerably less
costly than insurance, and these arrangements can work reasonably well for low-loss
events (Cohen and Sebstad 2003). However, they can be unreliable and inadequate for
covariate and catastrophic shocks that place a significant financial strain on whole
communities, regions and governments. Insurance theory and recent cost-benefit
assessments indicate that insurance and other risk financing instruments are mainly
advisable, and viable, for large and residual risks that cannot be reduced or retained
otherwise.
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21.4 Preventative Response: Does Insurance Support
the Risk-Reduction Response to the WIM?
Many analysts argue that insurance can go beyond enabling ex post relief, recon-
struction and recovery, to be an ex ante tool for promoting risk reduction (Kunreuther
1996;Kunreuther andMichel-Kerjan 2009; Crichton 2008; Botzen 2013). According
to the chapter by Schäfer et al. (2018): “Insurance spurs transformation by helping
countries reshape the way risks are managed. It does so by encouraging risk reduc-
tion, catalysing risk assessment, and drivingmore structured decision-making around
ex-ante risk”. Despite these claims, some commentators, including NGOs and par-
ties to the UNFCCC, remain sceptical that insurance goes beyond risk spreading to
risk reduction, and worry that insurance can even lead to a false sense of security
or moral hazard if the insured, by not bearing the full costs of risky decisions, take
on more risk (Vellinga et al. 2001; UNFCCC 2008). Moral hazard is widely recog-
nised, and insurers address it through the design of insurance products by using
deductibles or parametric products; however, questions remain whether insurance
products lead directly to risk reduction. According to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), insurance can “directly provide incentives for reducing
risk, yet the evidence is weak and the presence of many counteracting factors often
leads to disincentives…” (Chambwera et al. 2014).
Building on Surminski and Eldridge (2015) and Surminski (2014), Lorant et al.
(forthcoming) identify ways in which the contractual elements and ancillary mech-
anisms of insurance can (in concept) encourage risk reduction. After surveying the
developed-country practices of flood insurers, the authors note the disappointing
evidence of a strong link between insurance and DRR and suggest ways that insur-
ers can contribute more effectively, for example, making better use of hazard maps,
monitoring household risk improvements, rewarding risk mitigation with premium
discounts, inserting conditions or warranties into contracts, and developing protocols
that will better link risk inspections of large facilities with underwriting practices.
Beyond these design changes, there is evidence that public insurers invest more
in preventative risk reduction than their private insurer counterparts (Schwarze and
Croonenbroeck 2017; Ungern-Sternberg 1996). The evidence on the insurance-DRR
link for the on-goingwork under theWIM is that indemnity-based insurance as prac-
ticed in wealthy countries may need adapting if it is to be applied as an instrument to
foster reduction of loss and damage in developing countries. A similar conclusion
was reached by the IPCC, where authors confirmed that risk-financing mechanisms
contribute to increasing resilience, but that major design changes would be needed
to avoid providing disincentives for DRR (Chambwera et al. 2014). As we witness
in wealthy countries, progress will be slow and patchy without public and private
commitment to shaping insurance systems such that they foster practices that lead
to investment in disaster risk reduction practices.
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21.4.1 The Experience of Micro-insurance in Promoting
Risk Reduction
Themessage that insurance practices will require reform if they are to better promote
risk reduction holds not only for indemnity-based systems in wealthy countries, but
also for parametric micro-insurance systems that are increasingly targeting resource-
poor clients in the developing world (for reviews, see Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2012;
Mechler et al. 2006; Schäfer andWaters 2016).Already in 2010, therewere a reported
36 parametric weather insurance programs, including 28 addressing individual farm-
ers/herders, residents of informal settlements, village or cooperative risk (Hazell et al.
2010), with many other programs having appeared since then (Schäfer and Waters
2016).
Parametric systems are notable for the absence of moral hazard. The insured
remain motivated to reduce their losses and damages because insurance disburse-
ments, if they are triggered, are not based on actual losses. For example, a farmer
with a parametric insurance contract, which pays out if rainfall falls below a pre-
defined level, can gain doubly by planting drought-resistant crops since the farmer
will have less losses and still receive a pay-out. Beyond the elimination of moral haz-
ard, the literature on parametric micro-insurance makes little reference to specific
risk-reduction requirements, for example, in the form of conditions or warranties,
and there are few accounts of micro-insurers informing clients of hazards or advising
them on risk-reduction activities.
One notable positive exception is the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) that
offers micro-insurance for drought risk to food-insecure communities in Ethiopia,
Senegal, Malawi and Zambia (see Box 21.1). R4 currently reaches over 40,000 farms
through a combination of its four risk-management strategies: The first, R1, promotes
improved resource management (risk reduction); R2 supports microcredit (prudent
risk taking;); R3 is insurance (risk transfer); and R4 is savings (risk reserves). The
most unique and interesting feature of this initiative is its direct link to the reduction
of crop loss from drought. In lieu of paying aa premium, cash-constrained farmers
can opt to participate in an insurance-for-assets (IFA) plan, whereby they pay the
premium through their labour on projects that reduce risk in the community, such
as field irrigation projects and tree planting (World Food Programme and Oxfam
America 2016). It should be noted, however, that the R4 Program operates with
generously subsidised premiums, even to those not participating in insurance-for-
assets, and cannot be compared to a market-based insurance program.
R4 is exemplary by providing a proven insurance system design that promotes
DRR, especially since the risk management experiences of most micro-insurance
programs suggest that they could become a more powerful DRR tool with carefully
designed interventions by governments or donors. Importantly, the ability of those
most vulnerable to reduce their own risk and to change their behaviour may be very
limited or not feasible unless supported by donors.
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Box 21.1 R4 Rural Resilience Initiative for drought risk management
Countries: Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi, Zambia
Partners: farmers, local relief society, insurers, reinsurers, rural banks, university, gov-
ernment and donors
Policy holders: 40,000 Smallholder farmers’ livelihoods in
drought-prone regions with a sum insured of USD 2.2 million, premiums of USD
370,000, and payouts USD 450,000 (2015)
Fig. 21.3 The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative
Integrated risk management framework
– Improved resource management (risk reduction)
– Individual/group savings (risk reserves)
– Microinsurance (risk transfer)
– Microcredit (risk taking)
Insurance-for-work program to supplement the government’s “food and cash for
work” Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
Work program includes projects for reducing risk and building climate resilience, such
as improved irrigation or soil management.
Source World Food Program & Oxfam America 2016; World Food Programme 2017
21.4.2 The Experience of Regional Risk Pools in Promoting
Risk Reduction
The first of three regional sovereign risk pools, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk
Insurance Facility (CCRIF), was created in 2007 as a multi-government disaster risk
pooling arrangement with the aim of providing sovereign insurance coverage for
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hurricanes and earthquakes to its participating member countries (UNISDR 2017).
A second regional pool, Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) was established in 2012 as
a specialised agency of the African Union to help member states improve their
capacities to better plan, prepare and respond to natural disasters (Wilcox 2014).
Recently, a third regional sovereign risk pooling arrangement has been created for the
Pacific island states, thePacificCatastropheRiskAssessment andFinancing Initiative
(PCRAFI) (World Bank 2017). In all three cases, disbursements from the pool go to
participating governments for the purpose of supporting their post-disaster relief and
reconstruction efforts, although only one of the pools (ARC) makes requirements on
how the disbursements are used by requesting its members to provide details about
contingency management and disbursement when they join the pool.
A key feature of all three pools is the parametric nature of the insurance contract,
which, as discussed for micro-insurance, makes payments faster and the claim pro-
cess less costly than traditional indemnity-based insurance products for which claims
are paid based on assessments of loss through on-site verification. Fast payment of
claims is especially critical. Intervening quickly after a disaster can provide gov-
ernments with funds that support households and prevent the adoption of damaging
coping strategies (such as selling off or slaughtering livestock). A benefit-cost anal-
ysis carried out on the ARC shows that getting aid to households in the critical three
months after harvest can result in economic gains of over USD 1,200 per household
assisted (Clarke andHill 2013). CCRIF announced that its payouts to Caribbean gov-
ernments due to the impacts of Hurricane Irma, which devastated many island states
in September 2017, will reach $31.2 million, and the facility has now passed $100
million of payouts to members since its launch. All of the $100 million of payouts
were made to members within 14 days of the catastrophe events that triggered their
parametric insurance policies (ARTEMIS 2017a).
Advancing ex ante risk management is also important in all three regional pro-
grams, especially with respect to developing the knowledge base on which disaster
risk reduction and management policy can be pursued. Each pool makes an effort,
paid for by donors, to measure and quantify disaster risk in the relevant region by
examining not only the hazard but also exposure and vulnerability using detailed
mapping, data and modelling tools developed explicitly for this purpose. An exam-
ple is ARC’s modelling platform called African Risk View. It provides modelling
input to ARC for insurance purposes, but also aims to be a financial early warning
tool, supporting government decision-makers with cost estimates before and during
a drought season. As such it can trigger early action and risk reduction measures.
The models and quantification of risk constitute major progress as private markets
and the governments of the region were not supplying this information previously.
If combined with technical assistance and capacity building these advances in risk
information can lead to a culture of riskmanagement across governments, potentially
inducing a more anticipatory approach to risk (Vivid Economics et al. 2016).
ARC is currently preparing for the launch of an additional tool, the Extreme Cli-
mate Facility (ARC-XCF), which aims to address adaptation and resilience shortfalls
in African countries in the face of climate change. XCF is designed to take account
of increasing risk of extreme weather event activity in order to disperse funds to be
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used to invest in risk-reduction activities (Wilcox 2014, see Box 21.3). This tool,
requested by ARC member countries, offers an interesting approach to linking the
risk transfer structure of ARC to climate adaptation and risk reduction investment.
Notwithstanding the paramount importance of assessing risks to countries in the
pool and providing timely post-disaster funds, the regional pools have put into place
very few explicit incentives or funds for reducing disaster risks. There are some
requirements with regard to usage of pay-outs and emergency management, yet as
shown in the case of ARC, there are no conditions for proven disaster and climate
risk reductions. CCRIF has a disaster risk management function, but it focuses on
reducing downstream losses after a disaster has occurred by providing immediate
liquidity. In practice, then, beyond the data collection and modelling aspects (though
only the ARC provides open source risk data), there is very little evidence that the
regional pools shape DRR and climate adaptation policy in their member countries.
To conclude, it appears that more can be done to design regional sovereign risk
pools that contribute to the preventative aspiration of theWIM, although the proposed
ARC XCF offers an interesting proposition for this purpose. Design reform of the
pools might include a requirement for detailed contingency plans for pre-disaster risk
reduction and (in the case of CCRIF and PCRAFI) making risk data open source. The
implementation of these plans could be made a requisite for continued membership
in the pool.
21.5 Curative Response: Does Insurance Promote
the Equitable Compensation Response T the WIM?
The WIM extends beyond aspirations for disaster risk reduction to include climate-
attributed loss and damage that cannot be effectively reduced. This has raised aspira-
tions especially among highly vulnerable developing countries that a form of (legally
non-binding) compensation for residual climate impacts may be in the offing. The
question in this section is whether insurance, by reimbursing loss and damage from
climate disasters, contributes to the ‘equitable compensation’ or curative aspirations
for the WIM?
At the outset, it is worth emphasising that financial instruments, including insur-
ance, are not neutral as to how disaster costs are shared. Risk-based instruments
that require premiums or payments from those in the insurance program can shift
responsibility to vulnerable households and communities and away from social insti-
tutions that may have previously aided reconstruction; in contrast, informal or public
mechanisms, like remittances or reserve funds, share losses usually across family
members and taxpayers. For insurance programs, it should be asked if the insured,
themselves, pay the risk-estimated premium thus putting the full burden on their own
at-risk communities (and at the same time providing incentives for them to reduce
their risks). Alternatively, are there arrangements, like cross subsidies, that allocate
this burden differently within the risk pool, or are there arrangements, like transfer
payments, that allocate the burden at least partially to those outside the risk pool?
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21.5.1 Equity Principles in the Compensation of Loss
and Damage
The essential question for the L&D discussions is then “who pays the premium?”
To address this question in Box 21.2 we distinguish three principles of fundamental
importance for organising insurance arrangements, each principle building on a dif-
ferent view of equity. Private market-based insurance, unless it is subsidised from
outside or within the pool, operates on the principle of mutuality and thus does not
share losses beyond the at-risk insured community. Private insurers may deviate from
themutuality principlewith premium cross-subsidies, e.g., by charging their wealthy,
lower-risk clients higher premiums tomake policies affordable to low-income clients
in high-risk locations. Sometimes this means a flat or undifferentiated premium that
helps high risk (and often lesswealthy) clients and avoids the costs and administrative
burdens associated with differentiated premiums. In some cases, regulation dictates
how private insurers can set premiums, usually to safeguard affordability. In India,
for example, commercial insurers are required to offer ‘pro-poor’ policies, which
they finance by charging their wealthy clients a higher rate. Without these forms of
subsidy in a mutuality-based system the policyholders, themselves, can expect (in
the long term) to pay premiums that are approximately equivalent to their received
claim payments (actuarially fair premiums), plus significant additional costs (loads
shown in Fig. 21.2). Thus, in an insurance system based on mutuality, there is no
reimbursement to the victims of disasters (on average) outside of what they, them-
selves, contribute in premiums; in other words, the at-risk community finances its
own curative measures. This is an important and often misunderstood feature of the
insurance mechanism, and arguably disqualifies commercial insurance as a curative
measure as intended by the WIM.
Solidarity can take many forms, including subsidised or cross-subsidised pre-
miums, reinsurance or other forms of assistance that reduce premiums paid by the
most vulnerable. It is the fundamental principle underlying pre-disaster assistance
and post-disaster humanitarian relief and reconstruction (see Schinko et al. 2018).
Support can come from, among others, governments, NGOs, financial institutions
or international development organisations. Indeed, almost all micro-insurance pro-
grams and macro-level pools operating in developing countries receive some type of
donor or government support (Vivid Economics et al. 2016). Importantly, solidarity,
in contrast to accountability, need not appeal to a causal relationship between his-
torical greenhouse gas emissions and loss and damage, or culpability on the part of
those providing support for insurance instruments.
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Box 21.2 Three equity principles for organising insurance
Mutuality
Mutuality is at the core of the insurance concept, according to which the insured par-
ticipate in a disaster pool according to their risk class (and pay a risk-based premium).
The pool then pays those insured in accordance with the scale of their losses. Mutuality
is the primary principle underlying private, market-based insurance; clients enter the
pool usually voluntarily, and pay according to the best estimate of the risk they bring
with them. While insured agents receive payments from the pool depending on their
losses, in the long run (and on average) they pay their own reimbursement, and more,
since the premium is based on expected loss plus the additional insurance loads shown
in Fig. 21.2. According to this principle, there are no transfer payments within the pool
or from outside the pool (Wilkie 1997).
Solidarity
Solidarity is a profoundly different concept in that losses are paid according to need,
and contributions to the pool are not made fully in accordance with the risks that the
applicants bringwith them, but perhaps partly according to ability to pay, or just equally.
Solidarity can result from cross subsidies among those in the pool. It can also take the
form of payments by those not in the pool, for example, aid agencies can subsidise
micro-insurance schemes. Importantly, solidarity is based on the concept of voluntary
transfers for humanitarian or other grounds; there is no underlying notion of liability.
The concept of solidarity thus corresponds to the concept of distributive justice discussed
in Wallimann-Helmer et al. (2018).
Accountability
Accountability as a concept differentiates itself from the solidarity principle in one
important aspect; here, it is motivated by a perceived ethical or legal obligation for
compensating those experiencing climate-attributed losses and damages. Accountabil-
ity links an actor’s actions with outcomes, either causally or legally (Honoré 2010)
where the allocation of responsibility is based on causation and (often but not always)
fault or negligence. Being accountable not only means being responsible for climate-
attributed impacts and risks but also ultimately being answerable for them.
A far more controversial and potent principle to underlie support for insurance
instruments is accountability for loss and damage, which mirrors the “polluter-pays
principle” that is invoked across many environmental issues. Accountability invokes
questions of attribution (James et al. 2018) as well as some degree of culpability or
fault. Both can be difficult to assign to state and other actors since the science is not
sufficiently precise to estimate increased risk of losses and damages due to emissions
of greenhouse gases, and fault for emissions can be questioned due to historical
knowledge and other factors (Burkett 2014). The assignment of accountability for
losses and damages, and ultimately responsibility, has been understandably resisted
because of fears of legal liability. Indeed, the Paris Agreement explicitly rejects that
the treaty provide a basis for liability or compensation (Simlinger and Mayer 2018).
Yet, as Lees (2016) argues, the refusal to contemplate liability should not lead to a
refusal to contemplate the allocation of ethical responsibility—what he refers to as a
responsibility allocation mechanism. Indeed, recognition of ethical responsibility, as
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differentiated from legal liability, may be necessary, if not essential, for motivating
even voluntary support for insurance instruments on the scale contemplated by the
L&D discussions.
Principles of solidarity and accountability are strongly voiced in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which states that parties should act to
protect the climate system “on the basis of equality and in accordance with their com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (United Nations
1992). A fundamental element of this principle, which is restated in the preamble
to the Paris Agreement, is the need to take account of the different circumstances,
particularly each State’s contribution to the problem and capacity to remedy it (Deci-
sion 3/CP.19). TheWIM, likewise, refers to the need to take account of differentiated
responsibility (accountability) for losses and damages (Lees 2016). The principles
set out in the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement suggest that those bearing responsi-
bility for losses and damages, and those most capable of addressing it, should bear
some obligation to contribute to insurance premiums for climate-attributed risks in
highly vulnerable countries. In fact, many developing country Parties and NGOs
have advocated the accountability principle. The submission of CARE to the current
WIM work plan is illustrative:
…(WIM) should apply principles of global equity, including taking into account a “polluter
pays”-based approach to generating finance for addressing loss and damage from countries,
companies and institutions who significantly contribute to the causes of climate change
through fossil fuel emissions (CARE International 2017).
Invoking responsibility/accountability in the discourse on developed country sup-
port (but avoiding legal liability) changes the paradigm of post-disaster support
from ‘charity’ to ‘amends’, which has significance in terms of allocating funds
beyond humanitarian assistance budgets. Arguably, a responsibility-based discourse
can change the motivation for assisting victims of climate-attributed impacts and
risks—so essential to implementing the Paris Agreement and maintaining its volun-
tary, cooperation-focused approach (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018).
21.5.2 Experience of Micro-insurance for Equitably
Allocating the Impacts and Risks Burden
Almost without exception micro-insurance schemes that serve the resource-poor are
subsidised either by national taxpayer funds or, more often, by international donors,
international financial institutions,NGOs and official development assistance (Mech-
ler et al. 2006; Schäfer and Waters 2016). Few private insurers are optimistic about
the prospects of providing non-subsidised insurance to clients below the poverty
level (Swiss Re 2012).
As one example, India’sNationalAgricultural InsuranceScheme (NAIS), globally
the largest micro-insurance crop program, targetsmainlymiddle-income farmers and
is heavily subsidised by Indian taxpayers (Mechler et al. 2006). As another example,
the pro-poor R4 initiative discussed above is made possible by the significant support
it receives from NGOs and donors as well as its reliance on funds (in Ethiopia)
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from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program and theWorld Food Programme. An
innovative micro-insurance program for herders inMongolia is affordable and viable
to insurers due to its layered system of responsibility and payment, including herders
(who retain small losses or the lowest risk layer), the private insurance industry (risk-
based premium payments for the middle layer of risk) and taxpayers (for the highest
risk layer). In addition to subsidies, micro-insurance is typically made affordable
by greatly reducing the cover offered. A micro-insurance program in Bangladesh,
Proshika, that insures savings against natural disasters limits claims to twice the
amount in the client’s savings account (Mechler et al. 2006). Similarly, a micro-
insurance project in Malawi was made affordable by limiting cover to the cost of the
hybrid seeds, which protects the banks against defaults for their seed loans, but does
not protect households against drought losses (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009).
The extensive support for micro-insurance falls thus solidly under the insurance
principle of solidarity, where contributions to the pool are made, not in accordance
with the risks that applicants bring to the pool, but typically according to their ability
to pay the premium. Climate-attributed impacts and risks will likely continue to be
framed as a humanitarian issue invoking solidarity, and not as an issue invoking
accountability or liability.
21.5.3 Experience of Regional Insurance Pools for Equitably
Sharing the Impacts and Risk Burden
The question addressed in this section is to what extent the regional insurance
pools (CCRIF, ARC and PCRAFI) provide their members with an equitable curative
response to climate-attributed losses and damages, keeping in mind that the pools
provide cover to governments, which in turn (and in varying degrees) provide post-
disaster support to vulnerable households, farms and SMEs. By ‘equitable’ we again
refer to the three principles relevant to insurance: mutuality, solidarity and account-
ability. We ask, thus, who pays the price for membership in the risk pools, and based
on which equity principle?
All pools have received donor support, mostly through capitalisation, payment
of operational expenses, direct premium support or capacity building. While the
premiums are therefore less than would be required without outside support, in the
case of ARC and CCRIF the relative premiums (the proportion eachmember country
pays to the pool) tend to be based on risk levels (i.e., there are no cross subsidies).
The pools are thus based on solidarity from the outside, butmutuality in determining
the relative payments from members. For ARC, all insured countries pay premiums
based on risk estimates, while for setting up and operating the pools support comes
from donor organisations. In other words, donors contribute to reducing some of
the loads on the insurance premium. ARC’s non-profit mutual insurance company
(not necessarily meaning the premiums are based on mutuality) is capitalised by
financial and development institutions, including the German Development Bank
and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which means that
premiums are indirectly supported through a solidarity principle. For ARC, thus,
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there are elements of mutuality in setting country-specific trigger points and caps,
which largely determine premiums, and also elements of solidarity given substantial
donor support.
The PCRAFI, in contrast, bases premiums largely on ability-to-pay of its member
countries rather than a calculated risk. Thismeans there are substantial cross subsidies
across member states. In addition, multiple development partners and IDA credit
have contributed to the establishment of the pool as well as to premium support.
The PCRAFI is thus based primarily on the principle of solidarity in terms of both
outside- and inside-pool support.
Interestingly the principle of accountability has not been invoked in justifying the
contributions of the donor community to these systems, even though climate change
is a concern to all regional pools. However, not surprising after the devastating
2017 Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the attribution of the covered hazards to climatic
change is under investigation for CCRIF and the other pools. More specifically, as
an innovative proposition, ARC is setting up an Extreme Climate Facility (XCF) that
would be capitalised by the international community if trends in extreme weather are
found attributable to climate change (Wilcox 2014). Thus, theXCF can be considered
a manifestation of climate change risk, although there is no direct discussion of this
facility extracting payments based on greenhouse emissions from wealthy countries,
and thus no direct appeal to the accountability principle.
Box 21.3 The ExtremeClimate Facility (XCF) of the African Risk Capacity (ARC)
Function
Additional financing for countries alreadymanaging their current weather risks through
ARC.
Data-driven modus operandi
Payments to countries will be entirely data-driven over a 30 year period—if there is
no significant increase in extreme events over current climatology, then no payment is
made.
Climate Adaptation
Countries must use payments to invest in DRR or climate change adaption measures
specified in pre-defined country level adaptation funds.
Scale
Payment size would increase with extreme event number andmagnitude over and above
a pre-specified threshold, corresponding to the degree of confidence that extreme events
are increasing due to climate change.
Action focus
Leveraging ARC’s existing infrastructure, XCF will ensure that countries and the inter-
national community properly monitor climate shocks and are financially prepared to
undertake greater adaptation measures should their frequency and intensity increase.
Source Wilcox (2014)
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21.6 Summary: The Evolving Insurance Narrative
This chapter has asked whether insurance instruments, and particularly micro-
insurance and regional insurance pools, can serve as a risk-reducing and equi-
table compensatory response to climate-attributed losses and damages from weather
extremes occurring in developing countries, and consequently if insurance instru-
ments can serve the preventative and curative targets of theWIM and the Paris Agree-
ment? As background, the chapter recognises that insurance, by dealing exclusively
with residual, sudden-onset event risks, can be only one part of the L&D response.
The discussion has emphasised the substantial benefits of both micro-insurance
programs and regional insurance pools: micro-insurance for providing post-disaster
relief and reconstruction and also pre-disaster security (so important for adaptation
and escaping poverty); regional insurance pools for decreasing the costs of rein-
surance for governments and enabling early disbursement of emergency relief that
saves lives, reduces distressed productive asset sales and mitigates disaster-induced
poverty traps. The discussion has also emphasised the significant costs of insurance,
noting that insured households and governments will on average pay considerably
more for climate insurance than they expect to lose from extreme climate events.
Notwithstanding the benefits and costs, the discussion has examined insurance
instruments for their role in meeting the curative and preventative aspirations for
theWIM—equitably compensating for residual climate-attributed impacts providing
strong incentives or directives for reducing risks.Amainmessage from this discussion
is that absent significant intervention in their design and implementation, insurance
mechanisms as currently implemented will likely fall short of fully meeting WIM
aspirations as (differently) expressed by developed and developing country Parties.
This message is detailed in Table 21.3, which provides the mechanisms by which
insurance can in principle support WIM responses.
Recent experience shows that with some important exceptions indemnity and
parametric programs (mainly public-private partnerships), beyond pricing risk and
reducing moral hazard, have few explicit incentives or requirements for risk reduc-
tion, even if their potential is promising. Reforming insurance programs for improved
loss reduction can build on recent successful experiences, particularly evidence of
significant risk-reduction activities on the part of public insurers compared to their
private insurer counterparts, and innovations and developments in risk pricing and
engineering, along with more targeted use of limits, deductibles and warranties. Still,
as we witness in wealthy countries, progress will be slow and patchy without public
and private commitment to shaping insurance systems such that they foster practices
that lead to investment in disaster risk reduction practices.
A similar message emerges regarding the curative aspirations for theWIM. Insur-
ance based on the principle of mutuality (typically private, market-based insurance),
unless subsidised or otherwise supported, does not share risk beyond the at-risk
insured community. There is thus no reimbursement of losses to the victims of disas-
ters (on average) outside of what policyholders, themselves, contribute in premiums,
which disqualifies mutuality-based insurance as a curative mechanism meeting vul-
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nerable country aspirations for theWIM.Mutuality, however, is not a feature of most
donor-supported micro-insurance and regional insurance pools.
A challenge with the solidarity principle, if premiums are subsidised, is the less-
ened incentive for policyholders to reduce their risk. In meeting this challenge, inter-
national financial institutions, development agencies and other donors will need to
reconcile the contending equity and preventative objectives in their support of cli-
mate insurance programs.This is foremost a challenge in designing “smart” insurance
programs that are considered equitable and at the same time provide incentives or
directives to their clients to reduce risks.
Two often cited success stories for insurance instruments serving the most vulner-
able the African R4 micro-insurance program and the African Risk Capacity (ARC)
regional insurance pool, go a long way in combining these goals. Neither is a com-
mercial insurance enterprise; neither is (fully) characterised by risk-based premiums;
and both are highly subsidised. The R4 program’s success has been attributed in large
part to its close connection with public safety net programs in the participating coun-
tries, and the ARC can attribute its success largely to its required disbursement plans.
As evidence of extreme climate-attributed impacts and risks becomes more widely
available and accepted, ARC’s innovative XCF program may serve as a conduit for
institutionalising donor support in the form of increased pool capitalisation.
The provision of support to regional insurance pools and micro-insurance pro-
grams continues to be framed as humanitarian aid, not invoking accountability or
liability for climate-attributed loss and damage. Indeed, support for insurance pro-
grams has come mainly from development and financial organisations, such as the
World Bank, national development partners, and international NGOs, with empha-
sis on the potential role of insurance in supporting poverty reduction in the face of
climate and disaster risks. In other words, the narrative for support has been framed
as a humanitarian and development issue.
The insurance discoursemay, however, be changing. This is perhapsmost apparent
in discussions on the recent G7 Initiative onClimate Risk Insurance (InsuResilience),
which has the ambitious goal of increasing access to direct or indirect climate insur-
ance coverage for up to 400 million of the most vulnerable people in developing
countries by 2020 (G7 2015; InsuResilience 2017). While InsuResilience does not
officially commit to any specific equity principle, there are a number of voices that
raise this aspect. One example is the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), a
close advisor to InsuResilience. MCII is forthright about the need to ground finan-
cial support in ethical claims of accountability and also capability. In the words of
this NGO (whose members include insurers, NGOs and researchers), InsuResilience
should provide technical and financial support to the set-up and maintenance of risk
facilities and pools, the capitalisation of national and regional risk pools and other
forms of co-financing premiums. This support should follow the principles of “ca-
pability, including sharing the risks imposed by climate change and responsibility
for climate change impacts” (Schäfer and Waters 2016). The G7 initiative has thus
unleashed a broad-ranging discussion on who should pay for insurance, sovereign
risk transfer and social protection systems in light of climate change. In a commen-
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tary in Nature Climate Change, Surminski and colleagues (2016) explicitly raise this
issue:
As the intensity and frequency of climate extremes increase, is it fair to shift responsibility
on to those who are the least responsible for climate change, the least able to shoulder the
premiums, and in many cases the least able to reduce their losses?
As the recentG20/V20Global Partnership on InsuResilience (launched atCOP23)
shows, the need for donor support is increasingly accepted by the development
finance community. Importantly, this financial support should be ‘smart’, under-
stood as reliable, flexible, minimise incentive distortions, and make the recipients
aware of the true cost of the covered risk (Schäfer and Waters 2016). In this way,
subsidised insurance can be linked to risk reduction (Hill et al. 2014; Vivid Eco-
nomics et al. 2016). As a concrete proposal, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009)
have argued that the subsidy should take the form of an insurance voucher so that the
recipient is aware of the unsubsidised premium. In addition, donor support should be
conditional by requiring contingency and disbursement plans (Schäfer and Waters
2016; Surminski et al. 2016). A suggestion recently iterated by Schäfer and Waters
(2016) is that smart premium support should cover only part of the premium, for
example, only the markup (the risk and expense loads) while the beneficiary pays
just the actuarial fair value or pure premium.
The message this chapter holds for the L&D discussions is to advise caution
about relying on the market, alone, to provide insurance for fulfilling aspirations for
the WIM, and to recognise the criticality of international and public intervention
in climate insurance provision. Interventions can include subsidies, technical assis-
tance, capitalisation of insurance programs, provision of reinsurance and other types
of support that make insurance affordable to resource-poor and climate-sensitive
clients; interventions can also enable regulatory regimes and public-private arrange-
ments that exploit the potential for insurance to genuinely catalyse risk reduction far
beyond what has been accomplished by commercial insurers thus far. It is therefore
important to continue developing “smart” regional or national programs that explic-
itly combine insurance with loss prevention and that address the emerging equity
issues as climate change impacts the most vulnerable and least responsible. The
WIM Executive Committee continues to contemplate subsidies for pro-poor insur-
ance programs (Executive Committee to the WIM 2016), a measure that will grow
in importance if the insurance narrative continues to evolve from solidarity-based
humanitarian assistance to accountability for climate-attributed impacts.
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Chapter 22
Technology for Climate Justice:
A Reporting Framework for Loss
and Damage as Part of Key Global
Agreements
Marc van den Homberg and Colin McQuistan
Abstract Technology plays a critical role in the ability to retain, reduce or trans-
fer climate risk or address impacts. However, vulnerable communities do not fully
benefit from existing technology, whereas they are disproportionally impacted by
climate change. This chapter assesses how technology can shape limits to adaptation
and how to report on this injustice as part of key global agreements. We develop
an access, use and innovation of technology framework. As a case on a relevant
technology, we test it on transboundary early warning systems in South Asia. We
find that only a limited set of the state-of-the-art technologies available globally is
accessed and used. Insufficient capacity and funding result in the bare minimum,
largely copycat type of technology. As climate change progresses, demands on tech-
nology increase, whereas, if no action is taken, the technology remains the same
widening the adaptation deficit. A better understanding of the crossover from dis-
aster risk reduction to climate adaptation and the emerging policy domain of loss
and damage allows trade-offs in terms of reducing risks through greater investment
in technologies for adaptation versus absorbing risks and then financing curative
or transformative loss and damage measures. We argue that attention to especially
distributive, compensatory and procedural climate justice principles, in terms of dis-
tributing technology, building capacity and providing finance, can help to motivate
support for widening the technology spectrum available to developing countries. We
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propose as part of comprehensive risk management that, first, an inventory should
be developed how of technologies shape soft and hard adaptation limits. Second,
technology for climate justice might be included in the adaptation communications
to support reporting on the expected and experienced impact of measures on loss and
damage, at a sufficiently disaggregated level. Third, soft adaptation limits should be
levelled by making technology research, innovation and design equitable between
those countries having capacity and those not, recognising the commitment to leave
no one behind.
Keywords Loss and damage · Flood early warning systems · Adaptation
Climate risk management · Climate justice · Sendai framework for DRR
Sustainable development goals · Paris agreement
22.1 Introduction: Unequal Impact of Climate Change
and the Role of Key Global Agreements
Although anthropogenic climate change is a global phenomenon, its impacts are
neither equally distributed over developing and developed countries nor between the
rich and the poor. The poor face greater impacts when exposed to natural hazards
than the non-poor (Hallegatte et al. 2016). There is evidence that adaptation capacity
is and will be exceeded in various instances, requiring attention to loss and damage
(L&D) (see book chapters by Handmer and Nalau 2018; Heslin et al. 2018; Haque
et al. 2018; Landauer and Juhola 2018; and the introduction by Mechler et al. 2018).
This inequality places the impacts of climate change (and climate variability) and
the burden of climate action disproportionately on the most vulnerable (IPCC 2014).
At the same time, those developing countries and poor communities that will be
most heavily affected by the impacts of climate change have contributed the least (in
terms of greenhouse gas emissions) to the problem (Clark 2011). This latter aspect has
been discussed under the concept of Climate Justice in the domain of climate change
impacts and mitigation. Climate justice is a term used for framing climate change as
an ethical and political issue, rather than one that is purely environmental or physical
in nature. This is done by relating the effects of climate change to concepts of justice,
particularly environmental justice and social justice (see chapter by Wallimann-
Helmer et al. 2018). This chapter focuses on the unequal dimensions of climate
justice and, more particularly, it asks how technology can address climate risks for
themost vulnerable in a justway, andwhere the practical limits are towhat technology
can achieve.
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Fig. 22.1 Community information board in the Banke and Bardia district in Nepal explaining
appropriate flood mitigation measures and the community-based early warning system
More specifically, we aim to disentangle the relationship between technology
and loss and damage, adaptation and disaster risk management from a climate jus-
tice perspective through three guiding questions (1) How can the role of technology
in reaching climate justice for vulnerable and poor communities be assessed? (2)
How is technology shaping adaptation limits, thereby reducing losses and damages?
(3) What are the current transparency mechanisms of key global agreements (and
related regional, national and local ones) with relevance for climate change and
how do these cover losses and damages and unveil technology (in)justice? We use
an exploratory and mostly qualitative research design to address these research ques-
tions. We combine desk research of scientific literature, an analysis of the reporting
that is available on the global agreements (retrospectively) and an analysis of what
will be reported in the future (forward-looking), national and local level documents
in relation to disaster risk management on floods (the dominant climate-related risks
globally) as well as a case study. The case study investigates transboundary flood
community-based early warning systems (EWS) that are operational in the Brahma-
putra river basin (Bangladesh–India) and in the Karnali river basin (India–Nepal;
Fig. 22.1 shows community information on such an EWS in Nepal).
The chapter structure is as follows. Section 22.2 addresses research question (1)
and presents five components to characterise the role technology plays in reaching
climate justice. Section 22.3 categorises how technology can shape adaptation limits
(research question 2). Section 22.4 shows how the plethora of reporting and review-
ing mechanisms of the key global agreements and their regional, national and local
counterparts cover loss and damage only to a limited extent and do not adequately
unveil injustices (research question 3). Section 22.5 brings the results of these three
sections together in a coherent framework that can be used to assess technology for
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climate justice in global agreements and applies it to a case study on EWS. The case
study demonstrates far from equitable access to early warning and early action infor-
mation, as well as untapped technology and innovation potential. Section 22.6 shows
how the framework can be used to guide action. We identify windows of opportuni-
ties to include technology for climate justice more strongly into the crossover from
adaptation to L&D in the climate agreement, but also to make sure there is a linkage
to the other key global agreements.
22.2 Technology for Climate Justice
Climate justice is an umbrella term bringing together distributive and compensatory
(see chapters by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018; Schinko et al. 2018), retributive,
transitional1 (Klinsky and Brankovic 2018) and procedural justice (Tomlinson 2015;
Walker 2009) perspectives. Climate justice has spatial and temporal dimensions.
As an example, distributive justice is based on an inter-generational or an intra-
generational perspective, and compensatory justice on a retrospective one. We indi-
cate howdifferent justice dimensions could influence themeans of implementation of
the Paris Agreement through backward-, forward- and both backward- and forward-
looking actions in Fig. 22.2. Mitigation and adaptation are often discussed under one
and the same heading of climate justice, whereas there are clear distinctions between
what climate justice means in terms of duties for these two pillars (see chapter by
Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018). Climate justice aims to address inequalities and is
hence key for the L&D debate. We focus on the role that technology could play
in delivering climate justice. Technology and innovation are important enablers for
climate actions. In addition, technology can be seen as a way to overcome political
sensitivities. For example, a technological innovation process makes use of equi-
table procedures that engage all stakeholders in a non-discriminatory way, a form of
procedural justice (Walker 2009).
Disaster risk reduction (DRR), climate change adaptation (CCA) and L&D strate-
gies can minimise current and future losses and damages by protecting people, prop-
erties and ecosystems against climate-related stressors for flood risk (see box 22.1).
Even though these strategies comprise a plethora of different hard and soft risk
management measures, technology plays a crucial role. Inadequate or inappropriate
technology reduces the range of available options as well as their effectiveness in
reducing or avoiding risk from increasing rates or magnitudes of climate change
(IPCC 2014). In terms of climate justice, access to technology and its benefits are
not fairly shared.
1A way to recognise and at least partially remedy past injustices while also building a sense of
cooperation. It helps to overcome tension about the ideal relationship between responsibility for
past and future action and avoids the liability debate (Walker 2009; Klinsky and Brankovic 2018).
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Fig. 22.2 Overview of underlying climate justice principles and means of implementation
Box 22.1 Importance of technology to reduce flood risk
Our examination focuses on flood risk, as hydro-meteorological hazards cause the
largest economic, social and humanitarian climate-related losses. Between 1980 and
2013, global direct economic losses due to floods exceeded $1 trillion (2013 values),
and more than 220,000 people lost their lives (Winsemius et al. 2015). In 2016, the
high number of flood events, including river flooding and flash floods, was exceptional
and accounted for 34% of overall losses, compared with an average of 21% over the
past 10 years (Munich Re NatCatService 2017). Globally, economic losses due to flood
events have increased, due to the expansion of population and property in floodplains
(IPCC 2012) resulting from poorly planned socio-economic activities. Climate change
increases the frequency and aggravates the severity of many of these hazards (IPCC
2014). In Asia and the Pacific, 32% of the economic losses from natural disasters in
1970–2013 were due to floods (UNESCAP 2015). Calculations for Bangladesh predict,
for example, an average increase of flooded area of 3% in 2030 and 13% by 2050,
combined with an increase of inundation depth in most areas that are currently already
at risk, exposing 22% more of the population (World Bank 2010).
There are several frameworks developed by international organisations and Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to describe the transfer and diffusion of cli-
mate technologies. As one example, UNEP developed a framework to identify and
analyse these barriers as part of technology needs assessments (as we will discuss
in Sect. 22.4) (Boldt et al. 2012). They identified four key groups of barriers (or
enabling environments). Klein et al. (2014) used four key considerations for tech-
nology as an adaptation constraint that are closely related to the barriers. For example,
access is directly linked to the economic and financial conditions. The effectiveness
518 M. van den Homberg and C. McQuistan
Table 22.1 Practical Action’s framework for technology justice with five components
Technology justice
component
Description
Access Equitable access to services
Equitable access to technology and knowledge
Use Technology use can have a negative impact on future generations and a
negative impact on certain groups in society, while beneficial to others.
Sustainable, intergenerational use should be promoted and enabled
Technological
innovation and
implementation
Considerable untapped potential in implementing and developing
technology to push the limits of what can be managed and absorbed by the
poor and vulnerable. Unfortunately, technological development and
innovation are focused on creating new markets or exploiting existing
markets for those who can afford to pay. Investments therefore focus on
high tech technologies. Ideally, innovation and implementation of
technologies is driven by the most pressing social and environmental
challenges and with the equitable involvement of the poor and vulnerable
Governance Governance should enable access to the technology and knowledge that is
required, promote the use of inclusive technologies and curb those that
adversely affect the environment
Finance Adequate and well targeted finance from different sources funds
technology access, use, innovation and governance prioritised to respond to
the critical loss and damage challenges
in managing climate risk links to research and technological capacity but also to the
social acceptance of a new technology. Both frameworks have a multi-stakeholder
perspective and show that it is never about a straightforward transfer of technology.
If that is done, like with agricultural machinery (Trace 2016) or advanced flood mod-
elling software, chances are very high the technology is abandoned and not used. As
an NGO example, the technology justice framework launched by Practical Action
(Practical Action 2016) rethinks the role of technology from the perspective of the
poor and vulnerable (Trace 2016) and consists of three components: Access, Use and
Innovation. We complement these with Governance and Finance (see Table 22.1),
creating five components that are closely linked to the three Paris means of imple-
mentation.
Access to Services and Access to Technology and Knowledge is Not Equal
The poor have almost always more limited access to basic services such as water
and energy, but also to disaster-related services such as early warning and climate
information (Raworth 2012). In addition, developing countries and, within those
countries, the poor more than the rich have limited access to technology and knowl-
edge (Traces 2016). In the case of an EWS, further discussed below, even if vulner-
able communities receive early warning information, they often lack access to the
knowledge required for early action (Cumiskey et al. 2014). Christiansen et al. (2011)
extracted about 165 unmet technological needs related to adaptation (andmitigation)
from technology needs assessments carried out in developing countries. Examples
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include applications to agriculture in Cambodia and Bangladesh and coastal zones
in Thailand. In many of these cases patents and other forms of intellectual property
protection constrain technology transfer, especially from developed to developing
countries (Klein et al. 2014). Between 2008 and 2010, 262 patents were published
making specific claims to abiotic stress tolerance (such as drought, heat, flood, cold
and salt tolerance) in plants. Just six corporations, includingDuPont, BASF andMon-
santo, control 77% of these patents in relation to climate-ready crops (ETC Group
2010). National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHS) in developing
countries do not have access to the same level of knowledge and technology as
developed countries. For example, digital elevation model data at sufficiently high
resolution, required for more accurate flood risk modelling, is usually not affordable
(Simpson et al. 2015).
Use of Technology is Unjust
Technologies are often used in unsustainable ways, depleting resources and stacking
up problems for future generations (Practical Action 2016). For example, industri-
alised agriculture leads to biodiversity loss, thereby limiting the options available to
farmers to respond to climate-induced shocks and stresses. In some circumstances,
the use of technologies to reduce short-term risk and vulnerability can contribute to
increased vulnerability to extreme events for future generations (Etkin 1999; Moser
2010). This was seen in the impacts of Hurricane Katrina, where a flood defence
system enabling construction in a floodplain decades before failed, with catastrophic
consequences for the population of New Orleans in 2005 (Freudenburg et al. 2008;
Link 2010). Flood protection levees are known to eliminate overbank flooding, caus-
ing diminished sediment accumulation and eventual wetland loss, whereas wetlands
are beneficial as a natural buffer for hurricanes (Turner et al. 2006).
Technological Innovation and Implementation for the Most Vulnerable
Technological innovation and implementation is rarely driven by the most pressing
social and environmental challenges. Technology justice argues for the involvement
of the poorest andmost vulnerable so that technologies deliver impacts on our biggest
human challenges and are not driven by a profitmotive alone (Practical Action 2016).
It requires looking into how technologies can empower vulnerable communities and
which corresponding capacities they need to best utilise and further innovate these
technologies. This requires a critical examination of not only how technology reduces
vulnerability but also how the use of some technologies can increase vulnerability
to disasters, for example by degrading the local environment or by creating a false
sense of security.
Governance Mechanisms to Enable Access
Appropriate governance enables access to the technology and knowledge that is
required, promotes the use of inclusive technologies and curbs those that adversely
affect the environment (Practical Action 2016). Governance mechanisms should
ensure that there is a coherence between the global and national/local policies and
that technologies required for implementing climate risk management (CRM) are
considered in national and local public investments. Governance mechanisms are
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directly related to the ownership and institutional arrangements around the use of
technology (or orgware, as we will introduce in the next section).
Financial Support is Essential
The tragedy is that the poor and vulnerable are usually more exposed to natural
hazards, but not in a position to invest in technology that could potentially reduce
their exposure (Hallegatte et al. 2016). Similarly, at a national level, the least devel-
oped countries will in many cases have to apply their limited funds to deal with
the losses and damages incurred, rather than to invest in adaptation. International
climate change financing mechanisms are increasingly charged with addressing this
funding gap, but currently at low levels. In addition, economic valuations such as
cost-benefit analysis that are used to justify expenditures inter- and intra-nationally
are not well designed to consider the poor and vulnerable in an equitable way, as,
in absolute terms, the asset loss will be higher in the richer and more wealthy areas
than in poorer areas (Hallegatte et al. 2016).
This shows that developing countries have severely lower institutional and tech-
nological capacities to pursue climate-resilient development pathways (IPCC 2014)
as compared to developed countries. Technology for climate justice requires rethink-
ing access, use, innovation, finance and governance from the perspective of the poor
and vulnerable and making sure there is justiceand equity in these components. The
transfer and diffusion of technologies for risk management can be assessed against
the technology justice components at the global, regional, national and local level,
to which we turn after describing the spectrum of technologies for dealing with
climate-related risks.
22.3 Technologies for Public and Private Actions
to Address Loss and Damage
Technology involves hardware, software and orgware (Christiansen et al. 2011; Boldt
et al. 2012). Hardware refers to the tangible aspects such as capital goods and equip-
ment and includes flood resistant crops and new irrigation systems. Software refers
to the capacity and processes involved in the production and use of the hardware
and ranges from know-how (e.g. manuals and skills, awareness-raising, education
and training) and experience to practices (e.g. agricultural management, cooking and
behavioural practices). Adaptation methods and practices that may not normally be
regarded as technologies, such as insurance schemes or crop rotation patterns, may
also be characterised as software (UNFCCC 2006). Orgware is equally important
from an implementation point of view and relates to the ownership and institutional
arrangements of the community or organisation where the technology will be used.
It includes those organisations involved in the adoption and diffusion process of a
new technology.
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Adaptationmeasures either withstand, transfer or reduce risks, with risk reduction
preferred over withstanding or transferring risk. Apart from managing the down-
side risk, there is also in some cases potential for up-side risk, where a positive
impact results. For example, changing to flood-resistant crops might not only lower
the down-side risk of losing a harvest during a flood, but might also increase the
up-side risk by a higher yield. Maladaptation results if adaptation measures create
additional risks instead of reducing them.O’Brien et al. (2012) give an examplewhere
irrigation might be beneficial in the short-term, reducing a farmer’s vulnerability,
but in the long-term increases vulnerability when the non-renewable source used for
the irrigation is depleted. “Hard” engineering solutions can be expensive and may
not cover costs and risks equally for all stakeholders across time. As an example,
the Nanbéto dam in Togo reduced total days with flood conditions for downstream
communities, but also increased their flood vulnerability every time an overspill and
subsequent poorly managed and communicated release of water took place (Climate
Centre 2017). In theUnited States, past building in floodplain areas downstream from
dams that have exceeded their design life has become amajor concern (O’Brien et al.
2012). In this case, losses and damages are being exacerbated for themore vulnerable
communities. “Softer” solutions such as ecosystem restoration or stress tolerant crop
varieties may provide a range of benefits now and in the future (IPCC 2014; van der
Geest and Warner 2015) and can be very cost-effective sustainable solutions.
In the case of L&D risks that are “beyond adaptation” (see Box. 22.2 and intro-
duction by Mechler et al. 2018), risks can only be absorbed, and we distinguish hard
and soft adaptation limits. A soft adaptation limit means that adaptation options are
currently not available to those affected, but might become available with cultural,
social and economic change or technology and innovation (Dow et al. 2013). In
other words, the limit is mutable. As an example, Alaskan native villages threat-
ened by coastal erosion and inundation have, from their perspective, no available
options to maintain their way of life (which is for them an intolerable risk), since
protecting their infrastructure is economically not feasible (Klein et al. 2014). Hard
adaptation limits occur if no adaptive actions are available now or in the future to
avoid intolerable risks (Verheyen 2012; Klein et al. 2014). For example, protection
against sea-level rise is in some cases considered impossible, no matter what welfare
growth, institutional changes or technological innovations emerge (Dow et al. 2013).
But, even hard adaptation limits can be dynamic over time. The inability to breed
rice varieties that pollinate above 32–35 °C is currently considered as a hard limit
(Klein et al. 2014). However, heavy investments in research might someday result in
shifting pollination temperature limits upward (Dow et al. 2013).
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Box 22.2 Risk management and limits approach to L&D
The risk management perspective classifies risks as either acceptable (no additional
action required), tolerable (action required considering costs and other constraints) or
intolerable (action required irrespective of constraints). It makes clear that, once stan-
dard adaptation in the form of DRR, CCA or development is no longer feasible in the
intolerable space, transformative or curative action is required (Mechler and Schinko
2016). The limits to adaptation perspective focuses on soft and hard limits to adaptation
(Klein et al. 2014; Dow et al. 2013). A cross-cutting distinction is between whether
the option represents incremental, fundamental or transformative adjustment (Schinko
and Mechler 2017). Kates et al. (2012) distinguish between incremental and transfor-
mational adaptation. The former aims to improve efficiency within existing technolog-
ical, governance and value systems, whereas transformative adjustments may involve
changes in some of the fundamental attributes of those systems. Kates et al. (2012)
consider three groups of transformative actions, i.e. those adopted at a much larger
scale or intensity, those that are truly new to a particular region or resource system, and
those that transform places and shift locations. Schinko and Mechler (2017) use the
connotation “transformative” to denote a profound change in risk management going
beyond traditional adaptation measures, whereas Kates et al. (2012), with “transforma-
tional adaptation”, refer to an innovative approach of adaptation and include shifting
locations, which is strictly speaking no longer adaptation.
Considerable groups of vulnerable people who live in highly exposed and risk-
prone places and who lack the capacity to adapt have already reached either soft or
hard adaptation limits (van der Geest and Warner 2015). Apart from accepting the
limit and corresponding escalating losses, one can undertake curative or transforma-
tive measures, as we explain also in Box 22.2 on risk management. In the example
of Alaskan villages, a transformative measure would be to relocate residents and
economic activity away from high risk and increasingly unproductive areas—even
though this is deemed politically impossible, given the estimated costs of up to US$1
million per person (Huntington et al. 2012; Klein et al. 2014). If no transformative
action is taken, only curative measures remain as a last resort. This involves redress
and rehabilitation mechanisms, when climate change can be established as the key
driver, for example, displacement and involuntary migration.
Clusters of technologies can be distinguished that are beneficial for multiple
actions. Disaster risk management, such as EWS, and structural/physical technolo-
gies, such as ecosystem management, serve only adaptation purposes. Geographical
information management and applications are instrumental both in the adaptation
and “beyond adaptation” phase, for example for spatial or land-use planning. Tech-
nologies for poverty alleviation and livelihood security are clearly distinct. As an
example, for livelihood security in the adaptation phase, one can diversify liveli-
hoods by changing agricultural practices to ones that can cope with climate change,
whereas for “beyond adaptation” one must find alternative livelihoods and shift from
agriculture to, for example services. In this case, there is no longer a strong relation-
ship between the livelihood and natural hazards.
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Table 22.2 gives an overview of actions that public or private actors can take to
reduce, retain, transfer or absorb climate risk (Subsidiary Body for Implementation
2012) by giving examples that are drawn from the case study on EWS. For each
action, we explain the objective in terms of addressing loss and damage. We also
indicate for both the private and public action if the technology required is basic,
intermediate or advanced. The first column of Table 22.2 situates the action within
the spectrum of policy options. Boyd et al. (2017) and the chapter by James et al.
(2018) explain how different actor perspectives on L&D result in different ideas
about what policy options are available for addressing L&D, both ex ante to address
the risk of losses and damages and ex post to address impacts that have materialised.
They distinguish the adaptation and mitigation, the risk management, the limits to
adaptation and the existential perspective; we focus on the risk management and the
limits to adaptation perspectives to construct the overview.
22.4 Reporting Frameworks for Global, Regional, National
and Local Policies
We now turn to analysing key global agreements with their corresponding regional,
national and local counterparts regarding their transparency mechanisms in relation
to losses and damages and technology as a means of implementation. As tracking of
the post-2015 agreements has started only to a limited extent, we include reporting
under the pre-2015 agreements in our analysis.
Global Agreements and Risk Management
Figure 22.3 shows how the risk of losses and damages is associated with climate
change and climate variability. These risks can be reduced, retained, transferred or
addressed through climate action. There are three major global agreements which
guide climate actions and priorities in addressing climate risks to different extents:
the Paris Agreement on Climate Action (UNFCCC 2015), the Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDG) (UN2015), all agreed in 2015. The ParisAgreement distinguishes three pillars
of climate action: mitigation, adaptation and L&D.Mitigation will reduce losses and
damages by slowing down climate change. Adaptation will reduce risks, but without
changing the level of climate change, and result in avoided losses and damage.
The L&D pillar addresses losses and damages as they occur, losses and damages
that mitigation failed to reduce and that were beyond the scope of adaptation (van
der Geest and Warner 2015; see introduction by Mechler et al. 2018). Climate risk
management (CRM) is an integration of traditional approaches of climate change
adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) as well as transformational
actions, and aims to provide stakeholders with relevant decision-support information
and tools to face climate risks (IISD 2011; see also chapters by Handmer and Nalau
2018; Heslin et al. 2018; Heslin 2018; Haque et al. 2018; Landauer and Juhola 2018).
Comprehensive risk management is used as a broader term that includes all actions
aimed at reducing risk regardless of cause.
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Table 22.2 Overview of public and private flood risk actions and their intended effect on losses
and damages
Adjustment Spectrum and Timing Private action;
Tech level: Examples
Public action;
Tech level: Examples
Objective
Incremental DRR-preparedness. Short-term,
ex ante
Basic: Fishermen
putting fish net around
fishing pond after
receiving early
warning
Basic: NGO locating
relief items closer to
the predicted to-be-
affected area. Increase
response capacity of
communities
Risk reduction;
Limited increase of
avoidable losses and
damages
DRR-risk reduction; CCA.
Medium-term; for next year’s
floods; ex ante
Basic: A household
raises its plinths/floors
and diversifies crops
Intermediate to
Advanced: An NMHS
improves its
hydro-meteorological
modelling so that
forecasts with better
lead times and spatial
resolution become
available.
Government-led
irrigation system,
building of dykes
Risk reduction;
Moderate increase of
avoidable losses and
damages
Humanitarian aid. Directly after
floods; ex post
Basic/none: Support
from within the
community
Intermediate:
Post-disaster public
and donor assistance,
such as relief items or
cash transfers to
households and
money to governments
for reconstruction of,
e.g., roads and
embankments
Risk retention;
Compensation for
unavoided losses and
damages
non-attributable to
climate change
Fundamental DRR and CCA (larger scale or
intensity). Long-term; over
several years; ex ante
Intermediate: Access
interactive voice
response service to get
meteorological and
agricultural advice
Intermediate:
Improving access to
information through
digital inclusion, e.g.
providing early
warning services in
first language of
beneficiaries, voice
SMS early warning
service, nationwide
coverage of mobile
networks, lower
taxation on mobile
users
Risk reduction;
considerable increase
of avoidable losses
and damages
DRR and CCA (new to a
particular region or resource
system). Medium to long-term;
ex ante
Advanced:
Crowdsourcing data
on water levels from
citizens
Advanced:
Dam operator changes
its way of releasing
water by using
advanced forecasting
models. Forecast
based financing. A
rice research institute
develops
flood-tolerant rice
Risk reduction;
Soft adaptation limit is
stretched; what was
considered
unavoidable before
becomes avoidable
(continued)
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Table 22.2 (continued)
Adjustment Spectrum and Timing Private action;
Tech level: Examples
Public action;
Tech level: Examples
Objective
Intermediate:
purchase
micro-insurance
Intermediate:
Micro-insurance, can
be supported by
mobile technology
and/or public-private
partnerships to ensure
commercial viability
Risk transfer;
Adaptation limit not
changed. Insurance
for unavoidable or
unavoided losses and
damages
DRR and CCA (transform
places). Long term; ex ante
Intermediate: Citizens
contribute to
constructing bio-dykes
or ecological corridors
Intermediate:
build several smaller
dams instead of large
dam. Green
infrastructure such as
bio-dykes; ecological
corridors. Use of
floodplains instead of
building dykes
Risk reduction;
Soft adaptation limit is
stretched; what was
considered
unavoidable before
becomes avoidable
L&D curative: redress and
rehabilitation. Short term; ex
post
None: Involuntary
migration or staying
put
Intermediate:
Financial
compensation for loss
and damage that can
be attributed to
climate change.
Active remembrance
(e.g. through museum
exhibitions, school
curricula).
Counselling
Risk absorption;
Adaptation limit does
not change.
Compensation for
unavoidable losses
and damages
Transformative L&D transformative measures
(shift places). Long term; ex
ante, ex post
None: Voluntary
permanent migration
None: Voluntary
migration of a
complete village
Risk absorption;
Adaptation limit not
changed. Unavoidable
losses and damages
are avoided by moving
away
L&D transformative measures
(livelihoods). Long term; ex
ante, ex post.
Intermediate (not
hazard related):
Seeking training and
schooling for
alternative livelihoods
Intermediate, not
hazard related
technology:
Alternative
livelihoods. Providing
training and schooling
(e.g. agriculture to
services industry) and
access to new
technologies such as
e-learning
Risk absorption:
Adaptation limit does
not change.
Unavoidable losses
and damages are
avoided by moving
away
Examples are taken from the EWS case study discussed in this chapter, except for the one on dams building on ongoing forecast-
based financing projects in Africa. Source Climate Centre (2017), Coughlan et al. (2016)
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The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Cli-
mate Change Impacts (WIM) is the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) body that has been tasked to develop this pillar (UNFCCC
2013). Sendai, as a framework tailored towards DRR, is part of adaptation. Sendai
has indicators on losses and damages and includes paragraphs on relocation of human
settlements,2 but Sendai does not go into attribution of losses and damages data to
climate change and leaves the implications of relocation to the climate regime. The
SDG compact encompasses development inmany dimensions and has synergies with
all three pillars.
Notions of climate justice are relevant for all three global agreements; however,
there is now a crucial global opportunity to make climate justice a more coherent part
of these three agreements and to ensure that climate actions that follow from these
agreements are governed accordingly. Inequities play out more in those countries
where existing measures are insufficient to cope with the global warming that will
continue even if the ambitious target of the Paris Agreement in terms of limiting
warming is met. Therefore, we focus on adaptation, as it can reduce losses and
damages for the poorest and most vulnerable in developing countries on a shorter
time scale than is possible for mitigation alone. In these countries, investments into
transformative adjustments for adaptation and L&D as a step change to an alternative
socio-economic reality may be necessary.
Global Agreements and Transparency: Indicators and Reporting
As the different agreements evolve, methodologies and terminologies used for pro-
viding transparency do so as well. The UNFCCC uses the stringent measurement,
reporting and verification (MRV) mechanism (UNFCCC 2014), which is legally
binding contrary to the actual mitigation targets in the nationally determined contri-
butions (NDC) that are not dictated by the agreement (Bridgeman 2017). The UN
has review or progress reports for the SDGs, and the UNISDR speaks of monitoring
and reporting for Sendai, both of which are non legally binding (UNISDR 2015; UN
2015).
The transparency mechanism for the current climate agreements for non-annex
I countries starts with the climate pledge, that is (intended) NDCs, where 85% also
have an adaptation component (Pauw et al. 2016). Least developed countries such as
Bangladesh and Nepal express their adaptation plans through the short-term national
adaptation programme of action (NAPA). Countries are also developing medium-
and long-term national adaptation plans. Reporting formats on implementing the
convention are currently still different for the non-annex I countries due to “com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities” (CBDR-RC). The
reportingmechanism consists ofNational Communications (NC) and biennial update
reports (BURs), with sections on both mitigation and adaptation. As one example,
the section on adaptation in the NCs for Bangladesh, India and Nepal is much less
quantitative than for mitigation (see Box 22.3). These reports present no data on the
2Paragraph 27(k) of the adopted Sendai resolution reads “Formulate public policies, where applica-
ble, aimed at addressing the issues of prevention or relocation, where possible, of human settlements
in disaster risk zones, subject to national law and legal systems.”
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consequence of adaptation measures on impacts and risks. As another example, the
second NC for Bangladesh identifies as a gap that there is hardly any research related
to Loss and Damage. Scattered throughout the reports is some losses and damages
data, but often at a highly aggregate level or very specific.
Box 22.3 Case study findings on reporting frameworks
We assessed national- and local-level policies in relation to the three global agreements
for Bangladesh, India and Nepal. In general, ministries responsible for the environment
and forestry develop the national-level climate change policy and investment plans,
including the adaptation part. Both Nepal and Pakistan developed local adaptation plans
of action (LAPAs) in response to perceived shortcomings of the UNFCCC’s NAPAs
(Klinsky et al. 2014). Despite successfully integrating vulnerability assessments and
prioritising adaptation projects accordingly, the national plan is still seen as an overly
broad, top-down estimation that has not adequately captured local needs. Since the
impacts of climate change dramatically changed from one village to the next, a top-
down process such as a NAPA is considered ill-equipped to cater for meeting local
needs (Chaudhury et al. 2014). In Nepal, the LAPA process started mid-2010 and
covered, by 2016, 90 village development committees and seven municipalities—the
lowest administrative units in the country (Government of Nepal 2016). Nepal’s LAPA
has succeeded in mobilising local institutions and community groups in adaptation
planning and recognising their role in adaptation. However, the LAPA approach and
implementation have been constrained by socio-structural and governance barriers that
have prevented the integration of local adaptation needs into local plans and thus failed
to increase the adaptive capacity of vulnerable households (Regmi et al. 2016). For
DRR, each state and district develops its own state and district disaster management
plan by adapting the national plan to its local context. The Global Network of Civil
Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction has the Frontline programme in which it
collects community perceptions of disasters and risk to measure threats, local capacities
and underlying development factors, bringing local knowledge to national, regional and
global actors. It was one of the few agencies separate from the UN and the agencies
that were being assessed that also produced a review of HFA. Frontline continues its
programme for the post-2015 agreements, whereby it tries to capture data from local
experience and reality on all three key global agreements instead of only on Sendai,
by using grounded resilience indicators. Frontline has established baselines during
2015–2016 as a basis for ongoing monitoring during the currency of these frameworks.
The Nepalese government, supported by The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and in dialogue with development partners, implemented the MDG goals in
national-level policies and measures. In some cases, local-level implementation plans,
and reporting was completed. Similarly, also for the SDGs, Nepal states in its SDG
2016–2030 National (Preliminary) Report its ambition to combine the localisation of
SDGs with political setups at local levels that are willing and capable of handling the
development agenda (National Planning Commission 2015).
Article 13 of the Paris Agreement describes the principles for a transparency
framework. The new framework will build on the existing mechanisms, but will also
introduce the adaptation communication, containing adaptation priorities, implemen-
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tation and support needs, plans and actions. Standardised indicators for adaptation
may be useful to make comparisons across countries possible, but are considered
more complex than mitigation indicators, as the impact of climate change varies
greatly from one country to another. It is important to make adaptation goals more
specific and to build on monitoring approaches from different sectors (Transparency
Partnership 2017). The transparency framework also aims at aggregating reporting
on support offered and received, and gradually converging the review arrangements
for developed and developing countries (ECBI 2017). The facilitative dialogue in
2018 supports the development of the transparency framework and also makes clear
how it links to the global stocktake, the collective stocktaking of progress towards
achieving the paris agreement, which will start for the first time in 2023 and will
consider NDCs submitted in 2020 for the period 2026–2030.
Transparency regarding the WIM mechanism in its first phase from 2013 to 2017
can be said to consist of annual work plans, which report mostly on the first two
functions of theWIM, i.e. enhancingknowledge andunderstandingof comprehensive
risk management approaches and strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence
and synergies among relevant stakeholders. It is expected that the WIM in its second
phase (2017–2022) will be able to work more on its third function, i.e. enhancing
action and support. In that case, the transparency mechanismwill very likely become
more indicator-based.
The Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015) (HFA) was monitored through
regional, national and, for a limited number of countries, local progress reports,
usually at a 3—year interval. In 2015, the UN General Assembly endorsed its suc-
cessor: the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015–2030, aims to improve on some of
the issues encountered under Hyogo, such as the focus in the indicators on input
rather than output or outcome, and the lack of clear links to millennium development
goals (MDGs) and UNFCCC (Maskrey 2016). Four of sendai’s seven global targets
are outcome-focused instead of input- or output-focused and have clear links to the
SDGs and the climate agreements. Mysiak et al. (2015) state that the wording used
in the pre-conference version of the Sendai Framework seems to have been aimed at
fortifying the claims advanced under the WIM, claims in terms of accepting liability
for the residual risks. Sendai focuses not only on reducing existing risks, but also
on preventing new risks and strengthening resilience. Outcome targets are objective
and measurable, allowing international benchmarking of progress relative to a quan-
titative baseline of 2005–2015. A data readiness review for 87 countries has been
done (UNISDR 2017). The first progress reports are expected in 2018. Every 2 years,
UNISDR publishes the Global Assessment Report for DRR (GAR) as a supportive
tool for HFA and Sendai, which monitors risk patterns and trends and progress in
DRR while providing strategic policy guidance to countries and the international
community.
MDGs (2000–2015) worked with country progress reports usually every 3 years,
covering mostly MDG 1 through 7. MDG 8 was captured through annual MDG
Gap Task Force reports. After the UN defined its SDGs, both government spending
and donor funding will be tailored—although to a varying degree depending on the
specific country and context—to the current scores on these indicators as well as
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the targets that are to be reached in 2030 (Martin and Walker 2017). In 2016 some
countries had already submitted a voluntary national review. Table 22.3 shows the
losses and damages indicators for SDGs (the MDGs only had indicators in terms of
reducing loss of environmental resources and biodiversity).
Transparency: National and Local
Governments are expected to take ownership of the key global agreements in terms
of integration with national planning processes. For example, the National Disaster
Management Plan of India states that the country has incorporated substantively the
approach enunciated in Sendai. Focal points in each country are responsible for the
collection of high-quality, accessible and timely data on the indicators. But also col-
lecting and analysing data at scales greater than national boundaries is required, as
disasters do not stop at national borders. Key global agreements and several regional,
national and local policies are interrelated, and has each its specific means of imple-
mentation. Therefore, regional follow-ups and reviews are held regularly based on
the national-level analyses and contribute to follow-up and review at the global level.
Means of Implementation: Technology
CBDR–RC is a principle within the UNFCCC that acknowledges the different capa-
bilities and differing responsibilities of individual countries in addressing climate
change. UNFCCCmandated the technologymechanism (TM) in 2010, and it became
fully operational at the end of 2013. The TM supports parties in promoting and
facilitating enhanced action on mitigation and adaptation (Paris Agreement, article
10.4). The Paris Agreement further specifies that the TM, together with the Finan-
cial Mechanism, will support collaborative approaches to research and development,
and facilitate access to technology, in particular for early stages of the technology
cycle, for developing country parties (Paris Agreement, article 10.5). The Climate
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) implements the mechanism through tech-
nology needs assessments (TNA), corresponding technology action plans (TAP), and
TT:CLEAR, the web platform for all information related to climate technology. A
TNA and TAP has been performed for Bangladesh. A TNA was started but remains
unfinished in Nepal. In general, TNAs have been performed for several developing
countries, but there are still many that have not received and/or requested technical
assistance, and the CTCN seems understaffed (Shimada and Kennedy 2017). The
WIM executive committee has established at the end of 2016 a technical expert group
on comprehensive risk management and transformational approaches and engages
regularly with the Technology Executive Committee.
The Technology FacilitationMechanism (TFM) that supports the implementation
of SDGs has similar characteristics as the UNFCCC’s TM, but is still in its early
stages, as it started about 5 years later.3 It aims to ensure equitable access to key
3It has three components: (1) a United Nations interagency task team on science, technology and
innovation for the SDGs (IATT) with representatives from civil society, the private sector and
the scientific community; (2) a collaborative multi-stakeholder forum on science, technology and
innovation for the SDGs (STI Forum), which organises calls for innovations; and (3) an online
platform as a gateway for information on existing STI initiatives, mechanisms and programmes
(Antic and Liu 2015).
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Table 22.3 Transparency in the three key global agreements: reporting mechanisms, indicators
related to impacts and risks, and means of implementation for technology, with some detail on
Bangladesh, India and Nepal
Key aspects Climate agreements HFA/Sendai MDGs/SDGs
Reporting in
general
NDC, NC, BUR and NAP,
NAPA, adaptation
communication (in
development).
Self-reporting with strong
review and validation
mechanism for mitigation,
not for adaptation. WIM:
annual reporting of ExCom
to COP; 2-year work plan
with nine action areas
(2014–2016); 5-year rolling
work plan with seven
strategic work streams (as
of 2016). Review in 2016
and 2019. Request for Loss
and Damage contact point
at national level in 2016
HFA: global, regional and
national progress reports,
global assessment report.
Sendai: Sendai Framework
progress report.
Self-reporting at national
levels
MDG and SDG: national
review, self-reporting
Indicators related
to impacts and
risks
Paris Agreement Article
8.4 Areas of cooperation
and facilitation: (a) Early
warning systems; (b)
Emergency preparedness;
(c) Slow onset events; (d)
Events that may involve
irreversible and permanent
loss and damage; (e)
Comprehensive risk
assessment and
management; (f) Risk
insurance facilities, climate
risk pooling and other
insurance solutions; (g)
Non-economic losses; and
(h) Resilience of
communities, livelihoods
and ecosystems. WIM:
three functions: (1)
Enhance knowledge and
understanding of
comprehensive risk
management approaches;
(2) Strengthen dialogue,
coordination, coherence
and synergies among
relevant stakeholders; (3)
Enhance action and support
HFA: 2.2: Systems in place
to monitor, archive and
disseminate data on key
hazards and vulnerabilities.
Key question: Disaster loss
databases exist and are
regularly updated. 5.4:
Procedures in place to
exchange relevant
information during hazard
events and disasters, and to
undertake post-event
reviews. Sendai: A1
Number of deaths and
missing persons attributed
to disasters per 100,000
population; C1 Direct
economic loss attributed to
disasters as global gross
domestic product; D1
Damage to critical
infrastructure attributed to
disasters; D5 Number of
disruptions to basic services
attributed to disasters
MDG: 7A reverse the loss
of environmental resources.
7B Reduce biodiversity
loss, achieving, by 2010, a
significant reduction in the
rate of loss. SDG: 1.5.2
Direct economic loss
attributed to disasters in
relation to global gross
domestic product (GDP);
11.5.2 Direct economic loss
in relation to global GDP,
damage to critical
infrastructure and number
of disruptions to basic
services, attributed to
disasters
(continued)
532 M. van den Homberg and C. McQuistan
Table 22.3 (continued)
Key aspects Climate agreements HFA/Sendai MDGs/SDGs
Previous reporting
on impacts and
risks
Scattered reporting with
some aggregate numbers.
Nepal NC: over 10-year
period up to 2014 more than
4,000 persons died; $5.34
billion lost in property,
land, crops and livestock.
India BUR $5 to 6 billion
losses and damages
2013–2014. Bangladesh
NC: rice yield losses as a
function of inundation; data
on infrastructure damage
during last 25 years due to
floods. Bangladesh INDC:
Asian Development Bank
estimated 2% GDP annual
loss by 2050 due to climate
change. Estimated damage
of floods in 2007 more than
$1 billion
HFA: only reporting on
level of progress achieved.
No data on losses and
damages. Sendai: data
readiness review shows that
only 37–55% of countries
report having data on
economic losses to
productive assets, losses in
critical infrastructure and
cultural heritage, and
disruptions to health,
education and other basic
services, with between 29
and 33% able to develop
baselines
MDGs: reporting on
increase of land area
covered by forest. SDG:
only voluntary national
reviews; none yet for
Bangladesh, India and
Nepal available. Nepal
Preliminary report on
SDG: large earthquakes in
2015 killed nearly 9,000
people, more than 700
billion Nepalese rupees of
damage (destroyed more
than half a million houses
and damaged more than
200,000 houses and public
offices)
Means of
implementation:
technology
Technology mechanism
such as TNA and TAP
Sendai: Framework with
science and technology
roadmap
MDG: stimulation ICT as
enabling technology. SDG:
TFM, e.g. science,
technology and innovation
for SDGs forum, global
innovation exchange
Note COP Conference of the Parties, HFA Hyogo framework for action, NC national communication, BUR
biennial update reports BUR, NDC nationally determined contribution, NAP national adaptation plan, NAPA
national adaptation programme of action, WIM Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, MDG
Millennium Development Goal, SDG Sustainable Development Goal, TNA technology needs assessments, TAP
technology action plan
technologies and knowledge for developing countries. It is highly likely that it will
aim at avoiding overlap with what is being covered by the UNFCCC Technology
Mechanism, but somedegree of synergy can be expected. So far, no reporting onTFM
has been done. Technology transfer was stimulated under the MDG framework as
well, whereby especially ICT was put forward as an important enabling technology.
The HFA framework emphasises the importance of technical assistance, technology
transfer, knowledge and innovation, but means of implementation are not very well
articulated. The United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction bilateral and
multilateral cooperation are put forward as possible financing mechanisms. Sendai
has a section on means of implementation, where it is reaffirmed that developing
countries need technology transfer on concessional and preferential terms and that
thematic platforms of cooperation can be used to enhance access to technology (for
example global technology pools and systems to share know-how, innovation and
research) (UNISDR 2015). Also, a science and technology roadmap was developed
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to support the framework with a set of expected outcomes, actions and deliverables,
mostly aimed at the scientific community (UNISDR2016).However, these intentions
have not yet led to the establishment of tangible mechanisms such as UNFCCC’s
CTCN.
22.5 Reporting Framework for Technology to Address Loss
and Damage and Contribute to Climate Justice
The three key global agreements and their corresponding policy frameworks at
regional, national and local level—as also discussed for Bangladesh, India and
Nepal—have different ways of planning, reporting and reviewing and require the
involvement of many stakeholders. The SDGs and Sendai have Loss and Damage
related indicators. The Paris Agreement has no specific indicators, but the NCs do
contain some usually highly aggregate losses and damages data. The reporting on
adaptation is usually self-reporting without a review mechanism and standardisation
that allows for comparability, done at a highly aggregate level and not specific on
impact achieved. All three agreements have or are working on some form of tech-
nology facilitation for adaptation, but these mechanisms are still in their infancy,
except for the TNAs. Overall, it is complex if not impossible to distil from the cur-
rent transparency mechanisms a comprehensive overview of the status of progress
on adaptation and its role in tackling losses and damages retrospectively or prospec-
tively.
Developing the Framework
We thus proceed to lay out an analytical framework to analyse technology needs
to reduce losses and damages for decision-makers that brings together the findings
of the previous three sections, see Fig. 22.4. The framework puts centre stage two
repositories that each relate impacts and risks to technology and its three components,
hardware, software and orgware. One repository is an inventory of technologies used
to address impacts and risks; the other repository is a target list of those technologies
planned to address risk. Several repositories of technology are available that aim at
connecting and matching users to technologies.4 These kinds of repositories can be
used by practitioners, to select socially and environmentally sound technologies that
match the needs of the poor and vulnerable/marginalised groups.
Global, regional, national and local policies have different means of implemen-
tation, i.e. technology, capacity-building and finance, as depicted on the right side
4For example, the ClimateTechWiki offers detailed information on several of the mitigation and
adaptation technologies. It is a platform for awide range of stakeholders in developed anddeveloping
countries who are involved in technology transfer and the wider context of low emission and low
vulnerability development. The Technology Needs Assessment Database is complementary, with
factsheets on several technologies. IEEE Engineering for Change created an online, decision-aid
platform where users can search and compare technology-based solutions. The Flood Resilience
Portal (www.floodresilience.net) is an online knowledge-sharing space that offers practical solutions
to address the risks of flooding; the UN just started the Global Innovation Exchange.
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of Fig. 22.4. The key global agreements and interrelated regional, national and local
counterparts each have their own specific transparency mechanism, a way of mea-
suring, reporting and in some cases validating progress, with each their particular
focus. This plethora of reporting and reviewing mechanisms covers impacts and
risks only to a limited extent and does not adequately help to unveil injustices, as the
reporting is often based on self-reporting at a highly aggregate level with insufficient
ground-truthed data.
Therefore, credible, timely and high-quality data is an essential input for the
transparency mechanism, and as shown on the left side would be kept and updated
in another repository element. Reporting frameworks need to have data on access
to technology that reflects actual need and on the role that technology can play in
reducing losses and damage, both backward- and-forward looking. There are several
approaches, methodologies and tools available to collect pre-disaster data on the risk
components, i.e. vulnerability, hazards and coping capacity, and data on the actual
losses and damages (Surminski et al. 2012). To maximise utility, these databases
must be inclusive, capture the poor and vulnerable, be interoperable, preferably
open-access, timely (regularly updated) and represent different granularity levels
from global to local. It is essential to narrow the gaps in representing the poor and
vulnerable of developing countries in climate data, with the ultimate objective to
provide an evidence base that can be used in the policy and funding debate around
climate change, as well as for DRR and development. Apart from data, knowledge
is essential to assess existing and foresee new technologies for adaptation and trans-
formation, i.e. the repositories we referred to earlier.
Applying the Technology for Climate Justice Reporting Framework
We applied the technology justice components as explained in Table 22.1 to trans-
boundary early warning systems for the Brahmaputra River (Bangladesh–India) and
the Karnali River (India–Nepal).5 Seven key experts in Nepal, India and Bangladesh
provided information both in writing and through follow-up interviews.
Whereas the MDGs had no reference at all to EWS, the SDG framework has
two EWS targets. Target 3d is “Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular
developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national
and global health risks.” Target 13.3 is to “Improve education, awareness-raising and
human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact
reduction and early warning” (SDG 2016). Article 7 and Article 8 of the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement6 place a greater emphasis on understanding, action and support for
EWS, but no reporting is as of yet available. Pre-2015 reports such as the national
communications or the NAPAs do not have relevant data on early warning, except
for more general statements. HFA and Sendai do have relevant reporting. Table 22.4
summarises the injustices for each of the components.
5The component on sustainable use does not directly apply to EWS, as EWS cause negligible
intrusions such as through gauges that are put into rivers or radar installations.
6Article 7 is on “Enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability
to climate change” and Article 8 is loss and damage and “the importance of averting, minimizing
and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”.
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Table 22.4 Injustices identified in current flood early warning systems in South Asia
Proposed
technology for
climate justice
component
Injustices derived from case
study (expert interviews, focus
group discussions, desk research)
climate justice
principle required
to tackle the
injustice
Adjustments
required to bridge
the gap
Access to
services
Both national and
community-based EWS do not
effectively reach poor and
vulnerable communities
Distributive,
normative
Incremental and
fundamental
Access to
technology and
knowledge
NMHS are limited in their
possibility to improve the spatial
and temporal resolution of the
forecasts, as they lack the
funding and capacity necessary
to use the state-of-the-art
technology and collect more
granular data. The poor and the
vulnerable can often not benefit
from early warning early action
information due to the digital
divide
Distributive,
normative
Incremental and
fundamental
Use In assessments for
hard-engineering solutions for
flood CRM, the impact on the
poor and vulnerable is often not
considered
Procedural Incremental and
fundamental
Technological
innovation and
implementation
There is not much room for
innovation, as the available
budgets usually barely cover the
rolling out and scaling up of
existing copycat-type
technology. In addition, capacity
building to roll out flood CRM at
local level is often not sufficient,
due to many ad hoc, short-lived
project interventions
Procedural,
distributive and
normative
Transformative
Governance Insufficient governance at
national to local, and national to
regional/neighbouring countries,
interfaces. Plethora of reporting
frameworks, lack of
standardisation and quantitative
data at sufficiently granular level.
Capacity for reporting is not
sufficient
Procedural and
transitional
Fundamental and
transformative
Finance Limited funding for public
adaptation is going to the
least-developed countries, and
the poor and vulnerable have
very limited funding for private
adaptation actions
Compensatory,
distributive
Transformative
NoteNational Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHS), CRM climate risk management
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Equitable Access to Early Warning
The focus of National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHS) is on
calculating accurate forecasts nationwide. However, ensuring equitable access to
these forecasts also for poor and vulnerable communities is not core to their mandate.
Community-based earlywarning systems (CBEWS) try to bridge this gap, but they do
not cover all flood-prone communities, provide only very short lead times and are not
well integrated with national systems, hampering their sustainability. Communities
that do not receive an early warning inevitably face higher losses and damages, but
even those that do receive an early warning often do not have sufficient information
to take well-targeted (early) actions that could limit or avoid losses and damages. It
is key to characterise the early warning-early action gap to a sufficiently quantitative
extent and not—as is currently the case for HFA—in a multi-hazard, country-wide
andmostly qualitativeway. The self-reporting on access in theHFA, and soon Sendai,
has to be interpreted carefully, as the reporting is, to our current understanding, not
based on representative surveys conducted by governments among communities that
dependon earlywarning. In general, local self-reporting seems to give amore realistic
picture than national self-reporting.
Equitable Access to Technology and Knowledge
Access to services and technology is far from equitable both at the public and pri-
vate level. Access to more advanced flood risk modelling and observational data,
including the required advanced computational power, enables NMHS to improve
the spatial and temporal precision of the EWS. This in turn allows for better tar-
geting of adaptation actions for reducing or avoiding losses and damages. Poor and
vulnerable communities face digital disparities, impeding equitable access to early
warning and early action information.
Technological Innovation and Implementation
Communities are better able to manage and utilise CBEWS when they are involved
in the technology development process from the onset. The dissemination, com-
munication and response component of EWS can benefit from relatively low-tech
innovations, whereas the risk modelling and monitoring and warning components
require both low and high-tech innovations. Current policies and plans have identi-
fied several of these innovation needs, but available budgets usually barely cover the
rolling out and scaling up of existing copycat-type technology. In addition, capacity
building to roll out flood CRM at local level is often not sufficient, due to many ad
hoc, short-lived, mainly project-based interventions (Khan et al. 2016).
Governance
Many organisations are involved in implementing EWS at local, national, regional
and global level. Most CBEWS initiatives start at the project or pilot level and face
difficulties in scaling up and becoming sustainable. It is at the national to local and
national to regional/neighbouring countries’ interfaces that current governance is
insufficient. Governance has to occur across these different dimensions, to promote
synergy and coherence and to create political and financial support for using new
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technologies to reach the communities that need the information. In addition, there are
a plethora of reporting frameworks and a lack of standardisation and quantitative data
at sufficiently granular level. High-resolution spatial data on whether/how adaptation
technologies meet the needs of the poor and vulnerable is required for the focal scale
of flood impacts and interventions, but is lacking. It is complex if not impossible to
distil from the current transparency mechanisms a comprehensive overview of the
status of progress on adaptation and its role in reducing losses and damages. Clearly
capacity for reporting is not sufficient and self-reporting of countries to the global
policy agreements tends to lead to too-optimistic scoring, as is seen for example in
terms of the reach of early warning into poor and vulnerable communities.
Finance
We find in the transboundary EWS case study area that costs for bridging the gap
towards communities are currently not covered through structural and comprehensive
funding streams. There is evidence fromBangladesh that shows that these costs form
a significant percentage of the overall EWS costs. Innovations in the area of local
data collection are urgently needed to reduce the current costs for data collection
of water levels. Targeted crowdsourcing might be cost-effective to collect local data
for flood maps as compared with costly gauges and gauge readers; at the same
time, it will bring along uncertainties in relation to the continuity and validity of
the collection. To convince policy makers and practitioners, it is essential that a
more mature, longitudinal and standardised assessment of losses and damages at
community level takes place against investments that are being made in EWS.
Overall, we suggest the framework proves to be an adequate mechanism to assess
the injustices present in a flood CRM measure, such as a transboundary EWS, along
the technology dimension. This assessment forms a starting point for change. In
Table 22.4 we indicate in the third column which climate justice principle is appli-
cable to tackle these injustices. For example, procedural justice means making sure
the poor and vulnerable are included in evaluating a flood CRMmeasure. The fourth
column in Table 22.4 estimates what kind of adjustment is necessary to bridge the
gap between an unjust and just situation. Improving access to services can be a quick
win with mostly incremental adjustments. However, funding and governance might
require transformative adjustment.
22.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter assessed the role of technology for the L&D debate and developed a
reporting framework that links climate justice principles to access, use, innovation,
finance and governance of technology to address loss and damage at the crossover
from adaptation to “beyond adaptation” from the perspective of the poor and vul-
nerable. Application of the framework to a case study on a flood EWS showed that
developing countries (as well as poor and vulnerable communities in these coun-
tries) can only use a small part of the technology spectrum available to address loss
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and damage as they have limited capacities and funding for innovating, accessing
and using technology. They are therefore forced to implement the bare minimum
largely copycat type of technology. As climate change progresses, the level of adap-
tation required increases, whereas if no action is taken, the technology available for
adaptation remains the same. This means the adaptation deficit (Burton 2004) will
increase.
We argued that attention to climate justice principles can help to motivate support
for widening the technology spectrum available to developing countries and for
addressing the injustices we inventoried by distributing means of implementation
(technology, finance and capacity building) through underlying principles such as
distributive, compensatory, transitional or procedural justice. We hold that global
communities have a responsibility to ensure sustainable use of, equitable access to
and inclusive innovation of technology to shape the soft adaptation limit and, once
this limit is reached, to support transformative and curative measures necessary to
tackle additional risks due to climate change.
In this concluding section, we build on the framework in order to develop recom-
mendations for the Paris Agreement andWIMas to how technology can bemobilised
to contribute to climate justice. As the required actions are partly in the adaptation
and partly in the L&D pillar, recommendations will cover both. We organise our
suggestions around the three main functions of the WIM (understanding, dialogue
and support plus action).
Understanding L&D
Understanding the switch from adaptation to L&D enables improved investment in
technologies for adaptation while clarifying the unavoidable risks requiring curative
or transformative action. We emphasise that this will be possible up to the hard limit,
after which only L&D measures are possible. The executive committee of the WIM
may include in the work stream and expert group on comprehensive risk manage-
ment an inventory of how technologies shape the soft limits in both developing and
developed countries. It will also be important to reach a solid basis and agreement on
what the hard limits from a technological point are for climate change risks, such as
for sea-level rise, to avoid contentious political discussions on operationalising the
L&D mechanism.
Dialogue, Coordination and Coherence on Loss and Damage
Parties may want to link dialogue, coordination and coherence to the transparency
mechanism under Article 7, as the WIM does not have a transparency mechanism.
Article 7 of the Paris Agreement states that each party should periodically submit
an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and
support needs, plans and actions. In this context, Article 13 states that, under the
transparency framework, countries are encouraged—without it beingmandatory—to
report information on their adaptation actions to highlight what they have done and
what more needs to be done (Desgain and Sharma 2016). The transparency frame-
work offers flexibility in the scope, frequency and level of detail of reporting, and
in the scope of review (Kato and Ellis 2016). There is a window of opportunity
as part of the facilitative dialogue to start a discussion on including technology in
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the adaptation communication and to make sure reported data captures the actual
impact of adaptation on impacts and risks and represents the poor and vulnerable.
However, reporting on adaptation has the risk of shifting the burden to developing
countries if efforts to reduce risks are seen as their responsibility (ECBI 2017). It
therefore has to go hand in hand with a further development of reporting on theWIM
mechanism. It is also important to treat technology in coherence with the SDG and
Sendai framework, and join forces in reporting on losses and damages in the broader
sense (including L&D). A kind of devolution hub7 that makes access to policies at
global, regional, national and local level easily available and interpretable might be
beneficial to stimulate coherency. In addition, standardisation of how to measure and
report on losses and damages will be essential.
Action in Relation to Technology to Contribute to Climate Justice
In many instances, communities and countries still seem to have room for adaptation
between the soft and hard limit, as indicated by the reported avoidable impacts
and risks. Countries are expected to implement adaptation measures to the best of
their capabilities (meaning up to their soft limit) to protect their populations from
climate variability and/or to empower their citizens, especially those with the lowest
capacity to adapt (Winkler and Rajamani 2014) ,to implement corresponding risk
avoidance measures, given the common responsibility for adaptation. Governments
should provide essential services for DRR, such as a basin-scale EWS making use
of automated data collection, high-resolution satellite imagery and impact-based
forecasting. But insufficient funding for adaptation is going to the least-developed
countries, and the poor and vulnerable have limited access to technologies required
for individual adaptation, let alone for keeping up with future risk trends.
Technology canplay a role in creating additional adaptationoptions and/or shifting
the soft adaptation limit. Soft adaptation limits should be levelled between developing
and developed countries. This means that the objectives that shape the adaptation
limit should not be different. Technologies should be shared among those countries
having access and those not having access, recognising the commitment to leave
no one behind. Why would an NMHS in a developing country settle for less EWS
lead time than in a developed country? The technologies that do play a role in
transformative actions are in general different from climate-related technologies,
for example ICT technologies for distance learning or for outsourcing IT work.
Technological development and proliferation has to involve all stakeholders in a fair
and equal manner (procedural justice). It is essential to create funding possibilities
for developing appropriate technology within existing technology mechanisms such
as from the CTCN. The voices of the poor and vulnerable have to be heard. It does
not all need to be high-tech; many local technologies can be adapted with investment
in research, such as biodykes for flood mitigation, with the added benefit that they
can be maintained by local people with existing skill sets.
The transparency framework we propose overall exposes injustices in technology
innovation, access and use, with the objective of widening the technology spectrum
7Such as from the OpenInstitute, see http://www.openinstitute.com/devhubv2.
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available to developing countries by distributing means of implementation (technol-
ogy, finance and capacity building) through underlying climate justice principles.
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